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ABSTRACT
URBAN GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED:
ASSESSING THE ROLES OF PUBLIC-, PRIVATE-, AND THIRD SECTOR
LEADERS IN GOVERNING THE MODERN CITY
Benjamin C. Leamon
May 13th, 2017
As central cities redefine themselves after decades of commercial abandonment,
“urban renaissance” movements, white flight, and the gentrification of their central urban
neighborhoods, are cities still governed by the political-business coalitions conceptualized by
urban regime theorists, or have new players emerged? Further, as cities continue to evolve
within the post-Fordist landscape, do extant theories of urban governance, themselves built
upon decades-old observations, continue to provide adequate models for urban governance
as it actually exists in cities today? This dissertation is a quantitative and qualitative
examination of contemporary urban governance in the United States, and the roles of CDCs
and anchor institutions in urban decision-making structures. Chapter One begins with a
description of Dallas, Texas, and two of its central urban neighborhoods – Downtown
Dallas, the city’s CBD that is currently undergoing a conversion to mixed-use development;
and North Oak Cliff, a former streetcar suburb that has suffered from a half-century of
political and economic neglect, but has recently seen its fortunes dramatically improve.
Chapter Two retells the interconnected histories of theories of urban governance, the
socioeconomic impacts of Fordism, its crisis, and post-Fordism, and the evolution of Dallas
from a regional industrial hub to a major commercial center, while highlighting a number of

v

reasons why current conceptualizations of urban governance may no longer fit with actual
urban governance. Chapter Three details this study’s methods – first, the use of census data
from 1980 to 2010, and second, a reputational analysis of 79 participants who showed
themselves to be highly knowledgeable about Dallas’ contemporary decision-making
structure. Chapters Four, Five, and Six detail this study’s key findings – first, that modern
urban decision-making occurs within multiple interconnected levels (neighborhood and city);
second, that the structure of urban decision-making is still critical in understanding the
nature of which decisions get made (and which do not), as well as the range of responses for
a given situation; third, that Dallas’ third-sector organizations (e.g. CDCs and anchor
institutions) have been largely unable to meaningfully involve themselves in the politics of
decision-making; and finally, that under the right blend of economic- and political pressures,
structures of urban governance can change from one type to another. In the Dallas case, the
decline of its business coalition, and the court-ordered breakup of its at-large city council
resulted in a new structure of governance, or better put, a non-structure, wherein multiple
competing agendas and resource pools have taken over the larger political discourse, and
have largely prevented a unified vision for Dallas from emerging.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
With respect to post-Fordist cities in the United States, who governs today? As
central cities redefine themselves after decades of commercial abandonment, “urban
renaissance” movements, white flight, and the gentrification of their central urban
neighborhoods, are cities still governed by the political-business coalitions conceptualized by
urban regime theorists, or have new players emerged?
Questioning long-standing conceptualizations of urban governance is not a new idea.
As the 20th century waned, urban scholars looked at the turbulence of the 1960s, the
construction (and subsequent dismantling) of the Great Society, the end of the Fordist crisis,
and the rise of (some) cities within a truly global marketplace, and charged that the pressure
politics of the community power paradigm could no longer conceptualize urban governance as it
had become1. At the end of the 20th century, urban theorists used observations of central
U.S. cities to recast models of urban governance, first by painting cities as growth machines2,
and later, by using a more generalized model of urban regimes and coalition governance3.
Forty years after the start of this new, political economy paradigm, many cities look nothing
like they did when growth machine theory and urban regime analysis were first
conceptualized, so contemporary observations of central cities may, once again, yield new
insight into their decision-making structures.
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In the chapter sections that follow, this study will introduce the problem that it seeks
to address within current conceptualizations of urban governance, resulting from changes
within the demographic- and economic contexts of central cities, as well as the growing role
of third sector organizations – specifically community development corporations (CDCs)
and anchor institutions (i.e. urban universities and hospitals) – in urban policymaking and
economic development projects. Then, it will set down a series of research questions and
hypotheses for testing. Following this, it will outline methods that were used to test those
hypotheses, through a mixed-methods analysis of Dallas, Texas. Next, it will offer a brief,
logical argument to justify the study itself, as well as the significance of studying Dallas as a
crucial case. Finally, it will present a brief roadmap for the remainder of the study.
The Problem
As noted above, in the decades since scholars first examined cities using the urban
political economy perspective, cities in the United States have undergone another series of
changes. First, while white flight allowed (some) residents to abandon central cities, a
smaller, counter-migration of wealthier, highly educated whites moved back into gentrifying
urban neighborhoods, at the cost of displacing people of color and people with lower
incomes. Additionally, corporate disinvestment over that same period left many central cities
all-but abandoned, and a subset of these are transitioning into mixed-use hubs of capital
accumulation, culture, and entertainment4. At the same time, CDCs and anchor institutions
expanded into urban economic development projects and urban policymaking – roles
previously assumed by actors in governing coalitions. This integration has recently received
some limited attention and speculation by academics5, but an in-depth examination of
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whether this is actually occurring in cities, and what that involvement may portend, is largely
absent in current scholarship.
This study proposes to, once again, revisit the nature of big city politics. In the
following paragraphs, this study will first elaborate briefly on relevant post-Fordist
contextual shifts in U.S. cities. Then, it will discuss the growing presence of CDCs and
anchor institutions in roles once occupied by members of urban governing coalitions.
Finally, it will argue that the confluence of these factors justifies further exploration, which
the remainder of this study will attempt to undertake.
Post-Fordism and Cities after Urban Political Economy
Post-Fordism marked an (uneven) transition of the U.S. economy from its regional
blue collar roots to a globalized, integrated economy built largely on globalized white-collar
firms in finance, investment, and real estate (FIRE) sectors, supported by localized producer
services6. Although cities of the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s focused on attracting and
retaining corporate capital, urban cores today focus on providing a host of amenities inter alia
pedestrian-friendly streets, access to cultural amenities and entertainment, and unique
housing options that are unavailable in the suburbs7. As urban cores shift from centers of
capital production to centers of cultural consumption, the new values and preferences
expressed by the voters, small business owners, and prominent organizations are
fragmenting- and reducing the overall dominance of old guard economic elites on the
governing coalitions8. Additionally, the firms that remain are connected to global capital
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streams, and often show little (if any) interest in the politics of governing any particular
place9, leaving room for new actors to emerge.
An additional effect of this revitalization of urban cores can be seen in the racial
composition of central urban neighborhoods. A traditional understanding of race and the
urban/suburban divide suggests that, following decades of white flight, contemporary
central cities urban cores are predominantly populated by people who identify as nonwhite,
and often of low- and moderate incomes. Meanwhile, the suburbs and exurbs encircling
these cities are often white, and comparatively more affluent10. This chocolate cities, vanilla
suburbs model fails to adequately conceptualize the gentrification of urban cores, in which
affluent whites migrate back into majority-minority central urban neighborhoods11,
displacing both minority residents, and the businesses that serve them. These individuals and
businesses often move into the inner-ring communities that were once populated by the first
waves of white flight, creating a nonwhite ring of communities sandwiched between whitepopulated central urban neighborhoods and white-populated suburbs. The model that takes
into account this new racial makeup of central cities is called the new donut12, and will be
detailed in Chapter 2.
CDCs and Anchor Institutions as Unlikely, Emerging Partners in Urban Governance
While some scholars suggest that these new actors represent specialized
administrative units13, spatially-linked coalitions14, and regional governing bodies15, this study
instead forwards that CDCs and anchor institutions, which are traditionally considered
“ancillary” actors in governing coalitions, may have expanded to fill the power gap left

MacLeod, 2011, pp. 2629-2630; Swyngedouw, 2011, p. 3
Beauregard, 2010, pp. 11-23; Juday, 2015, pp. 3-4
11 Florida, 2003, pp. 8-10; 2006, pp. 26-29
12 Juday, 2015, pp. 3-4
13 J. Smith, 2010, pp. 429-430
14 Pugalis & Townsend, 2013, p. 54
15 Harrison & Hoyler, 2013, pp. 2254-2256
9

10

4

behind by hollowed-out public sector offices and fading business elites, potentially replacing
value-neutral development with more equitable alternatives16. CDCs and anchor institutions
have greatly expanded their roles within cities since the 1980s, attempting to fulfill their
stated missions of service to their communities, and limited scholarly examination of these
roles suggests that these organizations may be taking on greater roles in the politics of
decision-making, and within governing coalitions17.
Looking first at CDCs, these nonprofit organizations have been charged with
directing federal support into urban neighborhoods since the Great Society18, and have
traditionally focused on providing low-income housing and administration of social welfare
programs in economically-marginalized neighborhoods19. Since the 1980s, many of these
organizations have expanded into business enterprise development, commercial real estate,
venture capitalism, community finance, and urban redevelopment20. Anchor institutions, for
their part, have recently evolved into major economic engines in cities across the United
States21. Because they are geographically locked “anchored” in place, these institutions are
principally self-interested in the local economy, and some have begun leveraging their status
as major employers and purchasers in order to engage in more equitable economic
development and investment in economically-marginalized neighborhoods22.
Study Purpose
Although CDCs and anchor institutions hold the potential to advance beyond
“ancillary” status in the urban governing coalition, there is debate as to whether this occurs
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in actuality. While some CDCs have succeeded in creating social linkages with public- and
private-sector actors, and can enmesh themselves within the decision-making process,
research is somewhat inconclusive regarding whether they have actually done so in any
meaningful way23. In addition, although urban hospitals and universities are significant
drivers of urban economies, they are not often leveraged as policymaking assets because they
are seen primarily as service providers, and some doubt the actual impact of their
involvement in economic development projects24. If these organizations can be shown to
play a significant role in policymaking, then it would suggest that current urban theory needs
to be expanded, so that it can adequately describe this new, three-way (public-, private-, and
third-sector) sharing of power.
The purpose of this exploratory study, then, is twofold: first, to evaluate the evolving
urban context surrounding a contemporary governing coalition; and second, to evaluate the
structure- and nature of decision-making in contemporary governing coalitions, especially
with respect to the role of anchor institutions and CDCs, and the effects of those roles on
economic development and social- and economic equity. In service of this purpose, this
study will analyze the city of Dallas, Texas, a large, economically-thriving city in North
Texas, as well as two of Dallas’ central urban neighborhoods: North Oak Cliff and
Downtown Dallas.
Why Dallas, and Why These Two Neighborhoods?
Previous studies of Dallas have identified myriad reasons why this city is particularly
desirable for research into decision-making structures. Among these are Dallas’ location –
far enough from major coastlines to avoid the particular cultural influences of those
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population groups, its (broadly) consistent pattern of growth and economic development, its
diverse economy, and its self-contributing cultural life that creates (rather than imports)
much of its art and music scene25. Further, the dynamics of the city’s leadership as an
entrepreneurial governing coalition are particularly salient; therefore, a study of Dallas provides
a relatively straightforward setting for the study of these connections26. Building on this,
Dallas’ decision-making structure has, for decades, typified the developmental or entrepreneurial
governing coalition, and so findings from this study may be generalized, at least in part, to
other cities with similar decision-making structures – hardly a challenge, given that this type
of governing coalition has long been considered the de facto arrangement of urban
governance structures27. Further, as a large, economically-vibrant city in the United States,
Dallas is an archetypical post-Fordist success story28, and so some subset of the results from
this study may be generalizable to other, similar cities.
As this study of Dallas builds on two previous explorations of the city’s leadership –
the first by Carol Estes Thometz, and the second by Stephen Elkin – it is important to
(briefly) discuss the settings and contexts of each. Looking first at the Dallas featured in the
1963 Thometz study, the city could be characterized as being in a period of explosive growth
and modernization. A tightly-knit business community largely commanded both long-term
planning and day-to-day city operations, leading to significant public investment into private
development, bolstered by cheap access to domestic- and international capital for real estate
development projects29. Supported by both the public sector and the private, legendary
developers demolished much of the city’s urban core, replacing fine examples of art deco
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construction with the high-rise office buildings that define a large percentage of Dallas’
contemporary skyline30. Within this context, the Thometz study utilized participant
interviews to uncover a three-tiered hierarchy among Dallas’ leaders, in which senior
businessmen operated at the highest echelons of decision-making, while younger, lessexperienced protégés worked on smaller projects, proving their worth through service, and
advancing their careers alongside their roles as decision-makers31.
Roughly two decades later, the Dallas studied by Elkin (1987) had reached the peak
of its boom times, but this growth came at a cost. At the time of the study, Dallas’ business
community was no longer as unified as it once was, owing first to fragmentation over how
(or whether) to redevelop the city’s limited remaining land32, and second, to the decline of
locally-anchored businesses in favor of national- and international corporations whose
executives had little (if any) particular interest in Dallas itself33. In addition, a court-mandated
overhaul of Dallas’ elections, in which its all-powerful city council went from at-large
elections to a hybrid district-based / at-large system, had crippled the ability of the city’s
business community to control elections. Within this context, Elkin found that, although
Dallas’ business community continued to form alliances with political leaders, this politicalbusiness regime was no longer the pure entrepreneurial governing coalition that it was during
the Thometz study34.
Returning to the present study, Dallas’ history of development is a story of amnesiaby-design, wherein the city’s powerful private-sector elites, ever-mindful of creating the
image of the Dallas they wanted to see, paved over deep racial- and class divisions, and each
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new project seems to further cement an enduring pattern of inequity35. Like in other postFordist cities, Dallas’ pattern of development has not been even, and many of the city’s
historically low-income and majority-minority neighborhoods are not faring as well as the
wealthier, whiter areas, excepting in cases of gentrification.
On the most positive end of Dallas’ development spectrum is the neighborhood of
Downtown Dallas; as the city’s CBD, Downtown Dallas is the traditional hub of citywide
economic activity, and it is also the home of several of Dallas’ most identifiable landmarks,
in addition to a dramatic transformation from being an abandoned corporate capital
accumulator to becoming a vibrant, mixed-use urban hub. In contrast stands the
neighborhood of North Oak Cliff, a neighborhood that, in the wake of white flight
throughout the mid-20th century, has been occupied by people with low incomes and people
of color. Like Downtown Dallas, North Oak Cliff has entered a period of revitalization, but
unlike Downtown, much of this development has come at the cost of displacing long-time
commercial- and residential occupants. So far, the displacement has been minimal, but
residents (many of whom are renters or tenants, rather than owners) express concerns over
ever-growing plans to redevelop ever-expanding tracts of land. By expanding its focus
beyond the city level, and into these two neighborhoods, this study hopes to understand
whether, or to what extent, neighborhood decision-making, and the actors who get involved,
differ from decision-making and decision-makers at the citywide level.
Research Questions
Through its study of Dallas, this study aims to answer three primary research
questions. First, how have the city’s demographics and economy evolved in the decades
since the city was studied by previous urban scholars? Second, to what extent (if any) are

35

Phillips, 2006, pp. 3-5

9

CDCs and anchor institutions active participants in Dallas’ governing coalition? Finally, if
these organizations are active participants in Dallas’ governing coalition, what is the effect of
that involvement on urban development and policymaking?
Hypotheses
To guide its attempts at addressing these questions, this study forwards six primary
hypotheses. The first three of these hypotheses relate to the changing socioeconomic
context of Dallas as a whole, as well as the neighborhoods of North Oak Cliff and
Downtown Dallas, with regard to literature-based expectations of the demographic- and
economic fortunes of central cities and their innermost urban neighborhoods. The second
three of these hypotheses address the nature of governance in these same three geographies,
and the effects of “who governs” on the decisions made in contemporary cities and
neighborhoods. These hypotheses are as-follows:
Hypothesis 1
Consistent with expectations of modern, economically-prosperous cities in the
globalized, post-Fordist paradigm and the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs model, in the decades
since the Elkin & Thometz studies, Dallas’ citywide socioeconomic context has changed in
four primary ways:
•

People identifying as “white alone” represent a smaller percentage of the population
in 2010 (the most recent decennial census) than they did 1980 (the census
immediately prior to the Elkin study).

•

A smaller percentage of Dallas’ workforce is employed in blue collar fields in 2010
than in 1980.

•

A larger percentage of Dallas’ workforce is employed in creative class fields in 2010
than in 1980.

•

Dallas, as a whole, shows signs of greater economic polarization in 2010 than in
1980.

10

Hypothesis 2
Consistent with expectations of literature surrounding gentrification of urban
neighborhoods and the new donut model, within North Oak Cliff, recent urban
redevelopment projects and neighborhood gentrification are associated with four primary
changes in the neighborhood’s respective socioeconomic context:
•

People identifying as “white alone” represent a larger percentage of the
neighborhood’s population in 2010 than they did in 1980.

•

A smaller percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in blue collar fields
in 2010 than in 1980.

•

A larger percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in creative class
fields in 2010 than in 1980.

•

The neighborhood shows signs of greater economic polarization in 2010 than in
1980.

Hypothesis 3
Consistent with expectations of literature surrounding gentrification of urban
neighborhoods and the new donut model, within Downtown Dallas, recent urban
redevelopment projects and neighborhood gentrification are associated with four primary
changes in the neighborhood’s respective socioeconomic context:
•

People identifying as “white alone” represent a larger percentage of the
neighborhood’s population in 2010 than they did in 1980.

•

A smaller percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in blue collar fields
in 2010 than in 1980.

•

A larger percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in creative class
fields in 2010 than in 1980.

•

The neighborhood shows signs of greater economic polarization in 2010 than in
1980.
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Hypothesis 4
In Dallas as a whole, representatives of anchor institutions and CDCs are primary
(rather than ancillary) members of a citywide governing coalition, and this involvement
portends a more equitable development paradigm than the value-neutral development seen
in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century.
Hypothesis 5
In North Oak Cliff, representatives of anchor institutions and CDCs in are primary
(rather than ancillary) members, of a neighborhood governing coalition, and this
involvement portends a more equitable development paradigm than the value-neutral
development seen in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century.
Hypothesis 6
In Downtown Dallas, representatives of anchor institutions and CDCs in are primary
(rather than ancillary) members, of a neighborhood governing coalition, and this
involvement portends a more equitable development paradigm than the value-neutral
development seen in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century.
Overview of Methodology
In studying the context surrounding contemporary urban governance, the structure
of contemporary governing coalitions, and the hypothesized roles of CDCs and anchor
institutions within these structures, this study utilizes a case analysis of a single city, as
opposed to a more comparative research design. Although the results of case studies are
limited by a lack of generalizability, their shortcomings do not preclude their usefulness as a
basis for functional analysis of a phenomenon36. Further, this study argues for the use of
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Dallas, Texas as a crucial case, or in other words, a “least-likely” scenario for changes to be
found. The benefit of focusing on a least-likely scenario is that, if this study finds a
transformation in the role of third-sector organizations in such a city, its results would be a
powerful indicator of changes occurring elsewhere.
In considering this study’s specific methods, recall that this study contains two
components: first, a “context” component, and second, a “coalition” component; to address
these, this study combines quantitative and qualitative methods. Looking first at examining
changes in the demographic- and economic profiles of Dallas as a whole, North Oak Cliff,
and Downtown Dallas, this study utilizes decennial census- and American Community
Survey (ACS) records from 1980 to 2010, in order to understand how the city and a subset
of its central neighborhoods have changed in the decades since Elkin’s (1987) analysis of city
governance.
Specifically, for each geography, this study will examine changes in racial makeup,
labor force profiles using blue collar and creative class employment, and economic polarization
using median household income and poverty rates. For Dallas as a whole, select data will be
compared to its surrounding MSA, to compare actual demographic- and economic shifts to
what would be expected from the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs model of lower-income,
majority-minority central cities surrounded by wealthier, whiter suburbs. For both North
Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas, data from these neighborhoods and Dallas as a whole will
be compared to expectations from literature regarding the gentrification of central urban
neighborhoods and the new donut model of affluent, gentrified, white enclaves within
majority-minority, lower-income cities.
In addressing its “coalition” component, this study employs a reputational analysis of
potentially influential actors in Dallas as a whole, as well as within its two focus
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neighborhoods of North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. A previous reputational study of
Dallas described the city’s decision-making structure as being stratified into three tiers, with
each being comprised almost exclusively of business executives and civic elites37. To
determine whether (or to what extent) the previous reputational analysis’ results remain
valid, this study’s 79 participants completed detailed surveys and interviews regarding the
nature of decision-making in Dallas as a whole. To expand on previous studies of Dallas,
participants were further divided into two groups, based on their self-reported area of
expertise, and were asked to complete additional surveys and interview questions regarding
either North Oak Cliff or Downtown Dallas.
Participant free-response survey items and interview responses were coded, and
analyzed to determine whether decision-makers could be categorized into a typology; from
this analysis, five typologies emerged, although the specific makeup of each, and the relative
proportions of each differed within each geography. Participant survey results were also
analyzed for various correlations using a series of Spearman’s tests, comparing perceptions
of power with participants’ willingness to include any given actor on a critical decisionmaking team, as well as to uncover any effects of participant familiarity with particular
actors. Additionally, for the city as a whole, and for each neighborhood, Duncan’s New
Multiple Range Test was used to establish the extent to which power is stratified within
citywide- and neighborhood-level decision-making.
Study Rationale
Through its study of Dallas, this study aims to examine contemporary urban
governance as it actually exists, in order to consider whether current conceptualizations of
urban governance in theory remain valid, over a quarter-century after their inception.
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Specifically, this study aims to evaluate whether the roles of CDCs and anchor institutions
are becoming driving forces in skewing many urban agendas away from value-free
development, and toward more equitable models38, and further, that this increased
involvement may portend a change in these organizations’ respective positions within urban
governing coalitions39.
To assess whether third-sector organizations have taken an impactful role in urban
economic development, and whether this role (if it exists) portends the need to expand the
governing coalition to include third-sector actors as core members, this study focused on
Dallas, Texas. Throughout the city’s history, Dallas’ leaders have strived to make city policies
favorable to businesses and growth, but a legacy of racism has focused this growth into
white neighborhoods and Downtown Dallas, at the expense of majority-minority North Oak
Cliff and other southern neighborhoods that continue to lag behind, but recently, have
begun to gentrify as affluent whites migrate from Dallas’ northern suburbs to its central
neighborhoods40.
While necessarily limited due to time and financial constraints, this study of Dallas
offers at number of benefits to urban scholarship. First, the size of the city itself lends itself
to offering a large participant pool, even when nonresponse is taken into account41. In
addition, the city is currently engaged in a number of significant redevelopment projects42,
the study of which may help uncover the presence- and nature of the city’s governing
coalition. Further, while the city has a long, documented history of pro-development
coalition governance, it also shows signs of a growing third-sector involvement in a subset of
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economic development projects43. Finally, Dallas is a somewhat archetypical example of the
pro-development governing coalition writ large; even if CDCs and anchor institutions are
not found to be central members of its governing coalition, if successful examples of
equitable economic development projects are found, either at the citywide level or in this
project’s two focus neighborhoods, then these could serve as inspiration for similar projects
in other development-focused cities around the country.
Organization of this Dissertation
Over the summer of 2015, this study analyzed hundreds of census records to render
an image of the changing demographic- and economic profiles of Dallas as a whole, as well
as the neighborhoods of North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. Additionally, its principle
investigator conducted 79 surveys and interviews to develop an understanding of the
structure and nature of decision-making in these three geographies. In Chapter 2, this study
will outline relevant literature to undergird the present study, including changes in the greater
urban context that challenge the accuracy of current urban political theory with respect to
how it conceptualizes urban politics in practice. In Chapter 3, this study will describe the
methods that this study used to understand contemporary urban governance in Dallas
citywide, as well as in this study’s two focus neighborhoods. In Chapter 4, this study will
report data from its quantitative analysis of census and ACS data, as well as data from its
qualitative analysis of participant surveys and interviews regarding the nature of
contemporary urban governance. Chapters 5 and 6 will analyze these respective types of data
with respect to this study’s research hypotheses. Finally, in Chapter 7, this study will first
summarize its key take-aways, and then it will suggest directions for future research.
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Chapter Summary
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the present study, the
background that led to its creation, its setting and methods, and its significance and rationale.
In the preceding sections, this study introduced the problem of whether anchor institutions
and CDCs are central actors in contemporary governing coalitions, and further, whether (or
to what extent) that involvement portends more progressive urban policymaking and
equitable alterative economic development programs. Next, it established a series of research
questions and hypotheses for testing. Then, it outlined the quantitative and qualitative data
sources and methods used to test those hypotheses. Following this, it provided a brief
discussion of the rationale behind studying governing coalitions in Dallas and two of its
central neighborhoods: North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. Finally, it presented a brief
roadmap for the chapters that follow. In Chapter 2, this study will expand on a number of
these sections, especially those related to contemporary urban theory, the context of
contemporary cities in the United States, and the evolving roles of CDCs and anchor
institutions.

17

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF EXTANT LITERATURE
In writing about Dallas in the early 1960s, urban researcher Carol Estes Thometz
noted that, “in every community there are persons who ‘run things,’ who make decisions and
take action in the citizens’ behalf”76. The question, then, is not whether people govern, but
“who governs?” Although bureaucrats are certainly a crucial component of governance,
observation of urban governance in practice suggests that leaders of other organizations (e.g.
churches, universities, labor unions, and chambers of commerce) have various roles to play
in urban decision-making, and equally various motivations for playing those roles77. Urban
political scientists often lack the luxury of truly experimental settings for their research into
the “who” and “why” of participation in urban governance; as a result, they must look cities
themselves to find answers to these questions.
Systematically observing active, complex urban environments is challenging in its
own right, especially considering that cities are perpetually being reshaped by both internaland external social- and economic trends78. Thus, answers to the related questions of “who
governs” and “to what end” (i.e. theories of urban governance) are anchored within an
interlocking series of global-, national-, state-, and local economic- and social context;
further, the studies of urban governance guided by those theories are also embedded within
these contexts. Therefore, this study contends that as the urban context shifts, new studies
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must be conducted, in order to adapt urban governance from a theoretical perspective to
urban governance in actuality.
This study aims to retest the tenets of the urban political economy, particularly urban
regime analysis, in light of new developments in central cities in the United States,
particularly the ongoing demographic- and economic changes resulting from post-Fordism
and the globalization of capital flows, as well as the rise of CDCs and anchor institutions in
urban policymaking. In retesting the tenets of contemporary urban theory, this study will
also look to a city – Dallas, Texas – a city whose decision-making structure has been studied
twice before, each under a different paradigm in urban political scholarship’s understanding
of who governs cities, and during two different economic paradigms – Fordism and early
post-Fordism. Before doing this, however, this study will establish the presence of a lacuna
within extant literature regarding contemporary urban governance – one that a welldesigned, exploratory study could begin to address.
In the sections that follow, this study will first explore the effects of Fordism on
central cities in the United States, and then it will introduce pluralism and elite theory, which
are competing theories under the community power perspective. Following this, it will describe
Dallas under Fordism, and the 1963 Thometz community power study of the city’s decisionmakers. Next, this study will describe the collapse of Fordism with respect to central cities in
the United States, as well as the collapse of the community power debates, and the transition to
the urban political economy perspective within relevant scholarship, including a discussion of
both growth machine theory and urban regime analysis. Then, the present study will introduce the
1987 Elkin study of Dallas’ governing coalition, and its findings. Subsequently, this study will
introduce post-Fordism as an economic and social transformation, as well as the expansion
of CDCs and anchor institutions into urban policymaking, and how these two factors justify
19

a reconsideration of what Banfield (1965), and later Savitch and Thomas (1991) described as
big city politics.
Fordism, Community Power, and the Thometz Study of Dallas
By the mid-20th century, central cities in the United States were transforming under
the social- and economic effects of Fordism, with prewar construction being demolished to
make way for urban renewal projects, highways, stadiums, and skyscrapers. Within this urban
context, dozens (if not hundreds) of observations of central cities were conducted, and these
observations led to two competing theories of urban governance: pluralism and elite theory,
which are collectively referred to under the umbrella term of community power. In the
paragraphs that follow, this study will first examine the greater urban context of postwar
central cities in the United States. Then, it will discuss the two theories developed as a result
of urban studies conducted within that context, concluding with a brief discussion on their
similarities and the key, irreconcilable differences that engendered the community power debates.
Next, this study will introduce the Thometz studies decision-making in Dallas, the results of
which will be compared against the results of this study in Chapter 5.
Fordism and Central Cities in the United States
As a socioeconomic paradigm, Fordism can be described as a combined, co-evolving
network of factors that, following World War II, defined over a decade of interactions
between individuals, social modes of production, and the built environment79. At its most
basic, Fordism is closely associated with the mass-production of commoditized consumer
goods coupled with strong central state involvement in inducing demand for these goods
through various national-level policies80. Critically for central cities in the United States, in
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the years following World War II, these policies and consumption patterns convinced a
significant number of firms in related industries to co-agglomerate into regional
manufacturing hubs, in order to take advantage of economies of scale and a generally reliable
workforce81. Responding to the centralization of well-paying, stable jobs in central cities,
workers began a mass-migration from farms and small towns into the growing
manufacturing hubs of cities like Cleveland, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Detroit. As a result,
central cities across the United States grew at rates never seen before (or, in many cases,
since)82.
Community Power: Urban Theory under Fordism.
Following World War II, a new wave of perspectives on urban political science
began to emerge. Beginning with Floyd Hunter’s 1953 study of Atlanta (which also served as
the starting point of the community power debates83), mid-century urban political scientists used
empirical observations of postwar United States cities like New Haven and Atlanta, many of
which were booming under the Fordist paradigm, to reject previous iterations of urban
theory – notions which restricted (or, in some ways, ignored) the role of agency in
communities. For these scholars, power was a property of people, rather than abstractions
like the “hidden hand of the market;” thus, many focused instead on the study of power as a
social phenomenon, and looked to individuals and groups as the unit of measure for
understanding how community decisions are made84. In devising alternatives to the purely
positivist urban theories of their predecessors, postwar urban scholars reformulated 18th
century republican- and populist conceptualizations of governance, and reconciled these
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with the political-economic reality of cities in the postwar United States85. What resulted
from this process were two competing theories of urban governance: pluralism and elite
theory.
Pluralism. Looking first at pluralism, this position was championed by scholars like
Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby, who argued that the urban decision-making process is best
characterized by competition and compromise among various interest groups. In this model,
the wide distribution of power among competing interest groups precludes coercion or
dominance by any particular interest, and this dispersion forces groups to compromise and
negotiate86. As a result, urban policies and projects were designed to ensure that most groups
would be reasonably satisfied, at least as long as these groups maintain enough power to
pressure the decision-making process87. Further, the nature of capitalist development and the
democratization of governance actively create new roles for individuals and groups, whose
right to equal treatment by public-sector actors frequently demands that the relationships
among interests groups change and evolve88.
The end result of the pluralist model is that resource inequality among various
stakeholders in the governing coalition ensures that no particular group has all of the
resources necessary to govern, and as a result, cannot hold dominance over the entire
system89. However, as groups amass power and resources, some may seek to perpetuate
injustices, increase their control over the decision-making process, or weaken the democratic
process overall90. It is, therefore, the responsibility of a strong, elected government to
balance and regulate all of these competing interests, while respecting some degree of
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autonomy, and using their counsel to ensure that policies adequately address the wants and
needs of the electorate91.
Elite Theory. In repudiating the pluralist utopia, elite theorists like Lloyd Warner,
Floyd Hunter, C. Wright Mills, and G. William Domhoff argued that, while a vigorously
competitive governance structure in which citizens express their preferences through
elections and interest groups vie for support of their agendas offers the governed their best
opportunity for representation in the decision-making process92, in reality, this doesn’t
happen. Instead, the differential distribution of resources allowed some interests, especially
those of business leaders and wealthy elites, to exert dominance over the decision-making
process, subverting pluralist pressure politics entirely93. In other words, the privileged
position of an upper-crust of economic elites ensures a stability in which some elements of
that structure are “more equal” than others94. From this inequality rises a relatively stable
coalition of non-competing policy monopolies that support particular political interests95,
and an urban governance structure that reflect a particular bias towards the upper class.
The end result of elite theory is that a small, interdependent network of public- and
private sector actors are heavily involved in the politics of decision-making. Private sector
actors support public goods and services as concessions to the general electorate96, and in
exchange, economic elites are appointed to various positions of power, such as policyadvisory committees, issue-specific advocacy- and lobby groups, and are called upon to
provide expert testimony to influence others in the decision-making process97. Further,
urban policies and projects are deigned largely to support the agendas of these “power elite,”
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and other concerns (e.g. public goods and services) are addressed primarily to ensure that
voters keep “elite-friendly” political leaders in power98.
Community Power, in summary. By the mid-20th century, central cities in the
United States were booming under the Fordist paradigm, and to describe the decisionmaking processes that both responded to- and helped guide the individual expressions of
Fordism in cities across the United States, then-contemporary urban scholars developed two
competing theories of urban governance: pluralism and elite theory. Although each of these
handles it differently, both theories center on how civic leaders mitigate the central tensions
that result from the division of labor, and how they arrange land-use patterns within cities
such that the effects of these patterns were the least likely to engender popular resistance to
growth and development99. These conceptualizations were (and remain) wholly
incompatible, and for decades, political scientists debated the relative merits of these
different conceptualizations of urban governance structures, which led to a somewhat
schizophrenic approach to the study of urban governance throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and
early 1970s (i.e. the community power debates)100.
Fordism in Dallas
While other cities, with federal support, rebuilt their urban cores as modern,
industrial powerhouses, Dallas chose a different route, eschewing federal funds in favor of
issuing municipal bonds101. The modern Dallas was founded in 1963, immediately following
the assassination of President Kennedy102. Although ten years prior, Dallas’ business leaders
already felt that the commercial center of Dallas, with its architecture dating largely to the
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1920s, had become obsolete and too expensive to maintain, the Kennedy assassination
energized city leaders (and more importantly, voters) to rebrand the city under a banner of
growth and vibrancy, even if doing so meant making decisions in closed-door meetings and
informal, off-the-record dealmaking sessions103. As noted in Chapter 1, the resulting period
of explosive growth was encouraged by the support of political leaders who were largely
hand-picked by the city’s business elite104, and who invested millions of public dollars into
private real estate investment. In addition, significant private investment – both domestic
and international – flooded the real estate market, thanks to federal tax policies that allowed
wealthy individuals to reduce their tax liabilities by investing in certain types of businesses,
the most attractive of which was real estate development105. Supported by both the public
sector and the private, legendary developers like Trammell Crow, Henry Miller, and Hank
Dickerson spent the remainder of the 1960s and 1970s bulldozing the “old” Downtown
Dallas, with its marble floors and brass fittings, and replacing it with the skyscrapers that
comprise much of the city’s current skyline106.
Dallas’ growth was not spread evenly throughout the city, however. Following World
War II, Dallas’ leaders trumpeted the growth in the central city and northern
neighborhoods107, while largely ignoring the minority-majority communities south of the
Trinity River, even though the largest commercial corridor, located in what is today North
Oak Cliff, was second only to Downtown Dallas in revenue generation throughout the
1940s and 1950s108. However, public officials interested in re-election would largely ignore
the actions of well-connected white supremacists who terrorized nonwhite neighborhoods in
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southern Dallas. While privately, many within Dallas’ governing coalition disapproved of
racial violence, and its consequences for Dallas’ image, the threat of political backlash
ensured that there were no meaningful attempts to hold anyone accountable, as long as the
problems stayed south of the Trinity River, and as long as the people responsible for those
problems continued to support the development in northern Dallas. Thus, many of the same
back-room deals that prepared Dallas to grow into a modern economic hub also resulted in
the wholesale abandonment of Dallas’ southern neighborhoods, both economically and
politically109.
The Thometz study: urban theory under Fordism in Dallas. In postwar Dallas’
dynamic, though deeply troubled urban context, the Thometz study took shape. This study
of the city’s decision-making structure in the early 1960s, strongly aligned with the tenets of
elite theory, and somewhat unsurprisingly, it found that Dallas’ political and business leaders
were tightly connected, and that leadership was highly stratified among three different
echelons of decision-makers. At the top of this structure were seven key leaders, who
represented Dallas’ business elite, and who made the vast majority of decisions in the city –
only working with political leaders when public funding or approval was required. These
leaders were informed- and assisted by several top level business executives, as well as dozens
of younger, less-influential, second echelon business leaders, such as mid-level managers and
“up and coming” young men110. The study also found that Dallas’ men of power were
interconnected through various civic organizations and trade associations, which acted as
“stepping stones” for men looking to further their civic ambitions, and which allowed
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talented leaders to build the skills needed to eventually become top level and key leaders
themselves111.
As Thometz notes in a section regarding study limitations, these findings are
anchored in one particular point in time112, although they are corroborated by several other
accounts of Dallas’ leadership at that time113. By relying on a tightly-knit political-business
leadership committee as the basis for a reputational analysis, the study was inherently limited
by what these participants were willing to say, even with guarantees of anonymity114. This
created a “blind spot” in the study’s results; which neglected leadership in the southern
(minority-majority) half of the city, which was already tipping into what would become
decades of institutional neglect. As a result, people in southern Dallas who may have been
involved in the city’s leadership structure (whether any existed) were either not wellrepresented, or were not well-identified, and the study makes no mention of the leadership
divisions over racism and racial violence perpetrated by some members of Dallas’ decisionmaking structure. Further, the study was conducted during a time in which growth defined
the city; as such, had it been performed during a less-dynamic period in Dallas’ history of
urban redevelopment, it seems possible that actors outside of the business community would
have been more heavily represented in Dallas’ decision-making structure.
Fordism, Community Power, and the Thometz Study of Dallas, in Summary
In the years immediately following World War II, central cities in the United States
were trading in their 19th and early 20th century mid-rise CBDs for skyscrapers and
convention centers, fueled by the Fordist boom and a rush to fill factories and office
buildings with workers emigrating from the small, rural communities that dominated the
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landscape of the United States until that point. Studying these cities, postwar urban scholars
began to conceive of power as a social phenomenon, and looked to individuals and groups
as the unit of measure for understanding how community decisions are made115. Resulting
from these studies, two competing conceptualizations of urban decision-making: pluralism
and elite theory totalized the study of community power, leading to an intractable series of
community power debates that defined the study of urban political science for over a decade.
Within the above context, the Thometz study of Dallas found that the city’s
decision-making process was controlled by its business community, and more importantly, a
stratified power-structure of business leaders whose wishes were made manifest by
functionally subservient political leaders – only one of whom was even considered by the
study to be a decision-maker at the citywide level, and who had previously been a leader in
the city’s business community116. As a result, Dallas represented what later scholarship would
characterize as a “pure” political economy, wherein the primary purpose of city politics was
to further economic development, where the connections between business leaders and
political leaders were well-developed, and where citizens who rose to political prominence
were all-but exclusively business leaders first117. Public officials in Thometz’ Dallas were
voted for by the population, but the ballots were filled by those who were selected by the
Dallas’ leading business associations – the Citizens Charter Association and the Dallas
Citizens Council118.
The Fordist crisis, Urban Political Economy, and the Elkin Study of Dallas
The postwar economic- and population boom that allowed central cities to grow so
rapidly would not last, however, and neither would the community power debates. Social
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upheaval and abandonment of central cities throughout the 1960s was followed by
retrenchment and the “hollowing of the state” – a reassignment of responsibility for social
services from public-sector actors to private- and third-sector alternatives – during the 1970s
and 1980s119. The effects of the Fordist crisis, the wholesale rollback of federal support for
central cities, and the emergence of a new, knowledge-based economy led some scholars to
suggest that many of the generalizations made by community power theorists regarding the
nature of urban governance had become increasingly obsolete120. In addressing these
concerns, urban scholars at the end of the 20th century attempted to recast models of urban
governance within this new context of limited cities, Petersonian development agendas, and
close relationships between powerful (but constrained) public- and private-sector leaders,
first by painting cities as growth machines, and later, by using a more generalized model of
urban regimes and coalition governance.
In the paragraphs that follow, this study will describe the Fordist crisis, and its
effects on the context of cities in the United States. Then, it will connect these changes to
calls among urban political scientists for a new conceptualization of urban power and
decision-making, and the resulting urban political economy perspective. Finally, it will introduce
the Elkin study of Dallas, which helped to cement urban political economy as the dominant
urban theory at the end of the 20th century.
The Fordist Crisis and Central Cities in the United States
By (at latest) the mid-1970s, the Fordist dream had become a nightmare for central
cities, which found themselves in sharp decline121. Factors like high labor- and capital costs,
slowing productivity, regulations seen as “hostile to business,” and increased competition
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from Europe and Asia resulted in dramatic decreases in manufacturing profits122. In
response, firms often slashed both employment- and wage levels in manufacturing firms123,
and many manufacturers relocated to the comparatively lax regulatory environments in
Sunbelt cities throughout the southern United States, while others took advantage of low
shipping costs and international trade agreements to shift their production facilities to other
nations entirely124.
What resulted – a period called the Fordist Crisis – was a rapid, totalizing midcentury exodus of industrial capital from older manufacturing cities in the United States,
such as Cleveland, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and San Francisco, which starkly reduced both
employment- and wage levels in their primary industries125. As a result, not only could these
cities no longer support full employment at the prevailing blue-collar wages that once were
common126, the rapidly-growing ranks of long-term unemployed workers increasing the
demands placed on cities to provide social services127. When workers could find
employment, many opted to abandon central cities in favor of modern, consumptioncentered suburbs, located far from the collapsing property values, and perceived blight and
degradation of urban cores128.
With unemployment high and no end to the deindustrialization of the United States
in sight, many cities underwent several years of social unrest, including massive, highly
damaging riots that left many CBDs in flames. While some cities (e.g. Dallas, Atlanta)
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managed to avoid community conflict, by the mid-1960s, outbreaks of civil unrest in cities
like Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, and Philadelphia suggest that the relative utopia of the
mid-20th century had largely unraveled , if it ever existed at all129 Under the Johnson
administration, a number of federal attempts to alleviate extreme poverty and joblessness, as
well as the riots that left parts of many central urban neighborhoods reduced to ash, were
enacted130. Before many of these programs could take effect, most were cut short by
conservative rollbacks during the latter part of Johnson’s administration, and were cut even
deeper under both Nixon and Reagan; as a result, many cities were forced to divest
themselves of many social service programs131, and mayors across the country opted instead
to devote their dwindling tax dollars into programs designed to attract new businesses. These
“beggar thy neighbor” practices of the 1970s and 1980s, seemed to confirm a belief that
business elites had grown powerful to the point of being able to undercut political leaders in
furtherance of their own agenda – a phenomenon that neither pluralism nor elite theory
could readily explain132.
This Fordist crisis broadly refers to the apex of a demographic- and economic trend,
primarily in mid-late 20th century, wherein corporations and factories that traditionally filled
urban cores opted to abandon them for new facilities, both in nearby suburbs and abroad133.
Across the United States, waves of disinvestment left once-thriving central cities nearly
abandoned134, while many of the remaining corporations and financial institutions engaged in
international mergers, acquisitions, and consolidation efforts. As tax revenues declined and
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demands for social services increased, the threat of financial insolvency loomed over many
cities of the 1970s and 1980s135. In response, city leaders across the United States, with the
blessing- and support of austerity-focused state- and national lawmakers136, contracted out
responsibility for public services, and redirected the savings into neoliberal economic growth
and development strategies137. The resulting policies and projects were supported in part
through dependence on the federal funding138, especially the Urban Development Action
Grant (UDAG) program, which awarded almost $5 billion to thousands of economic
development projects in hundreds of cities across the United States139. Although this funding
stream would ultimately prove temporary, for a time, this funding, and the relationships
between public officials and private-sector leaders that it engendered, resulted in a new
model of urban governance: the development-focused, pro-business governing coalition140.
Urban Political Economy: Urban Theory under the Fordist Crisis
Roughly 25 years after they began, the community power debates (of which
Thometz’ Dallas study is a part) left urban political theory in disarray141. The radically
different arguments, i.e. pluralism and elite theory, were well-established by the early
1960s142, and what followed were hundreds of studies that found new examples of pluralistic
tendencies and elite dominance, but that ultimately failed to result in definitive
conclusions143. Further, as scholars looked around at central United States cities in the 1980s,
it became apparent that those who governed clearly had the ability to downplay (or even
ignore) many interest groups entirely. The city of the 1980s, scholars argued, was governed
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by highly enmeshed groups of political- and economic elites, whose control over city politics
was all-but complete, and who had the power to absorb oppositional groups into their
structures, or to neutralize them entirely144. Responding to this, and to the changing urban
context of cities since the start of the community power debates, a subset of scholars argued
that, whether or not “community power” had ever actually existed, it had been replaced by
highly enmeshed, informal coalitions of political- and economic elites, who merged their
extensive, but limited resources in order to achieve their own particular goals, subordinate
competing agendas and circumvent pressure politics145.
As a result of exhaustion from the community power debates, and new observations
about urban governance under the crisis of Fordism, many urban scholars drifted away from
the study of community power, as well as the methods employed in its study146. To illustrate
this point, table 2.01 outlines the results of a brief archival search for scholarly work
regarding community power, including published books and articles in peer-reviewed
journalsi.
Table 2.01: Community Power Keywordii Search Results
Publications

1950-1959
390

1960-1969
2,419

1970-1979
4,679

1980-1989
3,971

1990-1999
3,532

2000-2009
2,309

Though they are far-from comprehensive, these data suggest that scholarly interest in the
community power debates peaked between 1970 and 1979.
As scholarly interest shifted, two new theories emerged: growth machine theory and
the urban regime analysis. Both of these are parts of a new perspective on urban governance:
urban political economy, which emerged as an attempt to reconcile the divergent truths of
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elite theory and pluralism, while also overcoming the weaknesses inherent in each147. These
both offered a fresh perspective on decision-making, using informal interviews and archival
research of particular cities to suggest the interconnected nature of urban governance from a
systemic, behavioral perspective, and as future sections will suggest, quickly grew to
dominate the study of urban politics. Data in table 2.02 corroborate this, and suggest that
research interest in contemporary urban theory – including growth machine theory and
urban regime analysis, began to grow in the 1970s, and expanded most rapidly after 1980.

Publications

Table 2.02: Urban Political Economy Keywordiii Search Results
1950-1959
1960-1969
1970-1979
1980-1989
1990-1999
41
98
434
3,012
4,488

2000-2009
9,280

As with data regarding the numbers of articles and books related to community power, these
data are certainly not intended to be exhaustive. Nonetheless, these data suggest that starting
in the 1970s, urban scholars reflected on the state of their field, and on the nature of cities at
the close of the 21st century. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will unpack these new
conceptualizations of urban decision-making, first for growth machine theory, and then for
urban regime analysis.
Growth machine theory. First published about by Harvey Molotch in 1976, growth
machine theory attempted to undercut all sides of the community power debates by focusing
on the motives of economic actors within the governing coalition, as well as the actions they
take in order to change the socially-constructed meanings and values of place within the
city148. At the core of the growth machine are place-based elites, whose control over the
political decision-makers is all-but absolute, and who direct the policymaking process in
order to maximize rental incomes and property values within the city, with all other concerns
being of secondary importance149. Growth machine theorists argue that all places carry with
Vogel, 1992, pp. 12-13
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them two socially-constructed values – their use-value and their exchange-value. For landowners,
the value in a parcel of land is in what the land could be worth if sold or rented; this is the
place’s exchange-value. For renters, who do not own the land, the value in a place is in how
it is utilized or consumed – this is place’s use-value150. For any given place, these two values
necessarily contradict, and the resulting tension is the fundamental conflict of growth
machine theory151.
Growth machine theorists also argue that landowners (or rentiers), by having their
fortunes bound to local real estate values, universally support urban growth agendas152, and
join with other influential actors153 to combine deep wells of financial resources, control over
land-use regulations, tax abatement policies, and major media outlets to relentlessly pursue
its growth agenda. These actors gain public support for their projects by establishing a
discourse in which the city’s troubles, whatever they happen to be, can only be solved
through new, publicly-financed development projects154, that the costs of such development
will be unproblematic, and its benefits will be widely-spread155. Further, growth machine
members manipulate voters’ fears of “losing out” to competing cities (domestically and
abroad), proffering that alternatives to development will be highly detrimental to the city’s
well-being156. Individuals and organizations critical of the growth agenda are often
discredited, and in some cases, actively excluded from the discourse through media shut-
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outs157. As a result, growth machines are incredibly durable, regardless of opposition from
anti-growth coalitions or changes in developmental regulations158.

Critiques of growth machine theory. While there are a number of critiques of
growth machine theory, it is beyond the scope of this study to examine them all in detail;
instead, this study will focus on two. To the first of these, scholars level that growth machine
theory is somewhat conflicted with respect to what the growth machine actually is, and as a
result, what the growth machine actually does. Logan & Molotch, in their seminal work,
define the growth machine – first with a narrow specification, and then with a broad one. To
elaborate, the narrow definition of the growth machine refers only to the subset of elites
who draw income from property rental159, while the authors’ broad definition includes a wide
variety of place-dependent organizations, such as local banks and media outlets160, 161. By
taking the narrow definition, growth machine theorists bind the growth machine and its
members to a single-minded obsession with land-use and maximizing exchange value – a
position that effectively wallpapers over conflicts among economic elites162. Meanwhile, the
broadly-defined growth machine is engaged in perpetual conflict, both internally among its
members, and externally with various renters over use-values for various places163. Building
on this, a second critique suggests that growth machine theory too-narrowly defines
exchange-value, limiting it to land values within cities themselves. Thus, growth machine
theory ignores the exchange value of non-land assets164, and disregards the effects of greater
socioeconomic forces165. Therefore, critics charge, the model cannot adequately account for
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instances in which city leaders pursue agendas that may not directly induce development,
such as education and service delivery166, nor can it account for why development slowed in
many cities that took advantage of either private investment or federal funding to fuel urban
development throughout the mid-20th century167.
Urban regime analysis. Although (largely) well-received by urban political
scholarship, by the late 1980s, growth machine theory had been supplanted by a more
generalized urban regime analysis168, which serves as the framework for contemporary urban
theory169. Broadly speaking, urban regime analysis founds itself on the premise that the
capacity to govern in the modern, complex urban environment emerges from informal
relationships among partners within informal coalitions, and from their willingness- and
ability to combine resources in order to govern the general electorate170. Critically, each
partner possesses a resource that others lack, and as a result, urban regime advocates argue
that the only path to successfully governing comes from partnerships with leaders who can
marshal complementary resources171. Therefore, although political- and economic elites form
the core of the governing coalition, they cannot effectively govern without additional
support and legitimacy for their development-first agenda, support that comes from a wide
range of ancillary coalition members172, 173. By combining a broad range of resources to
further particular policies and programs, the governing coalition possesses a structural power
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to overcome objections to its goals that is far greater than that of any individual coalition
member174.
The versatility of the regime model allows a variety of governing coalitions to exist;
Stone himself identified four175 while subsequent authors have added additional typologies176.
After consolidating over a decade of literature on regime typologies, Jill Clark constructed a
six-type categorization scheme for urban regimes177, which table 2.03 summarizes; this table
also includes a seventh coalition typology, the antiregime, which Clark merged into the demandside urban governing coalition, based on DeLeon’s long-term studies of the evolving
leadership structure of late-20th century San Francisco178. This study argues that it is still
appropriate to include the antiregime, which is briefly summarized as one possible result of a
collapsed (or otherwise failed) urban regime, and are composed of fragmented interest
groups that fail to coalesce around a particular agenda, fail to establish ties with the business
community, and fail to reconcile their various agendas with the political system179. Like the
demand-side regime, the antiregime is successful at blocking unfavorable policies and
development, but because it lacks the support of bureaucrats or organized institutions, it is
unable to promote (or even to passively allow) beneficial urban policies or development
projects180.

Coalition Type
Activist
Caretaker
Demand-Side
Entrepreneurial
Progressive
Stewardship

Table 2.03: Typology of Governing Coalitions
Lead Actors
Minority-led electoral coalitions, engaged citizens, single-district councilmembers, neighborhood governments,
social justice or broker mayors, fiscal populists
Caretaker mayors, anti-growth bureaucrats, fiscal populists, post-materialists
Neighborhood organizations, single-district councilmembers, minority mayors, post-materialists
Business-led coalitions, strong mayor, pro-growth bureaucrats
Minority-led electoral coalitions, single-district councilmembers, neighborhood governments, social justice mayors
Group coalitions, engaged citizens, fiscal populists, "broker" mayors
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Antiregime

Temporary, issue-based coalitions; neighborhood organizations

Notably, Table 2.03 should not be taken to suggest that coalition types are equally
common; indeed, in practice, the pro-development, business-led entrepreneurial governing
coalition (also represented by the growth machine model) is the de facto characterization of
urban governance in the United States181, and the relatively privileged position of economic
elites has resulted in a skewing of municipal agendas in favor of value-neutral economic
development in many cities across the United States182. This coalition type is perpetuated in
three primary ways. First, private-sector elites use their financial resources to underwrite reelection campaigns, and to support projects that keep their political allies in power183.
Because the tenures of these allies are limited by the constant need to be re-elected, political
elites must continually appease their economic counterparts through business-friendly
policy- and regulatory environments, tax incentives for economic development, and a
general emphasis on economic development, often to the exclusion of social services,
education, and infrastructure development184. Second, because the overall health and stability
of the governing coalition is contingent upon cohesive internal cooperation, even in the case
of conflicting interests185, members may selectively incentivized to “go along” with the
development agenda in exchange for promises of coalition support for a future opportunity
of their own, or in some cases, an immediate financial side-payment186. Finally, because
governing coalitions must also mitigate external opposition, the aforementioned auxiliary
members mobilize in order to create- and maintain a public discourse in support of the
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coalition’s agenda, silence and discredit dissenters, and lend legitimacy to the coalition’s
plans187. As a result, entrepreneurial coalitions remain incredibly durable, even during times
of sharp public criticism and private disagreement188.

Critiques of urban regime analysis. As is the case for growth machine theory,
while there are a number of critiques of urban regime analysis, it is beyond the scope of this
study to examine them all in detail; instead, this study will focus on three that are particularly
germane to the present study. First, urban regime analysis fails to adequately embed the
regimes themselves within the wider institutional context189, arguing that regime actors have
– at best – a limited awareness of extra-local forces190. Corrections for this have been
attempted by linking urban regime theory to regulation theory, but even here, urban regime
theory continues to fail at any sort of sustained interrogation of economic trends, which
weakens its value as a proscriptive theory191 or comparative one192. Additionally, urban
regime analysis fails to address the consequences of particular types of governing coalitions;
i.e., no one type is “better” or “worse” than another, with respect to addressing the specific
needs of a given city. Moreover, the model cannot predict whether any particular governing
coalition will be successful at actually governing an individual city, or whether that regime is
vulnerable to replacement or collapse193. Finally, urban regime analysis takes on faith a
distinct division of labor between public- and private-sectors, assuming that the traditional,
profit-driven private sector dominates economic development194; whether this assumption
was ever completely accurate is debatable, but as cities transition away from a myopic focus
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on business and capital generation, it may be that it is growing weaker. Taken together, these
criticisms of urban regime analysis suggest that, as broader social- and economic forces
change the urban context of cities, it is (at best) unclear whether urban regime analysis can
adequately conceptualize the effects of these changes on real-world governing coalitions.
Urban Political Economy, in summary. In looking at United States cities in the
mid-late 20th century, urban scholars found that the pressure politics of community power,
whether it ever actually existed, had been replaced by informal, highly enmeshed groups of
political- and economic elites, whose control over city politics was all-but complete, and who
combined their extensive, but limited resources in order to achieve their own particular
goals, absorb oppositional groups into their structures, or to neutralize them entirely195. This
merger of politics and economics – urban political economy – is composed primarily of two
approaches, the narrower growth machine theory, and the broader urban regime analysis. Indeed,
scholars have found hundreds of examples of urban regimes in cities across the United
States, and even internationally, and the preponderance of available evidence strongly
suggests that both the urban political economy approach broadly, and at least some variation
of urban regime analysis has played a role in framing the scholarly observations of urban life
and urban governance in cities across the world196.
The Fordist crisis in Dallas
During the formative, early years of urban regime analysis, Stephen Elkin used the
city of Dallas, Texas to study the tight linkages between its political and business leaders.
Like Thometz before him, Elkin cited the city’s business growth (even in spite of national
recession), and the strong links between Dallas’ business community and its political leaders
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as primary reasons for selecting it for study197. Indeed, while much of the United States
stumbled economically during the Fordist crisis, Dallas’ growth from the end of World War
II until the mid-1970s was uninterrupted198, built on the backbone of a massive oil boom,
defense contracts, and electronics.
Looking first at oil, manufacturing equipment for oilfields and refineries had been a
steady part of Dallas’ manufacturing base since the 1930s, but production orders ramped up
alongside the automobile boom following the end of World War II199. In addition,
throughout the war, and lasting until the end of the Cold War, over a quarter of the city’s
manufacturing employee were employed in producing military aircraft200. Finally, Dallas is
also the home of Texas Instruments, first founded in the 1930s as a seismic services provider
for the oil industry, but (with the support of Dallas’ ruling elite) branched into transistor
manufacturing in the 1950s, eventually leading to the 1958 creation of the integrated circuit,
and new manufacturing contracts for electronics and guided missiles using this new
technology201. This convergence of high-growth industries within the city turned Dallas into
an industrial hub so vibrant that in the mid-late 1950s, it had become the manufacturing
hinge of the entire Southwest202. From the 1950s until the 1970s, the city’s status as a
regional manufacturing and trade hub was largely unchallenged, and helped attract a diverse
combination of firms involved in wholesale and retail trade, banking and finance, and
insurance203.
Of all of these industries, it was Dallas’ ties to oil that would largely inoculate the
entire region from the earliest effects of Fordism’s collapse. The oil crisis brought on by the
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1973 Arab embargo caused Texas oil companies – many of which were headquartered in
Dallas – to experience unprecedented growth and expansion. Prices per barrel of oil
skyrocketed by over 2000% between 1973 and 1980, and in that same period, land
speculation drove real estate prices up over 900%204. This boom would add over $367 billion
to Texas’ overall economy between 1970 and 1986, and much of that investment was
occurring in Dallas, where a city eager to remove itself from the shame of a slain president
eagerly constructed a new skyline205, funded by a mixture of public financing and private
debt from both domestic- and international sources206. For Dallas, the economic plight
throughout the rest of the United States may as well have been occurring in another country
entirely.
Not all of Dallas saw the benefits of the city’s growth and prosperity, however. For
decades, southern Dallas had been broadly ignored by both city leaders and the general
public for decades, and garnered a reputation for commercial disinvestment, high crime, and
poor school performance207. In reality, after many whites abandoned the neighborhood,
people from African American and Hispanic communities moved in, creating a racially
heterogenous region where wealth and poverty often lived within blocks of one another208.
Minority-owned businesses replaced those formerly owned by whites, and while commercial
corridors had changed by the late 1970s, limited commercial activity nonetheless remained,
especially in- and near what would become known as North Oak Cliff209.
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The Elkin study: urban theory under the Fordist crisis in Dallas. Writing in the
mid-1980s, Stephen Elkin used a study of Dallas (the “commercial republic”) to argue for
the presence and dominance of business interests in a governance structure that
characterized as an entrepreneurial governing coalition, in which a well-organized coalition of
business leaders formed natural alliances with public officials, but were often at “arm’s
length” from the day-to-day running of the city, as opposed to the deep, almost-daily
involvement of the business community in running the “pure” entrepreneurial coalition
found in Dallas during the Thometz study. Elkin’s study cites two primary reasons for this
transition: first, the city’s business community was no longer as unified as it once had been;
and second, the city’s political leadership was dramatically restructured, following a federal
court order.
Looking first at the disunity among members of Dallas’ business community, the
Elkin study identified two causes, both of which were consequences of the city’s success at
inducing economic growth and development. First, by the late 1970s, Dallas had largely built
itself out of undeveloped land210. In the past, Dallas’ leaders simply authorized massive bond
packages to induce redevelopment of the city’s built environment, based on the needs of a
unified business coalition. However, the city’s success in attracting outside investment
brought an influx of new corporations into the CBD, corporations whose heads often had
little interest in the politics of governance, preferring instead to focus their energies on
regional-, national-, and global concerns211.
Additionally, as the size of the business community grew, influential corporate
executives were increasingly less-able to reconcile different agendas through side-payments
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or “go along to get along” dealmaking, leaving the business community fragmented and
somewhat disorganized, and leading to tensions between developers who wanted to tear
down the city and rebuild, and existing tenants who were largely happy with existing
development212. Further dividing the city’s business community were the myriad
redevelopment and infrastructure projects, such as the city’s proposed light rail network,
which were implemented at great (and uneven) costs to various stakeholders213. This
fragmentation was most evident in the collapse of Dallas’ Citizens Charter Association,
which ceased operations following Dallas’ first attempt at modern electoral reformation,
concluding that it was no longer possible for the city’s business community to act alone in
guiding the city’s growth and development214. It could also be seen, to a smaller (though just
as important) extent, in the weakening of the Dallas Citizens Council, which remains
influential in city politics, but no is no longer able to command elections215.
Shifting focus, in considering the restructuring of Dallas’ elected leadership, in 1971,
a lawsuit filed against the city contended that the at-large election system for city nearlyomnipotent councilmembers was in violation of the Voting Rights Act, because it rewarded
candidates who were popular in areas with the highest voter turnout – in this case, the
affluent, white-majority neighborhoods in north of the Trinity River216. Because those areas
had higher voter turnout, plaintiffs argued, the system had the effect of diluting votes among
Dallas’ African-American and Hispanic populations217. The court case went on for four
years, and in 1975, a federal judge ruled against Dallas, agreeing that the city’s at-large
council election system violated the Voting Rights Act218. In response, the city council
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quickly replaced its existing at-large system with an “8-3” plan, in which eight
councilmembers were elected by districts in which they resided, while three more, including
the mayor, would continue to be elected at-large. The council argued (and the federal judge
agreed) that, while the eight district-based councilmembers would likely feel particular bias
toward their own districts, the at-large councilmembers and mayor would be free to look
after the needs of Dallas as a whole219.
Taking a broad approach to these changes, Elkin observed that their impacts were
not as sweeping as one might have expected them to be. To begin, council members were
only paid a small stipend for attending council meetings, so the position was still largely
voluntary, and in addition, councilmembers rarely sought to build political coalitions, unless
they intended to make politics a lifelong career. As a result, although the district-bound
councilmembers paid some attention to local concerns, especially around election time,
many continued to promote the pro-growth strategies of their predecessors220.
The study concluded that the ability of Dallas’ business interests to continue seeing
their needs often, though not always, addressed over those of the electorate was emblematic
of a greater, societal failure to separate the political need to promote a healthy economy
from “... how to contrive a happy environment for businessmen” 221. Elkin argued that that
public officials were induced to struggle and debate issues only when their audience demands
struggle and debate; as long as business leaders and civic boosters composed that audience,
then business inducement would remain at the core of public policy decisions222.
Nonetheless, Elkin noted that even with a continued pro-business slant among Dallas’
political leaders, the way in which citizens approached Dallas’ bureaucracy had evolved since
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the Thometz study. Specifically, Elkin found that citizens were increasingly drawn to interact
with City Hall – not to further business interests or offer visions of the best way to bring
vitality to Dallas – but instead to speak on behalf of their neighborhoods, or to demand
public goods and services as bureaucratic clients223.
Improving upon the Thometz study, Elkin thoroughly wove racial tensions in Dallas
into the narrative of the city’s political- and economic evolution. Nonetheless, like the
Thometz study before it, this study and its conclusions – are ultimately a product of an
urban study conducted within the context of limited United States cities in the mid-to-late
20th century. As a result, Elkin’s “solutions” to the dominance of the entrepreneurial
governing coalition are presented as national-level concerns, rather than local issues224.
Additionally, because Elkin could only see Dallas through the constraining lens of a rigidlydefined public-private division of labor, he could not see alternative paths to a new decisionmaking structure – paths that utilize third-sector organizations and alternative economic
development strategies, rather than national-level policy changes.
The Fordist crisis, urban political economy, and the Elkin study, in summary.
While scholars abandoned the study of community power, both residents and firms were
abandoning the communities themselves. Federal intervention strategies offered some hope
of restoring cities, and the public-private partnerships that these strategies engendered
portended a new kind of urban governance, the study of which would, in time, breathe new
life into urban political theory225. This new perspective, urban political economy, succeeded
in sidestepping many of the problems with both sides of the community power debates, and
has been used to describe cities across the United States, as well as internationally. Using this
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perspective, the Elkin study of Dallas found the city’s simple, political-business coalition had
been replaced by a more complex model of interlocking relationships, internal discord
among the business community, and political leaders who were (slightly) more inclined to
serve their electorate, yet who still served within a system that was designed to ensure that
business interests were ultimately given priority over other concerns226. Nonetheless, while
urban scholars used these methods to study cities, the cities themselves were changing, in
ways that progenitors like Elkin, Logan, Molotch, and Stone – like their predecessors – could
not have imagined, and for which they could not have accounted in their studies and
conclusions.
Post-Fordism, Urban Political Economy, and the Need to Revisit Dallas
In the decades since the Elkin study, the urban context has again shifted; first, the
crisis of Fordism has given way to post-Fordism, a new socioeconomic paradigm that has
reversed the economic- and population trajectories of many (though not all) cities in the
United States; and second, third-sector organizations have expanded beyond their original
missions and into public policy. As a result of these phenomena, the urban political economy
approach, with its strict interpretation of the public/private division of labor, and its roots in
the Fordist crisis, may need to be revisited. As the dominant theoretical model of urban
governance, this study argues that it is imperative for urban political scholars to test the
viability of what is now a (roughly) thirty year-old perspective. By re-examining Dallas, a city
used previously to establish the validity of both the urban regime model broadly, and the city
itself as an exemplar of the entrepreneurial governing coalition, the present study offers other
urban scholars the opportunity to revisit urban regime analysis, and to consider (at the least)
refining particular aspects of it. In the sections that follow, this study will first summarize
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particularly salient post-Fordist changes to United States cities throughout late 20th and early
21st centuries. Following this, it will focus on changes in Dallas following the Elkin study,
especially those related to its business- and political leadership. Then, it will build a case for a
fresh examination of the city’s governing coalition.
Post-Fordism and Central Cities in the United States
As urban scholars of the late-20th and early 21st centuries scoured cities across the
United States227 (and to some extent, abroad228) for evidence of urban regimes, cities
themselves were undergoing significant economic and demographic reorganization,
especially in- and immediately surrounding their respective CBDs. Against this backdrop, old
ancillary members of governing coalitions – community development corporations (CDCs)
and anchor institutions – began evolving their roles in economic development and policy
decisions while, simultaneously, business leaders began exiting the politics of decisionmaking. This study argues that, while urban scholars publishing near the turn of the 21st
century identified several of these transitions, urban regime analysis – itself a product of
research in the 1970s and early 1980s – failed to update itself with regard to these changes in
the urban context. Importantly, this study does not fault earlier scholarship for failing to
account for changes that had not yet happened, and instead argues that responsibility for
advancing the collective understanding of contemporary urban governance falls to today’s
scholars.
Under the new paradigm of Post-Fordism, both economic resources and
demographic trends have departed from their previous trajectories, and these changes have
reshaped the built environments in central cities across the United States, and even in other
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nations. In considering these economic changes, regionally-based, blue-collar manufacturing
work has been largely (though not entirely) replaced by globalized flows of knowledgebased employment in technology and finance throughout the developed world. In
considering demographic changes, the affluent (often white) employees of these technology
and finance firms, as well as the ancillary businesses that support them (e.g. law, real estate
development, advertising) often find themselves disillusioned with the suburban lifestyle, and
are migrating back to central cities and adjacent neighborhoods. In response, former
commercial cores have become high-end, mixed-use developments combining office space,
luxury retail and housing, and cultural amenities like museums and art installations.
As new, competing interests flow into central cities, it may be that the older, “probusiness” decision-making bodies no longer hold as much influence over decisions being
made in these areas, and further, there may be additional room for new actors with large
resource pools, such as CDCs and anchor institutions, to find a role in policymaking, To
better build this case, in the paragraphs that follow, this study will first discuss the economic
and demographic transitions found in U.S. cities as a result of post-Fordism. Then, it will
chronicle the expansion of third-sector organizations – particularly anchor institutions and
CDCs – beyond their traditional roles and into urban policymaking.
Post-Fordist economic transitions. As an economic shift, post-Fordism can be
summarized as a transition away from manufacturing as an economic engine, and into whitecollar firms in finance, investment, and real estate (FIRE) sectors, supported by localized
producer services229. Breakthroughs in transportation, communication, and information
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technology230, combined with a number of trans-national trade agreements231,232, have rapidly
accelerated the decline of urban fortunes within the Rust Belt233. However, they have also
have sparked unmatched growth and prosperity in communities referred to as global cities234.
From their positions as hubs in the global financial- and economic network, global cities
have experienced significant employment gains and wealth generation, benefitting from the
agglomeration of knowledge-based industries and innovation235.
Because firms can (and often do) find specializations in the global marketplace, there
is a wealth of opportunity for global cities to be located all over the world, without
necessarily engaging in direct competition with one another236. Each of these global cities
becomes a significant agglomeration of highly specialized firms, and participates in the
geographic restructuring of economic flows throughout the world237. In the post-Fordist
economy, firms choose to locate in specific cities in order to harness local market
knowledge, to convert that knowledge into profit, and to integrate that knowledge into their
global enterprise238. As a result of these advantages, global cities are attractive to foreign
investment – that is, investment in domestic businesses or the creation of new businesses in
a city by international investors239. In this way, global cities like San Francisco and Boston
have become international centers of knowledge production and economic power240.
This prosperity comes at a cost, though, and is far-from uniform in its spatial
distribution241. Although many cities have found prosperity in the new, global economy,
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there is simply not enough investment to go around242, which has created (or exacerbated)
uneven economic development243. Indeed, by comparison, far more cities have been
excluded from the post-Fordist economic boom than have been able to find a place within
it244.In this new economic geography, the upper echelons of prosperity rest within global
cities like San Francisco, New York City, London, Tokyo, and Dallas, while many other
cities find themselves locked in a pattern of disinvestment and decline, bound to the fate of a
shrinking manufacturing sector245. Additionally, and of concern with respect to entrepreneurial
governing coalitions, because many firms in FIRE sectors are branches of globalized firms,
private-sector leaders often have few – if any – particular ties to any given place246, and often
do not become lasting members in pro-development governing coalitions247.
Post-Fordist demographic transitions. Contrary to the bleak predictions of
“indifference and abandonment” regarding urban cores248, the paradigm shift that caused so
much disinvestment and abandonment among central cities in the United States has also
revived a subset of them, albeit no longer as centers of capital creation alone249. Beyond
commercial investment, CBDs are also becoming home to a variety of cultural- and
entertainment amenities such as, art galleries, university and hospital expansions, and upscale
retail and dining, which in turn has attracted wealthier, residents to return to urban cores250.
Finally, these younger, affluent professionals are also bringing with them a particular “leftliberal” ideology and political activism that may have implications for local elections,
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especially in cities like Dallas and Atlanta whose decision-making structures are closely
associated with the entrepreneurial-type governing coalition251.
Additionally, a subset of literature suggests that this changing demographic,
unsurprisingly, carries with it a racial component. As Chapter 1 noted, a traditional reading
of the racial composition of central cities across the United States252 describes the chocolate
cities, vanilla suburbs model (shown in figure 2.01) of largely white suburbs surrounding
predominantly African-American central cities, resulting from “white flight” throughout the
mid-20th century, subsidized by federal policies, highway-building campaigns, and
government-backed suburban mortgages253. While this model adequately describes cities in
the wake of Fordist consumption patterns, it fails to account for the post-Fordist
gentrification of many inner-city neighborhoods by white millennials and “urban pioneers.”
This “back to the city” counter-transition has the effect of pushing minority groups (and the
businesses that serve them) out of the central city, and into the inner-ring communities that
were once populated by the first waves of white flight254. Addressing the new reality of postFordist central cities, a new model – the new donut (shown in figure 2.02)255 – has emerged. In
this model, white central neighborhoods are surrounded by majority-minority communities,
which are themselves encircled by white outer-ring suburbs and exurbs.
Figure 2.01: Chocolate Cities, Vanilla Suburbs Model

Figure 2.02: New Donut Model
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Transitions in the roles of CDCs and anchor institutions. As cities’ economicand demographic profiles evolved under post-Fordism, so too did their rosters of actors
willing to engage in the politics of decision-making. Indeed, while private-sector elites
withdraw from governing coalitions, a subset of urban scholarship suggests that CDCs and
anchor institutions are advancing their roles as coalition members256. In the paragraphs that
follow, this study will first introduce the growing role of CDCs beyond their traditional
involvement in low-income housing projects, and then, it will describe the efforts of urban
anchor institutions to revitalize economically-marginalized communities without the use of
the “federal bulldozer.”

CDCs: moving beyond low-income housing. Most (though not all) community
development corporations were founded during the height of the Great Society, as
community action agencies (CAAs) charged with directing federal support into urban
neighborhoods257. Even as small-government conservatives dismantled the Great Society,
many cities greatly increased their reliance on the now-rebranded CDCs in order to address
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short-term, localist needs, such as low-income housing and social welfare provision in
marginal neighborhoods258. Public-sector reliance on these organizations increased
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as federal policies cut cities off from federal development
funds, while allowing CDCs to take advantage of the UDAG program, and later, the
community development block grant (CDBG) that replaced it. Across the country, CDCs
used these funds to accelerate expansion into projects like business enterprise development,
commercial real estate, venture capitalism, community finance, and urban redevelopment259.
Finally, since the 1990s, federal Empowerment Zone / Enterprise Community funds have
been made available to CDCs, who are tasked with representing the needs of the
communities being targeted by these federal programs260.
At the local level, CDCs draw cross-sector support through their boards of directors,
which often contain representatives from state- and federal organizations, political and
business leaders, private philanthropists, clergy, and neighborhood members, who combine
their various resource pools in service of organizational projects261. Because of these
connections, there is some evidence that CDCs have become a driving force in skewing
many urban agendas away from value-neutral development and back toward environmentaland social equity concerns262. However, even with this support, CDCs are frequently
undercapitalized, and lack the capacity to fully address growing needs in economically
marginalized communities; these challenges often prevent all but the largest CDCs from
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being as effective as various scholars suggest they could be263. Further, CDCs are often
considered challenging to evaluate; as CDCs venture away from traditional “charitable”
activities like housing and social services, their activities look increasingly like those of
private developers, but their redistributive objectives encourage these organizations to
develop in locations that traditional, for-profit developers would find undesirable, so it may
be inaccurate to compare them to private-sector peers264. As a final complication, a CDC
that is successful as an organization may not necessarily be benefitting its resident
community265.
One thread of scholarship outlines a number of challenges surrounding CDCs,
including evaluating their effectiveness, connecting measures of organizational success to
community improvement, and problems with organizational capacity. Alternatively, an
additional thread highlights an expansion of CDCs into long-range planning and urban
economic development, a connectedness to urban decision-makers, and the successful
efforts of some CDCs in affecting urban policies. As a result, it may be that, in spite of their
challenges, some subset of CDCs have achieved central positions within urban governing
coalitions. If a well-designed study could find evidence of this, then those organizations
could be studied to understand how they were able to grow beyond “ancillary status” within
these coalitions, and the effects of this on urban economic development policies and
projects.
Anchor institutions: urban development without the federal bulldozer. As
organizations that are geographically-linked (or “anchored”) to their surrounding cities,
anchor institutions like universities and hospitals are uniquely situated to bring about positive
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improvements in their communities. The idea that anchor institutions can be catalysts for
cities looking to solve complex urban problems reaches back to the late 1950s, though for
much of the 20th century, these organizations did not apply significant effort to advance
beyond research and teaching266. Instead, throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s,
urban hospitals and universities used hundreds of millions of dollars in grants from the Ford
Foundation and the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to engage in
destructive expansion projects that replaced economically-marginalized neighborhoods with
new- and expanded facilities as part of grand development plans267. By the early 1990s,
decades of mounting losses in federal- and state funding, as well as significant public
backlash regarding their untampered mid-century expansion projects268 forced anchor
institutions to rethink their commitments to their missions, any many realized that that their
missions could be better-served by improving the conditions in their surrounding
communities269.
In 21st-century cities across the United States, anchor institutions have become key
players in local economies. Taken as a whole, urban universities and hospitals across the
United States collectively represent over $1 billion in payroll, and more than $1 trillion in
overall economic activity, and in the largest 20 American cities, frequently among the largest
non-governmental employers.270 Additionally, because they are geographically anchored in
place, these institutions are principally self-interested in the local economy, and are once
again showing an interest in the vitality of their surrounding neighborhoods271. Increasingly,
urban universities and hospitals are actively working to address economic inequity in
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economically-marginalized areas, leveraging their status as major employers and purchasers
in order to engage in more equitable, value-driven economic development strategies in
economically-marginalized neighborhoods that have historically been ill-served by valueneutral development272. However, at the city-, state-, and federal level, officials have largely
failed to develop policies to utilize anchor institutions as partners in urban economic
development, and it appears that current policies are ill-suited for the needs and capabilities
of these organizations – in effect, public-sector decision-makers simply do not know how to
work with economic development organizations outside of the private sector, and research
on this appears to be slow in forthcoming. As a result, although anchor institutions are
(arguably) critical for improving community infrastructure, supporting their efforts is often
not seen as a priority by urban decision-makers273.

Transitions in the roles of CDCs and anchor institutions, in summary. As cities
have grown within the post-Fordist, knowledge-based economy, urban anchor institutions,
as centers of research and technological advancement, have become their economic
centerpieces, directly injecting millions of dollars into local economies through purchasing
and payroll. In limited cases, these organizations are leveraging this economic power to inject
new life into economically-marginalized neighborhoods, but even in such cases, local policies
usually fail to adequately support anchors’ efforts, limiting their overall effectiveness in
bringing about equitable economic development for cities’ most concerning neighborhoods.
As large employers and economic engines, these institutions are well-positioned to become
central members of urban governing coalitions, but considering that urban policies have not
adequately adapted to support their economic development projects in the same way that
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these policies continue to benefit private-sector economic development projects, it would
appear that they have not advanced beyond their traditional, ancillary positions. Like with
CDCs, if a well-designed study could find evidence of anchor institutions operating as core
members of a governing coalition, those organizations could be further examined in order to
accomplish this, as well as the effects of this increased involvement with respect to urban
economic development projects.
Post-Fordism in Dallas
Recall that the Elkin study found two key components that shifted Dallas’ governing
coalition away from the “pure” political economy found in the Thometz study: first, disunity
within the business community; and second, the transition from a purely at-large city council
to a mixed council of district-based and at-large members. Since the Elkin study, these
components have only amplified. First, as the study was published, Dallas’ economy was
gutted by the Savings & Loan Crisis and collapse of oil markets, only to be reborn in uneven,
disruptive ways. Second, the lawsuit that forced the city to change its at-large councilmember
elections to an “8-3” plan was again challenged under the Voting Rights Act, resulting in
another restructure in 1994. Certainly, Elkin could not have foreseen these changes, just at
Thometz could not have seen the changes that Elkin noted when arguing that the Thometz
characterization of Dallas’ decision-making structure was no longer accurate; nonetheless,
this study argues that it is time for a new study to reevaluate Elkin’s vision of a complex,
business-dominated entrepreneurial governing coalition. In the sections that follow, this
study will first examine Dallas’ economic struggles and resurgence, then it will look at the
city’s political reconfiguration, and finally, it will broadly discuss the city’s demographic
changes.
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Economic transitions. Between 1981 and 1986, Dallas’ seemingly-invincible
economy, which had grown steadily since the end of World War II274, was crippled by a
catastrophic decline in the oil market, as well the nearly-simultaneous Savings and Loan
Crisis275. The state as a whole, and Dallas in particular, had enriched itself over nearly a
decade of oil speculation, funded on loans secured by extraction equipment, stock
valuations, promises of future profit, and many loans were issued with little (if any) collateral,
from recently-deregulated savings and loan institutions276. Eager to compete with these
institutions, even traditional banks engaged in ever-riskier loan offerings, over-leveraging
assets and over-investing in oil and land speculation277. The Saudi embargo on oil had
brought incredible riches to the Texas economy, and to Dallas in particular, but the boom
could not last. By the mid-1980s, utility companies diversified their fuel sources to include
coal, natural gas, and nuclear power, while federal regulations forced fuel economy to rise in
passenger vehicles; as a result of the reduced demand for oil, many resource extraction
operations were forced into bankruptcy278.
As the owners of now-worthless oil drilling equipment and loans that would likely
never be repaid (in full or in part), Dallas’ banks could not continue operating. By 1992, 80%
of the region’s savings and loans were insolvent, 506 banks had failed, and of the state’s 10
largest banks, 9 had failed. Further, all of Dallas’ locally-owned financial institutions and
insurance firms – fully half of its economy – either abandoned the city or folded entirely279.
For Dallas’ other large industries – textiles, electronics, and defense equipment, the picture
was similarly bleak. By 1988, surging competition from Asian manufacturing firms drove

Grant, 1996, pp.19, 32-43
Grant, 1996, p. 20; Hazel, 1997, p. 61; Payne, 1994, pp. 398-399
276 Burrough, 2009, pp. 356-358; Grant, 1996, pp. 19-21
277 Grant, 1996, pp. 49-50
278 Burrough, 2009, pp. 406-407
279 Grant, 1996, pp. 2, 31, 216; Rice, 2007, pp. xviii-xix
274
275

60

down the costs of computer chips, which in turn put many of Dallas’ electronics
manufacturing firms out of business, the giant Texas Instruments nearly included280.
International pressure also impacted Dallas’ textile manufacturers, as factory owners moved
production to Mexico in the early-mid 1990s, lured by cheaper labor costs even before
NAFTA further distorted the economics of U.S.-based manufacturing281. Indeed, for a brief
moment in the late 1990s, the exodus of textile manufacturing to Mexico was so great that
the country supplanted China as the largest clothing supplier to the U.S282.
Finally, as the Cold War came to an end, defense spending cutbacks began
hammering Dallas’ beleaguered manufacturing sector. Between 1985 and 1989, defense
spending in the United States was cut by roughly 20% in real terms283. For the Dallas area,
which by 1988 was one of the largest recipients of DOD expenditures284, the effects were
devastating, triggering thousands of layoffs throughout the industry, including layoffs of
82% of Texas Instruments’ defense employees between 1990 and 1991, over 40% of whom
remained unemployed 9 months later285. Without oil revenues, and now without defense
contract revenues, the last of Dallas’ seemingly-endless capital streams dried up, and many
firms throughout the city followed area banks into insolvency286. As a result of corporate
bankruptcy and abandonment, by the early 1990s, 30% of Dallas’ CBD was vacant287, and
many of its skyscrapers were so empty that they were referred to as “see-through”
buildings288.
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Eager to return to economic “boom times,” civic first leaders looked to the business
community for help; after all, when Dallas looked to rebrand itself after the Kennedy
assassination, a group of civic-minded business elites stepped in to lead the charge. A
quarter-century had passed since those leaders were in their prime; many were retiring (or
dying), and had failed to groom their successors for positions in the governing coalition. The
men and women who were rising to the highest echelons of business leadership often had
little interest in the politics of development, and many remained divided over infrastructure
projects and urban redevelopment plans289. Nonetheless, the remaining “old guard’
successfully exploited divisions among the city councilmembers, and strong-armed the
council and city manager into finding a new way forward for the city290. The result was that
Dallas hired firms to market the city around the mythology surrounding its football team, as
well as the popular Dallas soap opera. In addition, the council engaged in several rounds of
urban redevelopment projects throughout Dallas’ northern neighborhoods and central
business district, although many of these projects fell far short of the grand ideas put
forward by the “Dallas Plan,” a 30-year development agenda approved by the city council in
1994291.
These efforts were highly successful, and since the mid-1990s, Dallas has seen
economic growth, even as other parts of the nation decline292. In 2010, the city contained
one of the highest agglomerations of Fortune 500 headquarters in the country293, and in
addition, the once-abandoned skyscrapers that define Dallas’ skyline are being converted
into mixed-use units, adding thousands of new residential units to the area294. However, this
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development, which quite obviously favored the majority-white central- and northern
sections of the city, engendered fierce political resistance from neighborhood groups in the
city’s southern half295. To quell social unrest, city leaders created a trust fund to improve
access to credit for businesses and community organizations in the city’s majority-nonwhite
southern neighborhoods296, but it is unclear whether this fund has actually been used
effectively, and the city has been accused of mishandling and misappropriating funds, while
the area continues to suffer from decades of disinvestment and decline297.
Political transitions. While Dallas’ economic transition has been relatively welldocumented by academia, its political transition is less well-documented, as its effects are
more recent than many of the works that chronicle the city. The “8-3” plan, identified by
Elkin, was only a partial success for advocates of representative governance. As soon as it
had been approved by the federal judge, the city had to determine how best to draw the
eight council districts, but found it impossible to ensure adequate representation for the
growing Hispanic and African-American populations, as well as changing demographics
resulting from continued white flight298. Federal approval for Dallas’ 8-3 proposal relied
upon demographic data from the 1970 census, but by 1980, these data – and the raceconscious election districts derived from them – were already obsolete. In particular,
between 1970 and 1980, the city’s Hispanic population grew by 62%, and its African
American population by 25%, while the white population fell by 9% over that same period;
these changes would require that some of the white-majority council districts would need to
be redrawn, or merged to become primarily African American, and somehow the city would
also have to create a district for people identifying as Hispanic, without increasing total the
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number of districts – a feat that city staffers argued was impossible299. Further, political- and
popular uproar over converting “white” districts into “black” districts under the 8-3
proposal engendered a variety of alternative proposals, including the creation of “quadrantbased” councilmembers to represent quarters of the city, and who would serve alongside
district-based councilmembers, and the creation of at-large council seats elected by only half
of the city300.
Ultimately, of the even reapportionment plans offered by the city manager’s office,
the city council would approve the quadrant-based 8-4-1 option for federal approval301. This
move engendered fierce resistance from the city’s African American community, with
tensions reaching a breaking point during a council meeting when activists locked arms and
sang We Shall Overcome at a 1989 council meeting concerning the plan302. By 1990, and before
any elections could be held, the 8-3 system was ruled in violation of the Voting Rights Act,
based on amendments made to the act after the 8-3 plan received initial approval303. In 1990,
a federal judge ruled that the 8-4-1 system was also unacceptable, and the city’s attempt to
appeal to the Justice Department also met with defeat. Meanwhile, an alternative, 14-1 plan,
in which 14 councilmembers would be elected by districts in which they resided, with the
mayor elected at large, was defeated by Dallas voters; however, courts ordered the city to
conduct its upcoming elections under the 14-1 plan, a plan that remains in-effect today304.
In the years following this transition, Dallas’ city council is more racially diverse than
ever before, with the city electing its first African-American mayor in 1995, and its first
minority-majority city council in 1999305. In addition, under this new system, city
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councilmembers hoping for re-election are forced to evaluate- and address the demands of
their districts, rather than the desires of business elites306. A side-effect is that council
districts are often operated more like fiefdoms than parts of a greater whole, and with this
approach, the opportunities for corruption are increased dramatically; indeed, since the
inducement of the 14-1 system, at least three major corruption scandals have erupted,
including the 2009 bribery and extortion conviction of the city’s Mayor Pro Tem related to
public housing contracts307. Absentee ballot fraud has also become a concern, peaking in
2001 when a judge disqualified absentee ballots and changed the outcome of a council
election in southern Dallas308.
Demographic transitions. Unquestionably, Dallas has historically been a
segregated city. Since (at least) the 1930s, city policies have reflected a city deeply divided –
both by the Trinity River (which splits the city into northern- and southern halves), and by
race, with people identifying as White tending to cluster north of the river, and minorities,
particularly people of Hispanic or Latino heritage and people identifying as Black or African
American, confined to Oak Cliff, south of the Trinity309. Even as Dallas’ economy has largely
rebounded from the collapse of the oil market and the Savings & Loan Crisis, not all of the
city has found a way to thrive; indeed, much (though not all) of the city’s southern half
continues to suffer from decades of disinvestment and decline, resulting from white flight
that followed racial violence and civil rights legislation in the 1960s, and the forced
integration of Dallas’ schools in 1971310. Although a comprehensive study of Dallas’
demographic transitions since the mid-1980s is beyond the scope of this study, a significant
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portion of that story can be told through the rise, fall, and rebirth of these two central
neighborhoods. The first of these, North Oak Cliff, is traditionally considered to be
predominately-nonwhite, economically marginalized community, but in recent years has
begun to rebound from decades of disinvestment, while the second, Downtown Dallas, is
the traditional hub of the city’s economic activity, the home of several of Dallas’ most
identifiable landmarks, and is currently undergoing a transformation from abandoned
corporate capital accumulator to a vibrant, mixed-use urban hub.

North Oak Cliff. Recall that after whites abandoned the neighborhood, people
from African American and Hispanic neighborhoods moved in to replace them, though
often as renters rather than owners. Minority-owned businesses replaced those formerly
owned by whites, and while commercial corridors had changed by the late 1970s,
commercial activity nonetheless remained. Further, attracted by depressed home values, a
subset of whites – the “urban pioneers” began to return to the area311, and beginning in the
1980s and early 1990s, developers like Jim Lake Jr. and David Spence began to redevelop
portions of North Oak Cliff, primarily surrounding an area now known as the Bishop Arts
District312. In addition, the 2010 completion of a new bridge linking North Oak Cliff to
Downtown Dallas has spurred additional development in the area; in-line with the new donut
model, this has attracted wealthier, younger whites into the neighborhood313. While this
revival of interest in North Oak Cliff is beginning to reverse decades of disinvestment, many
fear the negative effects of gentrification – particularly the displacement of minority
residents and businesses314.
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Downtown Dallas. While North Oak Cliff is experiencing a (somewhat
controversial) revival, Downtown Dallas is experiencing a new birth – not as a center of pure
capital accumulation, but as a center of both accumulation and consumption. Beginning at
the dawn of the 21st century, hundreds of apartment units, condominiums, and townhouses
have been added each year, built on an edgier, urban aesthetic, and with the support of a
Public Improvement District that reinvests levied fees into what has become, since the early
2000s, a white-majority neighborhood315. Since 2011, this transformation has dramatically
accelerated under Downtown Dallas 360, a comprehensive area redevelopment plan. This plan
was (and still is) billed as a way to bring together public officials, city staff, private
developers, and a nonprofit development corporation in order to both encourage- and guide
redevelopment projects throughout the neighborhood316. Initial stages of the plan focused
on infrastructure improvements317, while more recent stages emphasize attracting retail and
dining option into areas surrounding a series of newly-built museums, urban parks, and
outdoor art installations318. Early indicators suggest that the plan has been successful so far;
in 2014, over 1.5 million square feet of office space were leased, renewed, or expanded in
Downtown Dallas, and the number of real estate transactions reached a level unseen since
the boom times of the 1980s. In addition, since 2011, the neighborhood has added over
4,600 new residences319.
Post-Fordism, urban political economy, and the need to revisit Dallas, in
summary. Contrary to the bleak outlooks of mid-late 20th century urban scholars, the postFordist transition that caused so much disruption across the United States also revived a

Prior & Kemper, 2005, pp. 199-207
Downtown Dallas Inc., 2015, p. B3; Grimes, 2010
317 e.g. sidewalk repairs, bicycle lanes, improved lighting and crosswalks
318 Hall, 2015; Perez, 2014; Prior & Kemper, 2005, p. 197
319 Downtown Dallas Inc., 2015a, p. B4
315
316

67

subset of these localities. This transition was much an economic shift as a social one, with
locally-owned firms and manufacturing ceding ground to multinational organizations and a
knowledge-based economy, while a subset of the affluent whites who abandoned cities
during white flight return to reclaim urban neighborhoods for themselves. Within Dallas in
particular, although the 1980s saw the collapse of its oil- and financial markets, which left the
city’s urban core significantly vacant, and its economy in shambles, by 2010, the city had
largely rebounded, and its CBD had begun a revitalization process that continues today. As
in many (if not all) central cities growing under the knowledge-based, economic aspects of
the post-Fordist paradigm, the economic prosperity in Dallas is not uniform, and people of
color living in economically-marginalized neighborhoods (primarily in southern Dallas) face
threats of gentrification and displacement.
As cities transition in the early 21st century, so too do the coalitions that lead them.
While old guard leaders within governing coalitions remove themselves from the politics of
decision-making, some cities are seeing a growth in the roles of anchor institutions and
CDCs in governing coalitions. Although the involvement of CDCs and anchor institutions
in Dallas’ decision-making structure is unclear, literature already suggests a weakening of the
“old guard,” resulting in part from economic forces, but also from Dallas’ dramatic, courtordered restructuring of its system of electing city leaders. As a result of these changes, four
decades after the growth machine heralded in a new perspective on urban governance –
urban political economy – it may be time to revisit Dallas, and to once again reconsider big
city politics.
Chapter Summary
Beginning in the late 1970s, but primarily in the 1980s and early 1990s, urban
scholarship reflected the changes in the urban context since the late 1950s, and scholars
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suggested that the “community power” theories of urban governance could no longer
adequately conceptualize urban governance in practice. Two models emerged to fill this
then-void in the literature – growth machine theory and urban regime analysis – which
conceptualized urban governance from a systemic, behavioral perspective, and as a result,
quickly grew to dominate the study of urban politics.
Outside of the theoretical concerns regarding both of these theoretical perspectives,
this study argues that, given the changes in the urban context beginning in the late 20th
century, especially the economic- and demographic transitions in United States cities, as well
as a growing role of CDCs and anchor institutions, theories of contemporary urban
governance may no longer be accurate in modeling the actualities of contemporary urban
governance. Indeed, this study proffers that, as a result of continued changes in the urban
context, primarily the effects of post-Fordism on urban cores, and the expansion of CDCs
and anchor institutions into economic development, big city politics are again in transition,
and the structural components of urban governance need to be revisited. A well-designed
study, therefore, may be able to fill this emerging gap in the literature. In Chapter 3, this
study will outline the methods it will use in order to again revisit the nature of urban
governance.
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CHAPTER III
SETTING AND METHODOLOGY
In the previous chapter, this study discussed the state of extant urban scholarship
with respect to its research questions, and established the presence of a lacuna in the
literature with respect to contemporary urban governance structures. In this chapter, this
study will outline the setting of its data collection, and the methods it used to assess whether
cities are still governed by the political-business coalitions conceptualized in the 1970s and
1980s, or whether some subset of the third sector has achieved legitimacy as a primary,
rather than ancillary, component of urban governance320.
In the sections that follow, this study will first revisit its research questions. Then, it
will offer a series of hypotheses to be tested in order to answer those questions. Third, it will
details the study design, arguing for its appropriateness in addressing the research questions.
Fourth, it will describe the setting for this study, as well as the target population and research
sample. Fifth, it will outline the data collection methods and instrumentation, including a
note regarding the ethical considerations related to this study. Sixth, it will discuss how data
are to be analyzed and processed – first for the descriptive data, and then for the surveys and
interviews. Finally, it will offer an initial consideration of validity and limitations related to
the findings.
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Research Questions and Hypotheses, Revisited
The purpose of this section is to outline the research questions that this study
attempts to answer, or at least begin to address, and to present a series of hypotheses to be
tested. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will first list its overarching research
questions, and following this, it will introduce the particular hypotheses to be tested.
Research Questions Revisited
This study aims to answer three primary research questions. First, how have Dallas’
demographics and economy evolved in the decades since the city was studied by previous
urban scholars? Second, to what extent (if any) are CDCs and anchor institutions active
participants in Dallas’ governing coalition? Finally, if these organizations are active
participants in Dallas’ governing coalition, what is the effect of that involvement on urban
development and policymaking?
Hypotheses Revisited
As Chapter 1 noted, this study forwards six primary hypotheses. The first three of
these relate the changing socioeconomic context of Dallas as a whole, as well as the
neighborhoods of North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas, to expectations grounded in
current literature regarding central cities and their urban neighborhoods. The second three of
these hypotheses surround the nature of governance in these same three geographies, and
the effects of “who governs” on the decisions made in contemporary cities and
neighborhoods. These hypotheses are as-follows:
Hypothesis 1. Consistent with expectations of modern, economically-prosperous
cities in the globalized, post-Fordist paradigm and the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs model, in
the decades since the Elkin & Thometz studies, Dallas’ citywide socioeconomic context has
changed in four primary ways:
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•

People identifying as “white alone” represent a smaller percentage of the population
in 2010 (the most recent decennial census) than they did 1980 (the census
immediately prior to the Elkin study).

•

A smaller percentage of Dallas’ workforce is employed in blue collar fields in 2010
than in 1980.

•

A larger percentage of Dallas’ workforce is employed in creative class fields in 2010
than in 1980.

•

Dallas, as a whole, shows signs of greater economic polarization in 2010 than in
1980.
Hypothesis 2. Consistent with expectations of literature surrounding gentrification

of urban neighborhoods and the new donut model, within North Oak Cliff, recent urban
redevelopment projects and neighborhood gentrification are associated with four primary
changes in the neighborhood’s respective socioeconomic context:
•

People identifying as “white alone” represent a larger percentage of the
neighborhood’s population in 2010 than they did in 1980.

•

A smaller percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in blue collar fields
in 2010 than in 1980.

•

A larger percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in creative class
fields in 2010 than in 1980.

•

The neighborhood shows signs of greater economic polarization in 2010 than in
1980.
Hypothesis 3. Consistent with expectations of literature surrounding gentrification

of urban neighborhoods and the new donut model, within Downtown Dallas, recent urban
redevelopment projects and neighborhood gentrification are associated with four primary
changes in the neighborhood’s respective socioeconomic context:
•

People identifying as “white alone” represent a larger percentage of the
neighborhood’s population in 2010 than they did in 1980.

•

A smaller percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in blue collar fields
in 2010 than in 1980.
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•

A larger percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in creative class
fields in 2010 than in 1980.

•

The neighborhood shows signs of greater economic polarization in 2010 than in
1980.
Hypothesis 4. In Dallas as a whole, representatives of anchor institutions and

CDCs are primary (rather than ancillary) members of a citywide governing coalition, and this
involvement portends a more equitable development paradigm than the value-neutral
development seen in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century.
Hypothesis 5. In North Oak Cliff, representatives of anchor institutions and CDCs
in are primary (rather than ancillary) members, of a neighborhood governing coalition, and
this involvement portends a more equitable development paradigm than the value-neutral
development seen in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century.
Hypothesis 6. In Downtown Dallas, representatives of anchor institutions and
CDCs in are primary (rather than ancillary) members, of a neighborhood governing
coalition, and this involvement portends a more equitable development paradigm than the
value-neutral development seen in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century.
Research Design
Previous studies of informal urban governance structures suggest that governance
emerges from interactions among people, whether those people are influential elites321 or
competing interest groups322, and these interactions complex causalities, resource constraints,
and an element of path dependency based on the outcomes and contexts of previous
interactions323. In looking to current urban scholarship for recommended methodologies, it
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should be noted that seminal authors like Logan, Molotch, Elkin, and Stone all neglect to
meaningfully endorse any particular methodology324, possibly to avoid having their work fall
to the same fate as the community power studies to which their work owes a great deal.
These deep connections, however, offer some validity to the idea of using previous
methods – those found in the community power debates – in a contemporary setting. To
test its hypotheses, this study reproduced- and refined methods anchored in that literature: a
single-shot reputational analysis of a particular city, supported by descriptive quantitative
data drawn from decennial census- and American Community Survey (ACS) tables. In the
sections and paragraphs that follow, this study will first elaborate upon the case method,
including a note on comparative urban research, and why a case study is employed instead.
Then, it will offer a broad explanation of network analysis, as well as a detailed description of
the reputational method. Finally, it will consider the use of secondary-source analysis,
particularly when using census data.
The Case Method
In addressing the nature of contemporary urban governance, this study utilizes a case
analysis of a single city, as opposed to a more comparative research design. First, this section
will broadly describe the case method, making note of its advantages and disadvantages, and
then outline the use of Dallas as a crucial case for analysis. Next, it will present a brief
discussion of comparative urban research as an alternative, arguing for the inappropriateness
of a comparative model. Finally, it will offer a defense of using a case study in answering the
research questions.
Case studies, broadly. As an alternative (or complement) to the comparative
research methods, which takes a shallower look at a wide selection of cities, case studies
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produce intensive examinations of particular locations325, and have been heavily used to
investigate the variety of decision-making processes within cities, as well as the political and
economic forces that make each one unique326. It is somewhat inaccurate to consider case
studies as a unified block, and literature suggests that it is more appropriate to consider “case
study” an umbrella term encompassing a wide typology of design methods327, 328. Whatever
the particular design, though, a well-chosen case study allows researchers to engage
holistically with rare events that may not recur often enough for statistical analysis, enables
the study of interactions within cases too rare for statistical analysis or comparative
research329, and can be used to suggest the plausibility of a new position, especially when
there is a general lack of secondary source data330. Finally, it is important to note that case
studies generally require fewer financial resources to complete than comparative- or
statistical methods, while offering a degree of depth and complexity that are often infeasible
through these other designs331.
Certainly, case studies are not without their trade-offs. A primary concern with
relying on the results of a single case is that doing so introduces the possibility that any
conclusions drawn represent a deviant case, and as a result, are not representative of cases as
a whole332. In addition, the looseness of the case study as a form of research can complicate
attempts at generalization, as there are few widely-accepted guidelines for drawing inferences
and assessing causation from the data. Further, because case studies highlight the
particularities of any given case’s context, these contextual differences weaken attempts at
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generalization to the population as a whole333. Finally, case studies are often viewed as
lacking rigor, with sloppy research and lack of systematic procedures allowing researchers to
influence the direction of their findings and conclusions334. As a result, it can be challenging
for a single case to either constitute the basis for new generalizations, or to fully discount
existing ones335, and for these reasons, case studies have fallen out of favor in many fields,
concurrent with the rise of more powerful statistical methods336.
Dallas as a crucial case. In studying the structure of contemporary governing
coalitions, this study argues that Dallas is indeed a crucial case. While many Rust Belt
municipalities have starved for new development, potentially rendering their governing
coalitions more amenable to working with nontraditional organizations like CDCs and
anchor institutions, Dallas has benefitted from its relative diversity of industries, as well as
nearby resource extraction operations; indeed, the city’s economy has largely thrived since
the mid-1990s, even as the Great Recession plagued the rest of the nation337. As such, Dallas
is argued to be a “least-likely” scenario for changes to be found. If a well-designed case study
finds that there is a transformation in the role of third-sector organizations in Dallas, with
respect to current theories of urban governance, this would be a powerful indicator of
changes occurring elsewhere. By comparison, results from a “most-likely” case like
Cleveland or Detroit may simply be explained by that aforementioned hunger for
development, and it could be argued that the change in “who governs” is merely temporary,
lasting only until economic fortunes improve338.
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A note on comparative urban research. Comparative urban research is a popular
trend in contemporary scholarship, which makes the use of a case study seem somewhat
dated. Before defending the use of the case study, it is important to briefly discuss the
comparative method, which allows scholars to assess causality of defining characteristics and
trends within cities, by comparing them against one another within a uniform theoretical
framework. There are a nearly limitless number of ways in which a comparative study can be
designed, but in practical terms, most comparative designs tend to fall within a relatively
narrow band of study types339 that share the primary goal of testing whether (or to what
extent) an independent variable is causally linked to the dependent variables in the
researcher’s framework, and to develop empirically valid theories in the process340. Because
comparative studies involve several cases that are intentionally selected based on researcheridentified characteristics, it is somewhat unlikely that any conclusions drawn come from
outliers, as is possible with single-case studies341. Because of these strengths, comparative
research has been used to greatly expand the scope of urban theory, and in some ways, the
use of comparative methods helped revitalize urban research in the closing decades of the
20th century342.
With respect to varying approaches to urban research, “no concept can be
comprehensive, much less perfect, and each has its relative merits and liabilities.”343 While
comparative research offers a number of strengths, it can be hampered by political- and
cultural differences among various cases, as well as in differences among cities in terms of
how similar problems manifest themselves344. In addition, even when the differences among
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cities in a comparative study are minimized, the process of studying each city, and then
comparing them comes at tremendous cost, both in terms of time and financial resources345
Finally, when comparing variables found over multiple cities, the city-specific context in
which those data actually exist may be lost346. This study intended to address the research
questions by building a complex narrative for the evolution of the city of Dallas, and as such,
a comparative design was considered to be inappropriate.
On the appropriateness of the case method. Although the results of case studies
are limited, and subjective opinions of the method vary, this does not suggest that they are
without merit, as evidenced by their continuing popularity in urban research and theorybuilding347. The shortcomings of case studies do not preclude their usefulness as a basis for
functional analysis of a phenomenon, nor do they preclude the use of the method in
exploring relevant attributes of the case itself348. These positions in mind, the use of a case
study is appropriate for helping to foster a greater discussion about who governs cities today,
and for suggesting the plausibility of the research findings which are detailed in later
chapters.
Network Analysis and the Reputational Method
As part of its case study of Dallas, this study will employ a reputational analysis of
the city’s potentially influential individuals. Reputational analysis is an established (though
historically controversial) method under the larger umbrella of network analysis. In the
paragraphs that follow, this study will first briefly discuss network analysis as a cluster of
related methods. Then, it will examine reputational analysis, including its assumptions,
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historical criticisms and conceptual shortcomings, before offering a rejoinder. Finally, it will
offer a defense of a reputational analysis in answering the research questions.
Network analysis. Network analysis is not a single technique, but rather, a group of
related techniques including reputational-, decisional- and positional analysis (among
others)349, which vary with respect to the particular aspects of social networks (actors350,
activities351, or relations352) that they hold rigid, and which they allow to vary353. Generally
speaking, each particular method operationalizes networks as interrelated sets of
relationships among defined nodes or elements, which can represent range including (among
others) individuals, organizations, and nations. Most commonly, network analysis methods
attempt to explain and model the behavior of these people within their social networks, as
well as to explain the network as a whole354, but many of these methods can also be used to
examine individuals relative to their positions in organizations, or links between clusters of
organizations355. Further, network methods emphasize the importance of the structure of
networks in shaping actions of individual actors, or in other words, the effects of how
people are connected through their social environments, and how differing environmental
contexts describe and explain various decisions and outcomes356. In short, network analysis
attempts to evaluate the extent to which people know one another, and the extent to which
the people they know also know one another357.
Reputational method. The reputational method (or reputational analysis) is a
qualitative, narrative-driven method of network analysis, employed most commonly to
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uncover the particular makeup of governing coalitions within given cities. This method
focuses on the actors within a social network, using the reputation for influence in a
community as a proxy for actual influence358.
Reputational studies of cities are generally conducted in two phases. In the first, the
researcher identifies a core group of volunteers, such as bankers, real estate developers, and
community leaders; these volunteers are asked to rank lengthy lists of citizens who, based on
their positions in society, could reasonably be assumed to be influential people (commonly
referred to in the literature as influentials or decision-makers)359. Then, a new set of lists (often
containing 50-100 of the highest-rated names) are then presented to that same group of
judges, who are then asked to “vote” for the 10-25 most influential people, based on their
understanding of the city. The people with the highest votes are then invited to participate in
the second phase of the study.
In the second phase of most reputational studies, the new group of participants are
given similar lists of names to what the judges in the first phase were given, with similar
instructions to rate the relative influence of individuals. In addition, participants are invited
to add names that the list does not currently include. Researchers use these new names to
expand the participant pool through snowball sampling. Eventually, the researchers cut off
the snowball sampling, and use the results of the ranked lists to render an image the
structure and actions within a social network360. This method, while not random, holds the
advantage of being able to access hard-to-reach populations, as well as populations that are
difficult to identify through traditional sampling methods361.
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Assumptions, criticisms, and methodological challenges. Reputational analysis
is built on three primary assumptions. First, the method assumes that power within a city is
differentially distributed among members of a governing coalition, because the resources
required to effectively govern a city are beyond the capacity of any particular actor or
organization, regardless of their financial wealth or political clout362. Related to this, power
rests within a relatively small group of actors willing and able to mobilize their resources in
service of predetermined goals, with a reasonable likelihood of being able to attain them363.
Finally, power cannot be measured directly, and instead, must be measured through a proxy
variable; as such, a given actor’s reputation for having power is assumed to be a valid standin364.
The criticisms of reputational analysis generally fall into two broad categories:
criticisms of its assumptions, and criticisms of its procedures and findings. To the first set of
challenges critics assert that there is no reason to believe that power is either differentially
distributed, or that it is an emergent property of interactions among various actors. Even if
those assumptions can be supported, they do not necessarily suggest that influentials ever
form into cohesive governing coalitions. Further, even if such a coalition exists, this does not
presuppose dominance over the policymaking process. Finally, even if all of the previous
assertions prove valid, they cannot be made a priori, which invalidates the reputational
method365.
Looking at the method’s procedures and findings, critics charge that the method
offers little more than an ambiguous, static definition of power, and fails to recognize the
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difference between generalized power and project- or agenda-specific power. As a result, the
specific questions that reputational surveys use are generally imprecise, and results frequently
confirm the positions of the authors. Finally, the roster of influential actors created by these
surveys is merely a list of potential influentials, and cannot be assumed to contain all actual
influentials366.

A rejoinder. These pluralist arguments appear to reflect a deep misunderstanding of
the technique’s ontological scholarship, as well as common-sense examinations of urban
policymaking. To the suggestion that power is not differentially distributed, that there is
indeed a distribution of power within cities has been supported by an overwhelming
preponderance of evidence367, and dozens of studies are strongly suggestive of the presence
of cohesive formal- and informal social-, legal, and business relationships among those who
wield that power368. It is also inaccurate for critics to charge that reputational studies
conceptualize power as a monolithic construct; instead, the majority of these studies suggest
instead that, while some individual actors possess a degree of generalized influence, it is
more common to see a broad range and typology of influential actors with dynamic,
contextual scopes of influence that often reach beyond their particular fields or industries369.
Finally, it is inaccurate for detractors to accuse reputational studies of presupposing the
existence of governing coalitions. The reputational method itself does not assume the
existence of a governing coalition of influentials; certainly doing this would indeed prejudge
what has historically been a critical, fundamental question within urban political studies370.
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Looking now to the criticisms of the method’s procedures and results, it appears that
many of these arguments are actually responses to poor applications of the technique, or
result from cherry-picked meta-analyses of reputational surveys. For example, when noting
that some reputational studies fail to differentiate between generalized and issue-specific
influence, detractors accurately highlight a critical shortcoming those applications of the
technique, which have been addressed in more rigorous studies371. In addition, the
suggestion that the reputational method always finds a governing coalition ignores several
studies whose results fail to support the presence of one372. Further, to the criticism that the
reputation for influence is not a valid proxy for actual influence, during the 1950s and 1960s,
scholars validated the method against decisional- and positional surveys, and found
significant evidence that the reputation for power is a valid indicator of the extent to which
an individual is actually involved in the policymaking process373. Finally, that the results of
reputational studies are based on individual biases and imperfect knowledge is undeniable,
and as a result, it is assumed that there are an unknowable number of “blind spots” in the
results. However, all methods produce results that contain error, so it is (arguably)
unreasonable to invalidate reputational analysis for that reason.

On the appropriateness of the reputational method. This study aimed to
examine the structure of power in the city of Dallas, in order to consider fundamental
questions about the nature of governing coalitions more broadly. In addition, it compared
the Dallas of the early 21st century with the Dallas of the mid-20th, to understand how the
city and its governing coalition have evolved over time and circumstances. In service of
those goals, the reputational method held considerable appeal. First, the method is relatively
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straightforward, and can replicated across a number of communities of varying sizes374. In
addition, the method contains a tremendous amount of face validity; that is, it addresses the
research questions in a way that would (arguably) be substantiated by common-sense
appraisals from informed observers of a community’s affairs375. Finally, the previous study of
Dallas utilized a reputational method, so in comparing the city’s governing coalition today to
how it existed in the past, choosing an alternative method would likely jeopardize this study’s
validity, as results would not easily compare to those of prior researchers. These positions in
mind, the use of a reputational analysis was considered appropriate for analyzing the
structure of urban governance in Dallas.
Secondary-Source Data Analysis
Finally, in addressing the nature of contemporary urban governance, decennial
census- and ACS records from 1980 to 2010 are employed in order to trace the economicand demographic transformations in Dallas since the Elkin (1987) study. First, this section
broadly discusses the use of census data in social sciences, including specific data used for
this study. Next, it describes some of the concerns with secondary-source data, as they apply
to this case. Finally, it presents a defense of the appropriateness using these secondarysource data in answering the research questions.
On the use and appropriateness of secondary-source data analysis. Broadly
speaking, the use of census data has taken on an expanded role in investigating the social
world analysis, and its use is now widely accepted across the social sciences376. By federal law,
the U.S. government conducts a decennial census, and since 1940, this census has included a
census of housing as well, providing researchers with a valuable source of economic- and
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demographic information for a large section of the population377. These data are publicly
available, are generally available at no additional cost to the researcher, are available at many
geographic levels (e.g. tract-, city-, county-, and state-level), and are also available for
multiple years. As a result, using census data allows inclusion of additional descriptive data
than would have been feasible using direct surveys, in less time, for less money, and with
data that are more readily comparable between different locations, such as among different
areas within the same cities, or between one city and another378. This study utilizes decennial
census data to examine demographic- and economic shifts between 1980 and 2010, as well
as ACS data to supplement data from 2010 that have not yet been made available.

Concerns with using secondary-source data. The use of census data can be
somewhat problematic, though, for a number of reasons. First, it is often the case that
particular groups (e.g. people with low incomes, immigrants who are undocumented, people
with outstanding warrants) are poorly represented379. Further, these data are not always
reported at the level of specificity needed by the researcher, reported data may contain gaps
and errors for which the researcher cannot easily correct, and some data may simply not be
formatted or reported in a way that the researcher will find useful380. Finally, definitions
often change from one reporting period to the next, and the researcher must ensure that
they are aware of these changes, and that they can correct for them381.

In defense of secondary-source analysis. Although the use of census data is
hardly free from perfection, it is a well-established method in exploratory research, with
thousands of examples found across social sciences382. Decennial census data are considered
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“complete count” data, with participation mandated by federal law; as such, these data are
effectively measures of the research population, or at least, are as close to the actual
population as is feasible383. Looking at the problem of statistical error, the Census Bureau
documents margins of error in the census files themselves, while also noting where error
may have been introduced for the purpose of protecting confidentiality384. Finally,
considering the problem of under-representation, tremendous effort is undertaken to include
members of difficult-to-reach populations, beyond what is feasible for most researchers
outside of the Census Bureau385. These positions in mind, the use of census- and ACS data
for the purposes of suggesting economic- and demographic trends within Dallas was
considered to be appropriate.
In the paragraphs that follow, this study will first briefly introduces Dallas, Texas, the
site of the Thometz and Elkin studies, as well as this study’s two focus neighborhoods:
North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. Then, it will detail the settings of the surveys and
interviews themselves, so that future researchers can replicate the process, at least to the
extent feasible when repeating studies in natural (rather than laboratory) settings.
Study Focus Areas: Dallas and Two Central Urban Neighborhoods
This study focuses on three geographic areas for its analysis: the City of Dallas as a
whole, and two of its central urban neighborhoods: North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas.
In the sections that follow, this study will briefly introduce each, in turn.
The City of Dallas, Texas. The City of Dallas is located in North Central Texas,
and is the seat of Dallas County. The city was founded on the banks of the Trinity River, as a
trading post located on a natural river crossing used by Native American tribes. Now,
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instead of traces, the city is crossed by four major Interstate highways: 20, 30, 35, and 45, as
well as a number of rail lines, and is served by a major international airport386.
As Chapter 2 detailed, for nearly all of Dallas’ postwar history, city policies have
reflected the desires of city leaders to keep Dallas business-friendly, as well as deeply divided
by race, with people identifying as White tending to cluster north of the Trinity River, and
minorities, particularly people of Hispanic or Latino heritage and people identifying as Black
or African American, confined to Oak Cliff, clustered to the south387. Chapter 2 recounted
much of this history, at least with respect to the city’s history of developmental politics and
the differential developmental trajectories of its two halves. The effects of those histories
and trajectories can be seen even today, in the neighborhoods of North Oak Cliff and
Downtown Dallas, which are both revitalizing, but in strikingly different ways.
North Oak Cliff. Looking first at North Oak Cliff, recall that Chapter 2 recounted
the political- and economic disinvestment through this once-vibrant commercial hub within
southern Dallas. Much of southern Dallas has been broadly ignored by both city leaders and
the general public for decades, and has garnered a reputation for commercial disinvestment,
high crime, and poor school performance388. As Chapter 2 recounts, North Oak Cliff is
becoming an exception to this, and is rapidly gentrifying through a mix of new construction
and adaptive reuse of existing structures. As Chapters 4 and 5 will expand upon, these
changes have divided opinions, with many newcomers praising the growth and revitalization,
while a subset of existing residents, many of whom cannot afford to live in a Disneyfied
version of the former streetcar suburb, and are unsure of where they will move when they
are forced out of their rental houses and commercial pad sites. Finally, although the specific
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boundaries of North Oak Cliff are somewhat fluid and subjective, a common definition
bounds the neighborhood within Interstate Highway 30, Interstate Highway 35E, 12th Street,
and Hampton Road; these boundaries are reflected in figure 3.01 shows a map of North Oak
Cliff389.
Figure 3.01: Map of North Oak Cliff

Downtown Dallas. The home of the city’s skyline, Downtown Dallas is the city’s
visible face; as later chapters will note, many people believe this to be the heart of Dallas,
and that its health (or decay) is representative of the rest of the city. As Chapter 2 noted, the
Downtown Dallas skyline is largely a result of a publicly-funded push to move Dallas
beyond the Kennedy assassination by bulldozing offices and warehouses from the early 20th
century and replacing them with convention centers, stadiums, and office buildings in a
construction boom that lasted from the mid-1960s until the real estate, financial, and oil
markets collapsed throughout the early-mid 1980s. After floundering for over a decade,
starting in the mid-late 1990s, Downtown Dallas entered a second period of revitalization
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that continues today, under the Downtown Dallas 360 master plan. Rather than gentrifying an
existing residential area, much of Downtown Dallas’ real estate is being reclaimed from
existing commercial properties, with offices being converted into upscale lofts; nonetheless,
there is little room in the neighborhood for people with low- or moderate incomes. In terms
of geographical boundaries, figure 3.02 shows a map of Downtown Dallas390, using Spur 366,
State Highway 75 (Central Expressway), Interstate Highway 30, and Interstate Highway 35E
as commonly-accepted neighborhood boundaries.
Figure 3.02: Map of Downtown Dallas

Study Focus Areas, in summary. Like other entrepreneurial governing coalitions,
leadership in Dallas often seeks to solve its problems through growth and development.
Indeed, as Chapter 2 describes, throughout the city’s history, Dallas’ leaders have strived to
make city policies favorable to businesses and growth, although a legacy of racism has
focused this growth into white neighborhoods like Downtown Dallas, often at the expense
of majority-minority southern neighborhoods like North Oak Cliff. Although these
neighborhoods continue to lag behind, recently, a subset of them have begun to gentrify as
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affluent whites migrate back to the city from Dallas’ northern suburbs391. Although both
Downtown Dallas and North Oak Cliff have experienced high vacancy rates and
abandonment, the particular shape of that abandonment, as well as each neighborhood’s
respective paths to revitalization have been differentially affected by decisions made at the
citywide level, neighborhood-level leaders (at least in North Oak Cliff) have also played a
role. While the actions of past decision-makers are responsible for the current state of Dallas
as a whole, as well as both North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas, from this point forward,
this study will focus on the current decision-makers in these areas, as well as the effects of
the decisions that they make – particularly with respect to equitable economic development.
Setting and Context of Data Collection
Looking first at quantitative data collection, records were collected and added to the
dataset between April and June of 2015. For 1980 and 1990, data are not generally available
in electronic format, so this phase of data collection was performed in the libraries of the
University of Louisville and the University of Texas at Dallas using physical copies of
Census Bureau publications. For 2000 and 2010, data are available through the American
FactFinder website, which is produced and maintained by the Census Bureau.
For qualitative data collection, surveys and interviews were conducted over a fourweek period, beginning on June 3, 2015, and ending on July 2, 2015. To accommodate the
participants, each was slotted into a two-hour window, with 3-4 interviews being conducted
each weekday. Participants were invited to select the meeting slot and location, based on
their availability. Of the 79 total participants, 43 chose to meet in their offices or nearby
meeting rooms 31 elected to meet in coffee shops and cafes, 3 identified hotel conference
rooms, and 2 chose to meet in locally-owned, independent businesses. While a more
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rigorous experimental design would mandate the use of a specific, controlled meeting room,
it was decided that because of the sensitive nature of the questions being asked of the
participants, their preferences would be honored.
Research Sample and Data Sources
The purpose of this section is to outline the data sources used. First, it will list all
data points selected for quantitative analysis of the city of Dallas, first for 1980, and then for
1990, 2000, and 2010. Then, it will describe the target population for the reputational
analysis, as well as the sample of participants and how participants were identified and
invited to participate. Finally, it will evaluate ethical considerations, and how confidentiality
is protected.
Quantitative Data Sources
Data collected at each year. For all yearsiv, v, vi, vii this study uses the following data:
population (all races combined), population (white alone), population (black or African
American alone), population (American Indian or Alaskan native alone), population (Asian
American, Pacific Islander, or native Hawaiian alone), population (other or mixed-race),
population (nonwhite), and population (Hispanic, regardless of race). It also uses the
following income and poverty data: median household income, poverty (all races combined),
poverty (white alone), poverty (black or African American alone), poverty (American Indian
or Alaskan native alone), poverty (Asian American, Pacific Islander, or native Hawaiian
alone), poverty (other or mixed-race), poverty (nonwhite), and poverty (Hispanic, regardless
of race), unemployment (all races combined), and employment by industry (manufacturing).

Notes for 1980 and 1990. It is important to note that in 1980 and 1990, definitions
for a number of employment categories are not analogous to those listed in census files from
2000 onward. At the citywide level, these data are supplemented by data from the Texas
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Employment Commission. These data, while the best available, are less granular than those
presented in the decennial census. For example, for 1980, data are presented for the Dallas/
Fort Worth standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA)392, while in 1990, data are
presented for the Dallas-Fort Worth primary metropolitan statistical area (PMSA). These
terms were both deprecated in 2000, replaced by the broader term “metropolitan statistical
area” (MSA). The differences between an SMSA and a PMSA relate to how statistical areas
are classified, with PMSAs being reserved for statistical areas with at least one county
featuring a city of at least one million people, while SMSAs only require a county with a city
of at least 50,000. Thus, as Dallas’ population topped one million people in 1990, its
statistical area became a PMSA; this change in nomenclature has no bearing on the data
themselves. Nonetheless, it is critical to understand that these data are not limited to Dallas
itself, and include its surrounding statistical area, which includes large cities such as Fort
Worth and Arlington. This limitation will be revisited later in this study, but use of these data
allow for comparisons over the entire period from 1980 to 2010 at the citywide level –
comparisons which would be unavailable using census data alone.
These caveats in mind, this study uses the following employment-related data:
employment by industry (executive, administrative, and managerial), employment by industry
(professional specialty occupations), employment by industry (technical and related support),
employment by industry (sales), employment by industry (administrative support and
clerical), employment by industry (private household), employment by industry (protective
services), employment by industry (service occupations other than protective and private
household), employment by industry (farming, forestry, and fishing), employment by
industry (production, craft, and repair), employment by industry (machine operators,
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assemblers, and inspectors), employment by industry (transportation and material moving),
employment by industry (handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers), employment
by industry (construction), employment by industry (manufacturing), employment by
industry (transportation, communications, and utilities), employment by industry (wholesale
and retail trade), employment by industry (finance, insurance, and real estate), employment
by industry (professional and related services). Through analysis of relevant definitions, these
categories (either alone or in combination) were found to be similar in scope to categories in
census and ACS data, taking into account aforementioned limitations.

Notes for 2000. For 2000, this study uses the following employment-related data:
employment by industry (agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining), employment
by industry (construction), employment by industry (wholesale trade), employment by
industry (retail trade), employment by industry (transportation and warehousing, and
utilities), employment by industry (information), employment by industry (professional,
scientific, management, administrative, and waste management), employment by industry
(arts, entertainment and recreation, and accommodation and food services), employment by
industry (other services, except public administration), and employment by industry (public
administration).

Notes for 2010. Finally, for 2010 this study also uses the following employment
data: employment by industry (agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining),
employment by industry (construction), employment by industry (wholesale trade),
employment by industry (retail trade), employment by industry (transportation and
warehousing, and utilities), employment by industry (information), employment by industry
(professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management), employment
by industry (arts, entertainment and recreation, and accommodation and food services),
93

employment by industry (other services, except public administration), and employment by
industry (public administration). Of additional note, because of the comparatively recent
nature of the 2010 decennial census, published records are incomplete. Where noted, this
study uses ACS 5-year estimates, from the period of 2006 to 2010. While (arguably) less
accurate than the decennial census, these data use incredibly complex modeling- and
sampling techniques to remain a statistically valid representation of the population as a
whole393.
Qualitative Data Sources
Target population. The current conceptualization of urban governance is largely a
product of studies conducted from the early 1970s to the mid- to late 1990s, which in turn
owe a heavy debt to the community power studies of the 1950s and1960s394. These earlier
studies suggested that the informal coalition of city leaders primarily include prominent
businesspeople and leading politicians, but that a lower-tier of leadership exists on an asneeded basis, in order to help legitimize policies or development plans, with little overall
input in the decisions being made; this larger group consists of heads of community
organizations and universities, community leaders, local experts, local media, construction
companies, real estate developers, and regional banks, as well as leaders from religious
orders, social service organizations, and cultural institutions among395.
Survey sample. Because the exact makeup of Dallas’ governing coalition is not
known, it was decided to cast a wide net for potential participants. Using previous literature
as a guide, this study identified political leaders at the city-, state-, and national level;
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executive leadership- and board members of large businesses in the city; administration and
board members of the city’s school district; members of the state board of education; county
judges; executive leadership- and board membership of CDCs, universities, and hospitals;
members of every chamber of commerce in Dallas County396, membership rosters of social
clubs397; leaders in local media (newspaper and television); retired mayors and city council
members; pastors of large area churches; and neighborhood organization leaders.

Identifying public- and private sector participants. Identifying potential publicand private sector participants for this study was relatively straightforward. First, potential
public sector participants were identified through newspaper articles in the Dallas Morning
News – the city’s newspaper of record – regarding development projects in south- and
central Dallas, the Dallas City Council, the city’s Office of Economic Development, the
Dallas ISD organizational chart, and the Office of the Mayor. In addition, county judges,
membership rosters from city-wide and neighborhood-level chambers of commerce, and
state - and national legislators were added to the list, based on similar lists from previous
studies. Potential private sector participants were identified through the Fortune 500 list of
companies headquartered in Dallas, lists of the largest employers in Dallas, largest companies
in, a listing of the largest real estate developers in the city, and a listing of the city’s largest
banks. For each of these organizations, key employees, executives, and boards of directors
were identified through SEC filings and data found on corporate websites.

Identifying third sector participants. To identify potential participants from
CDCs, this study used the Guidestar Online database of nonprofits headquartered in Dallas-
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Fort Worth area, filtered by NTEE codes398 to limit results to organizations involved in
development, housing, and workforce development, as well as neighborhood organizations
and community centers. From these filters, over 1,200 organizations with tax records from
the past 5 years were identified. Using criteria for the IRS 990 form, which nonprofits file
annually to renew their nonprofit status, the list was filtered to include organizations with at
least $200,000 in income, or over $500,000 in assets. Finally, the list was reduced by
eliminating trade unions, duplicate organizations, and professional societies, as well as
organizations not headquartered in Dallas County. Executive management, key employees,
and boards of directors were identified using organization websites and IRS 990 records
from the Guidestar database, and were added to the list of potential participants. Anchor
institution participant identification was considerably simpler; potential participants were
found through hospital- and both public- and private university websites, to identify
leadership, key employees, and members of boards of trustees.

Supplementing participant lists. Past reputational studies have used archival
newspaper searches to add to their lists of potential influentials399. This study also utilized
archival research, using newspaper articles regarding development in South- and Central
Dallas from the Dallas Morning News (the city’s newspaper of record), as well as two altnewspapers: the Dallas Observer and the Oak Cliff Advocate. The resulting list of possible
influentials contained 7,727 names, including duplicates. Of these, 341 names appeared
twice, 83 appeared three times, 15 appeared four times, and 3 appeared five times. Each time
a name appeared was counted as a single “vote” for that person being an influential
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399 cf. Agger & Ostrom, 1956, p. 84; Hunter, 1953, pp. 263-264; C. Stone, 1989, 258-260
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individual in Dallas’ decision-making body, so, for example, a name appearing two times was
given two “votes.”
Initial participant pool and final participant tally. All names with at least three
votes were used to fill the participant pool; this initial pool contained 101 names. Each
person on the list was invited to participate in this study through a letter mailed to their
office four weeks prior to the beginning of data collection, with a follow-up email sent two
weeks prior400. Physical- and email addresses were collected through organizational websites.
Out of the 101 names in the initial potential participant pool, 43 responded; through three
rounds of snowball sampling, an additional 28 participants were recommended. These
potential participants were contacted by phone, with an email follow-up three days later;
from these, 19 additional participants were added to the sample. In addition, as surveys were
analyzed, it became apparent that a final wave of interviews would need to be conducted.
From the surveys, 31 additional people were invited by phone to participate in the study,
with a follow-up email sent three days later. Out of these, 17 participants were added to the
pool, for a total of 79 surveys and interviews.

A note on participant demographics. Of the 79 participants, 45 identified
themselves as male, and 34 as female. Further, 41 participants identified themselves primarily
as white, 19 as Asian-American, 16 as African-American, and 3 as another race or multiracial.
Additionally, 13 participants identified themselves as Hispanic or Latino. Additionally, 2
were between 25 and 35 years of age, 8 were between 35 and 44, 28 were between 45 and 54,
35 were between 55 and 64, and 6 were 65 or older; the median age among all participants
was 49.5. Finally, 75 participants identified themselves as having at least an undergraduate
degree.

400
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A note on snowball sampling and diminishing returns. For the first two rounds
of surveys and interviews, participants greatly improved the reputational analysis by offering
the names of several previously-unidentified participants, reinforcing existing lists of
potentially influential actors, and providing valuable narrative to contextualize the results.
This pattern declined sharply at the third round of sampling, and given the limited amount
of time remaining for data collection in the field, it was decided to not engage in another
round of snowball sampling. This is not to suggest that, had additional interviews been
conducted, new insight would not have been gained, but given the limits of time and
financial resources, it was deemed infeasible to continue.
Ethical Considerations and IRB Statement
The University of Louisville’s IRB approved the study in April 2015, and the study is
in full compliance with U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Code of Federal
Regulations,45 CFR § 46 (2009); a renewal was granted in April 2016. The IRB deemed the
study to be one of minimal risk to participants, and that the probability and magnitude of
harm or discomfort anticipated in the research was not greater than any ordinarily
encountered in daily life, or during the performance of routine physical or psychological
examinations or tests.
To protect anonymity, this study was granted approval to waive signed consent, and
instead participants were given a letter stating that their participation in the study was
equivalent to granting that consent, although they were free to withdraw that consent at any
time, and doing so would carry no penalty; to date, no participant has withdrawn consent.
Throughout the survey and interview, participants were reminded that their answers would
be kept in confidence, and that no direct quotations would be used without permission. With
respect to the snowball sampling interview question, participants were assured that their
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recommendation would be kept anonymous, and that additional participants would not be
informed about who volunteered their information with prior consent; this proved to be a
moot point, however, as all participants gave their consent to be identified as a source.
Completed surveys and interview notes were kept in possession of the data collector
while in the field, and stored in a locked filing cabinet within a controlled-access office
during the collection phase. After returning from the field, surveys and interview notes were
stored in another locked filing cabinet within a controlled-access office. Only the data
collector had access to these documents, which were shredded after being anonymized and
converted to digital copy. Confidentiality of collected data was be maintained at all times,
and identification of participants was not made available during or after the study.
Data Collection
The purpose of this section is to chronicle the data collection methods used by this
study. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will document the methods used to collect
quantitative data collection, using decennial census and limited ACS records. Then, it will
chronicle the context and process for collecting the qualitative data, using surveys and
interviews.
Quantitative Data Collection
For all years, both decennial- and ACS data are recorded from tables reporting data
at the city level, using all tracts wholly- or partially within Dallas. In addition, for all years,
tract data are aggregated at the neighborhood level by overlaying neighborhood maps401
provided by the Dallas Morning News and BC Workshop, a nonprofit urban research
institute, atop decennial census tract maps402, and then approximating census tracts into
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neighborhoods representing North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. This process is
repeated for 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010, in order to capture any changes in census tract
boundariesviii.
For 1980 and 1990, census data are not generally available in electronic format, so
data were copied from physical publications of the Census of the Population and Housing
for 1980 and 1990 into the study dataset - a series of Microsoft Excel tables. For 2000 and
2010, data are available through the American FactFinder website403, which is produced and
maintained by the Census Bureau. Necessary data were downloaded in a Microsoft Excelcompatible format, and then copied the data into the study dataset. Finally, the study dataset
was verified for accuracy against the source tables by two independent readers.
Qualitative Data Collection
Participants were asked to complete a paper survey, and also to participate in a brief
interview session. First, this section details the survey itself, which was constructed based on
the examples of older reputational analyses, including a previous study of Dallas, with
modifications recommended by the dissertation committee404. Then, it discusses the
interview questions used, which offered the participants the opportunity to contextualize
their survey responses, offer deeper insight into both Dallas’ development in recent years,
and into its informal governance structure.
Survey outline. After a brief introduction, study participants were asked to complete
a survey regarding how projects in Dallas come about, and who gets involved. First,
participants were asked to provide informed consent, and gave them the opportunity to opt
out of completing the survey. Once consent was given, the participants were asked to
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complete the survey of leadership and development in Dallas (a reproduction appears in
Appendix 8); the five sections of the survey are detailed below.
In the first section, participants were presented with the master list of 101
influentials, and for each, was first asked to indicate how influential each person is with
respect to policy decisions or development in Dallas as a whole, ranging from 1 (not very
influential) to 4 (highly influential); participants were instructed to respond based on their
own opinions, and were given an option to select “Don’t Know / Not Sure.” Then, for each
of the 101 names, participants were asked to briefly elaborate on why they gave the rating
that they did. Third, participants were asked to disclose whether they had served on a
committee or project team with each of the 101 names. Finally, participants were asked to
select which phrase (“Never heard of,” “Know slightly,” “Know well,” or “Personal friend
or relative”) best described their relationship with each of the names listed. Participants were
also invited to provide write-in names, in case the survey failed to identify someone who, in
their opinion, was influential in city-wide projects.
In the second section, the survey asked participants to imagine that they were
responsible for a project that would have an impact felt throughout the city, and that this
project would require a decision made by a group of leaders – leaders whose opinions nearly
everyone would accept. Using the lists from the previous section, as well as their own
knowledge of Dallas’ leaders, participants were asked to select up to 10 people for their
team. For each of these names, participants were asked to disclose whether they had been on
a committee or project team with that person in the past five years, and to describe (using
the same phrases from above) their relationship with that person.
In the third- and fourth sections, participants were asked to imagine that they were
responsible for a new project in, respectively, downtown Dallas and South Dallas / Oak
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Cliff, which would require a decision to be made by a group of leaders whose opinions
nearly everyone would accept. Using the lists from the first section, as well as their own
knowledge of Dallas’ leaders, participants were asked to select up to 10 people for their
team. For each of these names, participants were asked to disclose whether they had been on
a committee or project team with that person in the past five years, and to describe (using
the same phrases from above) their relationship with that person.
Finally, in the fifth section, the survey asked participants to record any concluding
thoughts on the nature of decision-making in Dallas, such as their thoughts on how
decisions are made, who makes them, or the types of people who get most heavily involved
in Dallas’ decision-making body - either for the city as a whole, or for projects in particular
neighborhoods. Participants were also asked to list any names of people who might be
willing to provide additional information that may be helpful for this study.
Interview outline. After completing the survey, participants engaged in a brief
interview with the data collector; this interview405 contained four questions. These questions
were intended to be kept brief, but participants often had much to say, and interviews
frequently took up the majority of the meeting time. For each interview, the data collector
kept detailed notes, labeled with the date and interview number; for example, the second
interview on the date June 23, 2015 would be labeled “2015072302.”
The first interview question asked participants about their subjective opinion about
development in Dallas; specifically, which individuals and organizations (public-, private-,
and third-sector) tend to get involved, and whether (and to what extent) residents of
neighborhoods being developed are part of the development process. The second question
asked participants to contrast development in Dallas’ CBD, particularly the Downtown
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Dallas 360 plan, with development in the Oak Cliff area, particularly with respect to the
Bishop Arts District and Oak Cliff Gateway projects. These specific projects were chosen
because, based on newspaper articles and discussions with local media reporters, these are
largest and most visible of the developments in the respective areas. The third question
asked participants to talk about the involvement of particular organizations in development,
and was tailored based on previous answers. For example, participants frequently discussed
the private sector’s involvement in development, so this question was often modified to ask
specifically about public- and third-sector organizations. The final question asked
participants to discuss their individual involvement with development in these areas, and
their individual experiences with the process. For participants who were most closely
associated with projects in either the CBD or Oak Cliff, this question was tailored to their
particular focus area, and for participants who were less-directly connected to one project,
the question was kept intentionally broad.
Data Processing and Analysis
The purpose of this section is to outline methods that were used to process the data
after collection. First, it will briefly sketch how quantitative data are to be processed and
analyzed. Then, it will detail a two-phase analysis to be undertaken of the qualitative surveyand interview data.
Quantitative Data Processing and Analysis
Quantitative data were analyzed in two phases. During the first phase, a series of data
tables and charts were created to show changes in racial- and economic profiles for Dallas as
a whole, as well as for North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. In the second phase, these
data were compared to expected data based on literature regarding post-Fordist racial- and
economic trends in central cities, as well as in central urban neighborhoods. In the
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paragraphs that follow, this study will introduce these quantitative data processing and
analysis methods.
Phase 1: Comparing geographies over time. In the first round of quantitative
analysis, economic and demographic census data were copied into a Microsoft Excel file;
data from 1980 and 1990 were hand-copied, while data from 2000 and 2010 were available
electronically, and were imported as .csv files, reducing the likelihood for transcription
errors. Then, detailed tables and charts were constructed from this “master” file, the
demographic- and economic profiles have changed over the 30-year period from 1980 to
2010, for Dallas as a whole, North Oak Cliff, and Downtown Dallas. These data first appear
in Chapter 4, and also serve as the basis of further analysis in Chapter 5.
Phase 2: comparing data to literature-based expectations. In the second round
of analysis, this study recast its quantitative data in the context of expectations based on
literature regarding the effects of post-Fordism on cities overall, and within central urban
neighborhoods. Recall that literature regarding post-Fordist shifts in central cities and urban
neighborhoods suggests that, while wealthier whites largely abandoned central cities for
suburban alternatives (conceptualized by the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs model), a subset of
them are “rediscovering” central urban neighborhoods (conceptualized by the new donut
model and gentrification literature). To test whether, or to what extent, these two trends
appear in Dallas citywide, North Oak Cliff, and Downtown Dallas, this study made three
primary comparisons: first, between Dallas and its surrounding suburbs; second, between the
neighborhoods of North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas; and third, between these
neighborhoods and Dallas as a whole. These comparisons are featured in Chapter 5.
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Qualitative Data Processing and Analysis
Completed surveys and interview notes were also analyzed in two phases. During the
first phase, completed surveys and interview notes were used to first create a typology of
decision-makers within Dallas as a whole, North Oak Cliff, and Downtown Dallas; these
typologies will be presented in Chapter 4. In the second phase, this study examined the
presence- and nature of decision-making structures that comprise these various typologies,
first for Dallas citywide, then for North Oak Cliff, and finally for Downtown Dallas. In the
paragraphs that follow, this study will introduce these qualitative data processing and analysis
methods.
Phase 1: Establishing a typology of decision-makers. Previous studies of Dallas
found that the highest levels of decision-making were largely occupied by business
executives and civic organizations406, supported by sympathetic public-sector officials
through business-friendly legislation and public funding for private development, especially
in Downtown Dallas. Recall that, in the decades following these studies, much of the
commercial heart of Dallas had moved to its surrounding suburbs, and many of its locallyowned firms have been merged into national- and international corporations. Additionally,
recall that in 1991 Dallas’ city council underwent a dramatic restructure that distributed
power from wealthy, white North Dallas into districts across the city. Finally, recall that
Dallas’ leadership was suspected of having failed to identify successors to retiring leaders,
leaving the future of the entrepreneurial regime in a degree of doubt.
To the extent that business dominance of citywide decision-making was ever
accurate, it may no longer be so today. Therefore, during the first phase of qualitative data
analysis, this study analyzed coded participant responses, as well as characteristics of every

406

Elkin, 1987a, pp. 67-71; Thometz, 1963, pp. 31-33

105

actor nominated to serve on any participants’ hypothetical decision-making team (even those
that did not receive enough nominations to be included in further analysis). Because this
study is also interested in decision-makers in North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas, it
repeated this analysis for each of these neighborhoods. As a result of these three analyses,
this study created a five-category typology of decision-makers in Dallas, which will be
introduced in Chapter 4, and which will serve as a starting point for this study’s examination
of structures of decision-making in Dallas as a whole, as well as in two of its component
neighborhoods.
Phase 2: Conceptualizing structures of decision-making. The previous
reputational study of Dallas found that, at the citywide level, decision-making power was
stratified among three levels, with a small cohort of key leaders at the top, a larger tier of top
level leaders supporting them, and a still-larger pool of second echelon leaders below those407. To
test whether, or to what extent, this remains an accurate depiction of the structure of
citywide decision-making in Dallas, this study’s participants were asked to rate their influence
in the city on a scale from 1 to 4, with higher numbers indicating a greater level of
generalized influence throughout the decision-making process. In addition, participants were
asked to nominate up to 10 of these names to serve on hypothetical decision-making teams.
The previous reputational study of Dallas found that those individuals with the most
nominations also tended to have the highest mean power scores. This result suggests two
things: first, that participants’ perceptions of an individual’s degree of decision-making
power are a valid indicator of their decision-making power in actuality; and second, that the
reputational method is indeed a valid method for examining decision-making power.
Building on these results, the previous study of Dallas also used a Duncan’s New Multiple
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Range Test to establish a stratification of decision-makers within Dallas. Duncan’s test
compares mean scores within a given dataset, and determines when the differences between
any two means are statistically significant; in effect, Duncan’s test is a method that helps to
establish whether subgroups exist within a larger dataset.
To allow its results to be compared with those from the previous reputational study
of Dallas, this study will first replicated methods used in the Thometz study for Dallas as a
whole408. Because the present study is also interested in the structure of decision-making in
two of Dallas’ component neighborhoods, it also replicated these analysis methods for both
North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. To contextualize these findings, this study also this
study recast results from its statistical analyses in light of participant observations regarding
decision-making in each respective geography, in order to understand the effects of the
presence (or absence) of types of decision-makers on the kinds of decisions that are made,
with respect to both urban policy and economic development projects. These results will
appear in Chapter 5, and also serve as the basis for larger themes regarding the role (or lack
thereof) of anchor institutions and CDCs in contemporary decision-making structures, as
well as conclusions drawn in Chapter 6.
Assessing Internal and External Validity
No study, no matter how well-planned, is immune to concerns over the validity of its
results; in the paragraphs that follow, this study will offer an initial foray into possible
concerns over both internal- and external validity of the study’s findings. First, it will outline
the methods used to check for internal validity, or whether the results actually measure what
this study claims they do. Then, it will discuss external validity, which establishes the extent
to which whether findings are transferrable to other cities.
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Assessing Internal Validity
Looking first at the quantitative data, of prime importance to this study is whether
the data are free of error, to the extent that the study can control for it. Because decennial
census- and ACS data contain some amount of error, but the primary-source data contained
within their reports are generally unavailable, this source of error cannot be controlled for by
this study. Transcription errors were identified and corrected by verifying data against the
source material; after the data are copied from Census Bureau records, three readers (the
researcher and two volunteer assistants) verified the inputted data against the source
material, correcting as-needed. After the data were used to construct the charts and tables
that appear throughout this work, these were also validated by volunteer readers.
This study’s survey and interview data were validated by summarizing and discussing
results with participants, so that each had ample opportunity to clarify or contextualize their
responses. First, participants were given opportunities to clarify their statements at the end
of each interview; additionally, participants were asked clarifying questions during natural
pauses in their interviews, giving them the chance to revise previous statements. In order to
preserve the confidentiality of the participants, outside readers were not allowed to read
interview notes, though it should be noted that past reputational studies have validated this
method against alternative techniques, and regularly found that these methods are able to
identify individuals who are deeply involved in the policymaking process409.
Assessing External Validity
Although this study argues for Dallas as a crucial case, it also argues that the city is not
so unique as to make results of this study inappropriate for comparison against other cities;
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in short, although Dallas is argued to be a least-likely scenario for supporting the presence of
third-sector actors in urban development, the city’s context is still similar to that of other
cities, and many aspects of the city’s historical- and present contexts will sound familiar to
urban scholars.
Like many cities, Dallas is divided by the lingering effects of white flight, with its
(comparatively) newer, northern neighborhoods tending to be wealthier (and whiter) than
those found to the south of the Trinity River. Unsurprisingly, these neighborhoods have
been the primary recipients of development, job growth, and infrastructure improvements,
while the predominately African-American and Hispanic portions of the city have fallen into
decades of decline and neglect, leading one newspaper to declare Dallas “worst in the
nation” for neighborhood inequality410. Additionally, the city, like many others, is locked in
competition with its suburbs for new businesses and residents; while the Dallas region
(known as the “DFW Metroplex”) continues to grow, new development in Dallas is on
sharp decline. Further, existing corporations have been vacating the city for lush corporate
campuses in northern suburbs like Plano, Frisco, and Allen411.
Even as businesses continue to abandon the city, a counter-trend is for younger
residents to move back – often finding highly affordable options those same neighborhoods
that have been historically neglected412. As demand grows for smaller housing, in walkable
neighborhoods, and with proximity to office buildings, these once-blighted areas are rapidly
gentrifying, causing concern among existing residents413. As a result of these trends, the city
is engaged in a number of development projects, both in its CBD and in inner-ring
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neighborhoods,414 and like other cities, Dallas’ third sector seems to be involved in some of
this development415.
Dallas’ history of white flight and corporate abandonment, and its current trend of
white return and rediscovery of the city are hardly unique, especially among cities that are
prospering in the post-Fordist economy416. In addition, the city’s response to these trends,
and the presence of third-sector actors in the redevelopment of low-income areas, are largely
similar to trends in other cities417. These positions in mind, this study argues that its results
are likely to be transferable to other cities in the United States.
Limitations
Every study, no matter how well constructed, has limitations that shape the
conclusions that can be drawn418. While Chapter 5 will offer an expansive discussion of study
limitations, it is nonetheless useful to introduce a subset of these before presenting this
study’s results and their analyses. In the paragraphs that follow, this section will first
introduce limitations related to the surveys and interviews. Then, it will introduce a number
of additional limitations, not directly related to the surveys and interviews.
With respect to survey and interview limitations, because they were collected in a
natural (rather than laboratory) setting, it is extremely difficult for future scholars to replicate
the study in other settings. Further, the responses were limited by the time constraint on the
meetings; participants may have truncated responses in order to fit within the time allotted,
reducing their overall quality. Next, because a number of survey items restricted the range of
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possible responses, the results are narrower than they may have been, were the questions
written to be open-ended. Additionally, the lack of cross-case comparative data case study
limits the ability of this study to eliminate alternative explanations for the findings, including
the possibility that Dallas is an extreme outlier. Also, the nonrandom nature of snowball
sampling introduces the possibility that the study sample is not actually representative of the
(arguably unknowable) population. Finally, because this study incorporates secondary-source
data, any error present in the source data is inherited by this study.
With respect to other aspects of this study, secondary-source data (e.g. decennial
census, ACS) may contain unknown errors in reporting and data collection; while every
attempt to use corrected data was made, it is possible that some error remains. In addition,
with particular respect to data regarding employment by industry, this study is limited by the
availability and sourcing of data; when possible, the decennial census was utilized, but for
two years (1980 and 1990), these data were unavailable, due to irreconcilable differences in
data reporting. In these cases, non-census data were used, and while these data are reliablysourced from the Texas Employment Commission (TEC), a state agency, they present
additional challenges, only some of which could be overcome. Differences in reporting
between TEC datasets and those in census records were successfully reconciled, but this
“translation” process introduces the possibility that a category was translated in error. In
addition, TEC data are representative of the entire Dallas-Fort Worth (now Dallas-Fort
Worth-Arlington) statistical area, and are not limited to Dallas itself. Third, TEC data are
derived from employer reports (rather than employee self-reports), and this difference in
methodology introduces a further source of error. Finally, these data preclude analysis at
levels more granular than the statistical error, so for years 1980 and 1990, employment by
industry cannot be ascertained for the North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas
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neighborhoods. For these reasons, discussions of employment by industry should be seen as
a “rough estimate,” based on data that are flawed beyond what should be expected from
census data in particular, and secondary-source data more broadly.
Chapter Summary
As noted in its introduction, the purpose of this chapter is to outline the research
setting and methods used to assess whether cities are still governed by the political-business
coalitions conceptualized in the 1970s and 1980s, or whether some subset of the third sector
has achieved legitimacy as a primary, rather than ancillary, component of urban governance.
In the preceding sections, this study restated its research questions, and then offered a series
of hypotheses to be tested in order to answer them. Third, it described the study design, and
argued for its appropriateness. Fourth, it discussed the setting for this study, as well as the
target population and sample. Fifth, it outlined the data collection methods and
instrumentation implemented, including a summary of ethical considerations. Sixth, it
detailed how data were analyzed and processed. Finally, it discussed validity and limitations
related to this study’s findings, which follow in the next chapter.
Author’s note: a detailed listing of tables referenced for 1980 appears in Appendix 1.
Author’s note: a detailed listing of tables referenced for 1990 appears in Appendix 2.
vi Author’s note: a detailed listing of tables referenced for 2000 appears in Appendix 3.
vii Author’s note: a detailed listing of tables referenced for 2010 appears in Appendix 4.
viii Author’s note: a detailed listing of changes to census tracts appears in Appendix 6; a listing of all tracts used appears in Appendix 7.
iv
v
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CHAPTER IV
PRESENTATION OF DATA
The purpose of this chapter is to report data collected using the methods introduced
in Chapter 3, in order to address this study’s research questions and hypotheses. In the
sections that follow, this study will first report quantitative data regarding select
socioeconomic changes from 1980 to 2010, first for Dallas as a whole, then for the study’s
two focus neighborhoods: North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. Then, it will detail
participant responses to surveys and interviews regarding decision-making in Dallas as a
whole, North Oak Cliff, and Downtown Dallas.
Quantitative Data
This study is primarily interested in the nature of governance, both formal and
informal, in the City of Dallas, as well as within two of its neighborhoods – Downtown
Dallas and North Oak Cliff. Before reporting qualitative data regarding the actors who
govern, and the structure in which they operate, this study will report quantitative data
regarding the economic- and social profiles of the people being governed. In the following
sections, this study will present findings from census-based data collection; first, this study
will first outline a brief demographic- and economic profile for Dallas as a whole, with data
reported at 10-year intervals to coincide with decennial census reports. Then, it will repeat
these data for each of the focus neighborhoods: North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas.
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Dallas as a Whole
This study hypothesized that Dallas as a whole has undergone demographic- and
economic transitions consistent with the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs model of cities. While
evaluation of whether this is indeed the case will be held until Chapter 5, in the chapter
sections that follow, this study will first present data documenting changes in Dallas’
citywide demographic profile from 1980 to 2010, and then it will present data documenting
changes in the citywide economic profile over that same period.
Citywide demographic changes, 1980 to 2010. In the following subsections, this
study will report relevant changes in Dallas’ demographics from 1980 to 2010. First, it will
report trends in Dallas’ population size, primarily to serve as an anchor for the data that
follows. Then, it will report decennial changes in Dallas’ demographics by race and Hispanic
status.

Citywide population. Table 4.01 shows Dallas’ citywide population changes from
1980 to 2010.
Year
Population
Decennial Gain (Loss)

Table 4.01: Citywide Population, 1980 - 2010
1980
1990
2000
904,078
1,006,877
1,188,580
(x)
102,799
181,703

2010
1,197,816
9,236

As the table shows, Dallas’ overall population rose steadily from 1980 to 2000, with the city
gaining over 250,000 residents between those years, even in spite of the Savings & Loan
Crisis that ruined Dallas’ financial markets and sent its economy into a severe retraction.
Equally striking is the lack of population growth between 2000 and 2010 (0.008% growth –
effectively no change), suggesting a growth plateau.

Citywide race and Hispanic or Latino status. Within the context of the city’s
rapid growth and subsequent plateau, figure 4.01 shows the changing demographic profile of
Dallas’ population with respect to race and Hispanic origin.
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Figure 4.01: Citywide Race and Hispanic or Latino Status, 1980 - 2010
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Data suggest that, since 1980, the proportion of the population represented by the largest
two racial groups in Dallas tend to decline from one census to the next, with people
identifying as “white alone” falling from 61.4% in 1980 to 50.7% in 2010, and people
identifying as Black or African American falling (though less precipitously) from 29.4% in
1980 to 25.0% in 2010. By contrast, the populations of people identifying as Asian
American, and especially those identifying as “Other” or multiracial has increased. Finally, of
particular note, the population identifying as Hispanic (of any race) increased nearly fourfold, from 12.2% in 1980 to 42.4% in 2010.
Citywide economic changes, 1980 to 2010. In the following subsections, this study
will report relevant changes in Dallas’ economic context from 1980 to 2010. First, it will
report basic data on workforce size and unemployment as an anchor for data to follow.
Then, it will report employment by industry cluster, combining data reported by BLS
industry code into the following categories: creative classix, blue collarx, services and tradexi,
and public administrationxii. Finally, it will report data related to median household income
and poverty rates.
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Citywide labor force. Table 4.02 shows Dallas’ workforce size and unemployment
rate in from 1980 to 2010.
Year
Workforce Size
Decennial Gain (Loss)
Unemployment Rate
Decennial Gain (Loss)

Table 4.02: Citywide Labor Force Size and Unemployment Rate, 1980 - 2010
1980
1990
2000
481,224
552,303
588,385
(x)
71,079
36,082
7.4%
12.2%
4.3%
(x)
4.8 pts.
(7.9 pts.)

2010
610,562
22,177
5.6%
1.3 pts.

While the size of Dallas’ workforce has increased at the 1990, 2000, and 2010 census, data
suggest that the rate of gain at each census appears to be slowing, with the labor force
gaining fewer new people at each census than at the census before. Data also show that,
somewhat unsurprisingly, citywide unemployment increases between 1980 and 1990, as well
as between 2000 and 2010; these periods both bookend financial downturns – the Savings &
Loan Crisis of the 1980s419, and the Great Recession from 2007 to 2009420.

Citywide employment by industry cluster421. Figure 4.02 shows the percentages of
Dallas’ citywide workforce employed in the creative class-, service sector-, blue collar-, and
public administration fields from 1980 to 2010. As a reminder, data from 1980 and 1990 are
representative of the statistical area; while not as precise as census data from 2000 and 2010,
these data represent a “best estimate” from among available sources.

Figure 4.02: Citywide Employment By Industry Cluster, 1980 - 2010

Federal Deposit Insurance Company, 1987, pp. 166-169
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010
421 Author’s note: as reported in Chapter 3, TEC data are used to estimate employment by industry at the citywide level for 1980 and 1990.
Among their myriad flaws, these data are unavailable at the census tract level.
419
420
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These data suggest that, between 1980 and 1990, there is a notable increase in the percentage
of working Dallasites employed in creative class fields, while over that same period, there is a
nearly-equal decrease in employment within blue collar and service sector fields. Since 1990,
these three employment clusters have remained relatively stable, with slightly over half of
working Dallasites being employed in creative class fields, roughly one-quarter of working
Dallasites being employed in blue collar fields, and about one-fifth of working Dallasites
being employed in service sector fields. Finally, at all four data collection points, about 2% of
working Dallasites have been employed in public administration.

Citywide median household income and poverty. Table 4.03 shows data related
to Dallas’ citywide median household income (MHI) in 2015 inflation-adjusted dollars, as
well as the citywide poverty rates, from 1980 to 2010, including basic trends in both.
Year
MHI in 2015 Dollars

Decennial Gain (Loss)
Poverty Rate
Decennial Gain (Loss)

Table 4.03: Citywide MHI and Poverty Rate, 1980 - 2010
1980
1990
2000
$79,611
$50,461
$52,146
(x)
($29,150)
$1,685
18.0%
18.0%
17.8%
(x)
0 pts.
(0.2 pts.)
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2010
$45,616
($6,530)
22.3%
4.5 pts.

These data suggest that median household income in Dallas fell sharply from 1980 to 1990,
holding relatively steady in 2000, and falling again in 2010, with median household incomes
in 2010 holding at just over 57% of their 2015-adjusted level in 1980. Additionally, data
show that the poverty rate held at roughly 18% between 1980 and 2000, but increased to
over 22% in 2010.
North Oak Cliff
This study hypothesized that the neighborhood of North Oak Cliff has undergone
demographic- and economic transitions consistent with gentrification literature regarding
central urban neighborhoods, and the new donut model of cities. As with data regarding Dallas
as a whole, evaluation of whether any identified changes in North Oak Cliff are consistent
with said literature will be held until Chapter 5. Nonetheless, in the chapter sections that
follow, this study will first present data documenting changes in the neighborhood’s
demographic profile from 1980 to 2010, and then it will present data documenting changes
in North Oak Cliff’s economic profile over that same period.
Neighborhood demographic changes, 1980 to 2010. In the following subsections,
this study will report relevant changes in North Oak Cliff’s demographics from 1980 to
2010. First, it will report trends in population size, and then, it will report decennial changes
in the neighborhood’s demographics by race and Hispanic status.

Neighborhood population. Table 4.04 shows the population changes from 1980 to
2010 for North Oak Cliff.
Year
Population
Decennial Gain (Loss)

1980
17,713
(x)

Table 4.04: North Oak Cliff Population, 1980 - 2010
1990
2000
17,544
19,617
(169)
2,073

2010
15,055
(4,562)

Data suggest that, between 1980 and 2010, the neighborhood’s population has declined,
losing over 2,500 people, or 15% of its population. Data also suggest that these losses have
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been inconsistent, with an insignificant loss at the 1990 census, a significant gain of slightly
over 2,000 people at the 2000 census, but then a loss of over twice that by the 2010 – a
census-over-census loss of over 23%.

Neighborhood race and Hispanic or Latino status. Within the growth and
abandonment of the neighborhood, Figure 4.03 shows the changing demographic profile of
North Oak Cliff’s population with respect to race and Hispanic origin.
Figure 4.03: North Oak Cliff Race and Hispanic or Latino Status, 1980 - 2010
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Anecdotally, people who live outside of the southern half of Dallas often assume the area to
be “mostly black” 422, although whether this was ever true for North Oak Cliff, data suggest
that this hasn’t been true since (at least) the 1980 census. At that time, North Oak Cliff was
majority-white, but by 1990, the neighborhood became majority-minority. This trend
reversed in 2000, and by 2010, people identifying as “white alone” had risen to their largest
422

cf. Merwin, 1977; Schutze, 2010, 2015a
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share of the population during the time period studied, at over 61%. Meanwhile, people
identifying as Black or African American have never held more than one-fifth of the area’s
population over that same period, and have not made up more than 10% of the population
since 2000. Until the 2010 census, the trend in the percentage of North Oak Cliff’s
population identifying as Hispanic or Latino followed the growth found in Dallas as a whole,
but by 2010, this trend had reversed, and the neighborhood’s demographics returned to
showing a white majority.
Neighborhood economic changes, 1980 to 2010. In the following subsections,
this study will report relevant changes in the economic characteristics of North Oak Cliff
from 1980 to 2010. First, it will report basic data on workforce size and unemployment.
Then it will report employment by industry cluster. Finally, it will report data related to
median household income and poverty rates.

Neighborhood labor force. Table 4.05 shows sizes of- and trends for North Oak
Cliff’s labor force and unemployment rates from 1980 to 2010.
Year
Workforce Size
Decennial Gain (Loss)
Unemployment Rate
Decennial Gain (Loss)

Table 4.05: North Oak Cliff Labor Force Size and Unemployment Rate, 1980 - 2010
1980
1990
2000
2010
8,580
7,852
8,559
4,421
(x)
(728)
707
(4,138)
5.3%
6.6%
4.4%
6.7%
(x)
1.4 pts.
(2.2 pts.)
2.3 pts.

Data suggest that, from 1980 to 2000, the area’s labor force remained relatively stable, with
unemployment below the citywide average in 1980 and 1990, and only 0.1% higher in 2000.
Significantly, at the 2010 census the labor force dropped by over 4,000 workers, in a trend
similar to the overall population loss in the neighborhood; at the same time, the
unemployment rate increased to 0.5% over the citywide average.

Neighborhood employment by industry cluster. Figures 4.04 and 4.05 show the
percentages of North Oak Cliff’s workforce employed in the creative class-, service sector-,
blue collar-, and public administration fields in, respectively, 2000 and 2010.
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Figure 4.04: North Oak Cliff
Employment by Industry Cluster, 2000
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Although data are unavailable for 1980 and 1990, available data suggest a loss of 20
percentage points in blue collar employment between 2000 and 2010, and a gain of 20 points
in creative class employment, which in 2010 holds a clear majority of the neighborhood’s
employment by industry cluster.

Neighborhood median household income and poverty. Table 4.06 shows the
median household income (in 2015 inflation-adjusted dollars) (MHI) and poverty rate for
North Oak Cliff, from 1980 to 2010.
Year
MHI in 2015 Dollars

Decennial Gain (Loss)
Poverty Rate
Decennial Gain (Loss)

Table 4.06: North Oak Cliff MHI and Poverty Rate, 1980 - 2010
1980
1990
2000
$28,861
$25,617
$51,915
(x)
($3,244)
$26,298
17.5%
18.0%
24.3%
(x)
0.5 pts.
6.3 pts.

2010
$39,106
($12,809)
21.8%
(2.5 pts.)

Data suggest that, from 1980 to 1990, MHI decreased while the poverty rate increased. Of
greater note is that, in 2000, neighborhood MHI increased to more than 200% of its 1990
level, while the neighborhood poverty shows an increase of over 135% over that same
period. Data also suggest that, in 2010, neighborhood MHI decreased to just over 75% of its
2000 level, while the neighborhood poverty rate also decreased, to just under 90% of its level
in 2000. The implications of these dramatic changes in MHI and poverty rates, especially in
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the context of the neighborhood’s gentrification, will be discussed in Chapter 5.
Downtown Dallas
This study hypothesized that the neighborhood of Downtown Dallas, like that of
North Oak Cliff, has undergone demographic- and economic transitions that are consistent
with gentrification literature regarding central urban neighborhoods, and the new donut model
of cities. While evaluation of data with respect to this hypothesis will be held until Chapter,
in the chapter sections that follow, this study will first present data documenting changes in
the neighborhood’s demographic profile from 1980 to 2010, and then it will present data
documenting changes in Downtown Dallas’ economic profile over that same period.
Neighborhood demographic changes, 1980 to 2010. In the following subsections,
this study will report relevant changes in Downtown Dallas’ demographics from 1980 to
2010. As with North Oak Cliff and Dallas as a whole, this subsection will first present data
on changes in population, and then on race and Hispanic status for people living in the
neighborhood.

Neighborhood population. Table 4.07 shows the population changes from 1980 to
2010 for Downtown Dallas.
Year
Population
Decennial Gain (Loss)

1980
2,828
(x)

Table 4.07: Downtown Dallas Population, 1980 - 2010
1990
2000
3,444
2,198
616
(1,246)

2010
9,262
7,064

Data suggest that the growth rates in Downtown Dallas vary widely, but of significant note
is the significant decline from 1990 to 2000, just before a dramatic increase in 2010, wherein
the neighborhood’s population increased to nearly three times its 2000 level.

Neighborhood race and Hispanic or Latino status. Within the context of
Downtown Dallas’ growth and decline, Figure 4.06 shows the changing demographic profile
of the neighborhood’s population with respect to race and Hispanic origin.
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Figure 4.06: Downtown Dallas Race and Hispanic or Latino Status, 1980 - 2010
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Data suggest a negative correlation between the percentages of neighborhood populations
identifying as “white alone” and Black or African American, throughout the entire time
period from 1980 to 2010, even as the neighborhood’s population increases over that same
period. Overall, the trend is one of growth for people identifying as “white alone,” with this
group making up a nearly two-thirds majority of the neighborhood’s population at the 2010
census. Of additional note is that the growth pattern for the percentage of the population
identifying as “other & mixed-race” similar to – though less dramatic than – that for the
population of people who identify as “white alone.” Finally, much like in Dallas as a whole,
the percentage of people identifying as Hispanic or Latino has grown at each census.
Neighborhood economic changes, 1980-2010. In the following subsections, this
study will report relevant changes in the economic characteristics of Downtown Dallas from
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1980 to 2010. First, it will report basic data on workforce size and unemployment. Then, this
study will report data regarding employment by industry cluster. Finally, it will report data
related to MHI and poverty.

Neighborhood labor force. Table 4.08 shows sizes of- and trends within
Downtown Dallas’ labor force size and unemployment rates from 1980 to 2010.
Year
Workforce Size
Decennial Gain (Loss)
Unemployment Rate
Decennial Gain (Loss)

Table 4.08: Downtown Dallas Workforce Size and Unemployment Rate, 1980 - 2010
1980
1990
2000
2010
582
273
1,157
4,370
(x)
-309
884
3213
6.7%
5.5%
5.4%
5.7%
(x)
(1.2 pts.)
(0.1 pts.)
0.3 pts.

Data suggest that, while the size of the labor force residing in the neighborhood declined
between 1980 and 1990, it has been growing ever since, with a large expansion between 2000
and 2010. Data for unemployment rates in 1980 and 1990 suggest a small decrease, but the
unemployment rate has held relatively steady since then, growing, though at a much smaller
rate than the expansion in the labor force overall.

Neighborhood employment by industry cluster. Figures 4.07 and 4.08 illustrate
relevant characteristics of Downtown Dallas’ labor force in both 2000 and 2010.
Figure 4.07: Downtown Dallas
Employment by Industry Cluster, 2000
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As with North Oak Cliff, while data for Downtown Dallas’ employment profile are
unavailable for 1980 and 1990, available data suggest that the majority of neighborhood
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residents are employed in creative class fields for both 2000 and 2010. Between these two
years, there is an increase in the percentages of residents employed in both creative class
fields, and in services and trade, with subsequent decreases in blue collar employment and
public administration, though blue collar employment saw the largest decrease of the two.

Neighborhood median household income and poverty. Table 4.09 shows
Downtown Dallas’ MHI in 2015 inflation-adjusted dollars, the neighborhood’s poverty rates,
and basic trends in both, each for the period of 1980 to 2010.
Year
MHI in 2015 Dollars

Decennial Gain (Loss)
Poverty Rate
Decennial Gain (Loss)

Table 4.09: Downtown Dallas MHI and Poverty Rate, 1980 - 2010
1980
1990
2000
$38,324
$46,678
$78,897
(x)
$8,354
$32,219
22.0%
7.7%
15.5%
(x)
(14.3 pts.)
7.8 pts

2010
$64,618
($14,279)
19.6%
4.1 pts

Data suggest that MHI more-than doubled from 1980 to 2000, with the majority of that
increase occurring between 1990 and 2000, although there is a significant decrease at the
2010 census. Additionally, data suggest that, although the percentage of people living in
poverty fell precipitously between 1980 and 1990, it has been rising ever since, with nearly
one in five neighborhood residents living in poverty in 2010, only 2.4 percentage points
lower than the 1980 high of 22.0%. Finally, data suggest that the largest rise in poverty rate
occurred between 1990 and 2000, the same years that bookend the largest MHI increase.
Quantitative Data, in Summary
In the preceding sections, this study presented various data regarding economic- and
demographic transitions in Dallas as a whole, as well as in this study’s focus neighborhoods.
Although this study is primarily interested in the nature of Dallas’ governance structure,
these data are suggestive of (arguably) inescapable socioeconomic changes with which any
governance structure, if it exists at all, must contend. This study makes several hypotheses
regarding the significance of these data, and Chapter 5 will revisit them in order to address
those hypotheses; before that, however, this study will report its qualitative findings.
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Qualitative Data
The previous reputational study of Dallas described three “classes” of leaders within
the city’s decision-making structure, and each class was comprised almost exclusively of
business executives and wealthy elites423. To determine whether (or to what extent) the
previous reputational analysis’ results remain valid, and to expand on its findings, this study’s
79 participants completed detailed surveys and interviews regarding the nature of decisionmaking in Dallas as a whole, as well as in two focus neighborhoods.
Previously, this study reported quantitative data regarding Dallas’ demographic- and
economic changes since 1980, and building on this, in the following sections, this study will
report data from its qualitative data collection. First, it will describe the broad categories into
which participants’ responses were ordered. Then, it will summarize results from surveys and
interviews; first, those regarding Dallas’ citywide decision-makers, then for decision-makers
in North Oak Cliff, and finally for decision-makers in Downtown Dallas.
Categorizing Decision-Makers
Through participant surveys and interviews, it quickly became clear that Dallas’
decision-makers regularly fell into thematic categories. Whereas the Thometz study of Dallas
proffered three categories of decision-makers: key leaders, top level, and second echelon424, this
study categorizes participant-identified decision-makers into five categories: formal authorities,
first tier influentials, second tier influentials, civic chairs, and anchor captains. In the sections that
immediately follow, this study will broadly introduce each of these categories.
Formal authorities. Actors in this category consist of elected officials, members of
council-appointed boards, committees, and commissions, and senior bureaucrats. As the

423
424

Thometz, 1963, pp. 47-49
1963, p. 46
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category title suggests, these actors are defined primarily by their formal authority to make
decisions, and this authority is generally derived from a combination of Dallas’ city charter,
various ordinances and policies, and unwritten practices of professional deference and
delegation. Participants universally acknowledged that these actors are the primary decisionmakers in Dallas, and that their authority is often difficult to meaningfully challenge.
First Tier Influentials. These actors have long-standing connections to the city, or
at least to particular neighborhoods within it, as well as reputations for remaining active in
the politics of decision-making, though this activity is normally indirect, through the use of
intermediaries (or, as some participants called them, “proxies”). While these actors lack
formal authority to make decisions, participants acknowledged that they have tremendous
financial capital, real capital, and/or social capital, and use these resources to influence the
agendas of those who do have that authority, in service of a broadly agreed-upon vision that
normally consists of neoliberal urban development strategies and packages of publiclyfunded inducements for private development.
Second Tier Influentials. This category’s actors are the most diverse, and can be
divided into three particular subcategories. First, retired formal authorities, such as former
mayors and city councilmembers, who remain active in the politics of development, often on
behalf of private-sector employers. Second, retired first tier influentials who remain connected to
Dallas’ most elite social institutions, but are no longer deeply involved in the politics of
decision-making. Finally, prominent leaders within Dallas’ developer class, including executives
within national- and global construction, real estate development-, investment-, and sales
offices, as well as senior partners in real estate law firms. Participants suggested that actors in
this category are regularly marshaled for support and advice on individual projects and
policies by first tier influentials and formal authorities.
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Civic Chairs. Actors in this category are heads of civic organizations, and are
charged with representing the interests of their constituents, so while they may have
significant leeway in interpreting those interests, participants repeatedly called these actors
“mouthpieces” for the organizations that they represent. Participants concurred that these
actors are well-known for building (temporary) alliances among actors in other categories,
either in support for- or opposition against particular issues, based on their organizational
missions and agendas. Participants frequently proposed that these actors benefit from the
social capital surrounding their organizations, and the support of their members, even when
actors in other categories (and, in some cases, the general public) oppose their efforts on a
particular project or policy decision.
Anchor Captains. Actors in this category are comprised of leaders within locallyanchored organizations and institutions, such as university presidents, departmental deans,
and hospital directors. Like civic chairs, these actors are able to draw support from actors in
other categories, as well as from outside of the decision-making process, but unique to these
actors is that they are not necessarily linked to any particular geographic group or social
class. Participants regularly noted that these actors benefit from a perception that their
organizations are politically neutral, and their support generally brings tremendous public
support for projects and policies.
Categorizing decision-makers, in summary. Expanding on previous research,
this study uses themes from participant interviews to group participant-identified decisionmakers into five categories: formal authorities, first tier influentials, second tier influentials, civic chairs,
and anchor captains. How these categories interact, and the particular constitution of each at
the citywide- and neighborhood levels will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter. In
the sections that follow, this study will report the makeup of these five categories; first, for
128

Dallas as a whole; then, for North Oak Cliff; and finally, for Downtown Dallas.
Decision-makers in Dallas as a whole.
Recall that Chapter 2 recounted two previous studies of Dallas; the 1963 Thometz
study identified a decision-making structure heavily populated by-, and biased towards the
interests of high-ranking business leaders, and the 1987 Elkin study that agreed with
Thometz, but also found that cracks were beginning to form in the city’s entrepreneurial regime.
In order to understand the structure and nature of Dallas’ contemporary decision-making
structure, and the extent to which anchor institutions and CDCs have found a more
prominent role within it, this study asked participants knowledgeable about Dallas’ decisionmaking process to identify- and describe actors who get involved in making citywide
decisions, and to nominate 10 people to form a committee that would be responsible for
making a decision that would affect the city as a whole.
With 79 participants, a maximum of 790 nominations were possible, and out of
those possible nominations, 726 of those nominations, or 91.9%, are represented by the 32
individual- or group actors who will be identified in the sections that follow. In reporting on
these actors, this study will first detail Dallas’ citywide formal authorities; next, it will introduce
the city’s its first tier influentials; third, its second tier influentials; fourth, its civic chairs; and finally,
the citywide anchor captains.
Formal authorities. Table 4.10 shows summary statistics related to Dallas’ citywide
formal authorities, named by eight or more participants to a hypothetical committee
responsible for making a decision that would affect Dallas as a whole, and that would need
to be supported by a majority of the city.
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Name
District-Based Councilmembers (14)

Mike Rawlings

A.C. Gonzalez
Appointed Commissioners (15)

Table 4.10: Citywide Formal Authorities
Decision-Making
Mean
Primary or
Committee
Power
Notable
Nominations
Level
Affiliation(s)
(1 - 4)
#
%
Dallas City Council
79
100%
4.00
Mayor
73
92%
3.78
City Manager
64
81%
3.78
City Plan Commission
26
33%
3.51

Mean Value (Actors in This Category)
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories)

61
23

77%
29%

3.77
3.11

#
44
21
15
17

%
56%
27%
19%
22%

Mean
Familiarity
Level
(1 - 4)
2.93
2.10
2.38
2.11

24
20

31%
26%

2.38
2.27

Recent Shared
Committee Service

At the citywide level, this category consists of two individual actors (i.e. the mayor and city
manager), and two group actors425 (i.e. the Dallas City Council and the City Plan
Commission, or CPC). Compared to other categories, formal authorities have above-average
numbers of nominations to decision-making committees, as well as above-average power
ratings, shared committee service with participants in the past five years, and familiarity with
participants. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will summarize participant thoughts on
each actor in this category, and how they fit into the citywide decision-making process.

Dallas’ City Council. The Dallas City Council’s powers include setting citywide
policies, approving annual budget- and capital improvement plans submitted by the city
manager, establishing and managing tax rates, municipal services, and municipal ordinances,
issuing municipal bonds, and creating municipal departments426. In explaining why the
inclusion of at least one councilmember is critical for a citywide decision-making team,
participants agreed that the city council is Dallas’ primary decision-making body, and that
successful policy- and project proposals must be written such that they will gain the approval
of an eight-councilmember majority; as one participant put it:
Dallas is run by the eight-vote majority; those votes change from one issue to another, but
every proposal is made to appeal to eight out of fifteen. A unanimous approval is the best
possible outcome, but short of that, eight is the magic number.

Author’s note: at the citywide level, the city council and CPC were considered as group actors, rather than as individual actors, because
participants often used generic titles (“a councilmember” or “someone on the CPC”), rather than giving specific names. Additionally,
participants suggested that, in many cases, the specific actor within these groups was less important than having any actor within them,
for purposes of supporting a decision that would affect Dallas as a whole.
426 Dallas City Charter, 2015, pp. 9-18
425

130

Dallas’ Mayor. Dallas features a weak mayor form of government, and its mayor acts
as an at-large 15th councilmember, in addition to a number of administrative and ceremonial
roles427. When asked to elaborate on including Mayor Rawlings on their decision-making
committees, participants often pointed out that Rawlings, like his predecessors, partners
closely with actors like the ones found in Dallas’ citywide first- and second tier influentials, as
well as many citywide civic chairs, and most considered these partnerships particularly valuable
in getting a citywide decision accepted by a majority of Dallasites, or at least, a majority of
the individuals with the influence and resources to put up a significant challenge; describing
this phenomenon, participants regularly admitted that:
For mayoral candidates, powerful endorsements and large contributions are a necessity; for
the elite, endorsements and contributions are investments. In exchange for their support,
Dallas’ regents expect a certain degree of access to their candidates, so if you have the
mayor’s support on a project, it’s a safe bet that you have the support of his masters, too.

Appointed City Plan Commissioners. Although fewer than one-third of
participants named “someone from the CPC,” or, less commonly, particular members who
serve on this commission, participants who did commonly explained that the CPC is the
primary gatekeeper for development projects that need council approval, but that the
commission’s role is narrow, and does not extend to other types of decisions. Within that
narrow role, the CPC hears proposals and requests related to new development and zoning
changes throughout Dallas428, and its recommendations are passed to the City Council for a
final decision. In practice, participants overwhelmingly considered each commissioner to be
a proxy vote for the councilmember who appointed them; participants often suggested that
this allows the city council to, as one participant put it, “outsource their fighting, because

427
428

Dallas City Charter, 2015, p. 9; pp. 13-24; 75; 91
Board of Adjustment Working Rules of Procedure, 2001, p. 3; Dallas City Charter, 2015, pp 51-53
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CPC meetings are rarely attended.” When explaining why they included a member of the
CPC on their decision-making team, one response well- summarized the general opinion:
Most decisions in Dallas deal with development, so it makes sense to have the CPC on board if you
can get them. If the CPC likes your idea, and passes along a favorable recommendation, you’ve got a
good shot at a rubber stamp from the city council.

Dallas’ City Manager. Over 80% of participants named City Manager A.C.
Gonzalez (by title or name) to their respective decision-making teams. In elaborating on
why, participants pointed out that under Dallas’ weak mayor system, tremendous decisionmaking power is vested in the office of its city manager. Variously, participants identified
that Gonzalez’ office is responsible for implementing the decisions of the mayor and city
council, preparing the city’s annual budget, coordinating city operations and programs,
managing nearly all non-appointed city personnel, and enforcing municipal ordinances
(including oversight of Dallas’ police department), entering into financial agreements on
behalf of the City of Dallas, and recommending how to use bonds and TIF revenue, among
many other administrative responsibilities429. Participants also acknowledged that, like Mayor
Rawlings, Gonzalez works closely with first- and second tier influentials, and that he has the
broad support of organizations represented by citywide civic chairs; summarizing many of
their comments:
Dallas’ City managers have always been told to go out and bring economic development to
the city. A.C. (Gonzales), like Mary (Suhm) before him, tries everything he can to keep
Dallas business-friendly, whether that’s TIF money, easing regulations, or just working with
developers to find financing, navigate zoning and construction permits, or break logjams on
the bureaucratic side of things.

Formal authorities, in summary. Within Dallas’ citywide decision-making body,
participants identified top-level elected leaders, political appointees, and its bureaucratic
chief. United by their formal decision-making authority, derived from a combination of
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Dallas’ city charter, various ordinances and bureaucratic policies, and professional deference,
data suggest that these formal authorities are among Dallas’ most powerful decision-makers.
Critically, however, no participant named an entire team of actors from this category, which
suggests that for a decision to truly be accepted by Dallasites, there is room for actors who
operate outside of the public sector.
First tier influentials. Table 4.11 shows summary statistics related to Dallas’
citywide first tier influentials, named by eight or more participants to a hypothetical committee
responsible for making a decision that would affect Dallas as a whole, and that would need
to be supported by a majority of the city.

Ray Hunt
John Wiley Price

Table 4.11: Citywide First Tier Influentials
Decision-Making
Mean
Committee
Primary or Notable
Power
Nominations
Affiliation(s)
Level
(1 - 4)
#
%
Hunt Consolidated
39
49%
3.86
Dallas County Commissioner
32
41%
3.84

Harlan Crow

Crow Holdings
Son of Trammel Crow

21

27%

3.74

30

38%

2.09

Ross Perot Jr.

Hillwood

17

22%

3.66

14

18%

2.09

Kay Bailey
Hutchison

U.S. Senate (former)
TX House of Rep. (former) TX
State Treasurer (former)

14

18%

3.59

8

10%

2.12

Caroline Hunt
T. Boone Pickens
Ruth Collins Altshuler

Rosewood Corp.
BP Capital
Philanthropist

13
11
11

16%
14%
14%

3.38
3.29
3.13

12
8
14

16%
10%
18%

2.38
2.10
2.09

Bobby Lyle

Lyco Holdings
Southern Methodist University

10

13%

3.03

8

10%

2.46

19
23

24%
29%

3.50
3.11

13
20

16%
26%

2.21
2.27

Name

Mean Value (Actors in This Category)
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories)

Recent Shared
Committee
Service
#
%
8
10%
12
15%

Mean
Familiarity
Level
(1 - 4)
2.08
2.45

Participants identified nearly every actor in this category as being part of Dallas’ old guard,
that is, a selective, enduring mix of civically-engaged actors who were born into the city’s
first families, or who have been “blessed” into this category through careers of service to
Dallas. Compared to actors in other categories, category means for first tier influentials are
above-average for mean power- and familiarity ratings, but not for recent shared committee
service or nominations to decision-making committees. In the following paragraphs, this
study will describe how these actors involve themselves in citywide decision-making, first
broadly, and then for category standout John Wiley Price.
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In general, participants concurred that Dallas’ citywide first tier influentials hold a
tremendous degree of influence over the decision-making process, though close connections
with each other, privileged access to several of Dallas’ formal authorities and civic chairs, and
tremendous reserves of social-, physical-, and financial capital. However, while many of
these individuals are independently wealthy, participants regularly agreed that these actors
intentionally curate strong social ties; summarizing many other comments, one participant
said that:
These people are in all the same country clubs, they serve on all the same boards, they pray
in all same churches; their kids go to the same exclusive private schools, (and) the same toplevel universities. They don’t have to organize, because they already are – they’re always
forming new projects to fit into their vision of the city.

Participants regularly admitted that the purpose of these social ties is, in many cases, to “feel
out” actors in other categories, and to identify partners who will allow these first tier
influentials to remain influential in Dallas’ decision-making process while keeping out of the
public eye. Participants also opined that shared social network either creates, or was created
by, what many called “shared vision” for Dallas, which many summarized as:
A city full of the most beautiful stadiums, the tallest skyscrapers, the largest convention
centers, the most beautiful hotels and luxury condos, and the widest highways to connect all
of it to the suburbs.

Category standout: John Wiley Price. Over 40% of participants nominated Dallas
County Commissioner John Wiley Price to their decision-making committees, and he
received an average power rating of 3.84, among the highest of all actors at the citywide
level. In nominating Price to their decision-making teams, participants often referred to him
as “the Black vote,” noting that throughout his career, Price has, for decades, billed himself
as “our man downtown,” connecting his identity as an African-American to the largely
African American district he represents, and that Dallas’ formal authorities and other first tier
influentials have relied on him to represent African-American interests in the decision-making
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process430. Indeed, participants repeatedly conjected that he has become the “token”
African-American in many of Dallas’ policy- and developmental decisions.
For nearly as long as Price has been active in forwarding the interests of his
constituents, he has been mired in scandals, including bribery, money laundering, and
accusations of unethical behavior431. Participants, especially those with close relationships to
Price, were unsurprised by the recent FBI investigations into Price’s behavior, and suggested
that his behavior is an “open secret” among Dallas’ leaders; sentiments well-summarized by:
Price has been “our man downtown,” the voice of the Black community in Dallas’ all-white
leadership for a long, long time, and lined his pockets by taking a cut of every deal he sent
our way. Of course he’s been on the take – he looks out for his own, and for himself. He’s
making $130,000 as a commissioner, but owns multiple houses, multiple luxury cars, and
wears suits that cost more than some of us make in a year.

For this reason, as well as the rising number of African-American political leaders and
ranking bureaucrats, nearly two-thirds of participants suggested that, to varying degrees, his
influence has declined rapidly, especially in the wake of federal bribery allegations that have
been under investigation since 2014, and which include many of Price’s staff, including
himself. As one participant put it:
Price’s star rose for many years, because he was the only [African American] running in an
all-Black part of town. Now that better has come along, you’re seeing him get what’s been
coming to him.

First tier influentials, in summary. Participants recognized that nearly every one
of Dallas’ first tier influentials has achieved a level of celebrity in the city, and many participants
pointed out the biographies, newspaper features, civic awards, and allegations of scandal
connected to each. Many called actors in this category “modern cowboys,” evoking a
romanticism that (arguably) pervades the Dallas myth432. Within Dallas’ citywide decisionmaking process, participants agreed that this exclusive group of highly influential operatives

Dallas County, 2012, p. 2; 2015
Krause, 2016; Miller, 1991; Rogers, 2014; Schutze, 2008; 2011; Thompson, 2014
432 Graff, 2008, pp. 81-90
430
431
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have historically exerted tremendous influence in Dallas’ citywide decision-making process,
and in spite of decaying membership, and that it continues to influence decisions in the city,
either directly, or (more commonly) from behind more publicly-visible actors. Data seem to
support these assertions, suggesting that within the citywide decision-making body, these
actors are second only to citywide formal authorities in power ratings, but no one particular
actor is seen on a large number of shared committees or boards.
Returning to a broad view of Dallas’ citywide decision-making process, participants
noted that this category of actors is exceptionally exclusive, and acknowledged that this
exclusivity has resulted in a decline in this category’s size, as aging members die – often
without naming heirs – and that the second tier influentials who have been looked to as their
replacements seem to have little interest in becoming “regents” in Dallas. As a result,
participants regularly conceded that Dallas has historically been run by a small collection of
elite influential operatives, and to some extent, remains as-such, but that the shrinking of this
category of actors has created a power vacuum in the highest echelons of citywide decisionmaking, and the results of this vacuum, as participants noted, are two-fold: first, formal
authorities have reclaimed significant decision-making authority, and second, there is more
space for competing interests to enter into the decision-making structure, especially from
more progressive formal authorities and ad-hoc collaborations involving second tier influentials.
Second Tier Influentials. Table 4.12 shows summary statistics related to Dallas’
citywide second tier influentials, named by eight or more participants to their citywide,
hypothetical decision-making teams.
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Name
Mary Suhm
Clint McDonnough

John Scovell
Robert Chereck
Arcilia Acosta
Michael Caffey
Angela Hunt
Albert Black
Donna D. Halstead

Jeff Staubach
Alan Walne
Steve Everbach

Table 4.12: Citywide Second Tier Influentials
Decision-Making
Mean
Committee
Primary or Notable
Power
Nominations
Affiliation(s)
Level
(1 - 4)
#
%
City Manager (former)
23
29%
3.26
Ernst & Young, LLP
15
19%
3.04
Woodbine Development
16
20%
2.95
PlainsCapital
16
20%
2.95
CARCON Industries
13
16%
2.78
C.B. Richard Ellis (CBRE)
14
18%
2.71
Dallas City Council (former)
12
15%
2.64

#
24
27
25
18
26
25
19

%
30%
34%
32%
23%
33%
32%
24%

Mean
Familiarity
Level
(1 - 4)
2.09
2.49
2.29
2.13
2.50
2.01
2.36

Recent Shared
Committee Service

On-Target Supplies & Logistics
Dallas Regional Chamber (former)
Dallas City Council (former)
Dallas Citizens Council (former)

11

14%

2.45

18

23%

2.36

8

10%

2.39

18

23%

2.04

Jones Lang LaSalle
Dallas City Council (former)
Texas State Fair Board
Colliers International

8

10%

2.38

25

32%

2.38

9

11%

2.32

21

27%

2.49

8

10%

2.22

21

27%

2.06

13
23

16%
29%

2.67
3.11

22
20

28%
26%

2.27
2.27

Mean Value (Actors in This Category)
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories)

This category features the largest number of actors out of any category at the citywide level,
and is primarily composed of two groups: retired formal authorities, and members of Dallas’
developer class. Data in table 4.12 suggest that these actors have, on average, an above-average
number of nominations to decision-making committees, as well as (slightly) above-average
recent shared committee membership. Data also suggest that these actors have a belowaverage power rating, and average ratings of familiarity. In the following sections, this study
will use participant interview responses to elaborate upon these actors, first, Dallas’ ex-formal
authorities; second, the citywide developer class, and finally, category standout Mary Suhm.

Ex-formal authorities. Participants spoke to particularly active roles of a subset of
Dallas’ former city councilmembers and mayors, who after leaving office, have “retired into”
prominent positions in real estate law-, investment-, and development firms, as well as on
high-profile philanthropic boards. These actors are often hired into these positions
specifically for their willingness utilize the connections they made while in office to garner
council support for their new employers’ projects, as well as regulatory and development
assistance from city staff. Summarizing many comments, two participant (respectively)
commented that:
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Some people never leave City Hall, even after they retire or get voted out. They land a job
with a high-powered law firm, or with a developer, and then go right back down to City Hall
to lobby their successor and former coworkers.
The experience of a top-level city employee, like a department head or elected official, is
incredibly valuable to any business that interacts with those offices, so it’s only reasonable
that those employees would find their skills and contacts valuable in the private sector.

The developer class. Participants regularly nominated one (or more) of a handful
of real estate developers, investors, financiers, and sales agents to their decision-making
bodies, and frequently agreed that these actors share similar characteristics. First, each works
for a company that operates in multiple cities throughout the United States, and most also
have international presences as well. Second, each of these actors generally subscribes to a
demand-based approach to development, and largely avoids speculative building in the
hopes of attracting tenants, or building solely to elevate Dallas’ civic profile. Finally, these
individuals tend to be disinterested in serving on multiple high-profile civic boards and
committees. As a result, these actors are more open to collaborating with a rotating cast of
stakeholders (such as formal authorities, civic chairs, and anchor captains) on particular projects, but
unlike their predecessors, do not form enduring coalitions; in describing this difference,
participant comments are well-summarized by:
It’s a different Dallas, now. Back in the day, Trammell Crow thought that Dallas needed a
convention center and hotel to compete with other cities, so he went to City Hall and got a
sack of money to help build a mid-sized convention space and hotel. Now, Dallas has a
flagging convention center, so Jack Matthews built a hotel onto it – not because he believed
Dallas needed it to compete, but because A.C Gonzales took half a billion city dollars and
threw it at Matthews’ company to build the […] thing.

Category standout: Mary Suhm. Dallas’ former city manager received the highest
number of participant decision-making team nominations of any actor in this category
(29%), and also had the highest power rating of any actor in this category (3.26). In
describing Suhm’s role as a former city official, participants agreed that, even though she no
longer draws a city paycheck, Suhm continues to remain a fixture in City Hall, negotiating
city contracts with union employees, planning civic events, and working as an appointee to
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various boards and committees – often at the personal request of Mayor Rawlings. Speaking
to this, participants commonly made statements similar to:
Mary (Suhm) never really left office. They don’t pay her anymore, but she’s always around,
getting her hands into different projects. She retired under a cloud of suspicion, and a lot of
bad blood with the city council, but she’s got a proven history of getting things done, so it’s
hard to know what exactly to do with her. It seems like the plan is to keep her around as a
volunteer until she moves on, one way or another.

Among participants who selected Suhm to serve on their hypothetical decision-making
committees, common consensus was that the former city manager continues to have
preferential access to Mayor Rawlings (and through him, the city council), top-level
executives in the private sector, and many of Dallas’ first tier influentials; as several allowed,
“Having Mary (Suhm) on your team is almost like having A.C. (Gonzalez), most of the
power, but none of the scrutiny that comes with being an official public employee.”

Second tier influentials, in summary. Within Dallas’ citywide decision-making
process, participants identified a collection of actors, each of whom is only selectively
involved in decision-making, but whose involvement is often a deciding factor in the success
of a project or policy decision. Because of their numbers, as well as the lack of a common
agenda, participants agreed that individual actors in this category tend to not be as
individually influential as their first tier counterparts; however, many offered that, taken as a
whole, these actors are still able to exert influence over the decisions of formal authorities at
the citywide level.
Civic Chairs. Table 4.13 shows summary statistics related to Dallas’ citywide civic
chairs, named by eight or more participants to a hypothetical committee responsible for
making a decision that would affect Dallas as a whole, and that would need to be supported
by a majority of the city.
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Name
Alice Murray
Mabrie Jackson
Dale Petrosky

Table 4.13: Citywide Civic Chairs
Decision-Making
Mean
Committee
Primary or Notable
Power
Nominations
Affiliation(s)
Level
(1 - 4)
#
%
Dallas Citizens Council
48
61%
3.53
North Texas Commission
28
35%
3.14
Dallas Regional Chamber
20
25%
2.97

Mean Value (Actors in This Category)
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories)

32
23

41%
29%

3.21
3.11

Recent Shared
Committee
Service
#
%
42
54%
22
28%
23
29%
29
20

37%
26%

Mean
Familiarity
Level
(1 - 4)
2.38
2.47
2.12
2.32
2.27

This category consists of three leaders of civic organizations whose members include (and
are often limited to) high-ranking business executives, city-, regional-, and statewide elected
officials, and long-time civic philanthropists, in other words, the actors participants regularly
referred to as the “ruling regents” of Dallas. In general, actors in this category received
above-average nominations to decision-making teams, and the average scores for actors in
this category are higher than averages from all categories combined in power, recent shared
committee service, and familiarity. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will first describe
the roles of Dallas’ regional civic chairs, and then the role of category standout, Alice Murray.

Regional civic chairs. In explaining the inclusion of these actors to their
hypothetical decision-making teams, participants acknowledged that these actors are able to
act as go-betweens for Dallas’ first tier and second tier influentials, and its formal authorities, and are
able to garner support for a decision from Dallas’ first tier and second tier influentials, and to
marshal resources around making that those decisions into a reality. Many participants
suggested that, while these actors are influential in their own right, their real presence in
Dallas’ decision-making body comes from preferential access to many of Dallas’ formal
authorities, and their ability- and willingness to assess and align the interests of their
constituents, mobilize constituent physical- financial-, and social capital in service of those
interests, identify- and support formal authorities who will be sympathetic, and use preferential
access to those actors to push the agendas set forth by their organizations’ members; as
several participants agreed:
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Groups like the (Dallas) Citizens Council and the [North Texas Commission] are made up of Dallas’
old guard, as well as big players from the northern suburbs. They’ve got direct lines into City Hall, but
they represent interests from all over North Texas, so when they push an agenda for Dallas, who are
they really serving - us, or the rich, white suburbs?
What used to be an oligarchy of Dallas’ business elite is getting drowned out by people who have their
eyes on the greater region, especially the northern suburbs.

Category standout: Alice Murray. Although participants concurred that each of
these actors possesses access to tremendous resources and influence through their
organizations’ members, interviews made it clear that one leader, Alice Murray of the Dallas
Citizens Council, possesses a degree of influence on a much higher order than other actors
in this category. Selected by over 60% of participants for inclusion on their decision-making
teams, and with a power score of 3.53, data suggest that the Citizens Council, and its leader,
continue to possess an incredible influence over the city’s decision-making process.
Participant comments on Murray’s role can be summarized by the comment:
Alice (Murray) is our unelected mayor. She doesn’t have to necessarily approve of a project,
but she and her people in the Citizens Council have to at least be neutral – you really can’t
get much done with them standing against you. They have the leaders of all the biggest
banks, the construction companies, the nonprofits, the for-profits… anyone who is anyone
is on the Citizens Council; they rule Dallas, and she basically rules them.

While participants conceded that Murray is a highly influential force, they regularly
conjected that this influence is far weaker than it was in mid-to-late 20th century Dallas, when
the city’s “ruling regents” enjoyed nearly limitless control over the decision-making process.
This power started to fade in the 1970s, when Dallas moved to a mix of single-district and
at-large councilmembers, and lost significant power in 1991, when Dallas moved to the “141” council system employed today433. Participants also noted that Dallas’ Participants also
suggested that, as members of the city’s old guard die or retire from the politics of decisionmaking, the emerging leaders who appear likely to replace them are less active in supporting
the Citizens Council, and that as Dallas continues to induce business migration within the
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city limits, there are more executives and top leaders; these leaders come into the city from
all over the world, and bring with them a diverse range of ideas for the city. In describing
this, participants’ comments are well-summarized by:
The Dallas Citizens Council endorsed nearly every mayor in recent memory, and their
members filled up campaign contributions lists going back to the last century – even on city
council elections, but that’s not as sure of a bet. A.C. (Gonzalez) is also one of their
annointees, so when the Council wants something, they usually get it. Ordinary people have
to make appointments to see their elected leaders, but Dallas’ ruling oligarchs get direct lines.
Murray and her supporters don’t rule the city like they used to. Just look at the City Council
– she’s lost seven seats since 2011, and as the current councilmembers hit their term limits,
she stands to lose even more.

Civic chairs, in summary. Participants identified three leaders of Dallas’ largest
civic organizations as being particularly influential in the citywide decision-making process,
citing their preferential access to formal authorities, and their ability- and willingness to
combine this access with physical-, social-, and financial capital from many of Dallas’ firstand second tier influentials, in service of goals supported by a majority of their members. As
Chapter 2 detailed, historically, the organizations that these actors represent have had an
outsized influence over Dallas’ decision-making body, but external forces have significantly
diminished this influence; as one participant put it:
Dallas tried hard to remain true to its big-business, big-building attitude, but the times, and
the Supreme Court got in the way. Gone are the smoke-filled rooms where men would lay
out plans for the city, but not everyone is ready to give up the past.

Even with their influence waning, though, participants agreed that actors in this category are
highly influential in the citywide decision-making process, and will likely remain so for the
foreseeable future.
Anchor Captains. Table 4.14 shows summary statistics related to Dallas’ citywide
anchor captains named by eight or more participants to their citywide, hypothetical decisionmaking committees.
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Name
Gerald Turner
Joel Allison
David Daniel
Lee Jackson

Table 4.14: Citywide Anchor Captains
Decision-Making
Mean
Committee
Primary or Notable
Power
Nominations
Affiliation(s)
Level
(1 - 4)
#
%
Southern Methodist Univ.
21
27%
3.33
Baylor, Scott, & White
20
25%
2.71
Univ. of TX at Dallas (former)
14
18%
2.54
Univ. of TX System
Univ. of North TX System
12
15%
2.47

Mean Value (Actors in This Category)
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories)

17
23

21%
29%

2.76
3.11

#
23
19

%
29%
24%

Mean
Familiarity
Level
(1 - 4)
2.10
2.27

13

16%

2.37

24

30%

2.24

20
20

26%
26%

2.24
2.27

Recent Shared
Committee Service

At the citywide level, this category consists of four leaders connected to local hospitals and
prominent universities. Compared to other categories, anchor captains, on average, received
below-average committee nominations, power ratings, and ratings of mean familiarity levels.
Overall, these actors also scored on-average for shared committee memberships. In the
paragraphs that follow, this study will first describe the roles in citywide decision-making of
anchor captains broadly, and then it will focus on category standout Gerald Turner.
Participants regularly noted that actors in this category have long-standing
connections to Dallas, and as a result, have developed decades-long relationships with highranking formal authorities, as well as first tier influentials, several of whom have university- and
hospital departments and facilities named after themselves, or their relatives. Participants
also recognized that in the past, these organizations were used for little more than ensuring
public support for somewhat questionable development projects, and that while this is still
often the case, many asserted that this is beginning to change. Several participants asserted
that anchor captains are still courted by Dallas’ developer class to support development projects,
so that these can qualify for state- and federal funding to offset construction costs, but that
in exchange for that support, Dallas’ anchor captains are starting to demand a greater role in
projects with which they affiliate their institutions, paying more attention to these
institutions’ public images, and reputation in their communities. As several participants
noted:
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Colleges and hospitals in Dallas, they don’t have to work with you on a project, because
they’ll just work with the guy across the street who gives them a better deal. It’s not just
money, either – it’s jobs for their students, or outpatient facilities that can do the biggest new
scan. They know that you can’t touch them on public opinion, so they’re really starting to get
into the driver’s seat on projects, looking to expand opportunities and meet their own
agendas, but it’s all so new – maybe five or ten years, if that, so who knows whether it will
last.

Category standout: Gerald Turner. Over a quarter of participants nominated
Gerald Turner, president of Southern Methodist University (SMU), a private, nonprofit
university surrounded by some of the most expensive, prestigious neighborhoods in Dallas,
to their decision-making teams, and his power rating (3.33) is markedly higher than the other
anchor captains. When nominating Turner, participants often explained that his participation in
Dallas’ decision-making process is unique among similar leaders, in that SMU has long-been
associated with power and influence in Dallas; several participants said that:
If you want to be someone in Dallas, and didn’t go to a private school like Hockaday,
Usuline, or Dallas International, then you want that SMU ring. The network is valuable, and
everyone who matters knows it.

Indeed, in researching individuals named as influential operatives, this study found
that a large number of participant-identified formal authorities and influential operatives
have either graduated from the university, or serve (currently or formerly) on its board of
directors, or within one of the university’s departments. Participants regularly admitted that
Turner himself, and several of the administrators under him, are deeply connected to Dallas’
first tier influentials and civic chairs, and acknowledged that his support for a project can alleviate
concerns among actors in these other categories, and that his support on a project is a viable
alternative to direct support from actors in these other categories, and the “political
baggage” that those actors often bring with them to projects. In describing this, participants
regularly agreed that:
SMU has been associated with [Dallas’] rich and powerful for so long that it’s almost a proxy
for their approval, but the university has less negativity associated with its name than a group
like the Dallas Citizens Council or the Dallas Petroleum Club, even though there’s huge
overlap in those circles.
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Anchor Captains, in summary. Participants identified four leaders of some of
Dallas’ largest anchor institutions as being influential in the citywide decision-making
process, citing connections with formal authorities, first tier influentials, and a subset of second tier
influentials. Participants had difficulty explaining the role of these actors in decision-making,
and usually suggested that the roles of these organizations are still evolving as Dallas’ leaders
learn how to work together with them, rather than relegating them to “ancillary” status.
Summarizing many participant comments, one said that:
College presidents and hospital chiefs have always been part of the equation, at least when it
got them a new building, but now they’re not just working alone, happy with whatever
scraps get thrown their way; they’re being proactive, and that’s a whole new ballgame.
Talking about really running Dallas, though – that’s a different thing completely. Who
knows? Ask me again in five years.

Decision-makers in Dallas as a whole, in summary. This study asked
participants knowledgeable about Dallas’ decision-making process to identify- and
describe actors who get involved in making citywide decisions, and to nominate 10
people to form a committee that would be responsible for making a decision that
would affect the city as a whole. A total of 79 participants delivered a combined 790
nominations, and 726 of these went to the 32 individual- and group actors outlined
in the previous section. These actors represent major public-, private-, and thirdsector organizations, but can largely be settled into support for one of two distinct
agendas for Dallas: a neoliberal, growth machine past, and progressive, post-Fordist
future. Before evaluating whether these actors, and the relationships among them,
are suggestive of a structure within this decision-making process, this study will
report its findings with respect to its two focus neighborhoods.
Decision-makers in North Oak Cliff
Recall that this study aims to extend previous studies of urban governance by also
examining the structure of decision-making within neighborhoods. To understand the
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contemporary decision-making structure within North Oak Cliff, and whether (or to what
extent) anchor institutions and CDCs have a primary role within it, this study asked
participants knowledgeable about decision-making in North Oak Cliff to identify- and
describe actors who get involved in making neighborhood-wide decisions, and to nominate
10 people to form a committee that would be responsible for making a decision that would
affect the city as a whole.
A total of 40 (out of 79) participants were identified as being particularly cognizant
of decision-making in North Oak Cliff; therefore, a maximum of 400 nominations were
possible, and out of these, 86 votes, or 21.5% were cast for actors who did not garner
enough votes (a minimum of 4, or approximately 10%) to be included in the tables
throughout this section. In reporting on these actors, this study will first detail North Oak
Cliff’s formal authorities; next, it will introduce the city’s its first tier influentials; third, its second tier
influentials; fourth, its civic chairs; and finally, the neighborhood’s anchor captains.
Formal authorities. Table 4.15 shows summary statistics related to North Oak
Cliff’s formal authorities, named by four or more participants to a hypothetical committee
responsible for making a decision that would affect the neighborhood, and that would need
to be supported by a majority of neighborhood’s population.

Name
Scott Griggs
Michael Anglin
Scott Hounsel

Neva Dean

Table 4.15: North Oak Cliff Formal Authorities
Decision-Making
Mean
Committee
Power
Primary or Notable Affiliation(s)
Nominations
Level
(1 - 4)
#
%
Dallas City Council
40
100%
3.85
City Plan Commission (CPC)
28
70%
3.40
Zoning Board of Adjustment (BOA)
25
63%
3.38
Sust. Development & Construction
24
60%
3.18

Mean Value (Actors in This Category)
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories)

29
21

73%
52%

3.45
2.96

Recent Shared
Committee
Service
#
%
9
23%
6
15%
2
5%
5
13%
6
4

Mean
Familiarity
Level
(1 - 4)
2.23
2.10
2.05
2.30

14%
10%

2.17
2.25

Actors in this category consist of the neighborhood’s elected representative:
Councilmember Scott Griggs, as well as two of his political appointees, and the interim
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planning director within the city’s Sustainable Design & Construction office, which handles
issues related to zoning requests, variances, and exceptions, and development code
amendments434. On average, actors in this category have the highest power rating of all
categories, above-average decision-making committee nominations, above-average recent
shared board or committee service, and below-average scores on familiarity. In the
paragraphs that follow, this study will summarize participant responses regarding North Oak
Cliff’s formal authorities; first, the neighborhood’s unelected leadership, i.e., its appointed CPC
and BOA members, and city staff, and then, category standout Scott Griggs.

City staff and political appointees. In considering bureaucratic involvement in
North Oak Cliff’s decision-making structure, participants regularly discussed the role of its
Neva Dean, the city’s interim planning director, and (commonly in the same breath), the
roles of Councilmember Griggs’ appointees to the City Plan Commission (CPC) and Zoning
Board of Adjustment (BOA). In some ways, city staff and political appointees serve similar
functions as advisors to Councilmember Griggs, and as enforcers of his policy vision for the
neighborhood, but a subset of participants proposed that city staff frequently advise as
advocates of first tier- and second tier influentials, while CPC and BOA appointees reinforce
Griggs’ ideas.
Looking first at Interim Planning Director Neva Dean, whose office oversees
permits and planning, and who works with city’s Landmark Commission, overseeing which
buildings receive landmark status and associated protections, participants agreed that her
office is a recurrent battleground between second tier influentials and civic chairs who,
respectively, propose and challenge plans for new development in the neighborhood.
Participants frequently suggested that city staff tend to keep a pro-development agenda, and
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this bias is evident in Dean’s office, where staff are often unhelpful in assisting residents find
particular ordinances that are being violated, but generally will act once specific violations are
documented; several commented that:
If a resident wants to complain about a project, they have to go to Planning and get a
meeting, or know the codes and demand action through Scott (Griggs). It ends up being a
fight down in Neva [Dean]’s office, or through public hearings, with her people taking the
side of the developer.

In selecting Dean for their decision-making committees, participants identified her abilityand willingness to selectively enforce various development ordinances, especially when a
project has the support of Councilmember Griggs, so long as those violations are relatively
minor, and not safety-related. Many participants agreed that:
Dean doesn’t send inspectors out to deep-dive into every single project, because that’s a
waste of time and people she doesn’t really have. If a proposal is good, and has [Griggs’s]
support, then those inspectors might elect to not go after you on minor zoning or permit
violations, and they might not even show up as long as nobody complains.

In considering the roles of Griggs’ political appointees in neighborhood decisionmaking, participants named Michael Anglin and Scott Hounsel (respectively, Griggs’
appointees to the City Plan Commission (CPC) and Zoning Board of Adjustment (BOA) ),
as the councilmember’s proxy votes during proposed zoning changes, battles over adding (or
removing) historic district protections, and requested exceptions to extant zoning policies.
To the extent that participants suggested pro-development bias in city staff, participants also
identified an anti-development bias in these two actors, and recognized that these two, like
Griggs himself, share a vision of a North Oak Cliff that respects its historical structures and
density, rather than razing that history in favor of neoliberal renewal strategies.
Participants regularly drew parallels between Griggs’ appointees and those of
Councilmember Kingston (discussed in later sections), in that both sets of appointees are
often in the minority when it comes to opposing particular developments, but participants
agreed that Griggs’ appointees are (generally) more successful in defeating controversial real148

estate plans for two reasons: first, the developer class in North Oak Cliff is less enmeshed
within the city than the analogous class in Downtown Dallas, and second, North Oak Cliff’s
civic chairs are actively involved in mobilizing neighborhood residents to oppose unpopular
development, with a level of organization that does not exist in other neighborhoods. In
drawing these distinctions, participants regularly called the neighborhood the “People’s
Republic of Oak Cliff,” and commended the work of organizers; their comments are wellsummarized by:
Oak Cliff was neglected for so long that people had to work together to get anything out of
City Hall, and there’s a strong spirit of surviving even without Dallas’ help. Different blocks
come together in a way you just don’t see anywhere else, and when you can get them all
together, you get a voice that even the (City) Council can’t ignore. They don’t win every
time, but they win more often than the developers would like.

Category Standout: Councilmember Scott Griggs. Participants unanimously
nominated Councilmember Scott Griggs to their neighborhood decision-making teams, and
has the highest power rating (3.85) of all actors in North Oak Cliff. Often, participants
would discuss the role of other neighborhood decision-makers in terms of how they work
with the councilmember, and repeatedly said that other formal authorities serve primarily to
inform- and implement Griggs’ decisions, especially as those decisions relate to construction
and development; as many agreed:.
Scott (Griggs) is the chief executive of this district – a leader whose authority here is basically
unquestionable. If he likes your project, then you’ll get the permits and zoning taken care of
quickly. If he doesn’t, then suddenly you get hit with all of these obscure zoning laws and
code violations, enough to delay your project for years, if not killing it outright. Enough
money can get through that, but it’s so expensive and time-consuming that most developers
don’t mess with it.

Participants also admitted that Griggs devotes much of his time to undoing the decisions of
his predecessors, fighting to keep his district from becoming, as one participant put it, “a
playground for the rich in North Dallas.” Although Griggs opposes the commodification of
the neighborhood, participants acknowledged that he is not totally anti-development, and
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has worked with locally-based developers, as well as developers with an interest in infill
construction and low-rise, new-urbanist style development. Participants’ regularly made
comments similar to:
Back in the 90s, and even through the early 2000s, there was an attempt to revive North Oak
Cliff by rezoning for suburban-style development, without respect to the layout or history of
the area, which is tied up in streetcars and walking everywhere. Scott (Griggs) can only
rezone so many places each year, so he’s constantly fighting with developers to make sure
they build with a sense of the scale and style of this place. We can’t stay stagnant forever, but
he tries to make sure that new development respects the feel of the community.

Formal authorities, in summary. When describing North Oak Cliff’s decisionmaking body, participants agreed that the neighborhood’s city councilmember is the primary
decision-maker. In addition to the unwritten policy of non-interference among
councilmembers, participants acknowledged that within his district, Councilmember Griggs
benefits from professional deference of the interim planning director, and from his
involvement in working with his proxy votes appointed to the CPC and BOA. Summarizing
many participant comments on this, one participant noted that:
Councilman Griggs is the central authority in this area. It’s practically suicidal to fight him;
sure, you can get permits and zoning approval without his okay, but he can bury you in
regulations, historic district red tape, funding nightmares… he can either clear the way for
your project, or have every city office stonewall and delay to the absolute legal limit.

First tier influentials. Table 4.16 shows summary statistics related to North Oak
Cliff’s first tier influentials, named by four or more participants to a hypothetical committee
responsible for making a decision that would affect the neighborhood, and that would need
to be supported by a majority of neighborhood’s population.

Name
Jim Lake Jr.
Joe McElroy
Tom Prohaska

Table 4.16: North Oak Cliff First Tier Influentials
Decision-Making
Mean
Committee
Primary or Notable
Power
Nominations
Affiliation(s)
Level
(1 - 4)
#
%
Jim Lake Companies
17
43%
3.38
Square Foot Inc.
16
40%
2.88
Texas Pro Properties, LLC
10
25%
2.78

Mean Value (Actors in This Category)
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories)

14
21

36%
52%
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3.01
2.96

#
7
0
0

%
18%
0%
0%

Mean
Familiarity
Level
(1 - 4)
2.53
2.10
2.08

2
4

6%
10%

2.24
2.25

Recent Shared
Committee Service

Actors in this category consist of three locally-based rentiers who have built real
estate empires on renting to residents with low- and moderate incomes, as well as leasing
commercial space to area businesses. On average, actors in this category have fewer average
nominations for inclusion in a decision-making committee than those in other categories,
but have a slightly higher average power rating. Actors in this category are also lower, on
average, on both shared committee service with participants and familiarity. In the
paragraphs that follow, this study will examine the decision-making roles of North Oak
Cliff’s rentiers, particularly category standout Jim Lake, Jr.

Local rentiers. Participants largely agreed that actors in this subcategory are unified
by their vast real estate holdings throughout North Oak Cliff (and southern Dallas in
general), their long-standing involvement in area development decisions, especially in- and
around development hotspots like the Bishop Arts District and the Oak Cliff Gateway, and
their relative cooperation in partnering with the area’s second tier influentials on real estate
development, and joint efforts to lobby formal authorities at the neighborhood- and citywide
level to relax ordinances (or, at least, enforcement) related to conditions in their rental
properties.
While individually, no actor in this category received nominations from a majority of
participants, many participants selected at least one of the three listed in table 4.16. In
explaining why, participants often suggested that these actors usually opt to cooperate with-,
rather than compete against one another, so gaining the support of one is usually enough to
bring the others’ support as well. Participants also agreed that this cooperation stems from
the largely weak demand for development in the neighborhood, especially compared to the
demand in nearby Downtown Dallas, so it is practically unheard of for these actors’ interests
to conflict. As many participants admitted:
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The guys who own the land around here have no reason to fight each other, so they work
together to bundle up their various tracts and sell them to hungry developers. It’s all quiet,
and under the table, so the people – usually renters – living on that land usually don’t know
anything until the eviction notices start coming in, or they see bulldozers knocking
something down.

Category standout: Jim Lake, Jr. A significant minority (43%) of participants
nominated second-generation developer and Oak Cliff native Jim Lake, Jr., to their decisionmaking teams; indeed, participants rated Lake higher in power, shared committee
membership, and familiarity than either of the other two actors in this category. Although
participants uniformly respected Lake for his devotion to the neighborhood, a strong subset
heavily criticized the effects of his development projects.
“When Jim Jr. started down here,” one of Lake’s advocates began, “everything was
all boarded up. Now look out there – it’s all alive. People shopping, eating… some even live
here, who wouldn’t have come through here without a platoon ten years ago.” Participants
frequently credited Jim Lake Jr. with successfully lobbying for the creation of a TIF district
to induce development in both the Bishop Arts District and the Oak Cliff Gateway, but had
divergent opinions of his motives. One group considered Lake a resource in fighting to
preserve some of the neighborhood’s architecture and character, and largely agreed that:
Jim (Lake) grew up here, and learned from his dad, Jim (Lake) Sr., that you don’t always have
to tear down a building to make something new.. They worked with local businesses to fill
up old warehouses, and made community anchors where other people would just tear down
and put some generic, brown building full of retail chains and companies that don’t care
about the neighborhood.

Not all participants were as positive, however, and their comments are well-summed
with:
Jim (Lake) Jr. says that he cares about the neighborhood, but what he really cares about
making money, and what makes money right now is saving old spaces. He’s knocked down
plenty of buildings, and kicked out plenty of family businesses here, back before it was hip to
keep that stuff around.

First tier influentials, in summary. Within North Oak Cliff’s decision-making
process, participants agreed that a small group of landowners exert significant influence,
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although standout Jim Lake is notably more active than others in this category. Data seem to
support these impressions, with Lake holding notably higher power, Committee Service, and
familiarity scores than other actors in this category. Participants conceded that these actors
work (to differing degrees) with area formal authorities, and with second tier influentials and anchor
captains to further a broadly noncompetitive pro-development agenda. Increasingly, this
cooperation is drawing the ire of residents who oppose what they consider “destructive
gentrification,” wherein local businesses and low-income renters are being displaced in favor
of higher-income tenants imported from other parts of the city; this opposition, as well as
attempts to mediate among different interests are being headed by area civic chairs.
Second tier influentials. Table 4.17 shows summary statistics related to North Oak
Cliff’s second tier influentials, named by four or more participants to a hypothetical committee
responsible for making a decision that would affect the neighborhood, and that would need
to be supported by a majority of neighborhood’s population.

Name
Matt Segrest
Farrokh & Michael Nazerian

David Eitches
David Spence

Table 4.17: North Oak Cliff Second Tier Influentials
DecisionMean
Making
Primary or Notable
Power
Committee
Affiliation(s)
Level
Nominations
(1 - 4)
#
%
Alamo Manhattan
21
53%
3.23
Exxir Capital
19
48%
2.85
Blackwood Developments, LLC
15
38%
2.70
Good Space
10
25%
2.33

Mean Value (Actors in This Category)
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories)

14
21

36%
52%

2.78
2.96

Recent Shared
Committee
Service
#
3
0
0
7

%
7%
0%
0%
18%

3
4

7%
10%

Mean
Familiarity
Level
(1 - 4)
2.40
2.35
2.03
2.43
2.30
2.25

Actors in this category are all members of the developer class, and each is connected to
multiple development projects in North Oak Cliff. Data suggest that, compared to actors in
other categories, actors in this category are likely to be nominated to participants’ decisionmaking committees, have below-average ratings of power and recent shared committee
service, and above-average familiarity ratings. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will
discuss the role of the local developer class in decision-making in North Oak Cliff broadly, and
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then it will draw out participant perceptions of category standout David Spence.

The developer class. When participants selected actors in this category for their
hypothetical decision-making teams, they ofttimes acknowledged that these actors have
forged strong relationships with neighborhood formal authorities, first tier influentials, and a
subset of North Oak Cliff’s civic chairs. Among participants more broadly, there was general
agreement that these actors do not have similar agendas with respect to development; many
commented that there are two types of actors in this new group: infill developers like David
Spence, who focus on revitalizing blocks through remodeling single buildings, and larger
builders like Matt Segrest of Alamo Manhattan, Farrokh and Michael Nazerian of Exxir
Capital, and David Eitches of Blackwood Developments of whose projects involve
significantly more demolition and reconstruction, commonly over multiple plots, if entire
blocks at once. Nonetheless, participants drew a sharp contrast between developers active in
North Oak Cliff and those revitalizing nearby Downtown Dallas, often saying that:
It’s different here (in North Oak Cliff); larger developers like CBRE aren’t as big of a
presence, because they’re focusing on projects in the hundreds of millions of dollars,
whereas the biggest projects here are in the tens of millions.

Finally, participants opined that these actors ofttimes utilize their local knowledge to exploit
historic divisions among neighborhood organizations, intentionally developing in places
where multiple neighborhoods stand to benefit (or suffer) to varying extents. Many accused
local landowners of using their knowledge of neighborhood mistrust to guide new
developers into areas where inter-neighborhood distrust will act as a roadblock to a unified
resistance to development, and as one participant put it:
Bishop Arts and the (Oak Cliff) Gateway are basically artificial – they’re just lines on a map,
and they cut across different neighborhoods in different ways. If the neighborhoods would
work together, they could put up some opposition to development, but they won’t, and
these developers know that – they knew that when they bought the land where they did.
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Category standout: David Spence. Although David Spence, owner of Good
Space, had the lowest rating of power (2.33), and was the actor least nominated for inclusion
on participants’ decision-making teams (25%), he scored higher than other actors in this
category on both shared committee service and familiarity. In describing Spence’s role in
North Oak cliff, participants drew a distinction between him and other actors in this
category; specifically, they noted that, whereas other actors in this category focus on larger
developments, Spence’s company repurposes existing, abandoned buildings. Participants
regularly commented that:
In North Oak Cliff, everything used to be low-rise brick, laid out along trolley lines that were
buried years ago. The big guys like Alamo Manhattan don’t seem to get that we want to stay
true to that, but David (Spence) does. For years now, he’s been piecing together his
developments, little by little, and with a lot of work himself.

While his projects lack the scope and magnitude of many others, participants often
noted that he has much more community support, and that he has been integral in
developing spaces for locally-owned businesses, and for fostering locally-oriented
development in a neighborhood that is quickly being, as several conveyed, “parceled out” by
larger developers. Finally, in their interviews, even participants who did not nominate Spence
for their decision-making teams identified him as someone who is heavily involved in
projects around the Bishop Arts District, and several conjected that his positive relationships
with first tier influentials, formal authorities, and the general public would make him a formidable
successor to Councilmember Griggs, once Griggs leaves office.

Second tier influentials, in summary. Comprised of real estate developers, North
Oak Cliff’s second tier influentials work closely with first tier influentials and formal authorities to
reshape North Oak Cliff, particularly in the Bishop Arts District and Oak Cliff Gateway,
both of which are covered by a TIF district. While participants did not commonly select any
particular actor in this category for their decision-making teams, all participants selected at
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least one, agreeing that these actors are willing- and able to use their access to financial
capital to bring much-needed development to the area, and that many are willing to utilize
somewhat-questionable tactics in service of their agendas. However, participants noted
exceptions to these blanket statements in David Spence of Good Space, whose practice of
renovating existing structures has, in the eyes of many, saved many structures from
demolition, and has been crucial in supporting the development of a local economy.
Civic chairs. Table 4.18 shows summary statistics related to North Oak Cliff’s civic
chairs, named by four or more participants to their hypothetical neighborhood decisionmaking committees.

Name
Pam Conley
Lisa Benskin
Jason Roberts

Table 4.18: North Oak Cliff Civic Chairs
DecisionMean
Making
Power
Committee
Primary or Notable Affiliation(s)
Level
Nominations
(1 - 4)
#
%
Kidd Springs Neighborhood Association
27
68%
2.85
Old Oak Cliff Conservation League
27
68%
2.83
Better Block; Oak Cliff Transit Authority
13
33%
1.68
Mean Value (Actors in This Category)
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories)

22
21

56%
52%

2.45
2.96

Recent Shared
Committee Service
#
5
7
5

%
13%
18%
13%

6
4

14%
10%

Mean
Familiarity
Level
(1 - 4)
2.25
2.28
2.33
2.28
2.25

Actors in this category consist of two leaders of neighborhood associations and one
neighborhood activist associated with a number of highly-acclaimed civic organizations
active in North Oak Cliff. On average, these actors are slightly more likely than actors in
general to be nominated to participants’ decision-making committees, tend to serve on more
shared boards and committees with participants, and are rated higher on familiarity. These
actors also have a lower than average rating of power, compared to actors more broadly.
While participants identified more similarities between Pam Conley and Lisa Benskin than
between these two and Jason Roberts, participants had strong, unique opinions about each,
and their respective roles in decision-making within North Oak Cliff. As a result, in the
paragraphs that follow, this study will discuss each of these in turn.
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Category standout: Pam Conley. Over two-thirds of participants knowledgeable
about North Oak Cliff named Pam Conley to their decision-making teams, and she holds the
highest power rating (2.85) of any actor in the category. Conley is the president of the Kidd
Springs Neighborhood Association, and is long-time resident of the area, although
participants commented that she is most regularly found in city offices, meeting with
Councilmember Griggs, or in public hearings regarding development – particularly regarding
the Bishop Arts District, but also around the neighborhood broadly.
Participants – even those who did not nominate Conley for their decision-making
committees – considered her to be a political force to be reckoned with, limited only by her
propensity for irritating both her allies and her opponents. Participants regularly cited to her
ability- and willingness to study zoning ordinances and building codes, work with local media
(including the Dallas Morning News, Dallas Observer, and Oak Cliff Advocate) to keep media
pressure on Councilmember Griggs, and most importantly, her ability to whip up resident
opposition to development projects. Summarizing these points, participants acknowledged
that:
“Pam Conley” is a name even Scott Griggs has to pay attention to, because she doesn’t
waste time. She knows codes and zoning regulations better than the departments do, and
most importantly, she can- and will get voters to come out and raise a fuss.
She’s done more to stop questionable development than anyone else. Two things balance
her out: first, there are more developers with more projects than she has time to fight, and
second, she pisses off just near as many people as she lines up as supporters.

Category standout: Lisa Benskin. As many participants selected Benskin as did
Conley, and rated her nearly-identically on power (2.83). Participants described Benskin as
less-polarizing than Conley, as well as more moderate when considering whether, or to what
extent, to challenge new development in North Oak Cliff. In explaining why, participants
pointed to the purpose of the organization she leads – the 34-neighborhood coalition called
the Old Oak Cliff Conservation League (OOCCL). In practice, this means that its president,
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Lisa Benskin, is often looked to by Councilmember Griggs, city offices, and members of the
media to speak on behalf of neighborhood residents, while also being looked to as a
moderator among competing neighborhood interests. Participants recognized that Benskin
often fosters close ties with first tier influentials and second tier influentials, and uses these
connections to “nudge development along in ways that are less disruptive to the existing
residents” and “preserve the spirit of the area, while addressing the results of long-time
neglect and abandonment,” rather than opposing all development outright. Participant
thoughts can be summarized as follows:
In Dallas, development is a given – it’s like breathing around here, you can’t stop it forever.
Under Lisa (Benskin), the [OOCCL] doesn’t totally oppose development, and would rather
work with developers than against them, because that leads to results that the neighborhoods
might be able to live with.

Category standout: Jason Roberts. Out of North Oak Cliff’s civic chairs, Jason
Roberts had the fewest nominations (33%) to decision-making committees, as well as the
lowest rating of power (1.68). Although Roberts is not the head of a neighborhood
association, he is affiliated with a number of civic organizations in North Oak Cliff,
including the Better Block Project and Bike Friendly Oak Cliff, and is the founder of the
North Oak Cliff Transit Authority, a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization responsible
for successfully blending local-, state-, federal-, and private-sector funds, funneling these into
designing and constructing a streetcar line connecting North Oak Cliff to Downtown
Dallas435. Participants who nominated Roberts to their decision-making teams (and several
who did not) considered Roberts a “rising star” in the North Oak Cliff’s decision-making
process, but many criticized his forward-thinking advocacy as being “out of touch” with the
needs of neighborhood’s current residents, many of whom participants considered likely to
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be displaced as North Oak Cliff continues to gentrify. Summarizing participant comments,
many suggested that:
Jason (Roberts) is going to get elected to high office someday, probably after millennials
move south of the Trinity (River) and kick out the folks who live here now. Streetcars and
bike lanes and urban gardens are nice, but we still can’t even get enough decent grocery
stores for the folks who don’t have cars, or can’t afford to use a lot of gas. He’s the right
man to solve problems that the neighborhood will have in ten years, after all the poor folks
are pushed out.

Civic chairs, in summary. Actors in this category consist of two presidents of
neighborhood associations and one neighborhood activist associated with a number of
highly-acclaimed civic organizations active in North Oak Cliff. Participants agreed that each
actor’s approach to protecting and improving North Oak Cliff is unique, simultaneously
appealing to- and distancing various constituent groups within the neighborhood.
Additionally, participants frequently that actors in this category spend tremendous amounts
of their own time (often lacking financial resources to hire assistants) in service of their
constituents, frequently to be met with more disappointments than successes. This is nearly
the opposite of how participants described the experience of North Oak Cliff’s sole anchor
captain, to be discussed in the following subsection.
Anchor captains. Table 4.19 shows summary statistics related to North Oak Cliff’s
sole anchor captain named by four or more participants to a hypothetical committee
responsible for making a decision that would affect the neighborhood, and that would need
to be supported by a majority of neighborhood’s population.

Name
Martin Koonsman

Table 4.19: North Oak Cliff Anchor Captains
Decision-Making
Mean
Committee
Primary or Notable
Power
Nominations
Affiliation(s)
Level
(1 - 4)
#
%
Methodist Dallas Medical Center
22
55%
3.05

Mean Value (Actors in This Category)
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories)

22
21

55%
52%
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3.05
2.96

#
3

%
8%

Mean
Familiarity
Level
(1 - 4)
2.38

3
4

8%
10%

2.38
2.25

Recent Shared
Committee Service

Martin Koonsman is the president of Methodist Dallas Medical Center (commonly
referred to as Methodist Hospital), which has a significant amount of history with the
neighborhood, tracing its roots in North Oak Cliff to 1924436. Compared to actors in other
categories, Koonsman has an above-average number of nominations to decision-making
committees, as well as an above-average score in both power and familiarity, but has recently
served on fewer-than-average committees or boards with participants. In the paragraphs that
follow, this study will discuss participant perspectives on Koonsman’s role in neighborhood
decision-making.
In reflecting on Koonsman’s role as the president of the hospital, as well as the role
of the hospital in decision-making, a strong subset of participants often accused Koonsman
of using the hospital’s history with North Oak Cliff, its presence as one of the few area
medical facilities, and its status as a large employer to gain tremendous leeway with its
expansion projects, to the point that many of these projects are able to proceed over
objections of surrounding neighborhoods. As many agreed:
That hospital has been around for as long as anything else around here, and has hundreds, if
not thousands of jobs connected to it. They get almost anything they want, because there’s
just nobody else that can soak up all those people if the hospital leaves.

Participants also often concurred that, outside of using its influence to ease restrictions on
expansion, the hospital is generally uninvolved in neighborhood decision-making; in this
way, the hospital behaves as “part time” member of the neighborhood’s decision-making
body. As several participants put it:
Martin Koonsman doesn’t care about Oak Cliff, because none of his doctors or lead nurses
live here, and he certainly doesn’t either. None of those people wake up at 5am to the sound
of supply trucks barreling down the street, but the people who live here have had to do that
for months now. He wants to act like the hospital’s a cornerstone of the neighborhood when
it might get them some free money to build a new wing, but then his contractors will go and
bulldoze a block of houses for the construction.
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It is important to note that not all participants had a negative appraisal of the role of
Koonsman and the hospital in North Oak Cliff’s decision-making process, or the effects of
this involvement. Several considered the hospital to be an economic engine in an otherwisederelict part of the city, pointing to the thousands of jobs created by the hospital directly, as
well as indirectly through its surrounding affiliated medical offices, its suppliers, and nearby
businesses. One participant, echoing the thoughts of many others, said that:
Methodist Hospital has been an economic anchor south of the Trinity (River), even when
everything else had abandoned the area. The commitment shown over the years, the jobs –
good, stable, well-paying jobs – created and maintained here can’t be forgotten, even when it
would have made more sense to move north with everyone else. The kinds of services that
Methodist provides now couldn’t have been dreamed of back in 1924, so if the hospital
doesn’t expand, it would have to move somewhere else.

Another, acknowledging the complicated relationship between the hospital and surrounding
neighborhood, commented that:
[The hospital hasn’t] always been a good neighbor. For a long time, [Methodist Hospital]
ignored complaints, knowing that there wouldn’t be repercussions. Those days have been
gone for a long time, but under Dr. Koonsman, [the hospital has] really stepped up, to
become a neighbor that isn’t just an economic boon, but a real center for the community,
working quickly to address neighborhood concerns in a meaningful way, and taking time to
really listen to what people need from [the hospital].

Anchor captains, in summary. Participants often (but not always) held a negative
view of the role of Martin Koonsman, and the hospital he represents, in North Oak Cliff’s
decision-making process. As a major employer and economic driver, participants agreed that
it has a tremendous amount of clout with neighborhood formal authorities, and with its
growing footprint, close relationships with first- and second tier influentials, but that it often only
uses this clout to serve its own agenda, rather than becoming an advocate for the people
who live in the community it serves.
Decision-makers in North Oak Cliff, in summary. This study asked participants
knowledgeable about Dallas’ decision-making process to identify- and describe actors who
get involved in making citywide decisions, and to nominate 10 people to form a committee
161

that would be responsible for making a decision that would affect the city as a whole. A total
of 40 participants delivered a combined 400 nominations, and 314 of these went to the 15
individual- and group actors outlined in the previous section. These actors represent all three
sectors, but also a deep division in North Oak Cliff, between use-value, represented by
residents who seek to remain in their homes and locally-owned businesses, and exchangevalue, represented by the coalition of larger developers and landowners who are actively
engaged in clearing older development in favor of higher-rent residences and retail outlets
catering to the post-Fordist generation of young adults who are rapidly gentrifying the area.
Before evaluating whether these actors, and the relationships among them are suggestive of a
structure within this decision-making process, however, this study will report its findings
with respect to Downtown Dallas.
Decision-makers in Downtown Dallas
To understand the contemporary decision-making structure within Downtown
Dallas, and whether (or to what extent) anchor institutions and CDCs have a primary role
within it, this study asked participants knowledgeable about decision-making in Downtown
Dallas to identify- and describe actors who get involved in making neighborhood-wide
decisions, and to nominate 10 people to form a committee that would be responsible for
making a decision that would affect the city as a whole.
A total of 39 (out of 79) participants were identified as being particularly cognizant
of decision-making in Downtown Dallas; therefore, a maximum of 390 nominations were
possible, and out of these, 81 votes (20.8%) were cast for actors who did not garner enough
votes (a minimum of 4, or 10%) to be included in the tables throughout this section. In
reporting on these actors, this study will first detail Downtown Dallas’ formal authorities; next,
it will introduce the city’s its first tier influentials; third, its second tier influentials; and finally, its
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civic chairs. No anchor captains were nominated by enough participants to be included in this
study’s discussion of Downtown Dallas’ decision-making process.
Formal authorities. Table 4.20 shows summary statistics related to Downtown
Dallas’ formal authorities, named by four or more participants to a hypothetical committee
responsible for making a decision that would affect the neighborhood, and that would need
to be supported by a majority of neighborhood’s population.

Name
Philip Kingston
A.C. Gonzalez
Karl Zavitkovsky

Mark Rieves
Paul Ridley

Table 4.20: Downtown Dallas Formal Authorities
Mean
Decision-Making
Primary or Notable
Power
Committee Votes
Affiliation(s)
Level
#
%
(1 - 4)
Dallas City Council
39
100%
3.97
City Manager
23
59%
3.90
Office of Econ. Development
13
33%
3.77
Zoning Board of Adjustment
15
38%
3.26
City Plan Commission
9
23%
3.10

Mean Value (Actors in This Category)
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories)

20
17

49%
44%

3.60
3.29

#
9
6
5
0
4

%
23%
15%
13%
0%
10%

Mean
Familiarity
Level
(1 - 4)
2.23
2.48
2.43
1.95
2.05

5
11

6%
28%

2.23
2.31

Recent Shared
Committee Service

As in both Dallas citywide and North Oak Cliff, participants asserted that the
primary agents of decision-making within Downtown Dallas. Actors in this category consist
of the area’s city councilmember, two of his political appointments, and two high-level city
bureaucrats. On average, actors in this category have above-average numbers of nominations
to decision-making committees and power ratings, and below-average recent shared
committee service and familiarity. In describing the role of these actors in Downtown Dallas,
this study will first introduce the role of city staff and appointed members of boards and
commissions, and finally, category standout Philip Kingston.

City staff and political appointees. Looking first at the role of city staff in
neighborhood decision-making, participants knowledgeable about Downtown Dallas’
decision-making process regularly brought up the roles of ranking city staff, as well as
Councilmember Kingston’s appointees to the City Plan Commission (CPC) and Zoning
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Board of Adjustment (BOA). As in North Oak Cliff, participants concurred that city staff
and political appointees serve similarly as advisors to Councilmember Kingston, and as the
implementers of his vision for Downtown Dallas, but participants regularly submitted that
city staff recurrently serve as mouthpieces of- and liaisons for first tier- and second tier
influentials, while CPC and BOA appointees remain fiercely loyal to Kingston’s wishes.
Looking first at city staff, participants often nominated either (and not uncommonly
both) City Manager A.C. Gonzalez, and Director of Economic Development Karl
Zavitkovsky to their hypothetical decision-making teams. Looking first at City Manager
Gonzalez, although his role in Downtown Dallas’ decision-making body is similar to his role
in citywide decision-making, participants conceded that he is generally only involved in the
largest development projects, whose implications are likely to reverberate throughout the
city; participants repeatedly cited examples of recent upgrades to the city’s convention
center, as well as rumors surrounding a plan to build a downtown baseball stadium, both
with the enthusiastic support of area first tier influentials.
Gonzalez’ economic development chief is Karl Zavitkovsky, whose office has
authority over planning, permits and code compliance, as well day-to-day administration of
the city’s TIFs and PIDs), several of which several are contained within Downtown Dallas437.
Participants agreed that Zavitkovsky’s support for a project can, as several noted, “smooth
the process” of project approval, particularly when there is no proposed change to land-use
or zoning policies (which necessitate approval of Councilmember Kingston). Participants
frequently admitted Zavitkovsky and Gonzalez work to both encourage- and enable
development, rather than regulate developers, and many comments categorized development
is an “outside proposal,” wherein city departments are disinterested in project particulars,

437

Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2015
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and are instead concerned with the amount of economic growth brought to Downtown
Dallas. In describing this, participants’ comments are well-summarized by the following:
Karl and his boss are firm believers in the old-school “growth gospel” of Dallas, and
Downtown is the jewel of the city’s crown, so why wouldn’t they push to bring as much
development to the CBD as they can? They’ve completely subordinated regulations and
planning policies to development, and any planner who wants to keep his job around here
learns quickly to not concern himself with regulating proposals.

Looking at the role of Councilmember Kingston’s appointees in neighborhood
decision-making, participants acknowledged that Kingston’s appointees to the CPC and
BOA, like those of the other councilmembers, act as his proxy votes, deliberating and voting
on proposals with his input, and assisting Kingston in countering the neoliberal tendencies
found within Dallas’ city hall. Participants recognized that, like Kingston, his appointees
envision a Downtown Dallas open to more than just wealthy Dallasites and suburban
visitors, but admitted that this remains a minority opinion, and one that opposes the position
of ranking city staff. As a result, participants agreed that projects that do not have the
approval of these appointees are not doomed to failure at the committee or council level, but
that it is much easier to achieve positive outcomes with their support. Participant comments
are well-summarized by the following:
Kingston gets one proxy on the CPC, and one on the (Zoning) Board of Adjustment.
You’ve got his proxies, and the proxies of a few other councilmembers who share his
progressive vision, but the majorities on both committees are still pro-development, and
Downtown Dallas is the jewel of the city, so if you’re going to see a dust-up over
development, it’s gonna (SIC) happen here. Egos run strong (SIC) here, so developers and
their backers fight harder here than they might in other parts of town.

Category standout: Councilmember Philip Kingston. All 39 participants
nominated Councilmember Philip Kingston, who represents Downtown Dallas, to their
decision-making teams, and his power score (3.97) is highest among both first tier influentials,
and among all listed decision-makers in Downtown Dallas. Within Downtown Dallas,
participants agreed that Councilmember Kingston commands functionally absolute authority
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over land-use decisions, and like his predecessor Angela Hunt, uses this authority in service
of a vision for Downtown Dallas that embraces the post-Fordist tendencies of millennials
who seek locations where work, home, and entertainment all exist in close proximity, while
also advocating for historic preservation and incorporation of affordable housing within new
development projects; describing this vision, participants consistently concurred that:
Philip (Kingston) is part of a newer wave of leaders in Dallas; they’re not “antidevelopment,” but they’re against the kind of speculative, “build for building’s sake” style
that got Dallas in so much trouble in the 1980s. They want to develop, but they want to do it
in a way that won’t leave the city center vacant if this push to move back into Downtown
turns out to just be a fad.

Participants admitted that Kingston’s vision often puts the councilmember in opposition
with City staff, as well as their backers found among Downtown Dallas’ first tier influentials
and civic chairs, many of whom continue to mobilize resources in ongoing attempts to remake
Downtown Dallas around stadiums, convention centers, and high-end hotels, retail, and
dining. Participants frequently conceded that Kingston, his staff, and his appointees to
various boards and committees are able to challenge these projects, but are largely unable to
completely halt them, primarily because of the close connections that persist between Dallas’
public- and private sectors; many described this as a “David and Goliath” scenario, wherein,
as one participant noted:
You have Philip (Kingston) and his people on one end, and then you’ve got A.C.
(Gonzalez), (Mayor) Rawlings and the masters who control them on the other. In every
development decision, Gonzalez and Rawlings come together and try to frame the issue in a
way that makes every option one they like, but Kingston keeps coming back and pointing
out alternatives, and finding holes in their proposals. He says the things people in City Hall
don’t want to hear, and that gets him a lot of popular support, but costs him the favor of
Dallas’ ruling elite. It’s also not always effective, so sometimes he spends hours and hours on
a plan that gets defeated in minutes.

Formal authorities, in summary. While participants acknowledged that these
actors are among the most central in Dallas’ decision-making process, interviews suggest that
this category is less effective than it might otherwise be, due to frequent within-category
infighting; participants regularly categorized a subset of the neighborhood’s formal authorities
166

as being in a degree of opposition with first tier and second tier influentials, some of whom are
also considered highly influential in Dallas’ citywide decision-making process, while other
actors in this category enjoy a more collaborative set of relationships. Acting to mediate
these tensions is the neighborhood’s sole civic chair, although participants admitted that this
actor’s role in neighborhood decision-making is hardly neutral. In the sections that follow,
these tensions, and the actors involved, will be explored.
First tier influentials. Table 4.21 shows summary statistics related to Downtown
Dallas’ first tier influentials, named by four or more participants to a hypothetical committee
responsible for making a decision that would affect the neighborhood, and that would need
to be supported by a majority of neighborhood’s population.

Name
Ray Hunt
Harlan Crow
Ross Perot Jr.
Jody Grant

Table 4.21: Downtown Dallas First Tier Influentials
Mean
Decision-Making
Primary or Notable
Power
Committee Votes
Affiliation(s)
Level
#
%
(1 - 4)
Hunt Consolidated
21
54%
3.92
Crow Holdings
13
33%
3.51
Hillwood
13
33%
3.41
Texas BankCap (Emeritus)
9
23%
2.90

Mean Value (Actors in This Category)
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories)

14
17

36%
44%

3.44
3.29

#
5
8
5
4

%
13%
21%
13%
10%

Mean
Familiarity
Level
(1 - 4)
2.54
2.10
2.03
2.48

6
11

14%
28%

2.29
2.31

Recent Shared
Committee Service

Actors in this category consist of three particularly active members of Dallas’ most
influential families, and a financier who participants often credited with financing
Downtown Dallas’ revitalization following the Savings and Loan Crisis; participants
considered each of these actors as part of the old guard in Dallas, and regularly made this
known throughout their interviews. Compared to actors in other categories, Downtown
Dallas’ first tier influentials have above-average power ratings, and below-average nominations
for decision-making teams, ratings of familiarity, and recent shared committee service with
participants. In the following paragraphs, this study will outline participants’ general
thoughts on these old guard actors, and then their thoughts on category standout Ray Hunt.
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The old guard. Participants conceded that, while it is increasingly inaccurate to
suggest that a small coalition of wealthy business executives, elite financiers, and civic leaders
controls the priorities and politics of Dallas, a subset of the old guard’s remnants remain
exceptionally active in Downtown Dallas. Many of the comments about first tier influentials in
Dallas’ citywide decision-making structure overlap significantly with those made about first
tier influentials in Downtown Dallas, which is unsurprising, given that three of the four actors
listed in table 4.21 also appear in table 4.11, and the fourth (Jody Grant) was one vote shy of
being included as well.
Participants were encouraged to consider whether, or to what extent, these first tier
influentials had different roles in decision-making in Downtown Dallas, as compared to
citywide decision-making. Participants agreed that, in Downtown Dallas as in the city as a
whole, these actors utilize their access to physical-, financial-, and social capital to achieve a
common, neoliberal agenda, but participants also suggested that there is a unique
relationship between these actors and Downtown Dallas. Several commented that these
actors, and their families, have been long-associated with large developments in Downtown
Dallas, including skyscrapers and civic amenities that defined Dallas’ skyline for decades.
These participants also admitted that, increasingly, both the skyline itself and neighborhood
surrounding it are transforming, with less and less input from the old guard, while the city
council and bureaucracy is slowly transitioning away from dependence on their resources. As
a result, those actors who do remain active focus their fading influence on Downtown
Dallas, rather than spreading projects throughout the city. Well-summarizing many
comments, one participant said that:
These men look back on their careers building Dallas, and the projects that their family
names are connected to, and then they look at the new projects that they haven’t been a part
of. They see their works being crowded out by projects that belong the “new Dallas” that’s
starting to happen without them, and that doesn’t sit right. Downtown Dallas is the heart of
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the city, so a lot of them are trying to get that one last, big project before they go, as a way of
leaving the most visible mark on the city they can, by changing its skyline.

Category standout: Ray Hunt. Over half (54%) of participants named billionaire
Ray Hunt to their decision-making teams, and his power score (3.92) is among the highest of
all actors considered by this section. In explaining why, many participants admitted that the
Hunt family has been intertwined with decision-making for decades, with several suggesting
that: “Dallas has ‘first families,’ like the Perots, Jones’, Crows, and Bush’s, but none of them
have the pull of the Hunts.” Describing Hunt, participants often agreed that:
Most of the “old guard” is gone, but Ray Hunt stuck around, and he’s got enough land
downtown and money in his pocket to keep things interesting. You won’t see his names on
as much these days, because he works through proxies to keep his name out of the
newspaper. Hunt may be a dinosaur, but he outlasted all the others because he’s smart, and
he’s probably going to keep pushing his old ideas for Downtown until he dies.

Participants frequently noted that Hunt prefers to keep his own name out of the
public eye, and instead acts through proxies, such as citywide civic chair Alice Murray as well
as formal authorities like Mike Rawlings and A.C. Gonzalez, in his efforts to develop his
tremendous landholdings in Downtown Dallas into office buildings, luxury residential and
retail properties, and perennial plans for urban sports arenas. Because Hunt develops
primarily on land he already owns, uses a preferred development company, Woodbine
Development, which is run by long-time business partner (and second tier influential) John
Scovell, and works directly with aforementioned formal authorities and civic chairs to gain
necessary permits, concessions, and support in final project approval by the City Council,
participants conceded that he is well-equipped to sidestep the authority of Councilmember
Kingston, who is ofttimes unable to meaningfully prevent Hunt’s projects.

First tier influentials, in summary. Participants identified four actors that can be
categorized as first tier influentials, and three among these were also identified as first tier
influentials at the citywide level. At both levels, participants conjected that these actors use
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their resources and influence with civic chairs and a subset of formal authorities to forward a
common vision for Downtown Dallas. Several participants conceded that the actors in this
category represent what many called the “last breath” of mid-late 20th century Dallas, and
that while these actors’ remain influential, their projects are not universally embraced by area
formal authorities, which effectively limits what these actors are able to accomplish. About this,
several participants’ comments can by summarized by:
The big men all died off, retired out, or moved on; [Eugene] McDermott, [Trammell] Crow, Jack
Evans, Bob Folsom – the men who built Dallas – so many just aren’t around anymore. You still got
(SIC) a few hanging on, but it’s not like things used to be.

Second tier influentials. Table 4.22 shows summary statistics related to Downtown
Dallas’ second tier influentials, named by four or more participants to a hypothetical committee
responsible for making a decision that would affect the neighborhood, and that would need
to be supported by a majority of neighborhood’s population.
Table 4.22: Downtown Dallas Second Tier Influentials
Mean
Decision-Making
Recent Shared
Primary or Notable
Power
Committee Votes
Committee Service
Affiliation(s)
Level
#
%
#
%
(1 - 4)

Name
Scott Krikorian
Jim Truitt
Michael Caffey
Vince
Ackerson
Jack Matthews
John Scovell
Ted Hamilton
Brock Bailey

Trammell Crow Co.

Mean
Familiarity
Level
(1 - 4)

20
19
18

51%
49%
46%

3.15
3.13
3.08

16
21
12

41%
54%
31%

2.33
2.40
2.53

Texas Capital Bank

12

31%

3.05

12

31%

2.40

Matthews Southwest
Woodbine Development
Dallas Citizens Council
Hamilton Properties
Bracewell & Giuliani, LLP

21

54%

3.03

20

51%

2.35

11

28%

2.85

16

41%

2.25

7
7

18%
18%

2.69
2.51

16
9

41%
23%

2.08
2.08

14
17

36%
44%

2.94
3.29

15
11

39%
28%

2.30
2.31

(subsidiary of CBRE)

Forest City
C.B. Richard Ellis (CBRE)
(subsidiary of Texas BankCap)

Mean Value (Actors in This Category)
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories)

Actors in this category consist of members of the developer class, including several executives
within real estate development firms, one executive of a major real estate financial services
provider (founded by first tier influential Jody Grant), and a senior partner in a large real estate
law firm. Compared to actors in other categories, Downtown Dallas’ second tier influentials
received a below-average number of nominations to decision-making committees, below-
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average ratings of power and familiarity, but scored above-average on recent shared
committee service with participants. In discussing the role of these actors in decision-making
within Downtown Dallas, this study will outline the role of the neighborhood’s developer class,
particularly the role of category standout John Scovell.
Participants often said that Downtown Dallas’ second tier influentials are generally
uninvolved with the formation of new projects, and instead, are mobilized by first tier
influentials and formal authorities for particular projects, primarily through shared membership
within CBD’s booster organization, Downtown Dallas Inc. Participants also admitted that
that these newer developers, many of which located offices in Dallas after the Savings &
Loan Crisis, are less-likely to form enduring partnerships with one another, or with political
leaders, because many are simply branch offices of national- or international firms. This is
not to suggest, however, that second tier influentials are uninvolved in decision-making.
Participants frequently suggested that, once mobilized by first tier influentials and formal
authorities to develop a project, that these actors exert tremendous control over the final
product, as the ones primarily responsible for day-to-day project management. Participants
also agreed that, although stiff opposition to a project is rare, when that happens, these
actors rely on first tier influentials to collaborate with sympathetic formal authorities to gain
regulatory concessions, or (if the opposition comes from Councilmember Kingston) a
supportive vote from the City Council to overrule him, especially in parts of Downtown
Dallas that are not in high-demand. As several put forward:
Dallas has a long history of working with the private sector, especially in Downtown, and
historically, political leaders don’t write Dallas’ planning code – developers do. If someone in
City Hall tries to stop a project that has the right backers, and those backers can’t get it
worked out, then you’ll see someone pitch a fit about how they’re going to have to
“reconsider” development, and just like that, they get whatever they want out of the eight
vote majority on the City Council. It’s a script, and you’ll see it over and over again, if you’re
around long enough.

171

As a result, participants regularly considered these actors to be the “spiritual successors” to
the men who build Dallas in the mid-to-late 20th century, and that although their level of
involvement in particularly large, high-visibility projects brings each a degree of celebrity,
most resist joining any enduring coalitions; summarizing this, participants often commented
along the lines of:
These new mega-builders are reshaping Dallas, and they’re not asking permission from
anyone to do it. They’re like Trammel Crow was back in the ‘60s and ‘70s, but once they
finish a project, they just go home. They’re not lobbying to change Dallas, and the old
oligarchs don’t know what to make of them.

Finally, participants repeatedly suggested that, as the recent development boom in
Downtown Dallas continues to slow, these actors have been especially vocal in pressuring
formal authorities for regulatory- and zoning concessions, as well as for additional public
funding to complete particularly ambitious projects. Several participants agreed that:
In Downtown, most of the “easy” projects are done, so the projects now get complicated by
unexpected surprises that crop up along the way – it happens with these older, abandoned
buildings. The developers went in with plans, timelines, and financing, but backers pull out
when plans change, and deadlines get missed. Some of these big builders are starting to go to
City Hall, saying things like: “Hey, we did all this good work for you when you needed us,
look at how great those are. If you want us to keep producing at that level, you need to work
with us to make that happen, or we aren’t going to finish and you’ll be left with an eyesore
that nobody can use.”

Category standout: John Scovell. While only a minority of participants (28%)
nominated John Scovell to their decision-making teams, and his power rating (2.85) is
among the lowest within Downtown Dallas’ second tier influentials, participants often discussed
Scovell’s unique role in decision-making, as a director and chair for the Dallas Citizens
Council, and as the CEO of his development company, co-founded with first tier influential
Ray Hunt. Participants frequently referred to Scovell as either Ray Hunt’s “proxy” or
“gatekeeper,” and proposed that this role sets him apart from other developers, while also
not elevating him into the first tier influentials, because Scovell and his company most
commonly develop properties with Hunt’s advice- and consent, on Hunt-owned real estate,
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and on projects for which Hunt and other first tier influentials lobby formal authorities,
particularly in Economic Development, to support. In describing this, participants often
agreed that:
John (Scovell) is a firecracker, but he’s content to do his job, make his money, and go home.
He’s not trying to build monuments to himself, but he’ll build them for other people,
because he doesn’t have that thirst for immortality that you see in some of the other big
names around here.

Second tier influentials, in summary. Participants identified eight individuals
within Dallas’ developer class as being particularly beneficial for decision-making in Downtown
Dallas, and that these actors are particularly active in in pressuring formal authorities to support
private development, albeit to a lesser extent than traditionally occurs in Dallas. Participants
also identified one actor with an especially close tie to first tier influential Ray Hunt. Overall,
participants agreed that these actors are willing to work on a wide variety of projects, beyond
any particular vision for Downtown Dallas. The job of coordinating these various projects,
and providing some broad guidance, falls to the only civic chair with enough nominations to
be included in this study.

Civic chairs. Table 4.23 shows summary statistics related to John Crawford, the only
civic chair in Downtown Dallas named by four or more participants to a hypothetical
committee responsible for making a decision that would affect the neighborhood, and that
would need to be supported by a majority of neighborhood’s population.

Name
John Crawford

Table 4.23: Downtown Dallas Civic Chairs
Mean
Decision-Making
Primary or Notable
Power
Committee Votes
Affiliation(s)
Level
#
%
(1 - 4)
Downtown Dallas Inc.
39
100%
3.87

Mean Value (Actors in This Category)
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories)

39
17

100%
44%

3.87
3.29

#
27

%
69%

Mean
Familiarity
Level
(1 - 4)
2.80

27
11

69%
28%

2.80
2.31

Recent Shared
Committee Service

John Crawford, the CEO of Downtown Dallas Inc. (DDI), was nominated to serve
on decision-making committees by all 39 participants with particular knowledge of
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Downtown Dallas’ decision-making process making him the only unelected actor to be so
frequently nominated in this neighborhood. Compared to actors in other categories,
participants rated Crawford above-average on power and level of familiarity, and a majority
of participants have served on a board or committee with him in the past five years, morethan double the average level of shared board or committee service. The following
paragraphs will discuss Crawford’s role in Downtown Dallas’ decision-making process.
In their surveys and interviews, participants explained that Crawford leads
Downtown Dallas Inc., a private nonprofit booster organization, which for the past halfcentury has dedicated itself to economic development and revitalization efforts in- and
around Downtown Dallas438. The organization is funded through membership dues from
firms whose interests generally involve the area in- and immediately surrounding Downtown,
contracts with the City of Dallas439, as well as funds generated by the Downtown
Improvement District, a PID wherein property owners are assessed an additional fee based
on the value- and size of their property. Monies from this fee are reinvested within the
district, often for “quality of life” improvements, infrastructure & maintenance, and safety &
security initiatives440. Participants regularly indicated that, practically speaking, DDI acts as a
networking tool and facilitator for informal business transactions and development deals,
and that this function continues even today, as the organization brings together high ranking
private-, public-, and third-sector organizations as members, and through its board of
directors441; summarizing participant comments, one emphatically noted:
Make no mistake, they (DDI) are not a nonprofit developer in the way that, say, Habitat for
Humanity is a nonprofit developer. Downtown Dallas Inc. is, and always has been, a vehicle
for big-time developers to get a piece of whatever public funds are out there, and to find the
right people to come together for a project.

Downtown Dallas Inc., 2015a; 2015b, p. B3
Downtown Dallas Inc., 2015c, p. 1
440 Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2015
441 Downtown Dallas Inc., 2015d; 2015e
438
439
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Within the structure of neighborhood decision-making, DDI works with Dallas’ city
manager and OED to oversee- and implement Downtown Dallas 360, a master economic
development- and revitalization plan that encompasses both the CBD and 14 surrounding
“districts” that loosely map onto various neighborhoods surrounding the urban core.
Participants concurred that DDI in general, and Crawford particularly, are able to shape
development decisions by providing a less-formal space for public-private partnerships to
form, and for project proposals to be developed before they officially reach the OED and
City Council for support. Participant thoughts on this are well-summarized by two
comments:
Look at who serves on DDI’s board: you’ve got Economic Development, developers, law
firms, mega real-estate, and city councilmembers – it’s all politics and money. Deals that
come out of that group (DDI) are approved before they’re ever approved. If Crawford is
willing to publicly support something, then all the people who need to agree to the idea are
probably already on board, in one way or another, or they’ve at least already weighed in.
(John) Crawford has worked with developers and with City Hall for years – he’s got the
blessing of the “old guard” around town. He knows who to talk to, how to get things done;
he knows when to lean on City Hall to bring more TIF money, and when a project isn’t
going anywhere.

In selecting Crawford for their decision-making teams, participants regularly noted
that he has strong support from multiple stakeholders, including Dallas’ old guard, many of its
newer, more progressive leaders, area businesses, and much of the general public. However,
participants also acknowledged that the organization’s support is not universal, especially
among residents who feel that DDI is only interested in new development, rather than in
addressing the complaints and concerns of existing residents. This dissatisfaction, however,
has not resulted in the formation of strong resident advocacy groups, and existing
neighborhood associations are frequently supported by DDI, so their leaders are loathe to
openly criticize the organization. In their description of the opposition to the tremendous
authority of Downtown Dallas Inc., a vocal subset of participants said that:
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Downtown Dallas Inc. isn’t in the business of development – it’s in the business of the
politics of development. John (Crawford) knows how to match investors with developers,
and that gets you the form of a neighborhood, but not the substance. What gets built where
has nothing to do with what residents want, or what the neighborhood needs if it’s ever
going to sustain itself after the building boom dies off. We have restaurants and museums
and parks for block after block, but no grocery stores.
The residents of Downtown Dallas don’t have the numbers to really coalesce around an
activist neighborhood organization, or someone like Pam Conley in North Oak Cliff. The
associations they have collect part of the money from the PID that supports DDI, but they
use that on social events, not on lobbying down at City Hall.

Civic chairs, in summary. Participants summarized the role of Crawford and his
organization as a unifying, networking organization that combines public- and private-sector
ideas, as well as physical-, social-, and financial capital in service of a particular revitalization
strategy for Downtown Dallas, and as a result, Crawford is a nexus of informal influence in
Downtown Dallas’ decision-making process, and that the approval of his organization, and
its stakeholders, have been crucial the success of many projects in the area; as one participant
explained it:
We have some amazing public-private partnerships in Downtown, and from those, we get
parks, museums, and culture cornerstones that make people want to spend a little more time
down here. We get people moving back to the inner city, where this place used to be 70%
vacant, whereas, used to be, nobody came to Downtown unless they worked here. If some
people had their way, that’s all this area would ever be, but John (Crawford) and his team
have pulled together something special down here.

Decision-makers in Downtown Dallas, in summary. This study asked
participants knowledgeable about decision-making in Downtown Dallas to identifyand describe actors who get involved in making neighborhood-wide decisions, and
to nominate 10 people to form a committee that would be responsible for making a
decision that would affect the city as a whole. A total of 39 participants made 390
nominations, and out of those, 309 were cast for the 18 actors appearing on tables
throughout this section.
Participant-identified actors represented four out of five broad categories used
throughout this study’s report of its qualitative findings, and participants identified several
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points of, respectively, collaboration and conflict among these actors. Throughout
participant interviews, a common thread was that in Downtown Dallas, much like in North
Oak Cliff and in the city as a whole, leaders can be divided into an old guard and a new guard,
each with its own ideas for the future of the neighborhood; participant thoughts on this are
well-summarized by the following:
Downtown Dallas is the jewel in the city’s crown, and everyone who has a part in leading
Dallas wants that area to be healthy again, and to thrive. Some people think that a healthy
downtown looks like convention centers, hotels, and stadiums intermixed with high-end
residential and retail, and others see a more inclusive Downtown that has a place for the
whole spectrum of people – the rich, the poor, the middle-class, and everyone from
millennials to the elderly.

Qualitative Data Summary
The previous reputational study of Dallas described three “classes” of leaders within
the city’s decision-making structure, and each class was comprised almost exclusively of
business executives and wealthy elites442. To determine whether (or to what extent) the
previous reputational analysis’ results remain valid, and to expand on its findings, this study’s
79 participants completed detailed surveys and interviews regarding the nature of decisionmaking in Dallas as a whole, as well as in two focus neighborhoods: North Oak Cliff and
Downtown Dallas. Each participant provided information on decision-makers within Dallas
as a whole, while 40 of these provided information on decision-makers in North Oak Cliff,
and 39 provided similar information for Downtown Dallas.
Decision-makers were categorized thematically, and tables throughout this section
reported data for those decision-makers who were nominated by at least 10% of participants
knowledgeable about each geographic area of interest, including names, primary
organizational affiliations, power ratings, recent shared board and committee service with
participants, and participant ratings of familiarity. In addition to the five thematic categories
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of decision-makers, participants identified a theme of conflict between Dallas’ developmentfocused old guard and, and more progressive, often younger (or at least, less-experienced)
leaders. This conflict (to be revisited in Chapter 5) manifests uniquely in Dallas as a whole, as
well as within both North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas, but is nonetheless a consistent
source of tension.
Chapter Summary
This chapter aimed to report data collected using the methods introduced in Chapter
3, in order to address this study’s research questions and hypotheses. In the previous
sections, this study reported quantitative data regarding select socioeconomic changes from
1980 to 2010, first for Dallas as a whole, then for the study’s two focus neighborhoods:
North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. Then, it detailed participant responses to surveys
and interviews regarding decision-making in Dallas as a whole, North Oak Cliff, and
Downtown Dallas.
Author’s note: this study’s operational definition of creative class employment is guided by Richard Florida’s description, which includes
careers in: “design, education, arts, music and entertainment, whose economic function is to create new ideas, new technology and/or
creative content” (2002, p. 8), and this category is comprised of the following industries: information; finance and insurance, and real
estate and rental and leasing; professional, scientific, and management, and administrative and waste management services; educational
services, and health care and social assistance; and arts, entertainment, and recreation, and accommodation and food services.
x Author’s note: this study’s operationalization of “blue collar” is defined as class of employment wherein tasks usually involve manual labor,
and often require work-specific clothing (dictionary.com, 2016), and is comprised of the following industries: agriculture, forestry, fishing,
hunting, and mining; construction; manufacturing; transportation & warehousing, and utilities.
xi Author’s note: this study’s operationalization of “service sector” is comprised of the following industries: wholesale trade; retail trade; and
“other services, except public administration.”
xii Author’s note: census data report public administration as an industry code unto itself, so it is reported by this study in order to ensure that
the employment percentages across all industry categories add up to 100%.
ix
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CHAPTER V
QUANTATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze and evaluate the quantitative data reported
in Chapter 4, in order to address this study’s first three research questions – those related to
the evolving context surrounding Dallas, as well as this study’s two focus neighborhoods:
North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. In the chapter sections that follow, this study will
first restate the relevant subset of its research questions and hypotheses. Next, it will review
and synthesize quantitative data first presented in Chapter 4, before evaluating them with
respect to urban literature regarding expected demographic- and economic shifts found in
post-Fordist cities, as well as with respect to the effects of these shifts on creating a new
normal in Dallas, compared to the old normals studied by Elkin and Thometz. Finally, this
study will revisit limitations introduced in Chapter 3, before introducing additional
limitations related specifically to these hypotheses.
First Research Question and Context Hypotheses Revisited
The purpose of this section is to outline the research questions that this study
attempts to address, as well as its series of hypotheses to be tested. First, it will list the
research questions that guide this study, and then, it will outline the hypotheses that this
study’s data will be used to evaluate.
First Research Question Revisited
As previous chapters have noted, this study aims to answer three primary research
questions, but of particular concern to this chapter is the first of these: how have Dallas’
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demographics and economy evolved in the decades since the city was studied by previous
urban scholars?
Context Hypotheses Revisited
In order to guide its attempts at addressing its first research question, this study
forwards three (of six) primary hypotheses, relate to the changing socioeconomic context of
Dallas as a whole, as well as the neighborhoods of North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas;
these hypotheses are as-follows:
Hypothesis 1. First, and consistent with expectations of modern, economicallyprosperous cities in the globalized, post-Fordist paradigm and the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs
model, in the decades since the Elkin & Thometz studies, Dallas’ citywide socioeconomic
context has changed in four primary ways:
•

People identifying as “white alone” represent a smaller percentage of the population
in 2010 (the most recent decennial census) than they did 1980 (the census
immediately prior to the Elkin study).

•

A smaller percentage of Dallas’ workforce is employed in blue collar fields in 2010
than in 1980.

•

A larger percentage of Dallas’ workforce is employed in creative class fields in 2010
than in 1980.

•

Dallas, as a whole, shows signs of greater economic polarization in 2010 than in
1980.
Hypothesis 2. Second, and consistent with expectations of literature surrounding

gentrification of urban neighborhoods and the new donut model, within North Oak Cliff,
recent urban redevelopment projects and neighborhood gentrification are associated with
four primary changes in the neighborhood’s respective socioeconomic context:
•

People identifying as “white alone” represent a larger percentage of the
neighborhood’s population in 2010 than they did in 1980.
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•

A smaller percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in blue collar fields
in 2010 than in 1980.

•

A larger percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in creative class
fields in 2010 than in 1980.

•

The neighborhood shows signs of greater economic polarization in 2010 than in
1980.
Hypothesis 3. Third, and consistent with expectations of literature surrounding

gentrification of urban neighborhoods and the new donut model, within Downtown Dallas,
recent urban redevelopment projects and neighborhood gentrification are associated with
four primary changes in the neighborhood’s respective socioeconomic context:
•

People identifying as “white alone” represent a larger percentage of the
neighborhood’s population in 2010 than they did in 1980.

•

A smaller percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in blue collar fields
in 2010 than in 1980.

•

A larger percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in creative class
fields in 2010 than in 1980.

•

The neighborhood shows signs of greater economic polarization in 2010 than in
1980.
Evaluation of Hypotheses
The purpose of this section is to evaluate this study’s first three research hypotheses.

In the sections that follow, this study will first evaluate those hypotheses, which (as noted
above) are related to the changing social- and economic contexts within Dallas as a whole,
North Oak Cliff, and Downtown Dallas.
Evaluation of Hypothesis 1
The following paragraphs will utilize quantitative data first presented in Chapter 4
data in order to evaluate Hypothesis 1, regarding the socioeconomic profile of Dallas as an
economically-prosperous city in the post-Fordist paradigm, and changes in that profile since
1980. In evaluating this hypotheses, this study will first evaluate the assumption that Dallas is
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indeed an economically-prosperous city. Then, this study will evaluate whether, in keeping
with the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs model, Dallas proper is noticeably “less white” than its
surrounding suburbs, by comparing data from Dallas as a whole to data representing the
suburban components of Dallas’ surrounding MSA. Third, this study will concurrently
evaluate whether Dallas’ workers are less likely to be employed in blue collar fields in 2010
than they were in 1980, and whether those workers are more likely to be employed in creative
class fields in 2010 than they were in 1980. Fourth, this study will evaluate whether Dallas’
residents are, on the whole, more economically polarized in 2010 than Dallas’ residents were
in 1980. Finally, this study will evaluate these components holistically, to make a
determination whether evidence supports (or fails to support) Hypothesis 1.
Evaluation of the assumption of Dallas as an economically-prosperous city. In
evaluating whether Dallas could be considered an “economically prosperous” city, this study
aims to define that term in a measurable way, supported by some subset of extant literature.
To that end, a basic literature search for “economic prosperity” in scholarly publications
resulted in roughly 141,000 scholarly articles443, and uncovered various approaches to
measuring this concept, including measuring concepts as esoteric as light pollution444,
degrees of religious freedom445, and birthplace diversity446. This study is not intended to be
an exhaustive interrogation of the various facets of economic prosperity, so a narrower
conceptualization is required, even if this narrower approach limits the study’s findings.
To develop this narrow conceptualization, this study begins by defining the term
“prosperity” as “the condition of being successful or thriving447.” Expanding on the latter

Google Scholar, 2016
cf. Henderson, Storeygard, & Weil, 2011
445 cf. Alon & Chase, 2005
446 cf. Alesina, Harnoss, & Rapoport, 2016
447 merriam-webster.com, 2016a
443
444
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part of this definition yields that “to thrive” is defined in terms of successful development or
growth448. Thus, a useful (and measurable) alternative to measuring the broad concept of
economic prosperity is to measure economic growth. Although competing measurement
tools for analyzing economic growth exist, review of a variety of these methods suggested
that, within the data already collected for this study, both population growth and
unemployment rates are reliable measures of economic growth; more specifically, population
growth is positively correlated with economic growth, and unemployment rate is negatively
correlated with economic growth449. In operationalizing economic prosperity in terms of
economic growth, this study is now able to test its assumptions about Dallas as an
economically prosperous city, using data regarding citywide population totals and
unemployment rates, which are restated from Chapter 4 in table 5.01.
Year
Population
Unemployment

Table 5.01: Citywide Population and Unemployment Rates, 1980 – 2010
1980
1990
2000
904,078
1,006,877
1,188,580
7.4%
12.2%
4.3%

2010
1,197,816
4.6%

Looking first at population growth as a positive correlate of economic growth, a
growing economy requires a growing population to increase both the number of available
workers and the number of available customers450. Further, given the (relative) mobility of
labor in the United States, migration patterns follow growth opportunities451. Put into
simpler terms, growing economies require growing pools of workers and consumers, and
worker-consumers move to growing economies where they can (presumably) find work.
This in mind, table 5.01 shows, the city’s population grew by nearly one-third from 1980 to
2010, though it should be noted that the rate of that growth peaked between 1990 and 2000.
Although a thorough interrogation of the reasons for this decline in growth rates from 2000

merriam-webster.com, 2016b
Berry, 2014, pp. 2-3; Glaeser, Scheinkman, & Shliefer, 1995, pp. 127-129; Jones, 2002, pp. 224-225; Skidelsky, 2009, pp. 121-126
450 Berry, 2014, p. 1; Gamble. 2014, pp. 82-88
451 Glaeser, Scheinkman, & Shliefer, 1995, p. 127
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to 2010 is beyond the scope of this study, it is reasonable to suggest that causes may include
the pressures of the Great Recession leading to less economic opportunity and an increased
aversion to the risks of relocation among would-be residents, as well as increased
competition for residents from Dallas’ affluent, northern suburbs. Nonetheless, the
unbroken, positive growth of Dallas’ population suggests that the city’s economy has grown
over the period of 1980 to 2010.
In considering the relationship between unemployment and economic growth, cities
with higher unemployment rates can be viewed as having a labor force that lacks (for
whatever reason) the necessary training to be appealing to productive businesses in a given
economic period452. Thus, a growing economy needs more than simply “enough” workers;
instead, a growing economy needs enough adequately-trained workers. The relationship
unemployment rates and Gross Domestic Product are connected by Okun’s Law, which
suggests that a one-percentage point change in unemployment is negatively correlated with a
(roughly) three-percentage point change in GDP453. While this ratio has historically proven
stable for most Western economies, since the Great Recession (and its “jobless recovery”),
some scholars have begun to question the specific numbers, while continuing to support the
overall presence of a negative correlation between unemployment rates and economic
growth454. This relationship in mind, there are three critical trends to be found in Dallas’
unemployment data. First, there are two periods – 1980 to 1990, and 2000 to 2010 – when
unemployment grew from one census to the next, suggesting two downturns in the city’s
economic growth. These data fit with the economic history of the city, and bookend the two
economic downturns related to, respectively, the combined S&L Crisis and oil bust

Glaeser, Scheinkman, & Shliefer, 1995, p. 131
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throughout the 1980s, as well as the Great Recession in the 2000s. Overall, though, it is
important to note that Dallas’ unemployment rate has declined from its peak in 1990, and in
2010, is only 62.1% of what it was in 1980. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that, based
on Dallas’ unemployment data (and setting aside economic downturns), the city’s economy
has grown from 1980 to 2010.
Certainly, these findings are limited, and in many ways they fail to adequately capture
the many factors related to Dallas’ economic growth. Nonetheless, when they are combined
with, for example, the city’s high concentration of headquarters’ for Fortune 500 companies,
its centralized location with respect to major highways and rail lines, its large, international
airport, and the presence of municipal-, county-, and state incentives for development and
business relocation to Dallas, a strong argument can be made in support of the overall
assumption that Dallas is economically prosperous within the post-Fordist paradigm455.
Evaluation of Dallas as “less white.” To evaluate whether Dallas as a whole has
become “less white” between 1980 and 2010, this study collected data related to the city’s
racial profile for those census years; first presented in Chapter 4, these data are restated in
table 5.02.
Table 5.02: Citywide Population and Racial and Hispanic or Latino Status, 1980 - 2010
1980
1990
2000
Population
904,078
1,006,877
1,188,580
White Alone
61.4%
55.3%
50.8%
Nonwhite
38.6%
44.7%
49.2%
Hispanic or Latino (Any Race)
12.2%
20.9%
35.6%

2010
1,197,816
50.7%
49.3%
42.4%

These data suggest that, even as Dallas’ overall population has grown between 1980 and
2010, people in Dallas identifying as “white alone” have decreased as a percentage of the
population at each census, with the sharpest declines occurring between 1980 and 1990.
Returning to conceptualizations of race and urban geography, these data are consistent with

Bruns & Rasmussen, 2016; Dallas Business Journal, 2015; Dallas Convention & Visitors Bureau, 2015; Dallas Economic Development,
2016; Halkais, 2014
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the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs model, which suggests that throughout the mid-late 29th
century, comparatively affluent whites abandoned central cities in favor of bedroom
communities around the urban periphery, leading to majority-minority (“chocolate”) cities
surrounded by majority-white (“vanilla”) suburbs. With respect to Dallas, although people
identifying as Black or African-American make up the largest component of the city’s
nonwhite population, the most notable growth has been among Dallas’ Hispanic and Latino
population, which has more-than tripled from 1980 to 2010 – a growth rate that dwarfs
those of any other racial- or cultural identifier. Indeed, when considering the overlap
between this cultural identifier and racial identifiers, Dallas becomes majority-minority.
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to exhaustively study the causes of this
growth, it is reasonable to suggest that a number of causes could explain (at least) some
subset of this. These reasons include Dallas’ location along major highway routes to the
Mexican border, its relative proximity to the international border, the relatively low cost of
housing – especially in the city’s southern neighborhoods, its economic prosperity, and its
proclivity for construction projects; in short, Dallas’ economic prosperity drives demand for
low-wage, often unskilled workers, its geography places it squarely in the migration path of
these workers, and a portion of its housing is affordable enough to house them (examples of
poor conditions notwithstanding).
While Dallas itself could be considered a “chocolate city,” at least in the spirit of the
term, can its suburbs be accurately considered “vanilla,” for purposes of the model? To
address this, data presented in table 5.03 show the relative percentages of the populations of
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Dallas and the suburban counties456 in the remainder of its MSA457 at the 2010 census458.
Table 5.03: Race and Hispanic or Latino Status for Dallas and Surrounding Suburban MSA Counties, 2010
Dallas
Suburban MSA Counties
Population
1,197,816
4,003,634
White Alone
50.7%
73.1%
Nonwhite
49.3%
26.9%
Hispanic or Latino (Any Race)
42.4%
21.1%

Although these data are limited, they nonetheless suggest that the suburban counties in
Dallas’ MSA are indeed consistent with the expectations of the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs
model. Compared to its suburbs, people in Dallas do not identify as “white alone” at nearly
twice the rate of people who live in the city’s surrounding suburbs. In addition, over twice
the percentage of Dallasites identify as Hispanic or Latino than residents of Dallas’
surrounding suburban counties.
Certainly, the data used throughout this discussion suffer from a number of flaws,
which will be expanded upon later in this study. Nonetheless, based on data presented in
figures 5.02 and 5.03, this study supports its assertion that Dallas has become “less white” in
2010 than it was in 1980. Further, this study supports its assertion that the chocolate cities,
vanilla suburbs model remains a valid conceptualization of the racial- and ethnic polarization
in Dallas and its suburban counties.
Evaluation of Dallas’ workforce as less blue collar and more creative class.
Recall that this study hypothesized that since 1980, Dallas’ workforce has shifted to include a
greater percentage of employees in creative class fields, as well as a smaller percentage of
employees in blue collar fields – shifts that are basically consistent with what would be
expected of the workforce of a thriving, post-Fordist economy.

Author’s note: Tarrant County was removed from the MSA, because it contains two large central cities: Arlington and Fort Worth.
Therefore, this study only includes aggregated data from Collin, Delta, Denton, Ellis, Hunt, Johnson, Kaufman, Parker, Rockwall, and
Wise counties.
457 United States Census Bureau, 2010a
458 Author’s note: data are unavailable for previous censuses, due to changes in both census definitions for urban areas and changes in
delineation (even when definitions remained consistent).
456
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To review how this study defines these terms, recall that the operational definition of
creative class employment includes careers in: “design, education, arts, music and
entertainment, whose economic function is to create new ideas, new technology and/or
creative content” 459; examples include careers in the FIRE sectors, as well as those in
education and fine arts. Additionally, this study’s operationalization of blue collar employment
includes fields wherein tasks usually involve manual labor, and often require work-specific
clothing460; examples include manufacturing and construction. Third, this study operationally
defines service sector employment as a combination of the census categories of wholesale trade,
retail trade, and “other services, except public administration.” Finally, and primarily in order
to ensure that category data add up to 100%, this study also reports employment in public
administration fields, which are reported as separate industry codes, and primarily include
careers in government positions.
These operational definitions in mind, to evaluate whether the hypothesized
workforce transition from employment in blue collar fields to creative class alternatives has
occurred, this section revisits data related to employment by industry. There data were first
introduced in Chapter 4, and are restated in table 5.04. As a reminder, data for 1980 and 1990
are based on Dallas’ statistical area, while data for 2000 and 2010 come from census records
based only on Dallas itself.

Creative Class
Blue Collar
Service Sector
Public Administration

Table 5.04: Citywide Employment Percentages by Industry Cluster
1980 (Est.)
1990 (Est.)
2000
36.6%
53.2%
51.6%
34.0%
26.1%
25.7%
27.4%
18.5%
20.6%
2.0%
2.2%
2.1%

2010
52.7%
25.7%
19.5%
2.1%

As Chapter 4 notes, data suggest that the largest transition in Dallas’ employment profile
occurs between 1980 and 1990, when the percentage of working Dallasites employed in
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creative class fields grew by over 16 percentage points, with a similar percentage point loss
spread over the service sector and blue collar clusters. Since 1990, the relative composition
of Dallas’ citywide employment in creative class-, blue collar-, service sector-, and public
administration fields has held relatively steady, suggesting that the city may have reached a
new equilibrium point with respect to the broad types of work that employees perform.
This new equilibrium point also coincides with the time in which Dallas’
unemployment rate hit its highest point over the measurement period (12.2%), as well as the
height of economic tumult brought on by both the Savings & Loan Crisis and oil bust. Prior
to these crises, recall that Dallas was known as a regional manufacturing hub461,
supplemented by a growing number of firms in real estate, banking, and finance462. If the
data for 1980 and 1990 are indeed representative of Dallas itself (and not just the most
representative of available data), then it would appear that, even though the CBD’s brandnew skyscrapers saw unprecedented vacancy rates throughout the early 1990s, it was Dallas’
blue collar firms that suffered the most, with employment losses between 1980 and 1990
that have not been seen since.
These data contain a number of unfortunate limitations (revisited later in this
chapter); nonetheless, based on data in table 5.04, this study supports its hypothesis that,
when comparing citywide employment data from 2010 to 1980, Dallas’ employees are more
likely to be employed in creative class fields, and less likely to be employed in blue collar fields.
Still, it is critical to note that blue collar employment continues to make up a significant
portion of the city’s employment profile, and later sections of this chapter will suggest that
there is significant intra-city variance with respect to where workers are employed.
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Evaluation of Dallas as more economically polarized. In evaluating whether
Dallas is more economically polarized in 2010 than it was in 1980, first recall that this study
operationally defines “greater economic polarization” as the presence of both higher median
household income (MHI) and higher poverty rates. Chapter 4 presented data regarding both
of these variables; these data are replicated in table 5.05. As a reminder, MHI is expressed in
2015 inflation-adjusted dollars, to better facilitate comparison among years.
Table 5.05: Citywide MHI and Poverty Rate, 1980 - 2010
1980
1990
MHI (in 2015 inflation-adjusted dollars)
$79,611
$50,461
Poverty Rate
18.0%
18.0%

2000
$52,146
17.8%

2010
$45,616
22.3%

For this study, greater economic polarization is operationalized in terms of both MHI and
poverty rates; if both are higher in 2010 than in 1980, then the data would support greater
economic polarization. Data suggest that, while MHI effectively decreased by over 40%
between 1980 and 2010, the city’s poverty rate increased by just under 24% over that same
period.
Taking a long-term view of Dallas’ economic profile, note that MHI seems to follow
the health of the overall economy – recessions in the 1980s and early 2000s are accompanied
by decreases in MHI, while the census betwixt these downturns suggests a (small) increase,
as the economy started to recover. Additional data points would be needed to verify this
speculation, but it fits with archival media accounts suggesting that, as early as the mid1970s, affluent Dallasites were migrating into the city’s suburbs, following corporate
migrations to expansive campuses in the city’s suburbs, especially those in adjacent Collin
County463. This growth was acknowledged by Dallas’ leaders as early as 1986, and was a
primary motivator for the city’s revised 1993 Thoroughfare Plan464, the construction of the
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DART light rail network, which runs along the city’s major north-south highway, and major
expansions to the regional interstate highway network465.
Additionally, data in table 5.05 suggest that Dallas’ poverty rate remained stable from
1980 until 2000, upticking in 2010 following the Great Recession. Recall that Dallas’ regional
economy remained strong throughout the recession, which suggests that the increase in
poverty rate, coupled with the 2010 losses in MHI that more-than erased gains seen at the
2000 census, it is reasonable to speculate that many high-income positions have moved
beyond the city limits, while the positions that remain are filled by workers who utilize the
aforementioned expansions in the regional transportation network to commute to urban
jobs from suburban residences. For residents of Dallas with low incomes, a half-hour (or
longer) drive to work may be unrealistic, if not impossible, so if these workers are limited to
employment opportunities within the city (or even within the subset of Dallas served by
mass transit). It is, therefore, likely that the trending decrease in MHI and recent increase in
poverty rate both point to the same conclusion: economic opportunities in the growing
regional economy may be increasingly out of reach for many Dallasites – a topic which will
be revisited later in this chapter.
As has been noted throughout this chapter, data presented are far-from perfect.
Flaws notwithstanding, the data in Table 5.05 fail to support the partial hypothesis that
Dallas’ economy has grown increasingly polarized between 1980 and 2010. Citywide, MHI
has fallen significantly from 1980 levels, while unemployment has largely remained static.
Finally, this study speculates that, while Dallas overall is not more economically polarized in
2010 than in 1980, it may be that the Dallas region is more polarized; people with low- and
moderate incomes are concentrating within Dallas itself, while wealthier people are
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distributed among the city’s surrounding suburbs and exurbs – certainly, this trend can be
seen in central cities across the nation, so it would be hardly surprising to see it in Dallas as
well. Additionally, as future sections will suggest, data and trends at the citywide level mask
some degree of neighborhood-level variance.
Evaluation of Hypothesis 2
The following paragraphs will utilize quantitative data first presented in Chapter 4
data in order to evaluate Hypothesis 2, regarding the socioeconomic profile of North Oak
Cliff, a gentrifying central urban neighborhood characterized primarily by majority-nonwhite
residents with low- to moderate incomes, and historically associated with decades of
disinvestment, decline, and disconnection from the structures of citywide governance. In
evaluating this hypotheses, this study will first evaluate whether, in keeping with the new donut
model of urban demographic composition, North Oak Cliff is “more white” than it was in
1980. Then, this study will concurrently evaluate whether neighborhood workers are less
likely to be employed in blue collar fields in 2010 than they were in 1980, and whether those
workers are instead more likely to be employed in creative class fields. Third, this study will
evaluate whether North Oak Cliff’s residents are more economically polarized in 2010 than
neighborhood residents were in 1980. Finally, this study will evaluate these components
holistically, to make a determination whether (or to what extent) evidence supports this
hypothesis.
Evaluation of North Oak Cliff as “more white.” To evaluate whether North Oak
Cliff has become “more white” between 1980 and 2010, this study collected data related to
the neighborhood’s racial profile for those census years; these data are restated in table 5.06.
Table 5.06: North Oak Cliff Population and Racial and Hispanic or Latino Status, Percentages, 1980 - 2010
1980
1990
2000
2010
Population
17,713
17,544
19,617
15,055
White Alone
58.8%
46.9%
49.3%
61.4%
Nonwhite
41.2%
53.1%
50.7%
38.6%
Hispanic or Latino (Any Race)
31.2%
48.8%
65.0%
59.9%
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These data suggest that, while the neighborhood’s population rapidly declined following the
Great Recession, which itself was preceded by a significant population jump, the population
of people identifying as “white alone” has been increasing from its 1990 nadir to a clear
majority in 2010. To better understand what happened, table 5.07 shows the demographic
numbers (rather than percentages) for North Oak Cliff.
Table 5.07: North Oak Cliff Population and Racial and Hispanic or Latino Status, Counts, 1980 - 2010
1980
1990
2000
2010
Population
17,713
17,544
19,617
15,055
White Alone
10,408
8,229
9,679
9,239
Black or African American
3,119
2,668
1,544
1,412
American Indian or Alaskan Native
108
177
162
197
Asian American or Native Hawaiian
173
82
71
149
Other or Mixed-Race
3,905
6,388
8,161
4,058
Hispanic or Latino (Any Race)
5,530
8,557
12,755
9,025

These data suggest that much of the neighborhood’s 2000-2010 population loss is in is
community of people who identify as “other or mixed-race,” as well as in the
neighborhood’s community of people who identify as Hispanic or Latino; as a reminder, this
latter category is independent of racial identification, so it is possible that there is overlap
between these two groups. Nonetheless, these data suggest that, rather than there being a
surge of people identifying as “white alone,” the change in North Oak Cliff’s demographic
profile is best explained by population losses across several minority groups – losses also
seen in the overall population figures for the neighborhood. Within the context of citywide
growth in people identifying as nonwhite as a percentage of the population, these data
suggest that there may be a migration of some minority groups away from North Oak Cliff.
Certainly, the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs narrative describes the declining percentage
(and counts) of people identifying as “white alone” in North Oak Cliff; this is also reflected
in personal accounts of the neighborhood prior to 2000466. From the 2000 census forward,
however, data in tables 5.06 and 5.07 support this study’s assertion that a greater percentage
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of North Oak Cliff’s population reports as “white alone” in 2010 than in 1980, consistent
with the expectations of the new donut model. Later in this chapter, a similar analysis of
Downtown Dallas’ demographic trends will allow this study to evaluate whether this
neighborhood is an outlier, or whether it is suggestive of a larger trend within Dallas.
Evaluation of North Oak Cliff’s workforce as less blue collar and more

creative class. In evaluating whether North Oak Cliff’s workforce (like that of Dallas as a
whole) has shifted to include a greater percentage of employees in creative class fields, as well
as a smaller percentage of employees in blue collar fields, Chapter 4 first introduced data
regarding employment by industry cluster for North Oak Cliff. As a note, recall that these
data, reproduced alongside citywide estimates in table 5.08, are limited to years 2000 and
2010.
Table 5.08: Citywide and North Oak Cliff Employment Percentages by Industry Cluster
1980 (Est.)
1990 (Est.)
2000
Creative Class
Blue Collar
Service Sector
Public Administration

2010

Dallas

N. Oak Cliff

Dallas

N. Oak Cliff

Dallas

N. Oak Cliff

Dallas

N. Oak Cliff

36.6%
34.0%
27.4%
2.0%

n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.

53.2%
26.1%
18.5%
2.2%

n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.

51.6%
25.7%
20.6%
2.1%

44.7%
34.9%
18.3%
2.1%

52.7%
25.7%
19.5%
2.1%

65.3%
14.3%
17.3%
1.8%

Between 2000 and 2010 the percentage of North Oak Cliff’s resident workforce employed in
creative class fields has grown at a much more rapid pace than that for Dallas as a whole, while
the percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce employed in blue collar fields has shrunk by a
similarly extreme degree. As with Dallas as a whole, changes in the neighborhood’s
workforce employed in service sector and public administration fields are comparatively slight,
suggesting greater stability in these fields.
Within the greater context of neighborhood depopulation between 2000 and 2010, it
is reasonable to speculate about the possibility that blue collar employment is abandoning the
workers of North Oak Cliff, and that employees of these firms are leaving as well, hoping to
find work elsewhere. Alternatively, it may be that as employment opportunities in blue collar
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fields dry up, only households with workers in creative class, service sector, and public administration
fields are able to afford to remain in the neighborhood. Whatever its cause, analysis of
Downtown Dallas will begin to reveal whether the transitions in North Oak Cliff are
outliers, or indicators of a greater story of displacement of people of color and blue collar
workers within a revitalizing urban core.
Lacking data specific to North Oak Cliff for both 1980 and 1990, the “best guess”
data for the makeup of its workforce employment profile would come from data
representing Dallas’ statistical area. However, this study argues that the scope of those areas
is so large as to make them unusable; whereas Dallas itself represents a significant portion of
its statistical area, North Oak Cliff is just one neighborhood out of hundreds within Dallas,
so it would be inappropriate to substitute area-wide data for missing values within the
neighborhood. As a result, while the rapid expansion of creative class employees and
simultaneous decline of blue collar employees as percentages of North Oak Cliff’s workforce
suggests a trend in-line with literature regarding the gentrification of central urban
neighborhoods, this study cannot reasonably support its assertion that, compared to its
workforce in 1980, the neighborhood’s workforce in 2010 can be characterized as “less blue
collar and more creative class.”
Evaluation of North Oak Cliff as more economically polarized. Although
Dallas as a whole did not exhibit signs of economic polarization, can the same be said for its
gentrifying neighborhoods? Using data regarding median household income (MHI) and
poverty rates, table 5.09 shows the changes in North Oak Cliff from 1980 to 2010.
Table 5.09: North Oak Cliff MHI and Poverty Rate, 1980 - 2010
1980
1990
2000
MHI (in 2015 inflation-adjusted dollars)
$28,861
$25,617
$51,915
Poverty Rate
17.4%
23.3%
23.4%

2010
$39,106
25.0%

Broadly speaking, these data suggest that inflation-adjusted MHI has increased from 1980 to
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2010, and additionally, that the neighborhood’s poverty rate has also increased over that
same period.
Of greater interest, however, is that while Dallas’ MHI sunk dramatically between
1980 and 1990, likely resulting from the severe economic downturn in the mid-1980s, the
MHI decrease in North Oak Cliff is comparative smaller; while the MHI for Dallas as a
whole is more-than $50,000 higher than that for the neighborhood ($79,611 vs. $28,861) in
1980, the difference shrinks to just under $25,000 in 1990 ($50,461 vs. $25,617). Given the
history of commercial and political neglect in this part of Dallas, it is reasonable to suspect
that during this period, North Oak Cliff had already “bottomed out,” that is, neighborhood
median incomes were already so depressed that they simply had less room to fall. With
median incomes so low at the 1990 census, it is reasonable to suspect that some amount of
the growth seen at the 2000 census is merely regression toward a mean; however, this hardly
seems adequate to explain a doubling of neighborhood MHI, when the citywide MHI only
increased by roughly $1,500. It is important to note that, at the 2000 census, the
neighborhood- and citywide MHI figures are within $500 of each other, although the
significant decline at the 2010 census suggests that the groundswell of interest in North Oak
Cliff had abated, likely as a result of the Great Recession.
For a neighborhood whose residents’ median incomes are so depressed when
compared to the citywide median, it should be unsurprising that, for three out of four
censuses, poverty rates are significantly higher than those for Dallas citywide. That residents
are able to remain in the neighborhood, even with such low incomes, also suggests that there
is a significant amount of low-cost housing stock concentrated in the area – the kind of
housing stock that is commonly targeted by both would-be gentrifiers and unscrupulous
landlords. In the case of North Oak Cliff, archival searches suggest that both gentrifiers and
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slum lords are present, active, and at the heart of several, often-heated disagreements within
the community467.
Certainly, the rising MHI between 1990 and 2000, as well as the documented interest
in North Oak Cliff by developers throughout the mid-late 1990s468 supports this speculation.
In addition, the rapid increase in neighborhood MHI suggests some combination of an
influx of people with higher incomes and an exodus of people with lower incomes occurred
between 1990 and 2000, although the comparatively stable poverty rate suggests that the area
attracted both people with high incomes (presumably to the gentrifying and middle-class
neighborhoods) and people in lower income brackets (presumably to the derelict
neighborhoods often adjacent to nicer ones). The growth in MHI and poverty rates between
1980 and 2000, but especially between 1990 and 2000 suggest that pockets of the
neighborhood are gentrifying, while others continue to decline. Indeed, evidence of these
block-by-block disparities in North Oak Cliff were visible even in the early 1980s469, and the
schizophrenic approach to neighborhood redevelopment since then has likely only
exacerbated these differences.
Confounding this speculation, however, is the decrease in MHI found at the 2010
census; this may be a result of the Great Recession, or it may be a regression toward the
mean. Although future study of this neighborhood will be required to fully address this issue,
recall that the neighborhood’s population declined by over 20% (or roughly 4,000 people)
between 2000 and 2010, so it may be that people with higher incomes simply moved on,
possibly as a result of the economic downturn, but perhaps also to seek opportunities in
neighborhoods with access to better amenities (e.g. schools, newer housing stock, access to

Brown, 2014; Griggs, 2016; Robberson, 2014; 2015; Schutze, 2001; 2015a; 2015b; Shine & Ramirez, 2015; Stone, 2015a; 2015b;
Wilonsky, 2015; 2016a;
468 Elliott, Summey, & Kokel, 2009, pp. 117-118; 2013, p. 59; Huang, 2014
469 Freeman, 1982
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quality foods). While these data fail to capture some of the more nuanced, granular changes
in the economic profile of North Oak Cliff, they nonetheless support the conclusion that the
neighborhood has grown more economically polarized from 1980 to 2010, even in spite of
citywide economic downturns.
Evaluation of Hypothesis 3. The following paragraphs will utilize quantitative data
first presented in Chapter 4 data in order to evaluate Hypothesis 3, regarding the
socioeconomic profile of Downtown Dallas, a mixed-use neighborhood being carved out of
the repurposed “see-through skyscrapers” of Dallas’ CBD. As with its previous discussion of
North Oak Cliff, in evaluating Hypothesis 3, this study will first evaluate whether
Downtown Dallas is “more white” than it was in 1980, in keeping with the prediction of the
new donut model. Second, this study will evaluate whether neighborhood’s employed workers
are less likely to be employed in blue collar fields in 2010 than they were in 1980, and whether
those workers are instead more likely to be employed in creative class fields. Third, this study
will evaluate whether the neighborhood is more economically polarized in 2010 than it was
1980. Finally, this study will evaluate these components holistically, to make a determination
whether (or to what extent) evidence supports this hypothesis.
Evaluation of Downtown Dallas as “more white.” As it did with North Oak
Cliff, to evaluate whether the percentage of Downtown Dallas’ population identifying as
“white alone” has, as-predicted by the new donut model, increased over the measurement
period, this study examined census data related to the neighborhood’s racial profile. These
data, presented first in Chapter 4, are restated in table 5.10.
Table 5.10: Downtown Dallas Population and Racial and Hispanic or Latino Status, Percentages, 1980 - 2010
1980
1990
2000
2010
Population
2,900
3,444
2,198
9,262
White Alone
50.3%
36.6%
69.0%
64.6%
Nonwhite
49.7%
63.4%
31.0%
35.4%
Hispanic or Latino (Any Race)
2.7%
7.0%
13.8%
19.5%
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These data suggest that, much like with North Oak Cliff, after a decline in the percentage of
the population identifying as “white alone” between 1980 and 1990, the white population of
Downtown Dallas has grown dramatically, spiking at the 2000 census before a slight decline
(within the greater context of a significant increase in neighborhood population) found at
the 2010 census. These data are consistent with this study’s position that, prior to 1990,
Dallas is best described by the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs mode, while after 1990, the new
donut model appears more accurate, based on the demographic changes of these two central
urban neighborhoods. It is also noteworthy that, although the percentage of the population
identifying as Hispanic or Latino has also increased at each census, this group comprises a
smaller percentage of Downtown Dallas’ population than that of both Dallas as a whole and
North Oak Cliff.
Digging deeper, table 5.11 shows, in greater detail, the demographic shifts found in
Downtown Dallas between 1980 and 2010.
Table 5.11: Downtown Dallas Population and Racial and Hispanic or Latino Status, Counts, 1980 - 2010
1980
1990
2000
2010
Population
2,900
3,444
2,198
9,262
White Alone
1,460
1,259
1,517
5,985
Black or African American
1,269
2,089
466
2,156
American Indian or Alaskan Native
30
25
17
67
Asian American or Native Hawaiian
12
10
34
294
Other or Mixed-Race
129
61
164
760
Hispanic or Latino (Any Race)
78
242
304
1,804

These data suggest that the neighborhood population loss between 1990 and 2000 is due
primarily to a sharp decline in the number of residents who identify as Black or African
American; however, given that this population returned to its 1990 level in 2010, this decline
may simply be an error in the initial data collection. Local media report a different story,
however – one of working-class majority-minority residential- and commercial corridors
packed between- and around the skyline-defining monoliths being demolished to make way
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for upscale versions of themselves, as well as new commercial- and office spaces470. During
this same time, efforts at the city level were made to remove the large concentration of
homeless people from the neighborhood, primarily through pressuring food distribution
centers to move operations elsewhere, using police officers to aggressively deter vagrants
and panhandlers, and in some cases, actively rounding up and moving people into other
areas471. Therefore, it is reasonable to speculate that, the loss of so many people identifying
as Black or African American can be well-described by a combination of purges of the
neighborhood’s homeless population and gentrification of minority-majority communities.
This urban gentrification only expanded after the turn of the century, culminating in
the Downtown Dallas 360 master revitalization plan introduced in Chapter 4, and which will
be revisited in Chapter 6. Following the Great Recession, data in tables 5.10 and 5.11 suggest
that the growth in Downtown Dallas’ population is largely attracting people who identify as
“white alone,” although smaller gains can be seen in the percentages of the population
identifying as, respectively, African American and Hispanic or Latino. To a lesser extent than
in North Oak Cliff or Dallas citywide, there is evidence to support the pattern of “white
flight” described by the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs model between 1980 and 1990. Also as
was found in North Oak Cliff, since 1990, and especially following the Great Recession, data
in tables 5.10 and 5.11 instead support this study’s assertion that a greater percentage of the
neighborhood’s population identifies as “white alone” in 2010 than in 1980, a finding that is
wholly consistent with the new donut model.
Evaluation of Downtown Dallas’ workforce as less blue collar and more

creative class. In evaluating whether Downtown Dallas’ workforce (like that of both North
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Oak Cliff and Dallas as a whole) has shifted to include a greater percentage of employees in
creative class fields, as well as a smaller percentage of employees in blue collar fields, Chapter 4
first introduced data regarding employment by industry cluster for the neighborhood; as a
note, recall that these neighborhood-level data are limited to 2000 and 2010. Neighborhood
workforce data (where available), as well as comparative data for Dallas as a whole, are
restated in table 5.12.
Table 5.12: Citywide and Downtown Dallas Employment Percentages by Industry Cluster
1980
1990
2000
2010
Downtown
Downtown
Downtown
Downtown
Dallas
Dallas
Dallas
Dallas
Creative Class
Blue Collar
Service Sector
Public Administration

(Estimated)

Dallas

(Estimated)

Dallas

36.6%
34.0%
27.4%
2.0%

n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.

53.2%
26.1%
18.5%
2.2%

n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.

Dallas

51.6%
25.7%
20.6%
2.1%

55.5%
25.7%
16.6%
2.3%

Dallas

52.7%
25.7%
19.5%
2.1%

60.0%
20.0%
18.2%
1.3%

These data suggest that, as with Dallas as a whole and North Oak Cliff, the percentage of
Downtown Dallas’ workforce employed in creative class fields is growing, while the percentage
of the workforce employed in blue collar fields is on the decline. These shifts are not as
dramatic as those found in North Oak Cliff, although they are larger than those found in
Dallas as a whole. This should be unsurprising, however, as Downtown Dallas encompasses
and surrounds the city’s CBD, presenting an historical availability of jobs in creative class
firms, while the city’s industrial base has historically been centered closer to neighborhoods
in the city’s southern sector, although notable exceptions exist, such as the Del Monte Foods
produce processing plant, and Kinki Sharyo International, which produces and maintains
vehicles in the city’s commuter light rail fleet. Further, as office towers in CBD increasingly
become mixed-use centers, combining retail, residential, commercial, and hotel spaces, it is
reasonable to speculate that, consistent with the post-Fordist “back to the city” movement
described by the new donut model, the idea of a downtown apartment is attractive to the
workers in downtown firms, a notion that has become part of the marketing strategy of the
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nonprofit development company Downtown Dallas, Inc. (DDI)472.
As with North Oak Cliff, lacking data specific to Downtown Dallas for both 1980
and 1990, the “best guess” data for the makeup of the neighborhood’s workforce
employment profile would come from data representing Dallas’ statistical area. However,
this study continues to assert that the scope of those areas is so large as to make them
unusable; whereas Dallas itself represents a significant portion of its statistical area, this
neighborhood is just one neighborhood out of hundreds within Dallas, so it would be
inappropriate to substitute area-wide data for missing values within the neighborhood. As a
result, while the rapid expansion of creative class employees and simultaneous decline of blue
collar employees as percentages of Downtown Dallas’ workforce suggests a trend in-line with
literature regarding the gentrification of central urban neighborhoods, this study cannot
support its assertion that, compared to its workforce in 1980, the neighborhood’s workforce
in 2010 can be characterized as “less blue collar and more creative class.”
Evaluation of Downtown Dallas as more economically polarized. Recall that,
although evidence of increasing economic polarization was not found in Dallas as a whole,
evidence was found for increasing economic polarization in the adjacent North Oak Cliff
neighborhood.
Table 5.13: Downtown Dallas MHI and Poverty Rate, 1980 - 2010
1980
1990
2000
MHI (in 2015 inflation-adjusted dollars)
$38,324
$46,678
$78,897
Poverty Rate
22.0%
7.7%
15.5%

2010
$64,618
19.6%

These data suggest that, although MHI is over $25,000 higher in 2010 than in 1980, even
after adjusting for inflation, the poverty rate has decreased, which suggests a decline in
economic polarization over the measurement period. However, when considering the

472
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positive trend in poverty rate growth since 1990, it is evident that polarization is on the rise
within Downtown Dallas.
Of particular interest is the significant decline in the neighborhood poverty rate
found at the 1990 census, followed by a sharp increase by 2000. It is reasonable to suspect
that some portion of the decline is a result of the aforementioned efforts undertaken by City
Hall to remove homeless people from the central city, but these efforts were at their greatest
between 1990 and 2000, peaking in the months leading up to the city’s hosting of the 1994
World Cup473. this study speculates that a larger portion of this decline can be explained by
early attempts (especially in the mid-late 1990s) to revitalize residential portions of
Downtown Dallas, which were characterized by the demolition of lower-income
neighborhoods in favor of lower density, mixed-use, new urbanist developments that
previous residents could ill-afford474. This early gentrification can be seen in the
neighborhood depopulation illustrated in table 5.11, especially among people identifying as
African American.
If the late 20th century decline in poverty rate is attributable (at least in significant
part) to homeless removal and gentrification in economically-marginalized residential
pockets, how can the increases since the 1990 increase be explained? In part, these rises are
attributable to a slight increase in the number of available housing units for people with low
incomes; in 2005, 50 cottages were built for people with low incomes475. Additionally, in
2010, 200 apartment units were made available, although within three months, all units had
been filled, and 300 people were waitlisted476. Third, media from that era reported that citywide efforts to force vagrants off of private property concentrated these individuals onto
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public land, much of which is concentrated in Downtown Dallas477. Finally, at the dawn of
the 21st century, new service providers had opened up, focusing on the homeless and people
with low incomes478.
To speculate on additional causes of the growth in poverty rates and declining
median household incomes, it is also possible that, in the older, less-pristine segments of the
neighborhood that have not yet been redeveloped, landlords are taking advantage of the lack
of affordable housing units in the area to rent units to large groups of people with low
incomes, effectively creating shared-bedroom dormitories that “warehouse” the lowerincome workers who provide, for example, security- and janitorial services to the creative class
firms throughout Downtown Dallas. Finally, in older neighborhoods with aging
homeowners, it may be that several generations are living together, sharing costs to remain
in the area when incomes are low, or during extended stretches of unemployment – a trend
found to have grown dramatically in the wake of the Great Recession479.
Considering the trends in Downtown Dallas discussed so far, evidence supports this
study’s assertion that Downtown Dallas is more economically polarized in 2010 than it was
in 1980. In addition, data presented so far support the speculation that as the city itself
emerged from the economic malaise of the 1980s and early 1990s, Downtown Dallas began
to transform itself into a neighborhood more fitting with the post-Fordist narrative of urban
cores as centers of capital consumption, rather than centers of capital accumulation. The
largely white, higher-income residents returning to Downtown Dallas, lured by the new
amenities and development found in the Downtown Dallas 360 master plan, are putting a new
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face on the city center, but this “new face” hides a growing chasm between the
neighborhood’s “haves” and its “have-nots.”
Discussion of Context Hypotheses
Throughout its evaluations of Dallas itself, as well as the neighborhoods of North
Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas, this study found evidence suggestive of a new normal in
Dallas, following the city’s economic collapse during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Broadly
speaking, the residents of the post-collapse Dallas are less wealthy, and less-white than those
of the pre-collapse Dallas, but when taking neighborhood-level data into account, it is clear
that this broader trend contains notable exceptions. In the sections that follow, this study
will first discuss the new normal at the citywide level, and then for the adjacent neighborhoods
of Downtown Dallas and North Oak Cliff.
Dallas as a Whole
So what is the new normal in Dallas? As noted above, the residents of the
contemporary city are a far cry from the Dallas depicted in its namesake television series.
Much of Dallas is no longer majority-white, and a growing subset of the city’s residents are
growing increasingly poor, and increasingly economically segregated. In the wake of Dallas’
white flight between 1980 and 1990, a growing population of people identifying as Hispanic
or Latino is earning less and less, as-evidenced by the general decline in MHI from 1980 to
2010.
These trends have not gone unnoticed by Dallas’ leaders’. A 2016 report by the
Mayor’s Task Force on Poverty reported that, since 1979, households earning more than
$50,000 annually have declined, while households earning less than $35,000 have grown, and
over half of the households in Dallas earn less than $50,000 per year480. Further, over 41% of
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Dallas’ adult population lives below the poverty line, even while 70% of the city’s “low
income” workers are employed, and many hold full-time positions481.
Intersecting racial disparities with Dallas’ position as a growing economy in the postFordist paradigm, minority workers often fill low-wage positions in creative class and service
sector firms, such as data entry, entry-level finance, and healthcare, and many more are found
in “producer services” fields like security, dining, janitorial- and facilities management
services, and child care482. Further, as in other cities, members of Dallas’ minority groups are
disproportionately burdened by poverty; that same task force found that, in 2016, nearly
one-third of nonwhites in Dallas live below the poverty line, and since 2000, the percentage
of people who identify as Hispanic or Latino has expanded by just over 20%, but the
percentage of that population who live below the poverty line has increased by over 50%483.
As Dallas’ economy expands, with job growth increasing by over 15% between 2000 and
2014, and positive growth trajectories projected through 2023484, it is clear that people with
low incomes are being increasingly left behind.
As the support workers underpinning Dallas’ growth, these employees are
indispensable, but with the lowest MHI of all major Texas cities, it is clear that they these
workers are increasingly being paid at levels that suggest they are disposable. Not only is
poverty in Dallas growing, data suggest that it is increasingly concentrated within particular
neighborhoods, and even within these neighborhoods, within particular blocks – indeed,
economic inequity is higher in Dallas than in any other city with a population over
250,000485. It is, therefore, reasonable to speculate that this intense, deepening economic
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segregation has its own effects on upward mobility, separating low-income workers (and
their children) from opportunities to escape generational poverty486. The effects of widening
economic (and often racial) segregation can be seen in the revitalization efforts found within
two neighborhoods – North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas.
North Oak Cliff
If the 1990 census heralded a new normal in Dallas as a whole, this study speculates
that a similar event has occurred in North Oak Cliff, albeit on a ten-year delay. In many
ways, the new, upscale face of North Oak Cliff broadly embodies the ideal of urban
revitalization. First, blue collar employment is dropping, and creative class employment is on the
rise within the overall workforce. Second, new shops fill repurposed, original architecture,
and the commercial corridors buzz with activity unseen in decades. Finally, instead of
garnering attention from stories of violence and crime, the neighborhood is now garnering
attention as a hip, young urban community for the post-Fordist millennials looking to live
near, but not necessarily inside of, the central city487.
Economists often suggest that there is “no such thing as a free lunch,” and in North
Oak Cliff, the cost of the ongoing rebirth that has defined a new neighborhood trajectory is
being paid by the displaced residents and businesses that once called the neighborhood
“home.” Far from the white flight that characterized this neighborhood at the close of the
20th century, at the beginning of the 21st, whites have returned at a notable rate, leading to a
number of media-documented battles between an ever-shrinking number of old residents,
and an ever-growing number of new ones488. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that, within
this neighborhood, the new normal consists of a reality in which both wealthier and less-
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wealthy individuals are coexisting within adjacent, homogeneous enclaves. This speculation
fits with media observations of the neighborhood489, and is not dissimilar to changes found
in gentrifying neighborhoods in, for example, Paris since the late 1990s490.
Further, even with workforce profile data limited to the 21st century, it appears that
as blue collar employment drops, so too does MHI, and in addition, data suggest that both
unemployment and poverty rates are also rising in the neighborhood. From this, it is
reasonable to suggest that, for all the articles lauding the redevelopment of an historicallydisinvested neighborhood, the reinvigoration found in North Oak Cliff is leaving some
people behind; given the data collected, this study speculates that the shrinking availability of
blue collar employment is pushing neighborhood residents – primarily nonwhites – to move
elsewhere for employment, or to accept lower-paying positions within creative class industries.
In other words, it appears that in this neighborhood, market forces and gentrification are
overruling the “native” residents’ right to place, resulting in some degree of dispersal. As one
study participant, interviewed for their particular knowledge of North Oak Cliff described it:
There’s a new neighborhood being built out of the old one [...]. Here, you had a community
that was surviving, and just needed a little more attention from City Hall to fix the problems
with the broken-down streets, the schools, and the crime. That’s what we wanted, but what
we got was this slap in the face – new buildings with shops selling nine-dollar slices of pie
that we can’t afford, new apartments we can’t afford, and new people who don’t want
anything to do with the neighborhood they just moved into. We already had something, and
it’s like someone decided one day that it wasn’t good enough, and that something else had to
come in instead, and more and more of us are being pushed somewhere else.

To counter this trend, some residents have attempted to band together, but these efforts are
often slow at best, and ineffective at worst. Built on a history of mistrust, the antiregime of
North Oak Cliff’s past continues to challenge efforts to unite the communities, and the
internal debates within various alliance groups lead to inaction that can be capitalized upon
by organized, resource-rich development firms, but also allow tremendous freedom for
489
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nontraditional actors, such as Jason Roberts and David Spence, both of whom were
introduced in Chapter 4, to engage in smaller, interconnected development projects that
unite area businesses, and strengthen the local economy in less-disruptive ways. These
actors, and their efforts within the greater context of neighborhood disunity, will be revisited
in both Chapters 5 and 6.
Downtown Dallas
Dallas is a city that rewrites itself in response to setbacks, and this habit is most
visible in Downtown; following the Kennedy assassination, the city spent roughly two
decades replacing pre-war construction with massive office buildings, riding on the
generosity of investors – both domestic and international – who used real estate
development to evade taxes, while continuing to reap record-breaking profits. In the years
following the economic implosion and IRS crackdown on investment properties as tax
shelters, Downtown Dallas is once again rewriting itself – turning a former commercial hub
into a mixed-use, post-Fordist utopia for the creative class, and utilizing a dizzying number
public-private partnerships that arise from the Downtown Dallas 360 master development plan
to achieve this makeover.
The effects of this makeover can be seen in the widening economic polarization in
the neighborhood since 1990, even as median household incomes have dramatically
increased over that same period, and unemployment between 2000 and 2010 has remained
largely static; they can also be seen in the ever-growing population of people identifying as
“white alone” since 1990. Given the broader connection between whiteness and wealth –
supported by the city’s own research – it is reasonable to suggest that, like in North Oak
Cliff, the new normal in Downtown Dallas is a neighborhood designed for- and populated by
well-heeled, largely white employees of creative class firms. Meanwhile, a growing underclass of
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nonwhites eek out an existence in the shadows of this new growth – certainly
metaphorically, but also literally, in the parts of Downtown Dallas that lie between its
skyscrapers, museums, public art displays, civic structures, and deck parks.
Whereas in North Oak Cliff, affluent whites are frequently displacing less-affluent
people of color, in Downtown Dallas, the redevelopment of economically-marginalized
spaces is a smaller story than the redevelopment of office buildings into mixed commercialresidential spaces. Thus, rather than (or, more accurately, in addition to) displacing
marginalized populations, new neighborhood residents are instead creating new places where
previously none existed. Therefore, the division between the “haves” and “have-nots” also
takes on a geographic component – rather than gentrifying an existing low-income
community, or creating a mixed-income alternative, the contemporary Downtown Dallas is a
high-density, wealthy enclave being carved out of high-rises and office buildings, bringing a
geographic component to division between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” This
geographic division, unsurprisingly, facilitates an attitudinal, “us versus them” mentality as
well; indeed, when participants interviewed specifically for their knowledge of Downtown
Dallas, the majority (34; 87.2%) described the “new residents” of Downtown Dallas as being
largely disinterested in the plight of the residents with lower incomes; one participant event
went so far as to describe the situation as such:
The new people moving into the old office buildings, they may vote progressives into City
Hall, but in the very next breath they’re telling them (SIC) same people that the homeless are
a nuisance to be eliminated, and to get the cops to crack down on panhandling and loitering,
and to get the group homes either shut down or moved out into the poor Black
neighborhood. They want bike lanes built, but then complain when poor people are riding
bikes to get to work, slowing down traffic in the mornings. They want a DART (transit) bus
that connects all the hot spots in- and around Downtown, but then they demand police to
keep the homeless from riding when it’s 100 degrees out here. They want the Disney version
of Jane Jacobs – not a real community.

While in North Oak Cliff, there is a contingent of organizing, politically-active residents
pushing back against the growing gentrification of their neighborhood, in Downtown Dallas,
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this does not appear to have happened. It is reasonable to suspect that some of this comes
from the lack of population prior to redevelopment – in the former office buildings, for
example, there were no previous residents to displace. In addition, the population that has
been displaced – people who are homeless, as well as people living in now-gentrified
neighborhoods – often have little (or no) voice in the political system, and are not wellequipped to mount resistance to redevelopment and displacement. Further, Downtown
Dallas has traditionally been the epicenter of the city’s redevelopment efforts, and is the area
in which the city’s power elite have historically held the most influence over political leaders.
Finally, Downtown Dallas underwent the bulk of its modern-day redevelopment during a
time when Dallas’ city leaders were desperate to return to the untrammeled growth and
development to which Dallasites were once accustomed. As a result, this study proposes that
the pressure to redevelop, and the level of resources available to developers – in terms of
both financial support and political support – simply overwhelmed the capacity of people
who would have otherwise organized.
The New Normal of Dallas Today vs. the Old Normals of Thometz and Elkin
The Dallas of Thometz’ early 1960s can be characterized by a deep optimism for the
future, combining a desire to see the city move out from the shadow of the JFK
assassination with an (at the time) boundless supply of private investment in urban
redevelopment. The city was experiencing untrammeled growth on once-vacant land, as well
as redevelopment where extant structures could no longer meet the needs of a budding
metropolis, all guided by a tightly-knit pure entrepreneurial governing coalition. This
development was uneven, however, and focused primarily on the “white half” of the city,
located to the north of the Trinity River.
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Roughly two decades later, this coalition had been so successful that city had built
itself out of most of its developable land, at least in terms of land where developers were
actively seeking to build. The city’s southern neighborhoods continued to suffer from a
dearth of development, as well as the loss of political ties as neighborhood whites fled across
the river, leaving abandonment and decay in their wake. In the northern half of Dallas, as
well as in the city’s northern suburbs, commercial growth and residential relocation saw
Dallas building itself out of developable land, and pitted the various interests in Dallas’
governing coalition against one another, both over use value versus exchange value with respect
to redeveloping existing land, and over public works projects, such as highway expansions
and the construction of a commuter light rail service. As the men who built Thometz’ Dallas
retired or died, successors often failed to emerge, leaving the governing coalition fragmented
and on the brink of collapse, but still broadly in control of what Elkin dubbed the complex
entrepreneurial governing coalition.
Further complicating matters, recall that as Chapter 2 first discussed, shortly after
Elkin’s study, Dallas’ economy completely collapsed. In the wake of this collapse, data from
this chapter suggest a white exodus into Dallas’ northern suburbs, while people identifying as
Hispanic and Latino, and to a lesser extent, African American, moved out to fill the
neighborhoods left behind. More recently, these data suggest a smaller-scale white
rediscovery of the central city, through the gentrification of both North Oak Cliff and
Downtown Dallas. In North Oak Cliff, this takes the appearance of long-time community
residents and businesses being displaced in favor of both wealthier whites and the shops,
restaurants, and entertainment venues that cater to them. Meanwhile in Downtown Dallas,
the commercial hub of the city is being rebuilt into towering enclaves of wealthy whites,
surrounded by an underclass of low-income minority groups; ironically, data suggest that
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many of these people likely work in the same creative class firms – possibly even in the same
building, but while the whites enjoy positions of privilege, members of minority groups
barely make ends meet.
As Dallas’ economic- and demographic patterns change, so too must change its
political boundaries – recall that the city’s councilmembers are elected from districts that
must maintain particular racial quotas in order to prevent voter disenfranchisement under a
federal court order, so as populations migrate, council district borders will too. As these
districts change, it is possible that long-time political leaders will find themselves
representing new constituents (as occurred with Councilmember Scott Griggs, whose district
was realigned in 2013), as well as new private-sector interests. As Dallas’ minority population
continues to grow, and as millennials return to the central city, it is reasonable to suspect that
a more progressive set of political leaders are likely to be elected; to some extent, this is
already happening, and the implications of this shift will be revisited in Chapter 6.
Limitations, Revisited and Expanded
As Chapter 3 notes, every study, no matter how well constructed, has limitations that
shape the conclusions that can be drawn491. Understanding these limitations is critical for
these findings to be properly evaluated, so in the paragraphs that follow, this study will
revisit- and expand upon limitations first introduced in Chapter 3.
Looking first at this study’s use of secondary-source data, any problems in the source
data are inherited by this study, and this study is forced to rely on definitions and
conceptualizations present in the source material. For example, participation rates for people
identifying as Hispanic or Latino are questionable, presumably because people worry that
census records will be used to identify them as undocumented immigrants, and they fear
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deportation492. As a result, recall that this study examined changes in poverty rates and
median household income (MHI), as well as changes in demographics with respect to race
and Hispanic or Latino status, which was complicated because MHI is available by race and
Hispanic or Latino status at the tract level, but poverty rates by race and Hispanic or Latino
status are not, therefore this study could only make broad inferences about the face of
poverty in these two neighborhoods.
Additionally, in at least one case, data are unavailable because definitions used by the
census bureau changed. One key example of this is that census definitions regarding
employment industries changed dramatically between 1990 and 2000, so data comparing blue
collar and creative class employment from 1980 and 1990 could not be reconciled with data
from 2000 and 2010. Finally, recall that economic data span the decades from 1980 to 2010,
inclusively, but during that time, Dallas experienced two large economic slowdowns – the
Savings & Loan Crisis, and the Great Recession – both of which likely affected the
economic data, further weakening this study’s quantitative findings. This particular limitation
is not unique to this study; indeed, any case study would have similar complications.
Finally, this study relies on a somewhat “loose” conceptualization of economic
prosperity, derived from a combination of dictionary definitions and a subset of past
research. Using different definitions, a case could be built to suggest that Dallas is not
actually economically prosperous, and that most of the prosperity associated with the city is
actually attributable to the Dallas region, with the city itself in dire economic straits. This
position, while an interesting thought experiment, fails to account for documented economic
growth in the city, although as this chapter has noted throughout, this growth is not being
felt by a significant subset of the city’s population.
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Chapter Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze and evaluate the data reported in Chapter
4, in order to address this study’s research questions. In the preceding chapter sections, this
study first revisited its research questions and hypotheses. Next, it synthesized quantitative
data first presented in Chapter 4, before evaluating them with respect to urban literature
regarding expected demographic- and economic transitions found in post-Fordist cities, as
well as with respect to the effects of these transitions on Dallas’ political landscape. Finally,
this study revisited and expanded upon a subset of the limitations introduced in Chapter 3,
before introducing additional limitations from data collection, reporting, and analysis.
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CHAPTER VI
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze and evaluate the data reported in Chapter 4,
in order to address this study’s final two research questions – those related to the city’s
contemporary governing coalition. In the chapter sections that follow, this study will first
revisit its second and third research questions, as well as its second set of hypotheses. Next,
it will evaluate its qualitative findings in order to render an image of contemporary urban
governance in Dallas, the relationship between the city’s decision-making structures and
entities involved in equitable economic development projects, and how these projects
compare to efforts in a subset of other cities.
Second and Third Research Questions and Coalition Hypotheses Revisited
The purpose of this section is to outline the research questions that this study
attempts to address, as well as its series of hypotheses to be tested. First, it will list the
second and third research questions that guide this study, and then, it will outline the three
hypotheses that this study’s survey- and interview data will be used to evaluate.
Second and Third Research Questions Revisited
As previous chapters have noted, this study aims to answer three primary research
questions. In Chapter 5, this study examined how Dallas’ demographics and economy
evolved in the decades since the city was studied by previous urban scholars. Now, this study
will address the extent to which CDCs and anchor institutions are active participants in
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Dallas’ governing coalition, and further, if they are active, what the effects of that
involvement are on urban development and policymaking.
Coalition Hypotheses Revisited
In order to guide its attempts at addressing this second research question, this study
revisits the final three of its primary hypotheses – those related to the decision-makers of
Dallas as a whole, as well as the neighborhoods of North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas;
these hypotheses are as-follows:
Hypothesis 4. In Dallas as a whole, representatives of anchor institutions and
CDCs are primary (rather than ancillary) members of a citywide governing coalition, and this
involvement portends a more equitable development paradigm than the value-neutral
development seen in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century.
Hypothesis 5. In North Oak Cliff, representatives of anchor institutions and CDCs
in are primary (rather than ancillary) members, of a neighborhood governing coalition, and
this involvement portends a more equitable development paradigm than the value-neutral
development seen in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century.
Hypothesis 6. In Downtown Dallas, representatives of anchor institutions and
CDCs in are primary (rather than ancillary) members, of a neighborhood governing
coalition, and this involvement portends a more equitable development paradigm than the
value-neutral development seen in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century.
Evaluation of Coalition Hypotheses
While Chapter 5 evaluated the relatively straightforward “context” hypotheses, the
sections that follow will engage in evaluations of this study’s three “coalition” hypotheses. In
these sections, this study will first evaluate the presence and nature of decision-making
structures in, respectively, Dallas citywide, North Oak Cliff, and Downtown Dallas, in order
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to understand whether, or to what extent, anchor institutions and CDCs are involved in
contemporary decision-making. As a note of caution, throughout the sections that follow,
this study will often make references to study participants; in the sections related to
Hypothesis 4, the term “participants” will refer to all 79 participants in this study, while in
those sections regarding Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6, the term will refer only to those
participants involved in discussions of those neighborhoods.
Evaluation of Hypothesis 4. The following paragraphs will utilize data first
presented in Chapter 4 data in order to address Hypothesis 4, regarding the status of anchor
institutions and CDCs in a governing coalition within Dallas as a whole. In the paragraphs
that follow, this study will first seek to establish the presence- and nature of citywide
decision-making power. Second, it will evaluate the relationship between power and
nominations to decision-making committees. Third, it will evaluate the respective
relationships between power and familiarity, and between power and recent shared board or
committee service. Finally, it will relate these findings to the present hypothesis, in order to
establish whether, to what extent, and to what end anchor institutions and CDCs are
involved in contemporary citywide decision-making.

Citywide decision-makers. Of the study’s 79 participants, only a subset admitted
familiarity with Dallas’ leadership in prior decades. Six participants (7.6%) spoke to personal
familiarity with the city’s leaders and its decision-making processes in 1960s, while 26
(32.9%) expressed familiarity with decision-makers and decision-making throughout the
1970s and 1980s. When asked to describe contemporary citywide decision-making, and the
extent to which it differs from decision-making in the past, many of these more “tenured”
participants made similar remarks, well-summarized by the following:
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There was a time when you had a basic group of two or three dozen men who would come
together informally and fix problems, or address things as we needed to. Dallas was a lot
smaller then, and people looked up to the men who made decisions like that. Things are a lot
different now…. [Dallas] is so much bigger, and the world is so much faster, and I don’t
think we can ever go back to the old way of doing things, even if it was a lot easier.

Nonetheless, data first introduced in Chapter 4 suggest that, on some level, Dallas still has
people who have a reputation for being able to make decisions that affect the city as a whole.
Seventy-nine participants identified 32 individual- and group actors who have some
combination of formal decision-making authority and informal influence, and whose
presence on a citywide decision-making committee would help ensure that the decision
would be accepted by the community; table 6.01 revisits these decision-makers.
Category
Formal
Authorities

First Tier
Influentials

Second
Tier
Influentials

Civic
Chairs
Anchor
Captains

Table 6.01: Citywide Decision-Makers
Name
Most Notable Affiliation(s)
District-Based Councilmembers (14)
Dallas City Council
Mike Rawlings
Mayor
A.C. Gonzalez
City Manager
Appointed Commissioners (15)
City Plan Commission
Ray Hunt
Hunt Consolidated
John Wiley Price
Dallas County Commissioner
Harlan Crow
Crow Holdings
Ross Perot Jr.
Hillwood
Kay Bailey Hutchison
U.S. Senate (former); TX House of Rep. (former); TX State Treasurer (former)
Caroline Hunt
Rosewood Corp.
T. Boone Pickens
BP Capital
Ruth Collins Altshuler
Philanthropist
Bobby Lyle
Lyco Holdings; Southern Methodist University
Mary Suhm
City Manager (former)
Clint McDonnough
Ernst & Young, LLP
John Scovell
Woodbine Development
Robert Chereck
PlainsCapital
Arcilia Acosta
CARCON Industries
Michael Caffey
C.B. Richard Ellis (CBRE)
Angela Hunt
Dallas City Council (former)
Albert Black
On-Target Supplies & Logistics; Dallas Regional Chamber (former)
Donna D. Halstead
Dallas Citizens Council (former); Councilmember (former)
Jeff Staubach
Jones Lang LaSalle
Alan Walne
Dallas City Council (former)
Steve Everbach
Colliers International
Alice Murray
Dallas Citizens Council
Mabrie Jackson
North Texas Commission
Dale Petrosky
Dallas Regional Chamber
Gerald Turner
Southern Methodist University
Joel T. Allison
Baylor Healthcare
David Daniel
Univ. of Texas at Dallas (former); Univ. of Texas System
Lee Jackson
Univ. of North Texas System

Contemporary distribution of citywide decision-making power. The previous
reputational study of Dallas’ leaders found that decision-makers in the early 1960s were
primarily composed of executives within commerce (including real estate, trade utilities, and
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communications), finance (including banking and insurance), manufacturing, and law, but
also included a handful of leaders from education, government, organized labor, and
religious institutions493. Even into the 1980s, the dominance of business leaders – both
directly, and through civic organizations – in Dallas’ decision-making remained evident494.
This study proffers that that Dallas’ contemporary governing coalition is no longer
quite so narrow, though there continues to be a strong bias toward finance and real estate
among the city’s leaders, and the support of the old guard within Dallas’ leadership can still
advance or sustain a career in public leadership. To the extent that table 6.01 is an accurate
representation of Dallas’ citywide decision-makers, the data within suggest that Dallas’
decision-makers are a collection of government officials (current and former), private-sector
executives in local branches of multinational businesses, real estate offices, finance and
investment firms, construction companies, and law firms, as well as heads of area anchor
institutions and elite civic organizations. Additionally, unlike the Thometz study495, the
decision-makers in table 6.01include both women and people of color.
Recall that Chapter 4 described five categories of decision-makers in Dallas: formal
authorities, first tier influentials, second tier influentials, civic chairs, and anchor captains. As an added
layer to these categories, in their interviews, all 79 participants agreed that some people in
the city have more power than others. Table 6.02 extends survey data introduced Chapter 4,
which listed mean power scores for each decision-maker, by including both total power
scores and rank-order data.

Thometz, 1963, pp. 31-33
Elkin, 1987a, pp. 67-71
495 Thometz, 1963, p. 31
493
494
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Table 6.02: Power Ratings of Citywide Decision-Makers
Rank
Order
1
2
3
4
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
20
22
23
23
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Name
District-Based Councilmembers (14)
Ray Hunt
John Wiley Price
Mike Rawlings
A.C. Gonzalez
Harlan Crow
Ross Perot Jr.
Kay Bailey Hutchison
Alice Murray
City Plan Commissioners (15)
Caroline Hunt
Gerald Turner
T. Boone Pickens
Mary Suhm
Mabrie Jackson
Ruth Collins Altshuler
Clint McDonnough
Bobby Lyle
Dale Petrosky
John Scovell
Robert Chereck
Arcilia Acosta
Michael Caffey
Joel T. Allison
Angela Hunt
David Daniel
Lee Jackson
Albert Black
Donna D. Halstead
Jeff Staubach
Alan Walne
Steve Everbach

Category

Power Score

Formal Authorities
First Tier Influentials
First Tier Influentials
Formal Authorities
Formal Authorities
First Tier Influentials
First Tier Influentials
First Tier Influentials
Civic Chairs
Formal Authorities
First Tier Influentials
Anchor Captains
First Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Civic Chairs
First Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
First Tier Influentials
Civic Chairs
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Anchor Captains
Second Tier Influentials
Anchor Captains
Anchor Captains
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials

316
305
303
299
299
292
289
284
279
277
267
263
260
254
248
247
240
239
235
233
233
220
214
214
206
201
195
191
189
188
183
175

Mean Power
Score
4.00
3.86
3.84
3.78
3.78
3.74
3.66
3.59
3.53
3.51
3.38
3.33
3.29
3.26
3.14
3.13
3.04
3.03
2.97
2.95
2.95
2.78
2.71
2.71
2.64
2.54
2.47
2.45
2.39
2.38
2.32
2.22

Two findings from table 6.02 achieve statistical significance. First, power score and mean
power score share a perfect, positive correlation with one another496, which suggests that
actors who received higher power scores also tended to receive higher ratings from each
participant; additionally, when formal authorities, first tier influentials, second tier influentials, civic
chairs, and anchor captains were coded, respectively, 0-4, the resulting moderate negative
correlation497 between category and mean power score suggests that actors in some thematic
categories (chiefly formal authorities and first tier influentials) tend to have higher mean power
scores than actors in other categories (particularly second tier influentials and anchor captains).
These results suggest that there is a particular hierarchy among categories of actors in
Dallas’ decision-making structure; indeed, in describing the structure of citywide decision496
497

ρ = 1.000, p < 0.001
ρ = -0..633, p < 0.01
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making, 77 of 79 participants (97.5%) used specific terms, e.g. “tiers,” “echelons,” or
“levels.” To derive an empirically-supportable number of decision-making tiers, and
following the practice of a previous reputational study of Dallas498, this study utilizes
Duncan’s New Multiple Range Test (DMRT) to measure the differences between each
power score and every other power score listed, in order to determine whether any gaps in
these scores are statistically significant, with significant gaps suggesting that scores are
clustered together; table 6.03 shows the results of this test for Dallas as a whole.
Table 6.03: Citywide Decision-Maker Levels of Power
Name

Thematic Category

District-Based Councilmembers (14)

Formal Authorities

Ray Hunt
John Wiley Price
Mike Rawlings
A.C. Gonzalez
Harlan Crow
Ross Perot Jr.
Kay Bailey Hutchison
Alice Murray
City Plan Commissioners (15)

Subset for α = 0.05
LowHighMiddle
Middle
Tier
Tier

First Tier Influentials
Anchor Captains
First Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Civic Chairs
First Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
First Tier Influentials
Civic Chairs
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials

Arcilia Acosta
Joel T. Allison
Michael Caffey
Angela Hunt
David Daniel
Lee Jackson
Albert Black
Donna D. Halstead
Jeff Staubach
Alan Walne
Steve Everbach

Second Tier Influentials
Anchor Captains
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Anchor Captains
Anchor Captains
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials

Thometz, 1963, pp. 44-46
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High
Tier
4.000

First Tier Influentials
First Tier Influentials
Formal Authorities
Formal Authorities
First Tier Influentials
First Tier Influentials
First Tier Influentials
Civic Chairs
Formal Authorities

Caroline Hunt
Gerald Turner
T. Boone Pickens
Mary Suhm
Mabrie Jackson
Ruth Collins Altshuler
Clint McDonnough
Bobby Lyle
Dale Petrosky
Robert Chereck
John Scovell

498

Low
Tier

3.861
3.835
3.785
3.785
3.744
3.658
3.595
3.532
3.506
3.380
3.329
3.291
3.256
3.139
3.127
3.038
3.025
2.975
2.949
2.949
2.785
2.709
2.709
2.641
2.544
2.468
2.449
2.392
2.380
2.316
2.215

These data broadly support findings from table 6.02, and share superficial similarities to
findings in the Thometz study499, in that they both suggest a series of statistically significant
tiers within mean power scores for each of Dallas’ citywide decision-makers. Figure 6.01
presents a visual representation of these tiers of citywide decision-making power.
Figure 6.01: The Structure of Citywide Decision-Making Power

These findings take into account data in table 6.02 and table 6.03, as well as participant
observations introduced in Chapter 4. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will broadly
describe these findings with respect to previous studies, and then it will examine each of the
four tiers.
Dallas’ citywide decision-making structure, broadly. While Thometz found three tiers of
power in mid-century Dallas (key leaders, top level, and second echelon), this study finds four: high
tier, high-middle tier, low-middle tier, and low tier. Taken together, table 6.03 and figure 6.01 suggest
a number of key findings that largely (but not wholly) agree with the previous reputational
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study of Dallas. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will outline key differences between
its findings and those of its predecessors.
First, recall that the Thometz study described actors in Dallas’ highest echelons of
leadership as being involved in most aspects of decision-making, either themselves or
through their representatives on various boards and committees, while lower echelons
tended to be occupied by younger, less experienced leaders and older decision-makers who
are retiring out of the politics of governing the city500. This study’s findings largely agree with
this; in describing actors found to be within the highest two tiers (respectively, high and highmiddle) participants generally described each as being deeply involved in most, if not all
citywide decisions, while actors within lower tiers (low-middle and low), these actors are more
likely to be described as only being involved in a subset of decision-making. In describing
the difference, one participant commented that:
Here (in Dallas), we [have] always had “big men” who run most things, and smaller men
who come around here and there with an opinion or who look to help. [...] It’s still a little bit
like that – some people are part of every decision that matters, and other people are closer to
what you’d call an “expert” on a certain area – there’s (SIC) go-to people for education, or
schools, or whatever you want, and they don’t have much say in anything else.

Second, the Thometz study found that Dallas’ leaders were primarily members of the
business community, most often finance and utilities, but also in manufacturing and trade501.
Two decades later, the Elkin study broadened the scope of city leadership to include
government officials, citing the simultaneous weakening of Dallas’ once-unified business
coalitions and disruptive changes in the city’s mayoral- and councilmember election systems,
but conceded that the result was similar; in the entrepreneurial regime, Dallas’ leaders continued
to place development policies over redistribution502. Table 6.03 suggests that Dallas’

Thometz, 1963, pp. 46-47
1963, p. 43
502 Elkin, 1987b, pp. 42-44
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501
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leadership is still heavily dominated by business leaders – especially those in real estate
development and construction – but that the seeds of transition away from the entrepreneurial
regime may have already been planted; this will be revisited later in this study.
Finally, Thometz argued that, as actors in the higher tiers of Dallas’ decision-making
structure retired, they nominated actors in lower tiers to replace them503, though twenty years
later, Elkin argued that this system had broken down, and new leaders were no longer being
“brought up” to replace their predecessors504. In this study, 75 (94.9%) of participants,
including the 32 participants personally familiar with citywide leadership in the mid-late 20th
century, agreed that this system is largely a relic of history; as one put it:
[...] It used to be that the business leaders were the political leaders. The men at the top
would give the younger men small tasks to handle, and if they did good (SIC), then they got
put on bigger projects. [...] That changed when the Charter Association fell apart, though,
and now it’s a whole new world.

In considering the four-tier system conceptualized in figure 6.01 with respect to the
five categories of decision-maker introduced in Chapter 4, the highest echelons of leadership
are primarily occupied by actors in categories that are largely restricted. Note that the high tier
is composed entirely of formal authorities; to join this category, an actor would need to either
be elected to public office or be appointed to a high position in city bureaucracy. Further,
the high-middle tier is made up of formal authorities and first tier influentials, as well as the civic chair
in charge of the Dallas Citizens Council (itself composed largely of first tier influentials). Recall
that, at the citywide level, first tier influentials are composed of key figures in Dallas’ first
families and a subset of outsiders with long careers serving the interests of these families; as
an “invite only” category, membership is simply not open to a majority of actors involved in

503
504

Thometz, 1963, pp. 70-76
Elkin., 1987b, pp. 71-73

225

citywide decision-making. This is conceptualized in figure 6.01 as a solid line between the high
tier and high-middle tier, and another solid line between the high-middle tier and low-middle tier.
By contrast, lower echelons are more open to individuals – there can by any number
of business leaders with an interest in the politics of development, or directors of nonprofit
organizations with an interest in providing policy expertise. Indeed, actors in the low-middle
tier and low tier are more varied, and analysis of participants’ comments suggests that there are
three broad categories of these actors, at least at the citywide level. First are actors whom 78
(98.7%) of participants identified as being largely retired out of the politics of decisionmaking, but who retain strong connections to current city officials, and who can be relied
upon to serve on boards or committees; summarizing this category, one participant noted
that:
Nobody really retires out of City Hall. They might not have a formal, paying job, but there’s
always a committee that needs someone who knows how things work. Sometimes you’ll see
people down here more often after they’re off the payroll than you did when they were on it.

Another participant described this phenomenon of post-retirement service asfollows:
It’s hard to leave public service, even when you leave the public sector. Part of it is that
everything in Dallas is politics, and it all takes forever to get done, but a bigger part of it is
that, for a lot of us, service gets in your blood – you want to keep being involved, and it’s
easy to use your old connections to do that.

A second category was identified by 49 (62.0%) of participants; in this category are the
“policy experts,” like leaders of nonprofit organizations, who have long-standing
connections to Dallas’ leaders, but are themselves only involved in subsets of decisionmaking, such as decisions related to educational policy or inter-governmental relations; One
participant commented that these actors:
… usually end up married into one of the big names in Dallas, or they’re a second or third
son or daughter; their name is worth something to the big philanthropies in the area, but
they aren’t going to take over anyone’s family business someday. They turn into experts on
one particular issue, and they’re the go-to folks whenever the mayor, or the council, or the
city manager needs someone to help write a policy.
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A second participant said that:
City leaders don’t have to be experts on anything, because they have a stable of “experts” to
call up whenever they need to know something. Most of the councilmembers get real (SIC)
bright people to advise them, usually from a related nonprofit, or from one of the local
colleges, but others, not so much. Either way, those advisors start to get a reputation – their
names end up in the newspaper, or on television. If they weren’t an expert before, suddenly
they become one, and they have an impact on policy for years.

A third category identified by a majority of participants (42 participants; 53.2%) are younger
executives, primarily involved in real estate development and construction firms. These
actors have not yet been elevated into a higher tier, often because they have no interest in
doing so. In describing this situation, one participant said that:
Years ago, you could always find someone willing to step into a bigger leadership role; it
meant the chance to do something big in this great city, but it also meant promotions, raises,
and the chance to rub elbows with famous Dallasites. That doesn’t mean as much to a lot of
people – they work for companies that have offices all over the world, and they’re busy
working on things in other cities... other counties... they don’t have time for Dallas, beyond
the occasional project here and there.

In differentiating low-middle tier and low tier actors, analysis of participant comments
suggests that low-middle tier actors are most commonly people with at least ten years of history
in citywide leadership positions, such as appointments to several civic boards or committees,
having previously held elected office, participation in high-level fundraising for a civic
project, or social connections to high-level leaders. While low-middle tier actors are involved in
a wider array of decision-making, low tier actors tend to only be involved on particular
projects or policy issues. This loose, fluid differentiation is represented in figure 6.01 as a
dashed line between the low-middle tier and low tier, suggesting that actors could more easily
shift between these tiers than between, for example, low-middle tier and high-middle tier.
Key leaders, past and present. Thometz, in describing Dallas’ leadership structure,
identified seven key leaders of the city, who were involved in most citywide decisions, and
whose opinions carried the most weight in the decision-making process505. These seven
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leaders consisted of two banking and finance executives, two executives of utility companies,
one manufacturing executive, and one trade executive506. This study argues that, in Dallas’
contemporary decision-making structure, high tier leaders occupy this same central position;
comprised entirely of the district-based city councilmembers, this tier is responsible for
nearly all citywide decisions. In describing Dallas’ city council, participants broadly agreed
that the council supports a progressive social agenda for Dallas, but with respect to
economic development – particularly when it comes to using publicly-funded inducement
packages to lure new businesses and economic development – the council is divided into
two camps: one that supports an untrammeled pro-development position, and another that
supports a more limited development position, in which economic development is tied to,
for example, provisions for affordable housing, or improvements to area infrastructure or
schools. The presence of this division (and lack of “neutral” councilmembers) was
unanimously agreed-upon, while the degree of nuance within it is reflected in table 6.04.
Table 6.04: Dallas City Council Divisions With Respect To Citywide Development
Participant
Cluster

Participants
(#)

Participants
(%)

Four-Category Participant Clusters
Cluster 1
8
10.1%
Cluster 2
4
5.1%
Cluster 3
5
6.3%
Cluster 4
12
15.2%
Cluster 5
14
17.7%
Two-Category Participant Clusters
Cluster 6
36
45.6%

Pro-Development
Strong

Leaning

6
3
5
3
4
5
4
4
4
4
Pro-Development
8

Progressive-Development
Leaning

Strong

3
3
4
3
2
4
4
3
3
4
Progressive-Development
7

These data suggest that a plurality of participants (36; 45.6%) support a simple dichotomy on
the city council between pro-development and progressive-development camps, and among
these, there is agreement that a once-councilmember advantage is held by those who argue
for policies in-line with those expected within an entrepreneurial governing coalition. Further,
these data suggest that this 8-7 split is agreed upon by an additional 26 participants (32.9%)
506
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from clusters four and five, and all 79 participants (100%) agreed that the pro-development
alliance is larger than its progressive-development counterpart. Therefore, all participants
agree on the presence- and nature of this council division, and 62 of these (78.5%) agree on
the sizes of the two alliances within the councilmembers themselves.
In elaborating on their respective positions, participants regularly cited ties between
pro-development councilmembers and Dallas’ neoliberal past, and admitted that these
councilmembers benefit from the support of Dallas’ first tier influentials and civic chairs, while
the progressive-development councilmembers often experience challenges from these extragovernmental sources. Describing this scenario, one participant said that:
In parts of Dallas, especially in the rich neighborhoods to the north, you have people who
have made a lot of money under the way we’ve always done things here, and they’re going to
support candidates who promise to keep things the same.

Another said that:
The men who built up Dallas in the 70s, and who sold it out to the suburbs in the 80s and
90s had kids, and those kids are looking to come back now that Dallas is starting to look like
dollar signs again. They’re doing everything they can to keep an advantage on the (city)
council, and to hamstring the younger councilmembers who want a different future in the
city.

Nearly all participants (63; 79.7%) qualified their observations by noting that, at nearly every
council election since 2011, the “progressive development” contingent has grown, and that
several of the pro-development councilmembers are rapidly approaching their term limits.
Even participants who did not make such a qualification agreed that, if the progressive
minority ever gains an additional council seat, such a change would dramatically affect the
kinds of projects and policies undertaken by the highest echelons of Dallas’ leadership. This
situation will be revisited later in this study, although several comments regarding it are wellsummarized by the following:
The old Dallas – where businessmen made decisions on behalf of the city, and bringing new
business was the only policy that mattered – that Dallas is going away. [...] Dallasites are
getting tired of that old way, and you’re seeing it in the council elections. Give it five, maybe
ten more years, and you won’t see that “old way” anymore.
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Top level leaders, past and present. Of the 55 top level leaders identified in the Thometz
study, only one represented a government employee, while the remaining 54 were executives
in banking and finance, insurance, utilities, manufacturing, local media, and trade. These
leaders were often consulted on important decisions, and were only slightly less-involved
than key leaders in decision-making. In addition, these actors often served to inform key leaders
about issues about which critical decisions would need to be made507. This study finds that
actors in the high-middle tier are loosely analogous to Thometz’ top level. Actors in this tier are a
combination of formal authorities, first tier influential and civic chair categories, and consist of highlevel political leaders (including the mayor and city manager), elite business leaders, civic
philanthropists, leading members of Dallas’ first families, and civic power brokers whose
organizations have historically held strong influence in citywide decision-making.
With the exception of Mayor Rawlings, who has a vote on the city council,
participants speaking broadly about actors who were categorized in the in the high-middle tier,
described them as acting primarily in advisory capacity to high tier actors (or, less charitably,
as “puppetmasters”), and participants reported that they have varying degrees of influence
over particular councilmembers. Out of the 79 participants, 49 (62.0%) spoke openly about
deep ties between councilmembers representing districts in northern Dallas and particular
private-sector high tier actors. Notably, 12 (15.2%) were equally adamant about connections
between councilmembers representing the city’s southern districts and at least one privatesector actor found in the high tier category, and 6 (7.6%) argued that all councilmembers have
some connections with at least one private-sector actor found in the high tier; an additional 12
(15.2%) participants declined to comment, even after reassurances of confidentiality; one
participant, summing the thoughts of several others, said that “nearly everyone who gets up
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high enough in Dallas politics has at least one friend who called in a favor or two to help
them get there, or help them stay there.” Recall that in Chapter 2, this study recounted the
findings of the Elkin study of Dallas in the 1980s – primarily that Dallas’ well-organized
coalition of business leaders formed natural alliances with public officials, but were often at
“arm’s length” from the day-to-day running of the city508. Taken holistically, the participant
observations noted above seem to suggest that, as Elkin found in 1987, the interests of the
city’s business community are well-represented in the highest levels of the city’s formalized
governance structure, even though this representation is primarily indirect; a representative
description of this arrangement came from one participant, who said that:
Mayors and councilmen used to get elected by the [Citizen’s Charter Association] and the
[Dallas Citizens Council]; those two groups controlled access to the ballot, and so their
candidates were more-or-less the only choices. It was understood that the mayor and the
council would include their benefactors on most decisions in the earliest stages; really, you
could’ve turned the city over to the business community and not seen a difference, in those
days. That’s (SIC) been a lot of years, and the men who used to do that, the ones still alive,
aren’t so active anymore. They’re more behind the scenes, sending one of their associates to
meet over lunch, for example, and they aren’t getting involved in every land deal or little
detail in running the city.

Second echelon leaders, past and present. For Thometz, the second echelon category was
effectively a “catch-all” containing each decision-maker who did not fit into one of the
previous categories. These leaders broadly fell into three categories: first, younger men who
lacked the experience to move into a higher tier; second, older men retiring out of
leadership; and third, men who had tremendous expertise or influence surrounding a
particular topic or set of problems, but who lacked a generalized level of influence, and who
were only invited to participant in particular decisions509. The present study finds that actors
in Thometz’ second echelon are loosely analogous to those found in the low-middle tier and low
tier. This modern second echelon is broader than its historic counterpart, and contains
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executives of national (and international) FIRE- and producer services firms, as well as
retired (or term-limited) formal authorities who have elected to remain active in the decisionmaking process, anchor captains in charge of urban universities and hospitals, and civic chairs
whose organizations comprise constituents from across Dallas’ MSA.
The present study also finds that this category no longer functions as a “farm league”
from which actors in higher tiers draw their successors. As an aside, while only a minority of
participants (22; 27.8%) made reference to when this system broke down, the general
consensus among participants links the breakdown of the city’s structure of civic promotion
to the time period between the late 1980s and mid-1990s; as one participant described it:
Back when the S&L Crisis really gutted Dallas, I mean, really sent people packing for the
suburbs, and ran a lot of the big companies out of business – that’s when things got ugly
with the “old guard.” Men who would normally be looking for heirs to their empires were
too busy trying to keep from going broke, and once people started moving out of Dallas for
Richardson and Plano, they didn’t so much care about what was going on in the big city.

Returning to the present second echelon, roughly two-thirds of participants (52; 65.8%),
including all 39 participants with primary expertise in Downtown Dallas, commented that
the private-sector executives in this category are part of firms that operate in several states
(or countries), and as such, have little interest in the politics of decision-making, while many
of the former formal authorities seem to have little current interest in seeking new roles in city
government, although a minority of participants (23, or 29.1%) speculated that this might
change as the city’s political landscape shifts; summarizing several other comments, one
participant said that:
Thirty-, forty-, fifty years ago, young men “on their way up” got involved in what you might
call “civic organizations,” like the (Citizens) Charter Association or the (Dallas) Citizens
Council. Now, young men and women “on their way up” in Dallas are part of global
companies; even the big developers still headquartered in Dallas have offices all over the
world. How can anyone spend their time working on improving this city, when they’re
working on projects in half-a-dozen (SIC) others?

Another, speculating about other reasons younger business executives avoid the politics of
decision-making, suggested that:
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Everyone knows that the (city) council will be changing soon, as Dallas’ voters wake up and
realize what’s happening with their tax money. Why get involved now, and maybe end up on
the wrong side of the new city leaders? If you’re going to be working in Dallas for a few
years, it makes sense to wait and see how things shake out.

This study also finds that actors in the low-middle tier and low tier continue to lack
significant generalized influence; all actors found in these tiers were described by at least one
participant as being involved in particular projects, but not in a majority of citywide decisionmaking. Further, in describing the particular involvement of the anchor captains in these
tiers, a slim majority (41; 51.9%) of participants described them as filling “expertise gaps” for
particular projects, particularly around those regarding higher education and healthcare. As
one participant described it:
For the most part, if you don’t run a business, your seat at the table only lasts as long as you
can be the expert on a given topic being discussed. If you can do that long enough, and
maybe make the right friends along the way, (then) that can change.

Decision-making power and nominations to decision-making committees. In
addition to asking participants to give ratings of power for potential decision-makers in
Dallas, the survey introduced in Chapter 3 asked participants to nominate 10 individuals to
form a committee responsible for making a decision that would affect the entire city, and
that needed to be broadly accepted by the city as a whole. As in the Thometz study510,
several participants commented that 10 people would not be sufficient to ensure broad
support, but many also noted that, among the 10 nominees, most would be able to “bring
others in line” with the committee’s decision. Participants who wanted to be able to
nominate more than 10 people tended to be younger, with a median age of 39.1 (compared
to the overall median age of 49.5), but there was no other discernable characteristic among
them. In addition, some participants did not select the full 10 committee members; the
lowest number of selected committee members was 6, and on average, participants
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nominated 9.2 individuals to their hypothetical citywide decision-making team. The fact that
some participants did not nominate a full 10 committee members negatively affects the
validity of the results; nonetheless, table 6.05 shows the number of nominations that each
decision-maker received, for all decision-makers receiving nominations from at least 10% (8)
of the participants.
Table 6.05: Comparison between Citywide Decision-Making Committee Nominations and Decision-Maker Power Score
Committee
Power
Nominations
Name
Category
Tier
Count
Rank
Score
Rank
District-Based Councilmembers (14)
Formal Authorities
High Tier
79
1
316
1
Mike Rawlings
Formal Authorities
High-Middle Tier
73
2
299
4
A.C. Gonzalez
Formal Authorities
High-Middle Tier
64
3
299
4
Alice Murray
Civic Chairs
High-Middle Tier
48
4
279
9
Ray Hunt
First Tier Influentials
High-Middle Tier
39
5
305
2
John Wiley Price
First Tier Influentials
High-Middle Tier
32
6
303
3
Mabrie Jackson
Civic Chairs
Low-Middle Tier
28
7
248
15
City Plan Commissioners (15)
Formal Authorities
High-Middle Tier
26
8
277
10
Mary Suhm
Second Tier Influentials
Low-Middle Tier
23
9
254
14
Harlan Crow
First Tier Influentials
High-Middle Tier
21
10
292
6
Gerald Turner
Anchor Captains
Low-Middle Tier
21
10
263
12
Dale Petrosky
Civic Chairs
Low-Middle Tier
20
12
235
19
Joel T. Allison
Anchor Captains
Low Tier
20
12
214
23
Ross Perot Jr.
First Tier Influentials
High-Middle Tier
17
14
289
7
John Scovell
Second Tier Influentials
Low-Middle Tier
16
15
233
20
Robert Chereck
Second Tier Influentials
Low-Middle Tier
16
15
233
20
Clint McDonnough
Second Tier Influentials
Low-Middle Tier
15
17
240
17
Kay Bailey Hutchison
First Tier Influentials
High-Middle Tier
14
18
284
8
Michael Caffey
Second Tier Influentials
Low Tier
14
18
214
23
David Daniel
Anchor Captains
Low Tier
14
18
201
26
Caroline Hunt
First Tier Influentials
Low-Middle Tier
13
21
267
11
Arcilia Acosta
Second Tier Influentials
Low Tier
13
21
220
22
Angela Hunt
Second Tier Influentials
Low Tier
12
23
206
25
Lee Jackson
Anchor Captains
Low Tier
12
23
195
27
T. Boone Pickens
First Tier Influentials
Low-Middle Tier
11
25
260
13
Ruth Collins Altshuler
First Tier Influentials
Low-Middle Tier
11
25
247
16
Albert Black
Second Tier Influentials
Low Tier
11
25
191
28
Bobby Lyle
First Tier Influentials
Low-Middle Tier
10
28
239
18
Alan Walne
Second Tier Influentials
Low Tier
9
29
183
31
Donna D. Halstead
Second Tier Influentials
Low Tier
8
30
189
29
Jeff Staubach
Second Tier Influentials
Low Tier
8
30
188
30
Steve Everbach
Second Tier Influentials
Low Tier
8
30
175
32

These data suggest that, broadly speaking, high tier and high-middle tier actors tended to receive
the most nominations for citywide decision-making committees, while low-middle tier and low
tier actors tended to receive the fewest nominations, although some exceptions do exist, and
there is some overlap among these four tiers toward the middle of the table. What is clearer
is that committee nominations and power are positively related; indeed, Spearman’s ρ for
these two variables is 0.793, which is statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level. While this is
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lower than the same calculation in the previous study of Dallas511, it is nonetheless a strong,
positive indicator of the close relationship between a participant’s perceptions of an actor’s
power, and their willingness to nominate that actor to make decisions at the citywide level.
In effect, the question of committee selection is one of the practical application of power,
therefore the strength of the correlation among these variables supports the use of a
reputational analysis in studying the nature of power in Dallas.
In considering the role of power tiers within Dallas’ decision-making structure, table
6.06 shows the total number of nominations to decision-making committees received by
actors in each of the three tiers, and compares these to the hypothetical maximum number
of nominations that could have been granted to these actors.
Table 6.06: Decision-Makers Selected to Serve on a Citywide Decision-Making Committee by Tier
Total Possible
Actors in Category
Total Nominations
Nominations
High
1
79
79
High-Middle
9
334
711
Low-Middle
11
184
790
Low
11
129
790
Tier

%
100.00%
46.98%
23.29%
16.33%

These data suggest that participants’ nominations for citywide decision-making teams are
skewed toward particularly powerful actors, with high tier being much more likely to be
nominated for decision-making committees than high-middle tier actors, while actors in the lowmiddle tier and low tier were least likely to be nominated out of the four categories. As such, it
is clear that participants would rely heavily on high tier and high middle tier actor for leadership
on a citywide decision. The reliance on top-level leaders is in-line with findings from the
previous reputational study of Dallas512, even though the contemporary makeup of top-level
leadership is dramatically different from what it was over 50 years ago. These data continue
to suggest the nature of decision-making at the citywide level; high tier and high-middle tier
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actors are most likely to be strategically involved in a greater number of decisions, while
lower-tier actors occupy less robust, though not unimportant roles.

Familiarity and shared committee service. How well do participants know the
actors involved in Dallas’ citywide decision-making process, and are these relationships
related to participants’ perceptions of citywide power? As part of their surveys, participants
were asked to report on their level of familiarity with over 100 potential decision-makers in
Dallas; possible responses included: “never heard of,” “know slightly,” “know well,” and
“personal friend or relative.” These responses were recoded onto a scale of 1 to 4, with
“never heard of” corresponding to 1, and the remaining scores coded to 2, 3, and 4,
respectively. Table 6.07 shows the mean familiarity scores for each of the four tiers in Dallas’
decision-making structure.

High
High-Middle
Low-Middle
Low

Table 6.07: Citywide Decision-Maker Mean Familiarity Score by Tier
Tier
Mean Familiarity Score
2.93
2.20
2.25
2.28

The previous reputational study of Dallas found that key leaders had the highest mean
familiarity score, with top level actors having slightly lower mean familiarity scores, and second
echelon actors having the lowest scores513. These data suggest that, while high tier actors have
the highest mean familiarity scores, there is a notable decrease in mean familiarity with actors
the high-middle tier, and an increase in mean familiarity as the tiers themselves decrease. These
data also suggest that participants are most familiar with senior elected officials and lowertier decision-makers (some of whom are former elected leaders), while actors in the highest
levels of informal influence are more distant. Finally, it should be noted that the differences
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in mean familiarity among the four tiers are slight, and the overall correlation between mean
familiarity and power score is not statistically significant514.
This study also asked participants to identify whether they had, in the past five years,
served on a board or committee with each of the 101 potential citywide decision-makers, in
addition to any individuals they wrote in. Table 6.08 shows the mean percentage of
participants that actors in each thematic category and decision-making tier at the citywide
level.

High
High-Middle
Low-Middle
Low

Table 6.08: Citywide Decision-Maker Mean Shared Board or Committee Service by Tier
Tier
Mean Shared Board or Committee Service
55.70%
23.55%
23.51%
26.35%

These data are similar to those in table 6.07, and suggest that that, on average, participants are
most likely to have recently served on a board or committee with an actor in the high tier (i.e.,
a city councilmember), while actors in the high-middle tier and low-middle tier are least likely to
have recent shared board or committee service. These findings are in-line with the previous
reputational study of Dallas, which found that the city’s elite private-sector leaders preferred
to limit their committee involvement in order to keep out of the public eye, and reduce their
likelihood of being involved in controversy515. Critically, the Spearman coefficient between
shared committee service and power score, like with the correlation between familiarity and
power score, is not statistically significant516. As a result, this study rejects the possibility that,
in plain terms, participants merely nominated their friends, colleagues, or familiar-sounding
names to serve on citywide decision-making teams, as well as the possibility that familiarity
with any particular actors is linked to perceptions of power associated with that actor.

ρ = -.005, p > 0.1
Thometz, 1963, pp. 59-61
516 ρ = -0.168, p > 0.1
514
515
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Evaluation of Hypothesis 5. While Hypothesis 4 refreshes the image of Dallas’
governing coalition, Hypothesis 5 refines this image, expanding upon urban scholarship
regarding Dallas by focusing in on one of the city’s central neighborhoods – North Oak
Cliff. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will reframe data first presented in Chapter 4
in order to address the status of anchor institutions and CDCs within a neighborhood power
structure. This study will first seek to establish the presence- and nature of organized
neighborhood decision-making power. Then, as it did in the section regarding Hypothesis 4,
this study will evaluate the relationship between power and nominations to decision-making
committees. Third, it will evaluate the respective relationships between power and
familiarity, and between power and recent shared board or committee service. Finally, it will
relate these findings to the present hypothesis, in order to establish whether (and to what
end) anchor institutions and CDCs are involved in neighborhood decision-making within
North Oak Cliff.

North Oak Cliff’s decision-makers. Out of this study’s 79 participants, just over
half (40) were able- and willing to answer survey items and interview questions regarding the
decision-making process within North Oak Cliff, and the actors who have roles within it. As
Chapter 4 details, these participants identified 16 individual- and group actors, who are
particularly involved in neighborhood decision-making; these actors revisited in table 6.09.
Category
Formal Authorities

First Tier Influentials
Second Tier
Influentials
Civic Chairs
Anchor Captains

Table 6.09: North Oak Cliff Decision-Makers
Name
Most Notable Affiliation(s)
Scott Griggs
Dallas City Council
Michael Anglin
City Plan Commission (CPC)
Scott Hounsel
Zoning Board of Adjustment (BOA)
Neva Dean
Sustainable Development & Construction
Jim Lake Jr.
Jim Lake Companies
Joe McElroy
Real Estate Investor
Tom Prohaska
Texas Pro Properties, LLC
Matt Segrest
Alamo Manhattan
Farrokh & Michael Nazerian
Exxir Capital
David Eitches
Blackwood Developments, LLC
David Spence
Good Space
Pam Conley
Kidd Springs Neighborhood Association
Lisa Benskin
Old Oak Cliff Conservation League
Jason Roberts
Better Block
Martin Koonsman
Methodist Dallas Medical Center
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Contemporary distribution of neighborhood decision-making power. As
Chapter 2 recounts, throughout the early-mid 20th century, North Oak Cliff’s strong (and
exceptionally racist) business community wielded so much political influence that even city
leaders dared not speak out against them publicly517, but by the late 1970s, white flight,
corporate abandonment, and the “us” versus “them” mentality dividing the city along the
Trinity River left the neighborhood largely bereft of these resource-laden, politically
connected actors. Racial and socioeconomic divisions split greater Oak Cliff into three
camps – blue collar whites, African Americans moving into areas left behind by white flight,
and a shrinking enclave of wealthy whites. Smaller ethnic- and socioeconomic groups
agglomerated into particular blocks, and it was not uncommon for each block to be home to
a different, independent community with its own set of leaders. As a result, there was not
enough consensus for any particular leader to give the neighborhoods (including North Oak
Cliff) a voice in Dallas politics518. As one participant put it:
For a long time, Dallas picked its leaders from at-large elections, which meant that the rich
whites up in the north made all of the decisions. Down here, you had two dozen churches
with pastors who all wanted to be the voice of the community, and every couple of blocks
was a new neighborhood organization, and they all wanted to speak too. They were all too
busy fighting each other for the scraps sent across the river by City Hall to ever mobilize, or
to build the kind of civic clout you need to really make a difference. People could unite to
fight off the things they didn’t like, but couldn’t come together to fight for things they really
wanted, so the city stopped paying attention to us.

When participants were interviewed regarding how decisions in North Oak Cliff are
made today, they described thematic categories of decision-makers, identical (in description,
though not in individual membership) to those found in Dallas as a whole. Participants’
comments in Chapter 4 described Councilmember Scott Griggs as being the center of
neighborhood decision-making, with support from city staff and his hand-picked advisors.
Data introduced in Chapter 4 also suggests the involvement of a number of long-tenured
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rentiers, real estate developers, neighborhood leaders, and the head of a local hospital in the
decision-making process. Holistic examination of participants’ comments suggests that while
individuals may involve themselves in decision-making at the neighborhood level on
particular projects, this involvement is often more informal than it is in Dallas as a whole.
While at the citywide level, projects and policy priorities often necessitate the creation of
formal task forces created by the mayor and city council, or the engagement of particular city
departments, these formal structures are largely absent at the neighborhood level. Often, adhoc task forces are composed of long-standing leaders, who have a reputation for being able
to gather and consolidate public interest around a project or policy, and accurately speak for
their communities, but these kinds of leaders are in short supply in North Oak Cliff,
primarily because so few people have been able to gather enough enduring support. In
describing this situation, one participant said that:
The folks have all been fighting each other so long that, to be honest, they wouldn’t know
how to get along anymore, and everyone is so scared to lose out on what little they already
have that they won’t risk anyone else getting ahead enough to become a real leader.

To attempt to structure these various actors, and to serve as the basis for comparisons made
in discussing the nature of neighborhood decision-making, table 6.10 extends survey data
introduced Chapter 4, which listed mean power scores for each decision-maker, by including
both total power scores and rank-order data.
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Table 6.10: Power Ratings of North Oak Cliff Decision-Makers
Rank
Order
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Name
Scott Griggs
Michael Anglin
Scott Hounsel
Jim Lake Jr.
Matt Segrest
Neva Dean
Martin Koonsman
Joe McElroy
Pam Conley
Farrokh & Michael Nazerian
Lisa Benskin
Tom Prohaska
David Eitches
David Spence
Jason Roberts

Category

Power Score

Formal Authorities
Formal Authorities
Formal Authorities
First Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Formal Authorities
Anchor Captains
First Tier Influentials
Civic Chairs
Second Tier Influentials
Civic Chairs
First Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Civic Chairs

154
136
135
135
129
127
122
115
114
114
113
111
108
93
67

Mean Power
Score
3.85
3.40
3.38
3.38
3.23
3.18
3.05
2.88
2.85
2.85
2.83
2.78
2.70
2.33
1.68

At the citywide level, power score and mean power score shared a strong, positive
correlation with one another; for North Oak Cliff, these two share a perfect positive
correlation519, which suggests that actors with high power scores tended to receive more
individual high scores (that is, more ratings of 3 and 4 on a four-point scale) than actors who
received lower power scores. Additionally, when thematic categories are coded to a dummy
variable, both total power score and mean power score are negatively correlated with
thematic category520, suggesting that formal authorities and first tier influentials tend to have
higher power scores than second tier influentials and civic chairs; anchor captains defy this trend,
which is reflected in the relatively modest Spearman correlation coefficient521. Even with
this more modest correlation (and obvious exception), these results suggest that there is a
particular structure to decision-making in North Oak Cliff.
To test for the presence of tiers within the citywide decision-making structure, this
study used Duncan’s New Multiple Range Test (DMRT) to measure differences among
mean power scores; the results of repeating this test for North Oak Cliff appear in table 6.11.

ρ = 1.000, p < 0.001
Author’s note: as with thematic categories in Dallas as a whole, formal authorities were coded with a 0, first tier influentials were coded with a
1, second tier influentials were coded with a 2, civic chairs were coded with a 3, and anchor captains were coded with a 4.
521 ρ = -0.635, p < 0.05
519
520
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Table 6.11: North Oak Cliff Decision-Maker Levels of Power
Subset for α = 0.05
Thematic Category
Low Tier
Middle Tier
Formal Authorities

Name
Scott Griggs
Michael Anglin
Scott Hounsel
Jim Lake Jr.
Matt Segrest
Neva Dean
Martin Koonsman
Joe McElroy
Pam Conley
Farrokh & Michael Nazerian
Lisa Benskin
Tom Prohaska
David Eitches

Formal Authorities
Formal Authorities
First Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Formal Authorities
Anchor Captains
First Tier Influentials
Civic Chairs
Second Tier Influentials
Civic Chairs
First Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials

David Spence
Jason Roberts

Second Tier Influentials
Civic Chairs

High Tier
3.85

3.40
3.38
3.38
3.23
3.18
3.05
2.88
2.85
2.85
2.83
2.78
2.70
2.33
1.68

In general, these data support the findings in table 6.10; formal authorities occupy higher
positions, and civic chairs tend to occupy lower positions, but there is also notable overlap,
especially throughout the middle tier; figure 6.02 presents a visual representation of these data.
Figure 6.02: The Structure of North Oak Cliff Decision-Making Power

These findings take into account data in table 6.11, as well as participant observations first
explored in Chapter 4. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will first discuss the North
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Oak Cliff decision-making structure broadly, and then it will individually examine each of
this structure’s three tiers.
North Oak Cliff’s decision-making structure, broadly. At the citywide level, this study
identified four tiers of decision-making power – high tier, high-middle tier, low-middle tier, and low
tier, and evaluated them with respect to Thometz’ three-tier model. In North Oak Cliff, this
study identifies three tiers: high tier, middle tier, and low tier, and equates them with two of
Thometz’ three tiers – key leaders and second echelon. Though awkward, this is in-line with
participant observations about decision-making in North Oak Cliff; primarily that formal
decision-making is concentrated within the city councilmember’s office, while other actors
are limited to using their often-limited resources to influence his decisions one way or
another. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will outline four key differences between
the decision-making structures of North Oak Cliff and Dallas as a whole.
First, while North Oak Cliff (like Dallas as a whole) once operated under an
entrepreneurial regime, commercial disinvestment, residential abandonment, and political
disconnection flowing from white flight and suburbanization induced an antiregime. Briefly,
recall that an antiregime is one possible result of a collapsed (or otherwise failed) governing
coalition, composed of fragmented interest groups that fail to coalesce around a particular
agenda, establish ties with the business community, or reconcile their various agendas with
the political system522. An antiregime is successful at blocking unfavorable policies and
development, but because it lacks the support of bureaucrats or organized institutions, it is
unable to promote (or even passively allow) beneficial urban policies or development
projects523.

522
523

DeLeon, 1992, p. 561
1992, pp. 561-562
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Returning to North Oak Cliff, historical evaluation of the neighborhood suggests
that, during the neighborhood’s decline through the 1970s and 1980s, would-be coalition
members524 lacked the financial capital and connections to the Dallas political machine
needed to create a successor coalition, and while some leaders emerged, none successfully
pulled together competing interest groups into an enduring coalition with a shared agenda,
and instead, were only successful in keeping out development, rather than selectively
allowing particular development projects to breathe new life into an economicallymarginalized community525.
Second, when district-based council leadership returned to the neighborhood
following the 1991 reorganization, there were no strong community institutions in place, and
as a result, city councilmembers have been able to exert more influence here than in other
districts. Recall that, in Chapter 4, participants praised the results of issue-based coalitions
when they can successfully form; of the 40 participants highly knowledgeable about
decision-making North Oak Cliff, all 40 mentioned that these coalitions largely fail to endure
beyond individual issues; describing this, one participant said that:
There’s 50 years of bad blood around here; racism, classism, (and) fights (that have) gone on
so long, nobody remembers why they don’t get along with the people across the street. You
have rich living next to middle class, and “almost broke” living next to “dead broke,” and so
no one issue affects anyone the same as their neighbors. That’s why nobody gets together,
outside of a few.

Another commented that:
People south of the Trinity, they get riled up and unite about particular problems, like
getting streets fixed, or stopping a specific development, but after that gets resolved, they all
go their separate ways, and start all over again when something else comes up. Issues and
problems can make a movement, but they can’t make a community. It’s (SIC) just not the
same thing.

524
525

e.g. small business owners, neighborhood leaders, leaders of minority communities
Atkinson, 1975; Merwin, 1977
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Qualifying the above sentiments, 37 participants (92.5%) made an exception to this for the
Old Oak Cliff Conservation League (OOCCL). Commenting directly about the OOCCL and
its longevity, one participant said that:
The [OOCCL] normally only takes a stand when a clear majority of its neighborhoods
agree on something, and whatever they decide is usually some kind of compromise. They
stay pretty neutral, supporting things like better schools, historic preservation districts,
community service, (and) fixing roads, and they usually oppose things like widening a
freeway, or building a big office building right next to houses. The only way that
organization sticks together is if nobody rocks the boat too hard, and makes some
neighborhood mad enough to want out. Individual neighborhoods might get more agitated,
and take to the streets about something, but the whole group tends to let that happen, and
remain overall pretty quiet.

Third, earlier in this chapter, this study found that at the citywide level, the highest
echelons of leadership are involved in most aspects of decision-making, either individually or
through proxies, while lower tiers tend to be occupied by less-active actors, who are
generally only involved in particular projects. Now, this study finds a similar differentiation
in North Oak Cliff, with the one high tier actor – Councilmember Scott Griggs – being
involved in nearly every neighborhood-level decision, as noted in Chapter 4. At the same
time, middle tier and low tier actors are generally only involved in particular projects – chiefly
those involving real estate development. Of the 40 participants, 12 (30.0%) clearly made this
distinction by specifically mentioning economic development, while another 17 (42.5%)
spoke more broadly about concerns including area schools, police presence, strategic use of
code enforcement (or “code crawls”), among others. Additionally, outside of the publicsector officials found in the middle-tier, there is tremendous disagreement among decisionmakers, often resulting from years of mistrust, primarily among racial- and ethnic groups, as
well as between wealthier residents and their poorer neighbors. It should be noted, however,
that 31 of the participants (77.5%) mentioned that, to some extent, these overall divisions
are softening, commonly stating that “things are better than they were.”
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Fourth, recall that at the citywide level, higher decision-making tiers (high tier and highmiddle) were considered to be essentially closed to new membership; elected officials,
appointees, and bureaucrats are largely replaced on a “one-for-one” basis, so these positions
are effectively only available when there is a vacancy, while first tier influentials are created by
virtue of family ties or invitation (i.e., “born in or blessed in”), and so this echelon is, in
practical terms, only available to particular actors. Meanwhile, lower tiers (low-tier and lowmiddle tier) were considered more open to membership, with no fixed limits on size or
qualifications. In North Oak Cliff, this study finds a similar combination of “restricted” and
“unrestricted” tiers. In figure 6.02, this is conceptualized as a solid line between the high tier
and the middle tier, and a dashed line between the middle tier and low tier. Figure 6.02 also shows
a second, solid line dividing the middle tier; this represents the presence of particular actors
within this tier – formal authorities – whose positions are effectively “locked” in place, and are
only open to new actors as openings are created, most commonly as the result of a vacancy.
Note that, as with Dallas as a whole, North Oak Cliff’s high tier, as well as the top
positions in its middle tier are composed of public-sector officials who are replaced when
vacancies exist; as a result, these positions are comparatively static, and participants
unanimously agreed that actors in these positions tend to remain in them for years, and only
leave office due to term limits, promotions, or retirement. By comparison, the remainder of
the middle tier is more open; for example, another developer could attempt to develop
property in North Oak Cliff, or a coalition of community members could form around a
particular issue. Thus, taken holistically with participant observations about the overall
decision-making structure of North Oak Cliff, the data in table 6.11 and figure 6.02 suggest
that Councilmember Griggs, and to a slightly lesser extent, the public-sector employees of
the middle-tier are the only constants found within neighborhood-wide decision-making, while
246

other leaders generally only involve themselves on an ad-hoc bases, forming alliances with
one another on one project, while simultaneously opposing each other on others. Describing
the overall decision-making structure and process within North Oak Cliff, one participant
said that:
What’s happening, especially in the Bishop Arts part of the neighborhood, is a lot like what
happens in the rest of Dallas, but on a smaller scale, with Councilmember Griggs calling the
shots, and delegating out to make things happen, while everyone else tries to influence his
decisions on a project that affects them, either as residents, or as developers looking to make
some money before the boom goes bust again.

Key leaders and top level, past and present. Recall that, prior to the 1991 city council
restructure, North Oak Cliff was effectively “cut off” from formal leadership, with no links
to Dallas’ political machine, no significant private-sector coalition, and an antiregime in which
no single individual or organization held enough support to be widely accepted as a speaker
for the community526. Following the restructure, the highest echelon of neighborhood
leadership has been occupied by the neighborhood’s city councilmember, who is the primary
community decision-maker. Participants unanimously observed that Councilmember Griggs,
in addition to effectively limitless authority over policy decisions and land-use within the
community, also receives professional deference from members of the city’s bureaucracy
regarding code enforcement, infrastructure investment, and public safety matters, among
many others. Fifteen participants (37.5%) also considered the role of the historical dearth of
investment in the neighborhood as a factor; with few competing economic interests taking
up the councilmember’s time, he has little need for additional support in decision-making
beyond his current staff and advisors. As a result, many participants (38; 95%) observed that
there are few opportunities for other actors to meaningfully oppose a decision with which
the councilmember agrees, suggesting in various (often colorful) terms: “There’s Scott

526

Merwin, 1977
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(Griggs), and then there’s everyone else. He has the power to decide, and everyone else can
only try to get him to change his mind.”
Second echelon leaders, past and present. For Dallas’ citywide decision-making structure,
this study found that a high-middle tier of leaders, composed of highly influential business
executives, civic philanthropists, and city staff had particularly high levels of influence over
decisions made by high tier actors. This is not the case in North Oak Cliff; while table 6.15
shows formal authorities and first tier influentials occupying the highest three positions among the
middle tier, 23 participants (57.5%) agreed that these actors often do not exert any outsized
degree of influence over Councilmember Griggs, when compared to other actors involved in
neighborhood decision-making; instead, these participants often described Griggs as, as one
participant put it, “working hard to not show favorites when he makes a decision.” A
minority of participants (6; 15.0%) strongly disagreed, describing the councilmember as a
“sellout” or “shill for gentrification,” although of these, only 2 were able to point out a
specific project to support their claim. Instead, nearly all (39; 97.5%) of participants
observed that the private- and third-sector actors found within the middle-tier 0often work
together in ad-hoc partnerships as evidence of community support for a particular project or
policy request, although these partnerships are fluid, and fail to result in the formation of
enduring coalitions. One participant clearly summarized this scenario, describing it asfollows:
People around here get passionate about an issue, and they go out and find other people
with that same passion, and they form these grand coalitions around it. The problem is that
nobody really invests in team-building, or forming relationships among the different
members, so these sorts of coalitions just don’t last very long.

Further complicating the issue, all 40 participants variously identified competing agendas
within North Oak Cliff’s decision-making structure, supporting a three-agenda competition
among pro-development, progressive-development, and anti-development constituencies;
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among active, engaged stakeholders in North Oak Cliff, participant observations suggest that
there are no neutral parties, with respect to economic development.
Looking first at the pro-development agenda, table 6.12 shows the names most
commonly associated with this perspective; this table also includes a summary entry for
actors who did not receive enough participant nominations to be individually included for
in-depth evaluation.
Table 6.12: North Oak Cliff Participant-Identified Pro-Development Agenda Supporters
Participant Mentions527
Actor
Number
Percentage
Matt Segrest
29
72.5%
David Eitches
17
42.5%
Farrokh & Michael Nazerian
13
32.5%
Martin Koonsman
13
32.5%
Tom Prohaska
11
27.5%
Joe McElroy
9
22.5%
Scott Griggs
5
12.5%
Jim Lake, Jr.
3
7.5%
David Spence
2
5.0%
Other Actor Not Listed
9
22.5%

These data suggest that participants identified Matt Segrest, David Eitches, Tom Prohaska,
and Farrokh & Michael Nazerian most closely with an agenda described by one participant
as a “mix of modern steel and glass high-rises that tower over gentrified, whitewashed
historic properties that nobody who grew up here could afford to live in” and another called
“the dream of millennials imposed on the reality of blue-collar neighborhoods.” In more
concrete terms, participants most commonly discussed attempts by these actors to lobby for
relaxed development restrictions, especially regarding building height and density (21;
52.5%), reduced mandatory minimum parking allotments (18; 45%), reduced (or eliminated)
affordable housing minimums (15; 37.5%), reduced (or eliminated) restrictions on the types
of businesses allowed to occupy proposed developments (13; 32.5%), and expanded limits to
TIF support for development projects throughout the neighborhood (13; 32.5%). This

527

Author’s note: subcategory totals do not add up to, respectively, 40 or 100%
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agenda is largely market-based, and is fueled by migration of younger, wealthier whites back
into North Oak Cliff. Describing this, one participant said that:
It’s the market in Dallas, but you see it in all kinds of other big cities. People are moving
back to these old neighborhoods because they like the vibe, but not all of them want a fixerupper house – they want to be surrounded by history without having to worry about old
knob-and-tube (electrical wiring) or lead pipes. North Oak Cliff is unique, though, because
so much of it is still here – most cities bulldozed these old buildings back in the fifties.

Opposing this agenda are progressive-development and anti-development advocates;
these actors (and the number of participants who identified them with a particular agenda)
are listed, respectively, in tables 6.13 and 6.14. As with table 6.12, these tables each also
include a summary entry for actors who did not receive enough participant nominations to
be individually included for in-depth evaluation.
Table 6.13: North Oak Cliff Participant-Identified Progressive Development Agenda Supporters
Participant Mentions528
Actor
Number
Percentage
Scott Griggs
34
85.0%
Jim Lake, Jr.
29
72.5%
Lisa Benskin
24
60.0%
Michael Anglin
23
57.5%
Scott Hounsel
21
52.5%
Neva Dean
19
47.5%
Jason Roberts
13
32.5%
David Spence
12
30.0%
Other Actor Not Listed
15
37.5%
Table 6.14: North Oak Cliff Participant-Identified Anti-Development Agenda Supporters
Participant Mentions529
Actor
Number
Percentage
Pam Conley
40
100.0%
Other Actor Not Listed
6
15.0%

These data suggest that, overall, there is significant agreement among participants regarding
which actors are associated with a progressive position on development in North Oak Cliff.
Describing this positon, participants identified a number of characteristics, including
community involvement in new development projects, including public design charrettes as
part of the design process for new projects (27; 67.5%), community needs assessments (22;
55.0%), local ownership of businesses in new commercial spaces (13; 32.5%), and

528
529

Author’s note: subcategory totals do not add up to, respectively, 40 or 100%
Author’s note: subcategory totals do not add up to, respectively, 40 or 100%
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modifications to TIF eligibility requirements to ensure that, whenever possible, existing
residents can afford rents in new housing units (9; 22.5%).
Although participants’ opinions differ on exactly what constitutes progressive
development in North Oak Cliff, many appeared to, as the adage goes, “know it when they
saw it.” Citing specific examples of the work of actors supporting the progressivedevelopment agenda, 22 participants (55%) referenced a recent development proposal by
Matt Segrest’s company, Alamo Manhattan, wherein community uproar over the design
proposal led to a series of meetings between residents and the developer at Griggs’ behest.
These meetings eventually led to a series of significant design changes, accommodations for
affordable housing units, and additional parking to address residents’ concerns530.
For a smaller subset of decision-makers, the progressive-development agenda makes
too many concessions, resulting in unnecessary displacement and what 5 participants
(12.5%) called “the neighborhood losing its soul.” Participants unanimously named Pam
Conley as the primary advocate for this position, which proffers heavy restrictions on newand infill development, including strict interpretations (and enforcement) of zoning
ordinances (19; 47.5%), limits on how many residential- and commercial tenants can be
displaced by development (15; 37.5%), and a moratorium on new development until existing
codes and zoning can be updated to keep new development in-line with extant buildings (7;
17.5%). Speaking of Conley’s efforts specifically, participants commented on her fights to
oppose the use of neighborhood streets for overflow parking (32; 80%), density increases
that result from tearing down existing structures in favor of new development (16; 40.0%),
and the creation of new restaurants with late hours in residential zones (11; 27.5%).

530

cf. Appleton, 2012a; 2012b; 2015b; 2015c; Chow, 2015; Griggs, 2016; R. Stone, 2015b
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Although participants often (29; 72.5%) expressed frustration at Conley’s hardline
position with respect to development, most (28; 70%) considered her an effective voice
when Councilmember Griggs and other formal authorities are powerless. For example, 13
participants (32.5%) mentioned that, as long as a development project is within the
constraints of how a plot is zoned, and does not seek TIF funding, Councilmember Griggs is
largely unable to prevent it, even if he disagrees with the development itself. In these cases,
those participants admitted that Conley’s knowledge of how to fight development and
willingness to do so is often the only hope residents have to prevent disruptive development.
While Conley is not always successful, a strong minority of participants (14; 35.0%) noted
that she often wins significant battles over zoning and new development against much larger,
better-funded developers531. Describing this, one participant said that:
Pam (Conley) is a bulldozer, when it comes to protecting the quality of life for the poor folks
living in the neighborhoods around here. Subtle, she ain’t, but she’s about the strongest,
most effective change agent outside of the (city) council. If a fight can be won – and not all
of them can – she stands the best chance of winning it.

While middle tier actors represent a majority of North Oak Cliff’s contemporary second
echelon, low tier actors David Spence and Jason Roberts tend to operate independently of other
decision-makers, circumventing the larger decision-making process, albeit with the support
of Councilmember Griggs. Looking first at second tier influential David Spence, whose
company (Good Space) purchases vacant buildings, many of which are slated for demolition,
renovates them, and rents them to local businesses and residents532. Many participants
credited Spence for much of the initial revitalization of the Bishop Arts District within
North Oak Cliff (23; 57.5%), for saving commercial corridors throughout North Oak Cliff
(23; 57.5%), and for ensuring that, within his own projects, existing development is not

531
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cf. Appleton, 2012a; 2012b; 2013d; Laussade, 2016; R. Stone, 2015a; Treviño, 2014
Appleton, 2013a; Best of Dallas, 2013; Mooney, 2014; Perez, 2015; Schutze, 2010; 2015; R. Stone, 2011
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displaced (11; 27.5%). One participant described Spence as a “privateer developer – not part
of the mainstream, but supported by City Hall for doing what the big developers can’t do,
which is keep the neighborhood fabric intact.”
On a smaller scale, participants also identified civic chair Jason Roberts, who has been
involved in two key projects within North Oak Cliff; first, the Oak Cliff Transit Authority,
which wrote a successful application for 23 million dollars in federal TIGER funding to
build a new streetcar line connecting the former “streetcar suburb” with Downtown
Dallas533; and second, the Better Block Project, which collaborates with local residents,
business owners, and artists to adapt intersections and vacant city blocks to include pop-up
shops, improved pedestrian and bicycle infrastructure, and urban plazas using easilyremovable supplies like temporary paint, potted plants, and lightweight outdoor furniture 534.
Participants often commented that these projects draw attention to distressed areas within
the neighborhood; as one put it:
People outside the area see Bishop Arts, and they think that Oak Cliff is doing alright now,
and that maybe it’s all turned around. That’s just not true, though – you go three blocks
away from that area and it’s all still run down. Jason (Roberts) does a good job shining a light
on places like that, showing what could happen in places that still need attention.

Some participants expressed concern over both Roberts’ and Spence’s efforts in North Oak
Cliff, accusing them of catering to the demands of newcomers to the neighborhood – the
wealthier, white gentrifiers who are (slowly) displacing extant residents. As one put it:
You can’t say that you’re building for the neighborhood when you renovate a building to
avoid having to build enough parking, and then bring in a tenant that charges $10 for a slice
of pie. People here don’t even make $10 an hour; at least, the people who were already here
don’t. People here don’t have Saturdays off, so what good is an art project to them? How
does a bike lane that cuts out a lane of traffic help someone get to work on time? For that
matter, the streetcar doesn’t even run when people need to get to work, so who really
benefits?

533
534

cf. Appleton, 2013b; 2015d; Austin, 2015; Crain, 2009
cf. Roberts, 2010; R. Ross, 2012; Team Better Block, 2016a
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Nonetheless, even their detractors hold Roberts and Spence in high regard for bringing
positive attention to the neighborhood, even if the results (i.e. gentrification) are
problematic. Many participants (26; 65%) commented that, even when infill development
brings additional parking headaches and traffic, the businesses are locally-owned, and hire
local employees; one participant suggested that:
We don’t like that the streets are packed with cars that don’t live here, but at least the shops
hire locally, and the owners live around here – if not in southern Dallas, then at least
somewhere in the area. It’s not like in other places, where the owner is a corporation out of
some other state, who couldn’t care less what happens here, or which neighbors get hurt by
their businesses. When someone lives nearby, at least we have a chance to work with them
and make things right.

Decision-making power and nominations to decision-making committees. In
addition to asking participants to give ratings of power for potential decision-makers in
North Oak Cliff, the survey introduced in Chapter 3 asked participants to nominate 10
individuals to form a committee responsible for making a decision that would affect the
entire neighborhood, and that needed to be broadly accepted by the neighborhood as a
whole. Much like in Dallas citywide, some participants did not select the full 10 committee
members; the lowest number of selected committee members was 4, and on average,
participants nominated 7.25 individuals to their hypothetical neighborhood decision-making
team. The fact that some participants did not nominate a full 10 committee members
negatively affects the validity of the results; nonetheless, table 6.17 shows the number of
nominations that each decision-maker received, for all decision-makers receiving
nominations from at least 10% (4) of the participants.
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Table 6.15: Comparison between North Oak Cliff Decision-Making Committee Nominations and
Decision-Maker Power Score
Committee
Power
Nominations
Name
Category
Tier
Count
Rank
Score
Rank
Scott Griggs
Formal Authorities
High Tier
40
1
154
1
Michael Anglin
Formal Authorities
Middle Tier
28
2
136
2
Pam Conley
Civic Chairs
Middle Tier
27
3
114
9
Lisa Benskin
Civic Chairs
Middle Tier
27
3
113
11
Scott Hounsel
Formal Authorities
Middle Tier
25
5
135
3
Neva Dean
Formal Authorities
Middle Tier
24
6
127
6
Martin Koonsman
Anchor Captains
Middle Tier
22
7
122
7
Matt Segrest
Second Tier Influentials
Middle Tier
21
8
129
5
Farrokh & Michael Nazerian
Second Tier Influentials
Middle Tier
19
9
114
9
Jim Lake Jr.
First Tier Influentials
Middle Tier
17
10
135
3
Joe McElroy
First Tier Influentials
Middle Tier
16
11
115
8
David Eitches
Second Tier Influentials
Middle Tier
15
12
108
13
Jason Roberts
Civic Chairs
Low Tier
13
13
67
15
Tom Prohaska
First Tier Influentials
Middle Tier
10
14
111
12
David Spence
Second Tier Influentials
Low Tier
10
14
93
14

Data in table 6.15 suggest that, within North Oak Cliff, high tier actor Scott Griggs received
the maximum possible nominations to decision-making committees. Much like in Dallas
citywide, there is a visible degree of overlap among actors in the various thematic categories.
Further echoing this study’s findings at the citywide level, Spearman’s ρ for these two
variables is 0.702, a finding that is statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level. While this is
lower than the same calculation at the citywide level, it is nonetheless a strong, positive
indicator of the close relationship between a participant’s perceptions of a given actor’s
power, and their willingness to nominate that actor to make decisions at the neighborhood
level. In addition, these results help validate the use of a reputational analysis in studying the
nature of power in North Oak Cliff.
In considering the role of power tiers within North Oak Cliff’s decision-making
structure, table 6.16 shows the total number of nominations to decision-making committees
received by actors in each, and compares these to the hypothetical maximum number of
nominations that could have been granted to these actors.
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Table 6.16: Decision-Makers Selected to Serve on a North Oak Cliff Decision-Making Committee by Tier
Total Possible
Tier
Number in Category
Total Nominations
Nominations
High Tier
1
40
40
Middle Tier
12
251
480
Low Tier
2
23
80

%
100%
52.3%
28.8%

Taken with data from table 6.15, these data suggest that participants’ nominations for
neighborhood decision-making teams are skewed heavily in favor of Councilmember Griggs,
evidenced his unanimous participant nominations for decision-making committees than
other actors. Outside of Councilmember Griggs, these data show that middle tier actors are
about half as likely to be nominated for neighborhood decision-making committees, but are
nonetheless twice as likely as low tier actors to be selected. These data are in-line with
aforementioned participant observations about the nature of decision-making in North Oak
Cliff, particularly the centrality of Councilmember Griggs in decision-making, and the
“outsider” status of low tier actors with respect to the politics of decision-making.

Familiarity and shared committee service. How well do participants know the
actors involved in North Oak Cliff’s decision-making process, and are these relationships
related to participants’ perceptions of neighborhood power? Table 6.17 shows the mean
familiarity scores for each of the three tiers in North Oak Cliff’s decision-making structure.

High Tier
Middle Tier
Low Tier

Table 6.17: North Oak Cliff Mean Familiarity Score by Category and Tier
Tier
Mean Familiarity Score
2.23
2.24
2.38

At the citywide level, key leaders were found to have the highest familiarity score among the
three decision-making tiers. Table 6.17 suggests that, for North Oak Cliff, these actors have
the lowest mean familiarity scores, while low tier actors have the highest mean familiarity
scores. However, as with data at the citywide level, these differences are slight. Additionally,
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as this study found for Dallas citywide, the Spearman coefficient between familiarity and
participants’ perceptions of power is not statistically significant535.
This study also asked participants to identify whether they had, in the past five years,
served on a board or committee with each of the actors that they nominated to
neighborhood decision-making committees; these data are reported in table 6.18.

High Tier
Middle Tier
Low Tier

Table 6.18: North Oak Cliff Mean Shared Committee Service by Tier
Tier
Mean Shared Board or Committee Service
22.5%
7.9%
15.0%

At the citywide level, participants were most likely to have recently served on a board or
committee with high tier actors, followed by low tier actors. As the above data suggest, this
pattern continues to hold for North Oak Cliff, although it should be noted that participants
reported less shared board or committee service with these actors than their counterparts at
the citywide level. In addition, it is critical to note that the correlation between shared
committee service and perceptions of power is not statistically significant536. Therefore, as
with Dallas as a whole, this study is able to reject the possibility that, in North Oak Cliff,
participants’ perceptions of power were skewed by proximity to various actors throughout
the neighborhood.
Evaluation of Hypothesis 6. While Hypothesis 5 focuses on one of the city’s
central neighborhoods – North Oak Cliff, Hypothesis 6 examines the city’s innermost
neighborhood – Downtown Dallas. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will reframe
data from Chapter 4 in order to address the status of anchor institutions and CDCs within a
neighborhood power structure. First, this study will seek to establish the presence- and
nature of organized neighborhood decision-making power. Then, it will evaluate the

535
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ρ = -0.027, p > 0.1
ρ = 0.278, p > 0.1
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relationship between power and nominations to decision-making committees. Third, it will
evaluate the respective relationships between power and familiarity, and between power and
recent shared board or committee service. Finally, it will relate these findings to the present
hypothesis, in order to establish whether (or to what end) anchor institutions and CDCs are
involved in neighborhood decision-making within Downtown Dallas.

Downtown Dallas’ decision-makers. Out of this study’s 79 participants, just
under half (39) were able- and willing to answer survey items and interview questions
regarding the decision-making process within Downtown Dallas, and the actors who have
roles within it. These participants identified 18 individual- and group actors, who are
particularly involved in neighborhood decision-making; those actors are listed in table 6.19.
Category
Formal Authorities

First Tier Influentials

Second Tier
Influentials

Civic Chairs

Table 6.19: Downtown Dallas Decision-Makers
Name
Most Notable Affiliation(s)
Philip T. Kingston
Dallas City Council
A.C. Gonzalez
City Manager
Karl Zavitkovsky
Office of Economic Development
Mark Rieves
Zoning Board of Adjustment
Paul Ridley
City Plan Commission
Ray Hunt
Hunt Consolidated
Harlan Crow
Crow Holdings
Ross Perot Jr.
Hillwood
Jody Grant
Texas BankCap
Scott Krikorian
Trammell Crow Co. (subsidiary of CBRE)
Jim Truitt
Forest City
Michael Caffey
C.B. Richard Ellis (CBRE)
Vince Ackerson
Texas Capital Bank (subsidiary of Texas BankCap)
Jack Matthews
Matthews Southwest
John Scovell
Woodbine Development
Ted Hamilton
Hamilton Properties
Brock Bailey
Bracewell & Giuliani, LLP
John Crawford
Downtown Dallas Inc.

Contemporary distribution of neighborhood decision-making power. For the
past half-century, much of Dallas’ history has been baked into the bricks of its CBD.
Anxious to shake off the association with a slain president, Dallas’ leaders invested
significant sums of public dollars into razing depression-era offices and constructing modern
skyscrapers – all within Downtown Dallas537. As the city’s commercial hub, this

537

Graff, 2008, pp. 220-221; Hill, 1996, pp. 160-169; Rice, 2007, pp. 220-221
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neighborhood had few residents throughout much of the late 20th century, but was
nonetheless at the center of Dallas’ power structure. Of the 39 participants who answered
questions regarding decision-making in Downtown Dallas, all of them spoke to this general
theme in one way or another; one participant’s comments stood out, however, and are asfollows:
The history of Dallas is the history of big men doing big things. A few of those men are still
around, but even the ones who died years ago still watch over the city – their names are on
the highways and skyscrapers and public places throughout the central business district. All
of Downtown Dallas is basically a monument to the men who built it, and to the kind of
leadership that allows that sort of thing to happen.

When participants were interviewed regarding the nature of decision-making in
Downtown Dallas today, they described thematic categories of decision-makers, which were
substantively identical to those found in Dallas as a whole, and as later tables will suggest,
there are several decision-makers found both at the citywide level and in Downtown Dallas.
As occurred in North Oak Cliff, when describing the nature of decision-making in the
neighborhood, participants speaking with respect to Downtown Dallas unanimously agreed
that its councilmember, Philip Kingston, is a crucial member of the decision-making process.
However, a majority (28; 71.8%) also agreed that the councilmember shares many aspects of
top-level neighborhood leadership, including city staff and long-standing business
executives, as well as John Crawford, the developer-turned-director of the nonprofit
development corporation and civic booster organization Downtown Dallas Inc. Of these 28
participants, ten referred to this as “co-leadership,” with the councilmember acting more like
a “first among equals” when it comes to Downtown Dallas specifically (as opposed to the
remainder of his district). One participant summarized this, saying that:
When Dallas went 14-1 back in 1994, you had 13 districts where the councilmember got to
rule however they saw fit, and nobody could really push back against that. District 14 is
really two districts – Downtown Dallas and Lakewood/East Dallas. On the Lakewood side,
you have a district mostly like any other on this side of the river, but in Downtown itself,
you still have all the power players in Dallas.
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Outside of formal authorities and first tier influentials, Downtown Dallas’ governing coalition is
composed primarily of second tier influentials made up of actors within the city’s developer class –
business executives in construction, real estate development, and related fields. To attempt
to structure these various actors, and to serve as the basis for future comparisons, table 6.20
extends survey data introduced Chapter 4, which listed mean power scores for each
decision-maker, by including both total power scores and rank-order data.
Table 6.20: Power Ratings of Downtown Dallas Decision-Makers
Rank
Order
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
12
14
15
16
17
18

Name
Ray Hunt
A.C. Gonzalez
John Crawford
Philip T. Kingston
Karl Zavitkovsky
Harlan Crow
Ross Perot Jr.
Paul Ridley
John Scovell
Jim Truitt
Mark Rieves
Michael Caffey
Ted Hamilton
Jack Matthews
Jody Grant
Scott Krikorian
Brock Bailey
Vince Ackerson

Category

Power Score

First Tier Influentials
Formal Authorities
Civic Chairs
Formal Authorities
Formal Authorities
First Tier Influentials
First Tier Influentials
Formal Authorities
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Formal Authorities
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
First Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials

153
152
151
150
147
137
133
128
123
122
121
120
120
119
113
111
105
98

Mean
Power Score
3.92
3.90
3.87
3.97
3.77
3.51
3.41
3.10
2.85
3.13
3.26
3.08
2.69
3.03
2.90
3.15
2.51
3.05

At the citywide level (and in North Oak Cliff), power score and mean power score shared a
perfect, positive correlation with one another; for Downtown Dallas, this relationship is
strong, but not perfect538, which suggests that actors with high power scores tended to
receive more individual high scores (that is, more ratings of 3 and 4 on a four-point scale)
than actors who received lower power scores, but this tendency is not as strong as in other
geographies in this study. Additionally, when thematic categories are coded to a dummy
variable, mean power score539 (but not total power score540) is negatively correlated with
thematic category541. The relatively modest Spearman correlation coefficients describing
ρ = 0.820, p < 0.001
ρ = -0.501, p < 0.05
540 ρ = -0.458, p = 0.056
541 Author’s note: as with thematic categories in Dallas as a whole and North Oak Cliff, formal authorities were coded as 0, first tier influentials as
1, second tier influentials as 2, and civic chairs as 3; no anchor captains received enough nominations for inclusion
538
539
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these relationships suggest that, while a connection exists, there are, as table 6.20 illustrates,
multiple exceptions – most interestingly, that unlike in both Dallas citywide and North Oak
Cliff, the highest raw power score is not held by the city councilmember representing the
area. Nonetheless, these results suggest that there is a particular structure to decision-making
in Downtown Dallas.
To test for the presence- and nature of such a structure, this study again utilized a
Duncan’s New Multiple Range Test to measure the significance of differences among mean
power scores for decision-makers in Downtown Dallas; the results appear in table 6.21.
Name
Philip Kingston
Ray Hunt
A.C. Gonzalez
John Crawford
Karl Zavitkovsky

Table 6.21: Downtown Dallas Decision-Maker Levels of Power
Subset for α = 0.05
Thematic Category
Low Tier
Middle Tier
Formal Authorities
First Tier Influentials
Formal Authorities
Civic Chairs
Formal Authorities

Harlan Crow
Ross Perot Jr.
Mark Rieves
Scott Krikorian
Jim Truitt
Paul Ridley
Michael Caffey
Vince Ackerson
Jack Matthews

First Tier Influentials
First Tier Influentials
Formal Authorities
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Formal Authorities
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials

Jody Grant
John Scovell
Ted Hamilton
Brock Bailey

First Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials
Second Tier Influentials

High Tier
3.97
3.92
3.90
3.87
3.77

3.51
3.41
3.26
3.15
3.13
3.10
3.08
3.05
3.03
2.90
2.85
2.69
2.51

Like its findings in North Oak Cliff, this study finds three tiers (high tier, middle tier, and low
tier) in Downtown Dallas’ decision-making structure, but uniquely, data in table 6.21 suggest
that the highest of these tiers is not occupied solely by the neighborhood’s city
councilmember. These findings broadly support those found in table 6.20, as well as
participant observations regarding a central conflict regarding decision-making in Downtown
Dallas, which will be reconsidered later in this study. Finally, figure 6.03 illustrates the data in
table 6.25, and shows the structure of decision-making at the neighborhood level.
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Figure 6.03: The Structure of Downtown Dallas Decision-Making Power

These findings take into account data in table 6.20 and 6.24, as well as participant
observations of the structure of power in Downtown Dallas. In the paragraphs that follow,
this study will first discuss Downtown Dallas’ decision-making structure broadly, and then it
will individually examine each of this structure’s three tiers.
Downtown Dallas’ decision-making structure, broadly. At the citywide level, this study
identified a decision-making structure composed of four tiers, with actors in the highest tiers
sharing decision-making involvement, actors in the lowest tier tending to only be involved
on particular decisions, and some gradient between the two. In North Oak Cliff, this study
identified a decision-making structure in which a strong city councilmember consolidated
decision-making authority, and a variety of lower-tier actors worked through ad-hoc alliances
to influence his decisions. In Downtown Dallas, figure 6.03 conceptualizes a leadership
structure that (like the one in North Oak Cliff) features three tiers, but that (like Dallas
citywide) emphasizes a coalition of top-level actors who are involved in most neighborhoodlevel decisions and lower-tier actors whose involvement is limited to particular projects.
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Finally, as in Dallas citywide and North Oak Cliff, the highest echelons of decision-making
in Downtown Dallas – the high tier occupied by formal authorities and first tier influentials – are
particularly rigid in their membership. Echoing terms used for this category at the citywide
level, 13 participants (33.3%) used some version of “born in” or “blessed in” to describe
how various actors in the first tier influentials category joined the highest echelons of
leadership in Downtown Dallas. Nonetheless, because the barrier dividing high tier leaders is
particularly rigid, while the low tier middle tier) is largely more open to membership, figure 6.03
depicts a solid line between high tier and middle tier, and a dashed line between the middle tier
and low tier.
Key leaders and top level, past and present. While archival research uncovered a limited
amount of literature regarding the decision-making structure (or lack thereof) in North Oak
Cliff, archival research suggests that the history of Downtown Dallas’ decision-making
structure is indivisible from that of decision-making in Dallas as a whole; this is in-line with
extant scholarly research, as well as participant descriptions of how decisions in the
neighborhood were made in the past; these are well-summarized by the following:
Downtown (Dallas) has two things that come together to explain a lot about who runs the
show. It’s the jewel in the crown, so anyone who wants to build something big is going to
want to build it right there, but also, only so many have the vision and resources to build a
skyscraper or Reunion Tower. Egos run high in Dallas, and they don’t run any higher than
when there’s a chance to change the skyline.

Therefore, this study argues that while North Oak Cliff suffered from a dearth of political
leadership prior to the 1991 city council restructure, Downtown Dallas is the political heart
of the city, where the city’s wealthiest and most powerful press for ways to leave enduring
marks on the city. As figure 6.03 illustrates, Downtown Dallas’ high tier comprises a wider
variety of actors than analogous tiers in Dallas citywide and North Oak Cliff, including
government leaders, private-sector executives, and the head of a nonprofit development
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corporation. Supporting this high tier are middle tier actors, who a clear majority of participants
(24; 61.5%) agreed are effectively subservient to high tier actors, working to support (or
oppose) various initiatives at the direction of their “superiors.”
Corroborating data found in table 6.21, participants almost universally (37; 94.9%)
suggested that, while other councilmembers enjoy functionally limitless authority over
development in their districts, Kingston is often challenged by Dallas’ first tier influentials and
their sympathizers on the Dallas City Council. In describing this situation, participants
identified two primary factors: approaching term limits for “developer-friendly” city
councilmembers (identified by 25 participants; 64.1%), and the presence of an aging, though
still powerful coalition of private sector leaders (35 participants; 89.7%). As a result,
participants often suggested that Kingston may (and does) lose a number of battles with
developers in the short run, his fights garner him support from other progressive city
leaders, as well as the voters in his district; as one participant put it:
It’s the 1980s and 90s teaming up to fight the 00s and 10s. What I mean is, men and women
who succeeded in building Dallas in the 1970s, and rebuilding it in the 1990s are trying to do
that again, but their ideas haven’t changed any – it’s all modern offices and luxury high-rises.
The ideas are old, but there’s a lot of money and (City) Council support behind them,
because old, rich men like Ray Hunt all-but own half the councilmembers, the mayor, and
the city manager. That’s what Councilmember Kingston is fighting against, even though it’s
hard for him to break even, much less win.

Analysis of participant comments regarding actors in Downtown Dallas’ decisionmaking structure suggests strong agreement around two conflicting agendas: one supporting
neoliberal, value-neutral development strategies in Dallas’ urban core, and one with a more
progressive outlook. Looking first at the pro-development agenda, table 6.22 shows the
actors most commonly associated with this perspective by study participants; this table also
includes a summary entry for actors who did not receive enough participant nominations to
be individually included for in-depth evaluation.
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Table 6.22: Downtown Dallas Participant-Identified Pro-Development Agenda Supporters
Participant Mentions542
Actor
Number
Percentage
A.C. Gonzalez
39
100.0%
Ray Hunt
39
100.0%
Karl Zavitkovsky
33
84.6%
Harlan Crow
33
84.6%
Scott Krikorian
30
76.9%
Vince Ackerson
29
74.4%
Jody Grant
23
59.0%
John Scovell
21
53.8%
John Crawford
19
48.7%
Ross Perot, Jr.
19
48.7%
Ted Hamilton
17
43.6%
Jim Truitt
13
33.3%
Michael Caffey
8
20.5%
Other Actor Not Listed
18
46.2%

This agenda, unsurprisingly, advocates continuing the historical practice of using city funds
to induce high-end, mixed-use development, new office space, urban stadiums, and further
expansion of the downtown convention center543. Describing the actions of this agenda’s
adherents, participants specifically mentioned the use of TIF and BID districts (39; 100.0%),
and to a lesser extent, tax abatements (20; 51.3%), earmarks within larger bond packages (8;
20.5%), and preferential treatment during the contract bidding process (7; 18.0%), which five
participants called “sweetheart deals.” In describing actors who adhere to this position on
development, one participant said that:
You have to remember that before the real estate market went belly-up in the 80s, Dallas
was putting up skyscrapers as fast as we could bring in the concrete and pig iron. We took
money from the schools, from the police, (and) from the roads to build all (of) this, and
when the market fell apart, what did we have to show for it? Now you have this group – the
same ones from before, or their kids, or their proxies – coming to City Hall, hats in hand,
trying to say that the only way to save Downtown is to repeat what we did before. Isn’t that
the definition of insanity – doing what you did before, and thinking things will be different?

A more charitable participant, representing the views of the majority (20 participants;
51.28%), characterized this agenda by suggesting that:
We have to keep Downtown Dallas growing, because if we don’t grow here, then some
other city will take those jobs out from under us. If it’s not Dallas, it’s Plano, Richardson,
Irving, Arlington, or even suburbs further out – Allen, Fairview, McKinney, (and) Princeton.

542
543

Author’s note: subcategory totals do not add up to, respectively, 39 or 100%
Brown, 2016a; 2016b; Robinson-Jacobs, 2013; Schutze, 2016; Simek, 2015; 2016
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If it’s not one of those, then maybe a different city in a different state. Point is, we either
grow or we die, and Downtown is where growth happens.

As an alternative, participants unanimously identified a second, progressivedevelopment agenda, which seeks to bind public development incentives to more equitable
economic development strategies and considerations for people who cannot afford upscale
housing, dining, shopping, and entertainment544; table 6.23 shows which actors participants
identified as being most closely associated with this perspective; as with table 6.22, this table
includes a summary entry for actors who did not receive enough participant nominations to
be individually included for in-depth evaluation..
Table 6.23: Downtown Dallas Participant-Identified Progressive Development Agenda Supporters
Participant Mentions545
Actor
Number
Percentage
Phillip Kingston
39
100.0%
Mark Rieves
28
71.8%
Paul Ridley
26
66.7%
John Crawford
19
48.7%
Other Actor Not Listed
16
42.0%

As data in table 6.23 suggest, support for this agenda is largely found among formal authorities
Phillip Kingston and two of his political appointees. These three actors hold within-district
authority over zoning change proposals, land-use policies, and zoning exemptions to push
for a number of progressive provisions added to development subsidies; participants
variously identified examples such as: “middle class” retail and dining options (18
participants; 46.2%), expanded affordable housing beyond legal requirements for TIF
funding (14; 35.9%), investment in local infrastructure improvements such as bike lanes (12;
30.8%), mid-block pedestrian crosswalks (11; 28.2%), and traffic calming measures (11;
28.2%), and requirements to bring in businesses like mid-range grocery stores, to support a
growing population (9; 23.1%).

544
545

Celeste, 2014; Schutze, 2015b
Author’s note: subcategory totals do not add up to, respectively, 39 or 100%
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In the fight over development projects in Downtown Dallas, participants
unanimously identified one actor whose organization attempts (often successfully) to broker
agreements between these disparate factions: civic chair John Crawford, who has become
central in brokering what many participants (31; 79.5%) considered to be “compromise
deals” for development projects. It should be somewhat unsurprising, then, that tables 6.22
and 6.23 suggest that as many participants identify Crawford with the local pro-development
agenda as identify him with the progressive-development alternative.
Recall that Crawford’s organization, Downtown Dallas Inc. (DDI) has been part of
Downtown Dallas’ business community for over five decades. Traditionally, DDI has been a
booster organization for the CBD, but since 2010, DDI has been at the center of fulfilling
Downtown Dallas 360546, the master redevelopment plan for Downtown Dallas. Crawford
himself has a decades-long career in real estate development in- and around Downtown
Dallas, and most participants (25; 64.1%) considered his professional- and social ties to be
crucial in legitimizing him among first tier influentials, while the public oversight of DDI,
through its board of directors, serves as a basis for the support of formal authorities both
within the neighborhood and at the citywide level. While Crawford is not always successful
in finding compromise between Kingston and his opponents, two-thirds of participants (26)
agreed that Crawford is involved in nearly every development-related decision in the
neighborhood, with many suggesting that Crawford’s support among other key leaders
places him as a de facto equal to Kingston himself, at least with respect to development
decisions.
Second echelon leaders, past and present. Recall that, although the Thometz study did not
specifically mention Downtown Dallas, literature regarding the city in the 1960s and 1970s

546

Downtown Dallas Inc., 2015, p. B3; Grimes, 2010
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suggests that decisions regarding the neighborhood were largely the purview of the business
leaders and real estate developers who made decisions at the citywide level547; therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that, if second echelon actors from the Thometz study took active roles in
decision-making within Downtown Dallas, these actors (as a subset of all second echelon actors)
were likely younger executives in real estate development, finance and investment, utilities,
trade, and manufacturing. As figure 6.03 illustrates, this study finds that Downtown Dallas’
contemporary second echelon is composed of its second tier influentials, which (as shown in table
6.21) notes are composed of executives in real estate development, finance and investment,
and real estate law.
The vast majority of participants (36; 92.3%) suggested that actors found in
Downtown Dallas’ contemporary second echelon are not individually involved in the early
stages of neighborhood-level decisions, and their involvement tends to be project-specific.
Where these actors differ from their likely predecessors is that, as participants often
described it, they often intentionally avoid becoming key leaders in decision-making. All
participants broadly agreed, however, that these actors are not tied to Dallas itself; their
companies have offices across the United States (and in some cases, internationally), so their
loyalties, if they exist at all, are primarily to their employers. Additionally, a minority of
participants (19; 48.7%) also suggested that, because the future Downtown Dallas’ leadership
is uncertain, executives would normally transition into a more central role in decision-making
are waiting to see what happens; as one participant suggested:
Dallas is in the middle of a power struggle, and it plays out here in Downtown because this
is where the power players are the most invested, in terms of their reputations and their
money. Progressive leaders like Philip (Kingston) are a seven-vote minority today, but they
may not be in the minority forever, so the smart move, if you’re an up-and-coming civic
leader, is to wait a few years to see how it shakes out.

Elkin, 1987b, pp. 38-41; Minora, 2013; Ruebens, 2011; Payne, 1994, pp. 369-378; 2010; Terranova, 2009, pp. 19-23; Wilonsky, 2008;
2011

547
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If these younger ones pick a side now, and that side ends up losing out in the end, then that
hurts their business long-term.

Decision-making power and nominations to decision-making committees. In
addition to asking participants to give ratings of power for potential decision-makers in
Downtown Dallas, the survey introduced in Chapter 3 asked participants to nominate 10
individuals to form a committee responsible for making a decision that would affect the
entire neighborhood, and that needed to be broadly accepted by the neighborhood as a
whole. Much like in Dallas as a whole and North Oak Cliff, some participants did not select
the full 10 committee members; the lowest number of selected committee members was 7,
and on average, participants nominated 9.18 individuals to their hypothetical neighborhood
decision-making team. Once again, the fact that some participants did not nominate a full 10
committee members negatively affects the validity of the results, but nonetheless, table 6.24
shows the number of nominations that each decision-maker received, for all decision-makers
receiving nominations from at least 10% (3.9, rounded up to 4) of the participants.
Table 6.24: Comparison between Downtown Dallas Decision-Making Committee Nominations and
Decision-Maker Power Score
Committee
Power
Nominations
Name
Category
Tier
Count
Rank
Score
Rank
John Crawford
Civic Chairs
High Tier
39
1
151
3
Philip Kingston
Formal Authorities
High Tier
39
1
150
4
A.C. Gonzalez
Formal Authorities
High Tier
23
3
152
2
Ray Hunt
First Tier Influentials
High Tier
21
4
153
1
Jack Matthews
Second Tier Influentials
Middle Tier
21
4
119
14
Scott Krikorian
Second Tier Influentials
Middle Tier
20
6
111
16
Jim Truitt
Second Tier Influentials
Middle Tier
19
7
122
10
Michael Caffey
Second Tier Influentials
Middle Tier
18
8
120
12
Mark Rieves
Formal Authorities
Middle Tier
15
9
121
11
Karl Zavitkovsky
Formal Authorities
High Tier
13
10
147
5
Harlan Crow
First Tier Influentials
Middle Tier
13
10
137
6
Ross Perot Jr.
First Tier Influentials
Middle Tier
13
10
133
7
Vince Ackerson
Second Tier Influentials
Middle Tier
12
13
98
18
John Scovell
Second Tier Influentials
Low Tier
11
14
123
9
Paul Ridley
Formal Authorities
Middle Tier
9
15
128
8
Jody Grant
First Tier Influentials
Low Tier
9
15
113
15
Ted Hamilton
Second Tier Influentials
Low Tier
7
17
120
12
Brock Bailey
Second Tier Influentials
Low Tier
7
17
105
17

The data in table 6.26 show that Downtown Dallas’ decision-making structure broadly
follows patterns seen in Dallas citywide and North Oak Cliff, with high tier actors generally
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having the most decision-making committee nominations, middle tier actors appearing in the
middle of the list, and low tier actors receiving the fewest overall nominations, although (as in
other geographies) exceptions to this exist. As was found in both North Oak Cliff and
Dallas citywide, there is overlap among actors in each of the four thematic categories (no
anchor captains were identified), but of particular interest is that civic chair John Crawford
received as many nominations as the neighborhood’s city councilmember; in this study, this
is unique to Downtown Dallas. These results suggest that although Councilmember
Kingston is the de jure primary decision-maker in Downtown Dallas, in practice, this position
is shared (to varying extents) with civic chair John Crawford, formal authority A. C. Gonzalez,
and first tier influential Ray Hunt.
This study also compares the correlation between decision-making committee
nominations and power score. These variables, like their counterparts in North Oak Cliff
and Dallas citywide, are positively correlated548, but not to the same level of significance as
measures for these other geographies. In short, while participants’ perceptions of power are
positively related to their willingness to nominate that actor to make decisions that would
affect the neighborhood, in Downtown Dallas (moreso than in other geographies studied),
additional factors are involved. This limitation in mind, the statistical significance of the
relationship between committee nominations and power score nonetheless continues to
validate the use of a reputational analysis in studying neighborhood-level power.
In considering the role of power tiers within Downtown Dallas’ decision-making
structure, table 6.25 shows the total number of nominations to decision-making committees
received by actors in each tier, and compares these to the maximum number of nominations
that could have been granted to these actors.

548

ρ = 0.529, p < 0.05
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Table 6.25: Decision-Makers Selected to Serve on a Downtown Dallas Decision-Making Committee by Tier
Tier
Number in Category
Total Nominations
Total Possible Nominations
High Tier
5
135
195
Middle Tier
9
140
351
Low Tier
4
34
156

%
69.2%
39.9%
21.8%

These data echo findings found in North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas, and suggest that
high tier actors are more likely to be involved in neighborhood-level decision-making than
middle tier actors, who are themselves more likely to be involved than low tier actors. This is
in-line with participants’ observations about decision-making, and is also consistent with
expectations regarding the presence of a hierarchical structure in decision-making in
Downtown Dallas.

Familiarity and shared committee service. How well do participants know the
actors involved in Downtown Dallas’ decision-making process, and are these relationships
related to participants’ perceptions of power? Table 6.26 shows the mean familiarity scores
for each of the four thematic categories and two tiers in Downtown Dallas’ decision-making
structure.

High Tier
Middle Tier
Low Tier

Table 6.26: Downtown Dallas Decision-Maker Mean Familiarity Score by Tier
Category or Tier
Mean Familiarity Score
2.50
2.24
2.22

At the citywide level, high tier actors were found to have the highest familiarity score
among the three decision-making tiers, while in North Oak Cliff, these actors were found to
have the lowest familiarity scores. Data in table 6.26 suggests that, like Dallas citywide, in
Downtown Dallas, participants are most familiar with high tier actors, and comparatively less
familiar with middle tier and low tier actors. These differences, though interesting, are
nonetheless small, and as this study found in both North Oak Cliff and Dallas as a whole,
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the relationships between familiarity and participants’ perceptions of power in Downtown
Dallas is not statistically significant549.
This study also asked participants to identify whether they had, in the past five years,
served on a board or committee with each of the actors that they nominated to
neighborhood decision-making committees; these data are reported in table 6.27.

High Tier
Middle Tier
Low Tier

Table 6.27: Downtown Dallas Decision-Maker Mean Shared Committee Service by Tier
Tier
Mean Shared Committee Service
26.7%
27.9%
28.8%

These data suggest that, on average, participants are most likely to have recently served with
low tier actors on a board or committee, with these percentages decreasing for middle tier and
high tier actors. These findings are dissimilar to those found in Dallas as a whole and North
Oak Cliff, but nonetheless, the relationship between shared committee service and
participants’ perceptions of decision-making power is not statistically significant550. Recall
that this lack of significance also occurs when comparing familiarity with power; therefore,
this study is able to reject the possibility that, in Downtown Dallas, participants’ perceptions
of power were skewed by proximity to various actors throughout the neighborhood.
Discussion of Coalition Hypotheses
In light of the changing demographic- and economic contexts of cities in the United
States, and the growing roles of CDCs and anchor institutions in economic development and
policymaking in cities like Cleveland551 and Philadelphia552, this study forwarded a need to
revisit “big city politics.” Building on a previous study of Dallas, this study systematically
determined the relative decision-making power of individuals at the citywide level, as well as

ρ = 0.245, p = 0.328
ρ = -0.196, p < 0.05
551 Alperovitz, 2013, pp. 5-6; Zuckerman et al., 2013, pp. 96-109
552 Dubb, McKinley, & Howard, 2013, pp. 18-19
549
550
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in two neighborhoods uniquely impacted by aforementioned contextual changes. A major
aim of this study was to provide data regarding the nature of contemporary urban
governance, and the role (or lack thereof) of anchor institutions and CDCs in governing the
modern commercial republic. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will first briefly
summarize the methods used to address its coalition-centered hypotheses, as well as results
of this study’s qualitative data analysis. Then, it will compare real-world equitable economic
development programs found in a subset of other cities to those found in Dallas.
Dallas as a Whole
In evaluating its second three hypotheses, this study began by updating knowledge of
Dallas’ citywide governing coalition. To summarize, during the summer and early fall of
2015, this study asked 79 participants to rate the levels of power for over 100 individuals
active on various boards, committees, and civic projects, including business executives,
political leaders, high-level bureaucrats, and directors of nonprofit organizations and local
anchor institutions. This study, in repeating measures from previous work regarding Dallas,
used Duncan’s New Multiple Range Test to determine that the ranges of mean power ratings
represented four distinct decision-making tiers at the citywide level. These tiers substantiate
participant observations about the nature of decision-making at the citywide level, and
suggest that high-ranking public sector officials have largely (but not entirely) supplanted
business leaders at the highest echelons of decision-making.
Analysis methods used. Following in the footsteps of Hunter’s 1953 analysis of
Atlanta, and Thometz’ 1963 analysis of Dallas, participants were asked to nominate ten
actors to hypothetical decision-making committees, whose decisions would need to be
accepted by the city as a whole. The number of nominations received were correlated with
power scores, and were found to be positively related, suggesting that perceptions of power
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are a valid proxy for decision-making power, and validating the use of the reputational
method in studying the nature of contemporary urban governance at the citywide level.
Participants were also asked to indicate their amount of recent shared board- and committee
service with these actors, and their level of familiarity with each. These results were
correlated with power scores, but were not found to be statistically significant, which helps
to negate the possibility that participants’ perceptions of power were confounded by
proximity to particular actors, while also helping to validate the reputational method itself.
CDC and anchor institution involvement in decision-making. A primary goal of
this study was to find whether, or to what extent, CDCs and anchor institutions are part of
Dallas’ contemporary governing coalition, and to understand the effects of that involvement.
With respect to the role of anchor institutions and CDCs in citywide decision-making, no
CDC director achieved enough nominations to be included in this study’s examination of
citywide decision-making. However, four leaders of anchor institutions – three university
presidents, and one hospital director – did receive enough nominations. This is a greater
representation than was found in previous studies, but both qualitative and quantitative data
suggest that the role of anchor institutions in citywide decision-making is limited; while these
actors appear in the mid-range of power scores, data suggest that in general, they are only
involved in decisions related to education and healthcare, or when a development project
seeks to include facilities for their institutions.
Importantly, there is one exception to the above characterizations of the roles of
anchor captains in decision-making – Gerald Turner, the president of Southern Methodist
University. As detailed in Chapter 4, Turner and the university appear to be unique among
Dallas’ anchor institutions, in that have both long-been associated with power and influence
in the city, as well as with several of Dallas’ first tier influentials, who commonly use the
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university as a proxy supporter of various projects, allowing them to indirectly express
approval without the “political baggage” associated with a direct endorsement.
The structure and nature of decision-making in Dallas as a whole. Based on its
analysis of 79 participant surveys and interviews, this study affirms its suspicion that the
strong, entrepreneurial governing coalition found in the Thometz study, which weakened
and fragmented into the complex entrepreneurial governing coalition by Elkin’s study, has
continued to fragment and fade, although it would be inaccurate to suggest that this coalition
has completely died. In the 1963 reputational study of Dallas, only two of 67 identified
leaders were not then-current members of the business community553, but in this study, nine
actors out of 32 are not directly affiliated with the city’s business community; recall that this
also contains two sets of actors (the city council and the CPC) who were considered jointly;
were these separated, the number of “non-business actors” would more-than triple. A
majority of these actors represent the public sector, especially at the highest levels of
citywide decision-making, so while private sector elites and civic organizations remain highly
influential, data strongly suggest that government officials have filled the “power vacuum”
left behind by a fragmented business community. The sympathies of these formal authorities
broadly still lie with the business- and real estate development communities, with a clear prodevelopment agenda being supported by a coalition containing the city manager, seven (out of
fourteen) district-based councilmembers, and the mayor, and it is supported by an elite,
wealthy, and older cohort of first tier influentials and the civic chairs whose organizations
represent the old guard ideas of Dallas’ past. However, an additional seven councilmembers
support more progressive alternatives, and their ranks have been growing for several years,
following the creation of the 14-1 election system.
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North Oak Cliff
This study also moved beyond previous research, by performing reputational
analyses on two neighborhoods within the city – North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas.
Looking first at North Oak Cliff, 40 of this study’s 79 participants self-reported as being
particularly knowledgeable about the decision-making process within this neighborhood, and
through their surveys and interviews, it was clear that these actors had a thorough
understanding of the history and current state of community-level leadership. Each
participant was asked to nominate ten actors to hypothetical decision-making committees,
whose decisions would need to be accepted by the neighborhood as a whole. Further, for
each actor that they nominated, participants were asked to rate the power level of that
individual, and to indicate any recent shared board- and committee service with that actor,
and their level of familiarity.
Analysis methods used. Duncan’s New Multiple Range Test was used to determine
that the ranges of mean power ratings indicated three tiers of decision-making power. As
with Dallas citywide, the number of nominations to decision-making committees that an
actor received was found to be positively correlated with power scores, again suggesting that
participant perceptions of power are a valid proxy for decision-making power in actuality. As
with Dallas as a whole, neither recent shared committee service nor familiarity were found to
be significantly correlated with participants’ perceptions of decision-making power, which
continues to validate the reputational method.
CDC and anchor institution involvement in decision-making. As with Dallas as
a whole, a primary aim of this study was to find whether, or to what extent, CDCs and
276

anchor institutions are part of North Oak Cliff’s decision-making structure. Although one
anchor captain, hospital director Martin Koonsman, was found to be influential in the
neighborhood decision-making process, analysis of participant surveys and interviews
suggests that Koonsman is only likely to involve himself in decisions that relate directly to
the hospital, such as facilities expansion plans, or ongoing conflicts with the residents of
households adjacent the hospital complex. Therefore, this study finds no particular evidence
that anchor institutions or CDCs have become part of any governing coalition in North Oak
Cliff, and no particular evidence to support the role of these institutions in equitable
economic development programs.
The structure and nature of decision-making in North Oak Cliff. Based on its
analysis of 40 participant surveys and interviews, this study finds that the antiregime of North
Oak Cliff’s past has been largely subsumed by the renewed presence of formal authorities in the
neighborhood – particularly its city councilmember, Scott Griggs, who occupies the highest
tier in the Duncan’s test for North Oak Cliff, and whom participants considered to be the
core actor in decision-making at the neighborhood level. Immediately below Griggs are his
appointees to development-related boards and commissions, as well as pro-development city
staff who (in most cases) defer to Griggs’ wishes, but on matters of development, advocate
on behalf of the developers. As participants unanimously agreed, other actors in the
neighborhood are often forced to work together to sway Griggs’ position on various policies
and development projects. This leads to the ad-hoc formation of temporary alliances, and
participants agreed that it is not uncommon for two leaders to work together on one issue
while simultaneously opposing one another on a different one.
Participants agreed that, broadly speaking, new development and gentrification in
this modest-income community are the catalysts for most debates among middle tier actors in
277

North Oak Cliff. Participants also identified alliances among rentiers and developers – the
first tier influentials and second tier influentials active in neighborhood decision-making. In
characterizing these alliances, participants observed that the three largest neighborhood
landowners work together with area developers in order to “bundle together” smaller parcels
of land to be more suitable for larger development projects, often at the cost of displacing
extant residents and businesses. Neighborhood leaders like Pam Conley and Lisa Benskin,
while lacking in direct authority over land-use decisions, nonetheless work to educate and
organize residents and business leaders who are at risk of displacement. Through mobilizing
neighborhood residents, these two have been somewhat successful in changing development
plans in ways that benefit their communities, and pressuring Councilmember Griggs to use
his land-use powers to keep new projects small, and within the scale of existing structures.
While Conley and Benskin organize social capital in the neighborhood, two
additional leaders – developer David Spence and “guerilla urban designer” Jason Roberts –
work to develop the physical capital in North Oak Cliff in ways that, while sometimes
controversial, nonetheless attract positive press to the area and help to anchor locally-owned
businesses into once-vacant commercial corridors. These two actors occupy the low tier of
the neighborhood’s decision-making structure, and often, participants characterized them as
independent actors who generally circumvent the larger decision-making process, albeit with
the support of Councilmember Griggs.
Downtown Dallas
In considering Downtown Dallas, 39 of this study’s 79 participants self-reported as
being particularly knowledgeable about the decision-making process within this
neighborhood, and through their surveys and interviews, reports that were validated through
survey data and interviews. As with participants responding to surveys and interview
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questions regarding North Oak Cliff, each of these 39 participants was asked to nominate
ten actors to hypothetical decision-making committees, whose decisions would need to be
accepted by the neighborhood as a whole. Further, for each actor that they nominated,
participants were asked to rate the power level of that individual, and to indicate any recent
shared board- and committee service with that actor, and their level of familiarity.
Analysis methods used. Duncan’s New Multiple Range Test was used to determine
that the ranges of mean power ratings indicated three tiers of decision-making power. As
with Dallas citywide and North Oak Cliff, the number of nominations to decision-making
committees that an actor received was found to be positively correlated with power scores,
again suggesting that participant perceptions of power are a valid proxy for decision-making
power in actuality. Additionally, neither recent shared committee service nor familiarity were
found to be significantly correlated with participants’ perceptions of decision-making power,
which continues to validate the reputational method.
CDC and anchor institution involvement in decision-making. As with Dallas as
a whole and North Oak Cliff, a primary aim of this study was to find whether, or to what
extent, CDCs and anchor institutions are part of Downtown Dallas’ decision-making
structure. This study finds no particular evidence that anchor institutions or CDCs have
become part of any governing coalition in Downtown Dallas and no particular evidence to
support the role of these institutions in equitable economic development programs.
However, as noted previously in this chapter, the private nonprofit development corporation
Downtown Dallas Inc. (DDI), and its CEO John Crawford, have become integral to
Downtown Dallas’ decision-making process.
Recall that, for over half a century, DDI has acted as a booster organization for
Downtown Dallas’ business- and development interests, and has acted as a public face for a
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subset of like-minded formal authorities, first tier influentials, and second tier influentials, who
combine public- and private resources to fulfill a common agenda: attracting economic
development and improving the vitality of Downtown Dallas. In effect, the supporting
members, directors, and senior leadership of DDI have created a neighborhood-level
governing coalition within the larger structure of governance for Dallas as a whole, and prior
to the transition to district-based councilmembers, many older participants referred to these
actors as the “real power” in Dallas, with one going so far as to say that:
Up until maybe the mid-nineties, you had Downtown, and then you had the rest of the city.
If any big idea came out of the “Big Men Downtown,” no matter how crazy it was, it was
probably going to happen. That’s how we got most of the more imaginative projects you see
through Downtown, from the underground mall to the top of (local landmark) Reunion
Tower. The mayor and the council ran the rest of the city, but the Big Men – the Hunts, the
Crows, the Coxes, the Perots, the Caruths – all of those families with museums and
highways named after them – they ran Downtown like their own personal sandbox, and the
truth is, for a long time it really was.

This coalition, as it existed before the current structure of the Dallas City Council, and
before the city’s economy collapsed, is likely part of the complex entrepreneurial governing
coalition that Elkin identified – the one less interested in the day-to-day operations of Dallas’
government, and more interested in a city government that facilitates “good development
opportunities” 554. Recall that Elkin already identified this coalition’s weakening following the
amendments to Dallas’ charter in the 1980s, and from participant comments that, following
the 1994 restructure of Dallas’ elected leaders, this coalition seems to have largely evaporated
outside of Downtown Dallas. Thus, what does the continued presence of a unified
governing coalition mean for decision-making within the “mini-fiefdom” represented by
Downtown Dallas’ council district, and headed by its councilmember?
To answer this, consider that according to Miles’s Law, actors are more likely to
support policies that benefit their organizations over those that serve collective interests, or
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in other words, “where you stand depends on where you sit.” While initially resulting from
observations at the national level, survey and interview data from this survey suggest that
this axiom applies to perspectives on Crawford and DDI as well. For example, a common
theme among supporters of Crawford and DDI is that the organization’s involvement has
resulted in less infighting among competing interests, and a more unified vision of
Downtown Dallas as part of DDI’s involvement in the Downtown Dallas 360 development
plan. Additionally, it is clear from participant comments that Crawford personally
encourages more collaboration with City Staff and Councilmember Kingston than would
have appeared in the past; comments representative of this position include:
DDI supports a lot of projects that end up controversial, but it won’t support a bad project
just because it’s a big one – you really have to show how your idea fits with the bigger plan.
Sometimes that means making concessions to folks like Kingston and his allies on City
Council, and other times that means digging in for a long fight.
It’s not like “The Godfather,” where you go to John (Crawford) for approval on something,
and if you don’t get it, nothing happens. This is still Dallas, and if you really want to build
something Downtown, there’s always a way to get it built. It’s just a lot easier when your
vision aligns with his, since his team basically wrote Downtown Dallas 360 and he’s got more
sway with the banks and City Hall than near (SIC) anyone else.

Presenting an alternate viewpoint, the participants presented negative opinions of
Crawford and DDI often suggested that the organization’s support structure undermines the
principles of a democratic society, by allowing private developers to circumvent the wishes
of Councilmember Kingston in ways that are not possible on other districts; recall that one
participant (whose comments were echoed by a number of others) said that: “What gets built
where has nothing to do with what residents want, or what the neighborhood needs if it’s
ever going to sustain itself after the building boom dies off.” Additionally, detractors
suggested that Crawford and his organization are often used as a proxy for public input. As
part of Downtown Dallas 360, DDI produces annual status reports on the state of Downtown
Dallas, and also holds a number of events throughout the year to gauge public opinion on
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various projects. However, these events are often held on weekday evenings, frequently
require reservations to be made in advance, and are all-but exclusively marketed through
social media. As a result, people who work unstable schedules, or who are unable to find
childcare, or simply cannot afford to take the time to attend these meetings are unable to
effectively voice their opinions. Describing this situation, two participants said that:
There’s (SIC) a lot of poor people living in Downtown, but you’d hardly know it by looking
at the crowd in one of these big meetings. I don’t even know if some of them would be let in
the building, if they even knew to get an RSVP and could show up.
Decisions get made behind closed doors, in the closed sessions of directors’ meetings, and
over lunch and dinner meetings all over the city. When all that’s done, and DDI wants it to
look like there’s neighborhood buy-in, they’ll plan something in one of these gorgeous hotels
around Downtown, but only at a time of day when folks with a regular 9-5 job can go, and
they’re all saying the same things about how they want more night life and how the poor
folks and the homeless are all criminals to be locked up or removed. Those homeless folks,
poor folks, (and) even the few parents with kids around here – they don’t show up, but it
wouldn’t really matter if they did.

It should be noted that this sense of inevitability regarding projects that Crawford and DDI
support (sometimes bordering on hopelessness or resignation) was a frequent theme among
participants, appearing in 22 (56.4%) of 39 the interviews.
While Councilmember Kingston’s objections to value-neutral development in
Downtown Dallas are often overridden by the city council’s pro-development majority, it cannot
be assumed that the councilmember is completely powerless with respect to economic
development. Indeed, recall that individual councilmembers hold broad authority over TIF
funding within their district, and this control is largely protected from the will of a council
majority. As such, when a particular developer wants to access that funding within the large
TIF districts in Downtown Dallas, they must negotiate with Councilmember Kingston.
Once again, this places Crawford and DDI in a position of being able to assemble a package
of concessions and design revisions that are likely to be agreeable to the councilmember, and
which already meet the requirements of Dallas’ various construction and design codes; as
one participant described the situation:
282

[Crawford] knows what it’s like to work with councilmembers who don’t really
agree with his vision for Downtown. He knew how to work with Angela (Hunt)
before, and he knows how to work with Philip (Kingston) now, so when he tells
you that you need to change something in a project to get that TIF money, then
you’d be well-served by listening.

The structure and nature of decision-making in Downtown Dallas. Based on
its analysis of 39 participant surveys and interviews, this study finds that the emerging rift
between pro-development and progressive development leaders is writ largest in Downtown Dallas,
the city’s traditional epicenter of development. As noted previously, the majority of
Downtown Dallas’ decision-making structure (like that of Dallas as a whole) continues to
strongly resemble the complex entrepreneurial governing coalition described in the Elkin
study, even as such a coalition has largely faded throughout the remainder of Dallas. The
purpose of this contemporary governing coalition, as it was during Elkin’s study (and
Thometz’s before that) is to promote business- and real estate development interests,
particularly those interests that, returning to extant urban theory, increase the exchange value
of real estate in Dallas’ urban core. This entrenched, pro-development agenda is composed of
two clusters of actors – first, the first tier influentials who are personally able to access city-level
formal authorities in order to find support for their projects, and second, the second tier
influentials who are individually unlikely to secure an audience with citywide formal authorities.
Therefore, while a subset of the most influential actors within the pro-development agenda can
reliably count on support of actors like billionaire oilman-turned-developer Ray Hunt and
City Manager A.C. Gonzalez, actors with less clout must rely on John Crawford and DDI to
act as an intercessor and advisor for their projects, making Crawford a “swing vote” of sorts
on development decisions.
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The success of Downtown Dallas’ pro-development agenda lies in its ability to reliably
sideline its opposition, while also silencing a disorganized (but growing) list of detractors, but
how long can this success last? In the two decades since the start of district-based council
elections, those councilmembers who continue to support the “Dallas Way” have seen their
numbers decline, in favor of councilmembers (like Kingston) who favor a more progressive
future. In addition, recall that younger business leaders and real estate developers frequently
show little (if any) interest in getting involved in the politics of development, leaving few (if
any) true successors to the “Big Men Downtown.” Describing this transition, and what it
portends for the future, participants’ comments are well-represented by the following:
The main players in Downtown all see that the old way of building isn’t going to
last much longer. (Councilmember) Kingston and the folks who agree with him are
the future. The developers who aren’t too stubborn to change are finally embracing
things like historic preservation and “complete streets,” and there’s even some
serious talk about mixed-income housing in Downtown. They don’t want to be on
the wrong side of the future, so they’re starting to change things now. Others,
especially the younger ones, are just staying out of big projects for now, waiting to
see what happens over the next couple of elections.

Equitable economic development in the commercial republic. At its outset, this
study argued that, although CDCs and anchor institutions hold the potential to advance
beyond “ancillary” status in the urban governing coalition, there is debate as to whether this
occurs in actuality. While this study found no evidence supporting the role of these
particular kinds of third-sector organizations in driving equitable urban economic
development projects or policymaking within Dallas as a whole, or in either North Oak Cliff
or Downtown Dallas, this is not the case in other cities. In the sections that follow, this
study will briefly summarize efforts of anchor institutions and CDCs actively implementing
these projects in two cities: Philadelphia and Cleveland. Then, it will speculate on why this
kind of involvement was not found in Dallas. Finally, it will expand upon the efforts of two
actors in North Oak Cliff – David Spence and Jason Roberts – in creating integrated
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networks of locally-owned, locally-oriented businesses within a community that, in many
ways, is more similar to the aforementioned Rust Belt cities than it is to the rest of Dallas.

Equitable economic development in a subset of other cities. One example of
third-sector involvement in urban economic development and policymaking is in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In this city, like in Dallas, political and business leaders exercise
tremendous control over urban policy and economic development555. However, since (at
least) the turn of the 21st century, actors involved in Philadelphia’s third-sector have begun
injecting themselves into decisions regarding education556 and economic development557.
The results of this involvement can be seen in cross-sector partnerships within the
city’s economically-marginalized neighborhoods. For example, Drexel University, the
William Penn Foundation, and the City of Philadelphia are leveraging over $575 million in
local- and federal Promise Zone funds, in order to support job creation, access to education,
and spur economic development into low-income, majority-minority neighborhoods in West
Philadelphia558. This involvement may also be part of a potential progressive shift in the
city’s governing coalition, with anchor institutions like the University of Pennsylvania
providing public forums for progressive citizen engagement, and successfully pushing the
city’s development-focused governing coalition into retreat559.
A second example is in Cleveland, Ohio, which is also the traditional home of a
tightly-knit pro-development governing coalition560. Here, the cross-sectoral involvement of
CDCs in economic development stretching back (at least) to the Voinovich (1980-1988) and
White (1989-2001) administrations561 have opened the door to a more progressive,
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heterarchic governing coalition with a heavy emphasis on neighborhood redevelopment
involving the public-, private-, and third sectors562; as a result, the city’s growth-minded elites
are more willing to accommodate neighborhood-level interests (even if only begrudgingly)563.
Following the mid-century collapse of its industrial base, Cleveland has suffered
economically for decades, and its population is under half its 1950 level564, but continued
cross-sector collaboration has created a sustainable, equitable economic development model
that, while still small, suggests a new possibility for other, economically-challenged cities.
Since 2008, the Evergreen Cooperative – a partnership between the Cleveland Foundation,
Cleveland Clinic, University Hospitals, Case Western Reserve, and the city’s municipal
government – has leveraged over $35 million in grants to create three worker-owned
businesses in six of the city’s most economically-marginalized neighborhoods565, providing
hundreds of jobs and allowing workers to generate wealth through equity stakes in the
companies themselves566.
So, with respect to the role of CDCs and anchor institutions in urban economic
development and public policy, why Philadelphia and Cleveland, but not Dallas? To begin,
governments must bargain over the conditions for inducing capital investment, in order to
achieve the economic goals of dominant political interests. Further, the ability to bargain for
capital investment is dependent upon the market position of a city, so an economically weak
city like Cleveland or Philadelphia is less able to bargain with the private sector than an
economically advantaged city like Dallas or Chicago567.
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Building on this argument, this study suggests the possibility that there may be little
(or no) private-sector capital investment available in cities with significant, decades-long
patterns of commercial disinvestment – cities like both Philadelphia and Cleveland, which
saw tremendous population- and economic losses during the Fordist crisis, and remain
economically troubled decades later, even though signs point to some amount of recovery
following the Great Recession568. Therefore, it may be that, in the absence of private-sector
actors willing (or able) to invest capital into a particular city, even the most ardent prodevelopment leaders in Rust Belt cities like Philadelphia and Cleveland are simply more
amenable to working with nontraditional organizations like CDCs and anchor institutions.
Returning to the Dallas example, recall that this study found no evidence supporting
the role of CDCs or anchor institutions leveraging more equitable economic development in
Dallas or either of the study’s focus neighborhoods. Although Dallas is not dissimilar to
Cleveland and Philadelphia with respect to urban poverty indicators, unlike both of these
cities, it is a hotbed of private investment and real estate development. In 2015, commercial
real estate investment was up by 45% over 2014; further, of the $129 billion invested in
2015, over half went to commercial real estate ($33.5 billion) and apartments ($33 billion),
with over $22 billion dollars in investment coming from foreign sources – primarily Asia and
Canada569. In many respect, contemporary Dallas looks increasingly like the Dallas of the
early 1980s, with tremendous investment in Downtown Dallas, as well as over 5 million
square feet in mixed-use development located along previously-undeveloped tracts adjacent
DART light rail stops since 2013570. With such a strong economy being fueled primarily by
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private investment, what need is there for public-sector leaders to enter into arrangements
with third-sector dollars to induce cross-sectoral development?
Economic boom times aside, recall also the “Dallas Way,” that is, the city’s longstanding habit of using development to pave over the plight of the city’s poor. Even if
Dallas’ economy lacked its current strength, it is unclear whether political leaders would
consider these kinds of partnerships – certainly, these were not pursued during the economic
downturn stretching from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. Then again, the city’s political
leadership was still dominated by pro-business interests, and while transition was underway,
the complex entrepreneurial coalition was still headed by the “big men downtown,” whose ideas
for economic revitalization were still heavily anchored in the private sector, and the use of
public incentives for private development. Would Dallas’ current political leadership, with its
(slim) pro-development majority be willing to entertain the idea of equitable alternative
development strategies if the city’s economy once again faltered? In Downtown Dallas,
could Downtown Dallas Inc., its private nonprofit development corporation, address the
issues of the poor (assuming it had the will to do so, which is certainly questionable).
Dallas, and scholars thereof, may not have to wait long to find out. Although real
estate investment and economic growth are both still high in Dallas, especially in Downtown
Dallas and its surrounding neighborhoods, commercial vacancy remains between 10% and
28% throughout the urban core, and new properties are sitting on the market longer,
signaling an impending slowdown571. While Dallas’ economy has greatly diversified itself
after the Oil Boom went bust, if the bottom should fall out again, this study argues that
Downtown Dallas Inc., which is funded by the real estate developers and businesses whose
activities are focused primarily in- and around the CBD, would largely lack the financial
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resources to engage in equitable alternative development strategies, like those seen in
Philadelphia and Cleveland. If Dallas “hot” real estate market cools, these private firms
would likely shift their focus to other cities where they have significant operations, leaving
(at best) token offices in the Dallas market, and these may be responsible for both the
central city and its surrounding suburbs.
In its current economic context, Dallas is doing precious little to address the growing
economic disparities between its “haves” and its “have-nots,” and given its past, and the
present state of the city’s decision-making structure, it is unlikely that the city’s current
leadership would engage in partnerships with anchor institutions and CDCs to create
equitable economic development opportunities if that economic context should cool. While
the current pro-development leadership is – slowly – being replaced by a growing progressive
development coalition, it is unclear when the “8-7 split” will fall in favor of leaders who favor
new strategies, and further, it is also unclear when significant numbers of leading bureaucrats
will follow suit. Within this somewhat-dismal outlook, however, there are two emerging
leaders who, by finding ways to operate outside of the decision-making structure – albeit
with the support of some of its members, are finding success at equitable alternative
development strategies; these emerging leaders will be the focus of the next section.

Equitable economic development, the Dallas way. While Philadelphia and
Cleveland have suffered economically, Dallas’ history since deindustrialization is largely
characterized by economic growth, even without the inclusion (or, as some might see it,
interference) of the third sector. As a result, it should be unsurprising that leaders of CDCs
and anchor institutions are largely absent from the highest echelons of decision-making.
Nonetheless, the continued preference for continuing neoliberal, corporate-centered
development practices among a (shrinking) majority of Dallas’ highest levels of leadership
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should not be taken to indicate that efforts to induce alternative, equitable economic
development are not being undertaken, if not at the citywide level, then at least in (a subset
of) Dallas’ neighborhoods.
In Chapters 4 and 5, this study introduced the roles of local developer David Spence
and “guerilla urban designer” Jason Roberts, and how each, on a (comparatively) small scale,
is working to bring economic development into the North Oak Cliff neighborhood in ways
that keep ownership within the neighborhood itself. Although their particular projects differ,
what unites these two actors is that they have proven themselves willing to operate
independently of other decision-makers, and circumvent the larger decision-making process
in order to achieve their objectives. In the sections that follow, this study will briefly expand
on how each of these actors works to improve economic equity within their neighborhood,
using specific examples for each, and connecting them to extant urban theory.
David Spence. Jane Jacobs, in her seminal work, argued that neighborhoods devolve
into slums in a cascading pattern, with small changes rapidly leading to decay; she also
suggested that the reverse could also be true – small improvements in a neighborhood could
lead to rapid improvements572; in Dallas, this “cascading effect” can be seen in the work of
David Spence. Embodying Jacobs’ mixed-use, diverse, organic development mantra,
Spence’s most upscale projects are surrounded by taquerias, tire shops, and quinceanera
boutiques that have been locally-owned for generations. Participants regularly credited
Spence for his role in the ongoing revitalization of the Bishop Arts District, for saving
commercial corridors throughout North Oak Cliff, and for his adaptive reuse of existing
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space has encouraged other local entrepreneurs to revive shuttered movie theaters, markets,
and retail outlets573.
The key to Spence’s success is more than simply redevelopment existing space;
Spence also reaches out to area business owners looking to grow, and acts as a networking
hub between his old clients and his new ones, helping to found- and expand collaborations
among North Oak Cliff’s locally-owned businesses. One of Spence’s most successful
collaborations has been with Shannon and Jenni Neffendorf, owners of Oak Cliff Coffee
Roasters. In 2008, the Neffendorfs began roasting coffee in their garage, selling locally
within the neighborhood574. Five years later, a partnership with Spence allowed them to open
a storefront (Davis Street Espresso), and expand their clientele to include over two dozen
restaurants and markets throughout North Oak Cliff and the Dallas area, while offering
pastry options sourced from two neighborhood bakeries575. As their business has grown,
their success has enabled the Neffendorfs to open a second shop next door to the original576.
Jason Roberts. Not everyone has the capital to invest in repurposing vacant and
abandoned buildings, though. Jason Roberts became a public figure in 2005, when he helped
found the Oak Cliff Transit Authority – a nonprofit organization that advocated for
installing an electric streetcar to link North Oak Cliff (a former streetcar suburb) with
Downtown Dallas. While some observers praised the five-year effort to connect these two
growing neighborhoods, others describe the project as “by hipsters, for hipsters,” and
begrudged the $50 million price tag, roughly half of which was covered by a federal TIGER
grant577. Opponents also criticized the limited number of stops and limited hours of
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operation as unhelpful for residents with low incomes who reside in North Oak Cliff.
Although the line has proven controversial, with frequent service interruptions for
maintenance issues since the 2015 inaugural run, it has already been successful enough that
millions in additional city- and federal funding has been allocated to construct new stops
throughout North Oak Cliff578.
As Chapters 4 and 5 note, Roberts – who also works as a full-time IT consultant579 –
is more commonly known as a “guerilla urban designer,” who sees blocks that have been
“written off” as blighted, and envisions flower-lined, pedestrian- and bicycle-friendly streets,
where empty lots are replaced with small, locally-owned shops selling locally-produced
goods, and where people can see a place as something more than “that place” where “those
people” live. His organization (a group of his friends with $1,000 between them) called
themselves Team Better Block, and identified an abandoned commercial corridor in North
Oak Cliff that, while lined with abandoned storefronts, was zoned as light industrial, and
(thanks to Dallas’ draconian zoning laws) could not be easily rezoned.
Not satisfied with leaving this block to continue declining, Roberts and his team
declared it a target for temporary, guerilla-style urban development. The team painted midblock pedestrian crosswalks, used potted plants to create protected bicycle lanes, installed
(temporary) outdoor seating, and worked with local businesses and craftspeople to create
pop-up shops and turning vacant storefronts into cafes that lined the street580. Strictly
speaking, none of this was legal, but Roberts had the approval of the area’s city
councilmember, and the city’s code enforcement team was notoriously absent from the area
during the event581. The project was so successful that Roberts has repeated it in North Oak
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Cliff, and now his team consults with other cities (most recently, Detroit) to engage in
similar programs582. Importantly for the neighborhood, though, several of the businesses that
participated in the Better Block’s projects have remained in North Oak Cliff, hiring locally
and forming a network of businesses that support one another583.
Good spaces and better blocks in building a local economy. Although the effects of projects
undertaken by Spence and Roberts remain small compared to the size of the neighborhood
and the magnitude of the need for equitable economic development, they are nonetheless
crucial components of equitable economic development in North Oak Cliff in a number of
different ways. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will connect these actors’ real-world
projects with extant urban theory regarding locally-owned, locally-oriented businesses. Then,
it will consider the role of neighborhood context in the ability of projects like these to be
successful, or even exist in the first place.
To begin, the businesses that work with Roberts and Spence often become part of
North Oak Cliff’s interconnected, organic network of locally-owned, locally-oriented
businesses; this network serves a number of purposes. First, it strengthens the economic
links between each business, allowing firms to more easily communicate their needs to one
another. Second, it helps local businesses identify new opportunities for expansion into new
markets. Finally, it helps local businesses match buyers and sellers584. Indeed, all of these
benefits can be seen in the aforementioned example of Oak Cliff Coffee Roasters, which was
able to move from being a (literal) garage industry to becoming an anchor business within
the neighborhood and a regional exporter of goods, bringing dollars from all over the Dallas
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region back into an economically-marginalized neighborhood, thanks (at least in part) to the
local business network found in the neighborhood.
Additionally, Roberts’ and Spence’s focus on supporting home-grown businesses
through adaptive reuse of space preserves the “local flavor” of the neighborhood – that is,
its culture, architecture, history, and art, when chain businesses would be more likely to
bulldoze and rebuild585. Further, these businesses allow local dollars to be circulated
repeatedly through North Oak Cliff, creating a local economic multiplier effect and
increasing local tax revenues586. Finally, this interconnected dependence among local
businesses makes it harder for any one of these to abandon the area587. For this reason, and
because of the added variety found among these businesses, the entire local economy
becomes more resilient in the face of economic shocks588. Looking toward North Oak Cliff’s
future, economic stability underpins enduring citizen engagement with politics and decisionmaking structures589– something currently lacking among long-time neighborhood residents.
North Oak Cliff: Philadelphia and Cleveland writ small. With respect to attempts at
equitable economic development, why North Oak Cliff, but not Downtown Dallas or Dallas
as a whole? This study argues that, when considering the respective contexts of these three
geographies, North Oak Cliff is actually more similar to the previously-discussed cities of
Cleveland and Philadelphia than it is to either Downtown Dallas or Dallas as a whole. Like
those cities, North Oak Cliff has experienced decades of economic decline and residential
abandonment, and its population – especially its people of color – generally earn low
incomes, even as much of the northern half of Dallas continues to thrive. However, unlike
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Cleveland and Philadelphia, as a single neighborhood, North Oak Cliff is unable to enter
into cross-sectorial partnerships with anchor institutions and CDCs, and Dallas’ city council
has historically shown little interest in devoting significant resources to improving “those
neighborhoods” occupied by “those people.”
Dallas’ contemporary governing coalition. To briefly review the state of Dallas’
governing coalition in the years prior to this study, recall that as Chapter 2 first described,
when Carol Thometz looked across Dallas in the early 1960s, and looked through the eyes of
the city’s leaders to understand how the Dallas was run, she found a structure composed of
nearly 70 men from industries like finance, commerce, and manufacturing590. Among these,
about 10% were centrally involved in nearly every aspect of decision-making, while a further
80% acted in many, but not all decisions, while the final 10% were only involved tangentially
as “technical experts” on particular issues591. At that time, Dallas’ political leadership was
selected by its strong, unified, and resource-laden business community, forming close
professional- and personal ties among political and business leaders in what Elkin would
refer to as a pure entrepreneurial governing coalition592; the at-large electoral system ensured
that, with few exceptions, the wealthy, white voters of northern Dallas reliably supported the
candidates forwarded by groups like the Dallas Citizens Council and the Citizens Charter
Association, while the voices of minority groups in southern Dallas were largely silenced (or
in later years, tokenized)593.
This governing coalition would grow Dallas from a regional manufacturing hub into
a global city, and would elect as mayors men like Bob Folsom and Starke Taylor, real-estate
developers whose policies toward development would expand the city’s footprint to well
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over 300 square miles (of land that their companies largely owned), and would fill in that
land with everything from skyscrapers to apartment complexes and acres of single-family
housing, in a decade-long building boom that only ended when the local economy collapsed
in the mid-1980s. In the years leading up to this collapse, Stephen Elkin looked across
Dallas, and found that the city’s untrammeled success in attracting globalized businesses,
executives of which had little loyalty to Dallas itself, combined with the city’s first attempt to
modernize its election system, had left the city’s governing coalition both depleted, and
marred by infighting594. Gone were the days when Dallas’ industrial titans played key roles in
the day-to-day running of the city, and many of the aging leaders had found themselves
without successors to carry on with the “Dallas Way.” Even though the pure entrepreneurial
coalition had given way to a complex entrepreneurial coalition, Elkin found that when business
leaders and real estate developers wanted support for their projects from Dallas political
leaders, support was nearly always found595.
This study does not challenge the notion that Dallas’ decision-making structure was,
at one time, an archetypical entrepreneurial governing coalition; it also does not challenge
Elkin’s differentiation between the pure entrepreneurial coalition of the 1960s and 1970s with
the complex entrepreneurial coalition lasting from the 1980s until (at least) the mid-1990s.
Instead, this study proffers that as Dallas emerged from economic ruin as a globalized
economy composed largely of multinational firms with no particular loyalty to Dallas itself,
and transitioned its political leadership to a district-based system that crippled the onceunstoppable political machine found in civic organizations like the Dallas Citizens Council
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and (now-defunct) Citizens Charter Association, the seeds for structural transformation were
sewn.
Also recall that the precursor elements that signal structural transformations among
governing coalition typologies are poorly-studied, though the Elkin study notably includes a
number of criteria that could divorce political leaders from the lure of economic elites – in
effect, charting a hypothetical course that could transition entrepreneurial governing coalitions
toward some (arguably) more progressive alternative. These conditions include a lowering of
barriers to political dissent, reducing the eagerness and tenacity of business leaders with
respect to public inducement packages, reducing the advantages that business leaders have
when it comes to collecting and dispersing political funds, curbing the natural tendency of
political leaders to facilitate inducements, and improving the grasp of public officials on the
considerations of bowing to commercial interests at the expense of the principles of
republican government596. Given the transitions since the Elkin study, are some subset of
these criteria now satisfied?
This study argues that, in part, a subset of Elkin’s conditions for transformation have
been met. First, this study argues that barriers to political dissent were effectively reduced
when the city switched from an at-large city council and mayor to its present hybrid of
district-based councilmembers with an at-large mayor, 14 of 15 political leaders were
suddenly held accountable primarily to their constituents. Councilmembers today are often
seen in their communities, for example, to hold public hearings and gather public input,
especially when the public is unhappy with a decision. To remain in the good graces of their
constituents, councilmembers must approach decisions with an eye for the costs and
benefits to their particular district, lest they be punished during re-election attempts. Second,
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this study argues that district-based political leaders are somewhat less willing to pursue a
pro-business agenda, especially when that agenda contains no considerations for their
constituencies. Finally, without a unified business community, there is no longer a single
“pro-business” agenda for political leaders to follow, and benefits to, for example, real estate
developers seeking to repurpose occupied buildings must be weighed against the risk of
harm to the residents and businesses that occupy them.
Thus, if political leaders are bound to the will of their constituents, and the business
community is too disorganized to produce a unified agenda for those leaders to follow,
Dallas’ citywide decision-making structure seems to resist categorization using the existing
typologies. If Dallas’ decision-making structure has stumbled its way into a structure that no
longer resembles the entrepreneurial governing coalition archetype, and if this divergence is too
great for qualified descriptors (e.g. Elkin’s complex entrepreneurial nomenclature), then how can
Dallas’ contemporary decision-making structure be most accurately described? In answering
this question, first recall that this study recognizes seven broad types of governing coalitions;
a summary of these, restated from Chapter 2, is provided in table 6.28.

Caretaker
Demand-Side
Entrepreneurial
Progressive
Stewardship

Table 6.28: Typology of Governing Coalitions
Lead Actors
Minority-led electoral coalitions, engaged citizens, single-district councilmembers, neighborhood governments,
social justice or broker mayors, fiscal populists
Caretaker mayors, anti-growth bureaucrats, fiscal populists, post-materialists
Neighborhood organizations, single-district councilmembers, minority mayors, post-materialists
Business-led coalitions, strong mayor, pro-growth bureaucrats
Minority-led electoral coalitions, single-district councilmembers, neighborhood governments, social justice mayors
Group coalitions, engaged citizens, fiscal populists, "broker" mayors

Antiregime

Temporary, issue-based coalitions; neighborhood organizations

Coalition Type
Activist

These definitions in mind, figure 6.04 combines data previously introduced throughout this
chapter, repackaging them into a comprehensive view of decision-making in Dallas as a
whole, as well as in North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. These data first illustrate the
tiered decision-making structures found at the citywide level and in both focus
neighborhoods, as well as the composition of each tier with respect to category of decision298

maker. Further, the figure portrays the divisions within each separate structure with to the
three development agendas found by this study – the pro-development and progressive development
agendas found in all three geographies, and the anti-development agenda found in North Oak
Cliff. Finally, the figure shows where these three separate decision-making structures are
connected by actors with shared membership.
Figure 6.04: The Interconnected Decision-Making Structure in
Dallas, North Oak Cliff, and Downtown Dallas

299

These data suggest a number of trends that connect contemporary decision-making
structures in Dallas to those of the Elkin and Thometz studies. To begin, these data support
the prior assertion that a majority of decision-makers in Dallas support a pro-development
agenda, with roughly twice as many actors supporting this agenda than support alternatives.
Additionally, these data suggest that a larger subset of leaders in Downtown Dallas is also
active at the citywide level, when compared to leaders in North Oak Cliff. These findings are
both telling and unsurprising, given the history of Dallas with respect to white flight and
political disconnection of southern-sector neighborhoods, as well as the city’s traditional
penchant for using value-neutral economic development as a response to urban problems.
Data also suggest that that to whatever extent Elkin’s complex entrepreneurial governing
coalition persists, it is at its strongest within Dallas’ central urban core. However, at the
citywide level, whatever remains of that decision-making coalition has grown far more
limited in 2016 than it was in either 1963 or 1987. What remains is a pair of looselyorganized citywide agendas regarding economic development, and while adherents of the
pro-development agenda currently holds a slim majority of decision-making power, their
opponents continue to make gains at each election. As such, can Dallas’ decision-making
structure even be considered a governing coalition?

Dallas’ decision-making structure as a nonregime. For a decision-making
structure to be a governing coalition, several criteria must be met; these include:
•
•
•
•
•
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Dallas’ contemporary structure no longer features a stable, informal group of actors who can
marshal enough resources to push a specific agenda (and it is unclear whether, except in the
case of Downtown Dallas 360, such an agenda exists); instead, individual actors (and civic
organizations) support particular projects, sometimes with the support of other actors, and
sometimes in opposition to those same individuals. With lingering fragmentation among the
city’s business community precluding partnerships across business sectors, and a sharp
divide among pro-development and progressive development councilmembers, there is also little
enduring cooperation across the state-market divide outside of individual projects (again
excepting Downtown Dallas 360). Finally, with a lack of a single policy agenda at the citywide
level, this study found little evidence to suggest a pattern of selective incentives used to build
consensus support for anything resembling a distinct policy agenda on the level of, for
example, Stone’s famous Atlanta case. Thus, this study considers Dallas to be a nonregime; but
more than that – Dallas appears to be a collapsed entrepreneurial coalition with enough
vestiges of the “old way” to prevent a “new way” from fully emerging, but not enough to
revive the development-first agenda that once was. This divide creates a situation similar to
that of New Orleans in the early 2000s598, though for different reasons, and with different
possible outcomes.
In the New Orleans example, this nonregime city lacks a stable of would-be political
leaders within its business community, and this community also fails to provide monetary
and non-monetary resources to the leaders that do emerge. Slow-growing, issue-based
coalitions must negotiate (and re-negotiate) all policy decisions, and without stable ties
among them, each new negotiation must start from square one599. Such coalitions may
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individually draw resources from private interests, but these resources are limited, and as a
result, various actors only have enough resources to govern within particular interest areas,
such as attracting a professional basketball team in 2002, or reducing the city’s high crime
and murder rates in the 1990s600. In their initial assessment of the New Orleans nonregime,
Scholars Burns and Thomas suggested that the city’s amorphous decision-making nonstructure served well enough to avoid municipal bankruptcy or state takeover, but that was
wholly inadequate during both the city’s preparation for Hurricane Katrina, and during its
reconstruction because it lacked the stability necessary to smoothly allocate resources and
enact relevant policies in the lead-up to- and immediate aftermath of the disaster601. While
this initial assessment raised concerns over whether an enduring governing coalition could
form to address the city’s ongoing needs602, a more recent assessment suggests that some
amount of stability eventually returned to the city’s leadership structure, and that an alliance
between Uptown whites and the business community has emerged, albeit to the detriment of
people of color and people with low incomes603.
Like New Orleans in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Dallas does not
have a single, unified governing coalition, resulting from the collapse of the coalition that
once existed. However, an important distinction must be made; while New Orleans in the
early 2000s lacked any enduring decision-making structure, Dallas suffers from having too
many. Consider that, at the citywide level, two sorts of governing coalitions exist, though
with differential access to various resources. At the center of each of these coalitions is a
subset of the city’s mayor and city council – the 15 people with formal decision-making
authority – as well as leading bureaucrats who are responsible for interpreting and
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implementing the decisions that are made. Each of the 14 district-based councilmembers is
principally accountable to their district, rather than the city as a whole. Further, each of these
councilmembers, the mayor, and those leading bureaucrats, holds a unique agenda, a unique
set of preferences, unique loyalties, and a unique willingness to be influenced by particular
actors. As a result, there are 15 different entry points into the decision-making process, and
numerous entry points into the implementation of decisions, once they are made.
Further complicating the decision-making structure, consider that each council
district is composed of perhaps innumerable neighborhood-level decision-making
arrangements. Thus, city-level leadership is characterized by temporary arrangements
between two semi-stable coalitions with differential access to private capital, and featuring
political leaders who are themselves answerable solely to members of within-district issuebased associations that individually fail to possess the resources required to support
permanent civic leaders aligned with a singular agenda. Thus, in considering the decisionmaking structure of Dallas, it may be more accurate to consider Dallas as a league of microcities with a “first among equals,” at-large mayor, with decisions being framed in order to
achieve an “eight-vote majority,” rather than with an eye toward effectiveness and equity.
To differentiate Dallas’ decision-making structure from what is found in New
Orleans, and further, to differentiate the contemporary iteration of this structure from those
of Dallas’ own past, this study considers Dallas’ current decision-making to be an unstable
nonregime. What, however, does this mean? To begin, as an unstable decision-making structure,
it is relatively amenable to change – consider that at the citywide level, the slim majority of
pro-development agenda proponents is shrinking, while the minority of progressive development
agenda proponents grows as political leaders reach their term limits; further, while progressive
development agenda proponents seem to be replaced by like-minded successors (e.g.
303

Councilmember Kingston and his predecessor, Councilmember Hunt), this is not always the
case for pro-development actors (e.g. Councilmember Griggs and his predecessor,
Councilmember Jasso).
Further, as a nonregime, citywide decision-making power is first fragmented among
districts, and then divided among district-based political actors, their appointees, and various
levels of bureaucrats who follow semi-stable agendas. Each of these agendas draws support
(or at least non-opposition) from a variety of private- and (to a much lesser extent) thirdsector actors, who use their access to resources to influence various decisions, but who
generally have no particular authority to make decisions on their own (with exceptions for
organizations explicitly given authority, such as Downtown Dallas Inc.), and who most often
act on their individual agendas, rather than “going along to get along” within a larger
coalition. In addition, each council district studied seems to feature its own decision-making
structure, independent of the kinds of structures found in other districts, although more
research would be needed to verify whether this claim holds for all 14 districts. This study
argues that, assuming that each of the 14 districts possesses a unique decision-making
structure, if Dallas is to be moved toward a more equitable future with respect to economic
development, changes must occur at the district level first, such that a majority of districts
feature progressive, equitable economic development agendas, and leaders who support
these agendas and provide necessary resources; this perspective (and implications thereof)
will be revisited and expanded upon in Chapter 7.
Discussion of coalition hypotheses, in summary. This study’s second three
hypothesis are designed to address its second and third research questions, respectively: “To
what extent (if any) are CDCs and anchor institutions active participants in Dallas’ governing
coalition?” and “If CDCs and anchor institutions are active participants in that coalition,
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what is the effect of their involvement on urban development and policymaking?” In the
preceding sections, this study evaluated qualitative results of surveys and interviews from its
79 participants, in order to first uncover the nature of governing coalitions for Dallas as a
whole, but also for two of its central urban neighborhoods: North Oak Cliff and Downtown
Dallas.
Through its evaluation, this study found that, although there are signs of a growing
progressive minority among Dallas’ leaders, the city as a whole continues to embody an
entrepreneurial governing coalition, focused on corporatist economic development strategies
and maintaining a pro-business environment. Further, this study found speculative evidence
suggesting that, as Dallas’ old guard continues to fade, uncertainty about the future of Dallas’
leadership may be preventing younger executives from joining in the politics of decisionmaking, out of concern for choosing the “losing” side. Additionally, although this study
found no particular evidence to support the presence of anchor institutions and CDCs at the
highest levels of decision-making, it did find that in North Oak Cliff, there are nonetheless
efforts to engage in equitable economic development strategies, through the development of
a network of locally-owned, locally-oriented businesses. Their results, while limited, offer
real-world examples of the theoretical benefits of interconnected, locally-owned businesses,
and do so with a flavor that respects the neighborhood “as it is,” while offering a vision of
what the neighborhood could be in the future. Finally, this study presented data supporting
its conclusion that, at the citywide level, Dallas’ decision-making structure is best
conceptualized as an unstable nonregime, owing to a lack of cohesive, enduring, cross-sector
support for a single developmental agenda. Because citywide decision-makers are divided
(though unevenly) between two agendas (i.e. pro-development and progressive development),
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decision-making with respect to economic development is difficult, and coalitions tend to
form around a patchwork of individual projects that generally lack any sort of overall vision.
Chapter Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze and evaluate the data reported in Chapter
4, in order to address this study’s research questions. In the preceding chapter sections, this
study first revisited its research questions and hypotheses. Then, it evaluated its qualitative
findings in order to render an image of contemporary urban governance in Dallas, the
relationship between the city’s decision-making structures and entities involved in equitable
economic development projects, and how these projects compare to those in a subset of
other cities. The implications of these relationships, as well as possibilities for Dallas’ future,
are the focus of the next (final) chapter.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS RE-REVISITED, AND NEW DIRECTIONS
Conceptualizing urban decision-making structures based on theory is one thing;
understanding those structures from the perspectives of the decision-makers themselves, and
situating them within evolving socioeconomic- and historical contexts is an altogether
different proposition. While decades of urban scholarship has focused on the former, there
appears to be a relative dearth of recent studies in the vein of the latter, especially as cities
muddle their way through the post-Fordist landscape. This is problematic, because
historically, as cities have transitioned from one socioeconomic paradigm to the next, the
theories that scholars consider reliable and accurate (notwithstanding all of the usual
normative and empirical caveats about using these terms in the social sciences) have also
transitioned, moving from community power studies of Fordist cities in the 1950s and 1960s
to the crisis-era growth machines and urban regimes of the 1980s and 1990s. Now, cities
have transitioned into yet another new socioeconomic paradigm (post-Fordism), but there
appears to be no particularly new “grand” urban theory to match.
Thus, the purpose of this study is to reevaluate contemporary theories of urban
governance in light of contemporary contexts of urban governance, utilizing the perspectives
of both decision-makers themselves and persons knowledgeable about the urban decisionmaking process. In the sections that follow, this chapter will first summarize briefly those
chapters that precede it. Then, it will summarize a number of particularly interesting
findings, before engaging in a discussion about the future of urban governance in the Dallas
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case, considering that this case may contain lessons for other large, economically-vibrant
cities in the United States. Following this, it will engage in a brief expansion of limitations
first introduced in Chapter 3. Finally, it will suggest new directions for future scholarship,
based on this work.
The Present Study in Review
Chapter 1 argued that, in the decades since scholars first examined United States
cities using the urban political economy perspective, those cities have undergone both racialand economic transitions. To the former, while white flight allowed (some) residents to
abandon central cities, a smaller, counter-migration of wealthier, highly educated whites
moved back into gentrifying urban neighborhoods, at the cost of displacing people of color
and people with lower incomes. To the latter, corporate disinvestment over that same period
left many central cities all-but abandoned, and a subset of these central urban cores are
transitioning into mixed-use hubs of capital accumulation, culture, and entertainment.
Alongside these two transitions, CDCs and anchor institutions expanded into urban
economic development projects and urban policymaking – roles previously assumed by
actors in governing coalitions. From these, Chapter 1 suggested that it is possible that the
entrepreneurial governing coalition archetype, characterized primarily by informal cooperation
and resource-sharing among public- and private-sector actors is no longer an accurate
representation of contemporary urban decision-making structures.
Anchoring Dallas’s story in the greater context of United States cities following
World War II, Chapter 2 explored the co-evolving histories of theories of urban governance;
postwar socioeconomic paradigm shifts in the United States; and the growth, decline, and
resurgence of Dallas through the intersecting lenses of urban governance and
socioeconomics framed well by two previous qualitative studies of the city’s governance
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structure. This chapter drew out summaries of contemporary urban theory, as well as a
subset of particularly salient critiques, in order to more deeply establish the depth and
breadth of the gap in extant literature that this study intended to fill, and introduced a new
angle in the study of urban decision-making structures: the study of neighborhood-level
decision-making structures, and an analysis of whether (or to what extent) actors,
organizations, and institutions involved at one level interact with those at other levels, and
the effects of that interaction. Owing to limited resources, Chapter 2 also established a focus
on two neighborhoods: Downtown Dallas, which is composed of the as the city’s rapidlyrevitalizing CBD and its immediate surroundings, and North Oak Cliff, a traditionally
majority-minority, economically-marginalized neighborhood also undergoing revitalization,
but that is experiencing internal turmoil regarding the displacement of long-time
commercial- and residential occupants, and concerns over the potential loss of identity that
may coincide with the influx of urban pioneers. Thus, Chapter 2 suggested that the structure
of the story of Dallas is structurally similar to the story of the study of urban governance –
well-researched in the past, but lacking in contemporary follow-up, and that as a result, it
would be valuable to revisit the city as the setting for a new study of who governs.
Chapter 3 outlined the setting of this study’s data collection, and the methods used
those data, arguing for the continued use of reputational crucial case analysis based on the
resources available to the researcher, the benefits proffered by this method broadly, and the
ability to compare the results of the present study to prior research. For its part, Chapter 4
described this study’s quantitative data regarding select socioeconomic changes from 1980 to
2010, first for Dallas citywide, and then for the study’s two focus neighborhoods. Then,
Chapter 5 synthesized the aforementioned quantitative data, before evaluating them with
respect to urban literature regarding expected demographic- and economic transitions found
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in post-Fordist cities, as well as with respect to the effects of these transitions on Dallas’
political landscape. Finally, Chapter 6 synthesized this study’s qualitative findings in order to
render an image of contemporary urban governance in Dallas, the relationship between the
city’s decision-making structures and entities involved in equitable economic development
projects, and how these projects compare to those in a subset of other cities.
Summary of Findings
The Dallas case allows for a number of findings into the nature of contemporary
urban governance as it actually exists, which appears to deviate from the predictions of aging
theories of urban governance. To begin, the Dallas case shines a light on the interconnected
nature of contemporary decision-making the historical context of the city itself. Additionally,
this case study reaffirms the importance of structures in decision-making, as well as the
effect of those structures on the outcomes of the decision-making process. Third, this study
suggests that CDCs and anchor institutions have a long way left to go, if they desire to
become primary, rather than ancillary members of governing coalitions. Finally, this study
suggests that under the right pressures, even the dominant decision-making archetype – the
entrepreneurial governing coalition – can become something else, even if that transition is
somewhat haphazard. In the sections that follow, each of these findings will be discussed inturn.
Finding 1: the interconnected nature of real-world urban decision-making.
This study argues that contemporary decision-making in Dallas is bound to the city’s racial
history. At the citywide level, first consider the landmark federal order for the city’s election
system to be reconstructed around racially-balanced districts, resulting from a federal lawsuit
filed using the Voting Rights Act wherein plaintiffs successfully arguing that the whitedominated northern neighborhoods were effectively silencing those political voices
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belonging to people of color. Additionally, as wealthy whites fled the city during the mid-late
20th century, there was a similar exodus of corporate capital, with firms whose leaders often
found themselves elected to high political office relocating to those suburbs. Thus, Dallas
was left with fewer (and increasingly disinterested) leaders to act as successors. From these
critical wounds, the city’s traditional entrepreneurial governing coalition has all-but vanished.
Certainly, signs of this collapse were visible during the Elkin study, when the damage was
limited to the business side of the political-business alliance, but this study finds that by
2015, people with knowledge of the city’s decision-makers openly considered that an
alternative, more progressive coalition was poised to seize control – an arguably unthinkable
proposition when the city’s “old guard” was at the height of its power.
At the neighborhood level, the city’s inability (or unwillingness) to equitably address
the inequity in urban development is evident in the continued dearth of commercial- and
political capital in the city’s majority-minority southern neighborhoods, and can still be seen
in the antiregime tendencies of the community organizations and neighborhood leaders within
North Oak Cliff. The same legacy of northern-sector bias in development that stripped
southern-sector neighborhoods of their economic vitality and political connectedness
remains visible today, though the support among northern-sector councilmembers for
development projects in Downtown Dallas over the objections of actors like
Councilmember Kingston, even though otherwise, these leaders tend to defer to the wishes
of individual councilmembers with respect to projects within their districts. As a result, the
city’s private-sector elites continue to enjoy significant (but waning) informal influence, even
though this influence is largely limited to Downtown Dallas.
Finding 2: Structure still matters in urban decision-making. In his analysis of
Broward County, Florida, Ronald Vogel noted that “communities that are decentralized in
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their decision-making structures face difficulties in pursuing policies designed to attract
capital investment to the community” 604. In Dallas, these difficulties are baked directly into
its system of district-based political leadership. Recall that the “go along to get along”
practices of councilmembers effectively splits the city into 14 mini-cities, each headed by a
mini-mayor, or perhaps more cynically, 14 loosely-united fiefdoms headed by would-be
feudal lords. This structure is self-reinforcing, because councilmembers are elected only by
voters living within their districts, and as such, seek primarily seek benefits and resources for
their own constituents, even at the cost of a more equitable distribution of resources,
especially in districts or communities that have declined under decades of disinvestment.
Thus, while individual council districts may gain short-term advantages or increases in
prosperity, the city as a whole suffers (à la the “tragedy of the commons”).
As a result, this study finds it highly unlikely that Dallas will ever see a
comprehensive development strategy, because such a strategy necessarily benefits some areas
at the cost of others. Further, each councilmember is able to pursue a unique set of
priorities, which challenges private- and third-sector actors to adapt their plans to suit each
councilmember in whose district they seek to develop. In North Oak Cliff, for example,
developers seeking the approval of Councilmember Griggs or his appointees often must
hold neighborhood meetings, to ensure that the community is aware of (and broadly
supports) new development projects, although there are some exceptions to this, based on
zoning changes that were enacted prior to Griggs’ involvement in city politics. By
comparison, in Downtown Dallas, it is only necessary for a developer to gain the support of
the first- and second tier influentials who are regularly willing to use their deep connections to
the city’s eight pro-development councilmembers (including the mayor) and to high-level city
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officials, in order to circumvent the disapproval of Councilmember Kingston.
Finding 3: CDCs and anchor institutions have a long way left to go. A critical
finding in this study is that neither CDCs nor anchor institutions are particularly involved in
the politics of decision-making in Dallas, and when they are involved, they tend to favor prodevelopment agenda items and self-serving policies. This is unfortunate, given that these
organizations could be transformative in economically-marginalized communities, but also
unsurprising, given that Dallas’ public- and private-sector leaders are still able to combine
political and economic capital in service of individual development projects, even when these
projects fail to develop into enduring partnerships. Dallas is not unique in the noninvolvement of CDCs and anchor institutions in the decision-making process; certainly,
while inclusive, community-based, cross-sectoral governing coalitions have been speculated
about in the past605, like most progressive governing coalition typologies, they have only seen
limited, short-lived instances in the real world (e.g. Chicago under Harold Washington,
Philadelphia at the beginning of the 21st century, San Francisco at the end of the 20th
century)606.
The Philadelphia case noted above is highly relevant to Dallas, because it features
neighborhood-level mobilization combining the resources of anchor institutions with the
involvement of hundreds of citizens and over a dozen community groups, which helped
pave the way for the 2007 election of a progressive-minded mayor, causing speculation that
the city’s governing coalition could transition away from its elite-dominated, entrepreneurial
governing coalition past607. Dallas, at a similar crossroads of its neoliberal past and an
uncertain future, could benefit from the lessons found in Philadelphia – chiefly, that issue-
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based alliances can lead to enduring coalitions, and can change how a city is governed. In
this chapter’s final substantive section, this study will revisit the Philadelphia case as a basis
for discussing how Dallas’ decision-making structure could become more progressive, even
if the unstable nonregime persists.
Finding 4: Under the right pressures, governing coalitions can transition.
Following the dissolution of its business community, and a forced-restructure of its political
leadership, Dallas’ entrepreneurial governing coalition has been replaced by competing agendas
and discord, found both among political leaders primarily interested in their own districts
(over the city as a whole), and among private-sector leaders who are cautious about
becoming too political, lest they be on the “wrong side” when the battle over Dallas’ future
as either a pro-development or a progressive development city is finally resolved. This study finds
that, much like the San Francisco of the late 1980s, Dallas’ has (at least, in substantive part)
cast off its entrepreneurial governing coalition past, but has failed to supplant it with a unified
alternative, resulting instead in the present unstable nonregime that is unable to pursue longterm development strategies, and is instead limited to reactionary policies and one-off, shortterm development plans.
Key to the return of a unified agenda is a necessary divorce of public-sector leaders
from private-sector interests. While this has occurred in part, this study finds a continued
series of deep connections between a subset formal authorities and various highly influential
actors from the private- and third sectors. This in mind, encouraging news for progressive
development advocates came in May 2016, when pro-development city manager A.C. Gonzalez
announced his resignation, which became effective in early 2017 after only three years on the
job, and amid suggestions of weakening support from city councilmembers608. Among the
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five candidates under consideration to replace Gonzalez were four from other cities as well
as one internal candidate, widely assumed to be the “favorite” for the position, especially
among pro-development advocates609, yet after a closed session in early December 2016, only
one finalist was announced for a final city council vote. After three decades of city managers
who made their careers within Dallas’ city hall610, the city’s incoming top bureaucrat – T.C.
Broadnax – is a true “outsider,” currently unaffiliated with the first tier and second tier
influentials who, for so much of Dallas’ history, have enjoyed preferred access to the levers
of decision-making. This decision, confirmed by a majority council vote in mid-December,
was lauded by progressive development councilmembers Kingston and Griggs611. With another
key formal authority unencumbered by informal commitments to highly influential private
actors, a progressive-minded future for economic development in Dallas becomes more
plausible.
While this news is encouraging for advocates of a new, more progressive Dallas, it
remains true that city-level decisions are still made by the “eight vote majority,” which is
currently tilted in favor of the pro-development agenda. While all councilmembers (excepting
the mayor) will come up for re-election in May of 2017, for the first time in Dallas’ history,
no district-based councilmember is currently term-limited, so all 14 will benefit from
incumbency. Because of the tremendous advantages this confers, this study finds it unlikely
that a councilmember running for reelection would lose; however, as the recent presidential
elections have reminded scholars and talking heads alike, there may not be such a thing as a
“sure bet” in politics. Notably, and for the first time in recent memory, a sitting
councilmember is actively campaigning against one of his colleagues; in early December
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2016, Councilmember Kingston endorsed a progressive development challenger running for the
seat of incumbent (and increasingly unpopular), pro-development councilmember (and Mayor
Pro Tempore) Monica Alonzo612. Additionally, in northern Dallas, long-time realtor, real
estate journalist, and “Dallas Way” critic Candy Evans is challenging pro-development advocate
Lee Kleinman for his council seat, and she appears to have the support of several area real
estate bodies613. As the election draws closer, it is likely that additional challengers will
emerge across the city, with some being supported by pro-development organizations and
influential actors, and others being supported by progressive development advocates; thus, while it
is possible that in this election, the “Dallas Way” may become functionally irrelevant, it is
too early to tell whether this is likely to occur. Even with such unprecedented potential for
upsets, however, this study argues that relying on upset votes in some districts, while hoping
for progressive incumbents to retain their seats in others is, at best, a tenuous proposition
for progressive development advocates.
A Vision of Future Governance in the Commercial Republic
With the aforementioned Philadelphia case in mind, this study argues that when
community members (e.g. residents, business owners, leaders of community organizations
and anchor institutions) are willing to assume key roles in designing their neighborhoods’
revitalization, they gain the opportunity reclaim power that has historically been denied, and
thus, develop a sense of ownership over their communities. From this, it follows that
community-based governance can extend beyond simply involving community members in
formal decision-making, and can also guide efforts to build the kinds of community capacity
needed to address (a subset of) problems without the direct involvement of formal authorities.
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To be successful in Dallas, community-based governance requires councilmembers to be
willing to share decision-making with community stakeholders, but at the same time, it is
incumbent upon those stakeholders to find common ground, and to demonstrate a
willingness and ability to make decisions together, cultivate leadership from within the
communities themselves, and share knowledge and resources across sectoral boundaries, in
spite of the presence of real (or perceived) slights614. Once organized behind a common,
enduring agenda, this study suggests that community members will be able to demand a
greater role in the formal decision-making process, either from incumbent political
leadership, or by supporting challengers who are more open to shared governance. In the
process of preparing community members to successfully assert roles in organized districtlevel decision-making, this study considers the roles of actors like David Spence (for
business organization) and Jason Roberts (for community engagement).
In first speculating about Spence’s role in the development of district-level,
community-based governing coalitions, recall that – beyond repurposing and renovating
existing structures, Spence’s firm also works with local entrepreneurs to fill these buildings
with locally-owned businesses, which are then interconnected with other firms in Spenceleased properties. Beyond the economic benefits that a network of interdependent, importsubstituting local firms provides for a community, Spence’s network also allows business
owners within a relatively compact commercial corridor to communicate with one another,
share ideas, and potentially identify common concerns and develop a common agenda.
Although Spence himself operates primarily in North Oak Cliff, this study argues that the
model is both sustainable and transferable to other parts of the city, particularly in southernsector districts where Dallas’ multinational real estate development firms have shown little
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interest in investing. As tools for building a more inclusive decision-making structure, such
networks could be mobilized in support of city councilmembers who value the protection
and growth of locally-owned firms, and the kinds of development projects that allow more
local businesses to form. In a progressive future for Dallas, these networks would aggregate
their resources – both financial and social – to support progressive candidates and civic
projects, and by connecting them financially, it becomes more reasonable for these actors to
connect in support of political leaders as well.
While private-sector resources can help fund a candidate’s campaign, as well as
various projects throughout their term in office, councilmembers are (at least, ostensibly)
responsible to the voters in their districts. This study argues that organized, engaged
constituents are better able to hold a councilmember accountable than the disorganized
collection of needs and demands found in, for example, North Oak Cliff. Thus, Dallas’
progressive future relies on disparate interest groups coming together around a common
vision for their development, which is where Jason Roberts enter the equation. Recall that
Roberts’ organization produces temporary urban revitalization projects in areas of deep
disinvestment, engaging community members (e.g. residents, local business owners, and local
community organizations) throughout the design- and implementation processes. Through
this prolonged engagement, Roberts provides communities with best practices, training in
community organization, and (non-financial) resources615. If these leaders and organizations
can successfully work together after individual projects are completed, and are willing to
move beyond past disagreements, then this study posits that they are likely to be wellpositioned to take ownership over neighborhood issues, and will have many of the necessary
resources to be attractive partners for political leaders who are actively involved in the
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problem-solving process. In addition, this study argues that these coalitions will be better
able to elucidate a cohesive set of demands for political leaders, as well as proposed solutions
and resources that can be devoted toward these, all while representing significant numbers of
voters who can alternatively reward or punish councilmembers during elections. In a
progressive future Dallas, these neighborhood coalitions, working in concert with coalitions
of locally-owned businesses, form the alternative support structures that councilmembers
will need in order to fully divorce themselves from corporatist interests.
Although a Dallas run by progressive-minded political leaders who themselves are
supported by (and accountable to) a series of district-level, community-based governing
coalitions is an intriguing thought exercise, that it has not yet come to fruition is suggestive
of the real-world challenges that this model faces – primarily, a lack of resources needed to
scale up the initiatives of actors like Spence and Roberts. To begin, it is important to note
that David Spence is not the primary (or arguably, even a significant) driver of the economic
revitalization of North Oak Cliff, and even without his firm, North Oak Cliff would likely
continue to be a focus for development. Spence’s success is, to some extent, catalyzed by the
unique confluence of factors that is bringing new life to North Oak Cliff (e.g. proximity to
Downtown Dallas, TIF support, infrastructure investment), as well as the presence of larger,
successful development projects. For his part, Roberts also shares a similar problem –
insufficient resources to increase scale. Because his organization relies on external funding
and contracts with various cities to “reimagine” derelict spaces, Roberts is unable to focus
on enduring projects, or on any single community. Thus, while his organization has found
limited success in Dallas, as well as in other cities, it remains unclear whether small successes
will translate into a larger movement.
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Without sufficient capacity to grow their existing projects, it seems unlikely that
change-agents in southern Dallas will be able to convert these into a foundation for a more
progressive future citywide. In other cities (e.g. Cleveland, Detroit, Philadelphia), funding for
change-making initiatives came (at least, in part) from anchor institutions, but in Dallas,
many of these institutions are often funded and lead by first tier and second tier influentials
whose pro-development agenda built Dallas into the city it is today, and who would stand to
benefit from continued pro-development policies. It stands to reason that, if these organizations
had the desire (or ability) to involve themselves in programs like those being implemented by
Spence and Roberts, they would have done so already.
Much like Dallas’ new city manager, whose “outsider” status leaves him largely free
of the tethers to Dallas’ most highly-influential actors, there is one new anchor institution
that has established itself in southern Dallas, and is also largely free of these tethers. As such,
it is possible that this new institution – the first (and presently, only) public university within
Dallas’ city limits – can become the supporting organization that actors like Spence and
Roberts need in order to “scale up” their efforts. The University of North Texas at Dallas, a
“daughter” campus of the University of North Texas (located to the far northwest of
Dallas), has taken up residence on over 250 acres of undeveloped land in the southern part
of the city, and is rapidly expanding. While it remains small, this institution is already
leveraging public- and private-sector support to improve its surrounding communities, both
through capacity-building initiatives within disenfranchised neighborhoods and through
involvement in economic development projects in derelict commercial centers616. Although
these efforts are still relatively new, they could portend greater support for a more
progressive Dallas in the future, regardless of the results of the next citywide election.
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Limitations, Re-Revisited and Expanded
As Chapter 3 notes, every study, no matter how well constructed, has limitations that
shape the conclusions that can be drawn617. Understanding these limitations is critical for
these findings to be properly evaluated, so in the paragraphs that follow, this study will
revisit- and expand upon limitations first introduced in Chapter 3.
Looking first at this study’s use of secondary-source data, any problems in the source
data are inherited by this study, and this study is forced to rely on definitions and
conceptualizations present in the source material. For example, participation rates for people
identifying as Hispanic or Latino are questionable, presumably because people worry that
census records will be used to identify them as undocumented immigrants, and they fear
deportation618. As a result, recall that this study examined changes in poverty rates and
median household income (MHI), as well as changes in demographics with respect to race
and Hispanic or Latino status, which was complicated because MHI is available by race and
Hispanic or Latino status at the tract level, but poverty rates by race and Hispanic or Latino
status are not, therefore this study could only make broad inferences about the face of
poverty in these two neighborhoods.
Additionally, in at least one case, data are unavailable because definitions used by the
census bureau changed. One key example of this is that census definitions regarding
employment industries changed dramatically between 1990 and 2000, so data comparing blue
collar and creative class employment from 1980 and 1990 could not be reconciled with data
from 2000 and 2010. Finally, recall that economic data span the decades from 1980 to 2010,
inclusively, but during that time, Dallas experienced two large economic slowdowns – the
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Savings & Loan Crisis, and the Great Recession – both of which likely affected the
economic data, further weakening this study’s quantitative findings. This particular limitation
is not unique to this study; indeed, any case study would have similar complications.
In considering the collection of survey and interview data, additional limitations
emerge. First, because surveys and interviews were collected in a natural (rather than
laboratory) setting, it is extremely difficult for future scholars to replicate the study in other
settings; moreover, the settings themselves may also have impacted the kinds of responses
that participants were comfortable with giving. However, this may also be a benefit, as
participants were allowed to select their interview and survey settings, and may have
strategically selected locations where they could speak more freely. Even in these participantselected interview settings, however, there were occasions wherein participants were not
comfortable addressing all aspects of each interview question.
In any case, responses were limited by the time constraint on the meetings;
participants may have truncated responses in order to fit within the time allotted, reducing
their overall quality. Related to this, because a number of survey items restricted the range of
possible responses, the results are narrower than they may have been, were the questions
written to be open-ended. A further limitation is that the nonrandom nature of snowball
sampling introduces the possibility that the study sample is not actually representative of the
(arguably unknowable) population; at best, it merely approximates the breadth of leaders
involved in decision-making. This sampling was further limited because the researcher lacked
the time or funds to interview every possible individual with knowledge of various decisionmaking structure, which denies this study the perspectives of un-interviewed individuals.
Related to the topic of participant perspectives, survey and interview results were
based on participants’ subjective opinions and knowledge, and as a result, contain an
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unknowable amount of error – participants could, for example, be misleading with their
answers (intentionally or otherwise), be simply uninformed, may be biased in their responses
and perceptions, or may be attempting to give the answers that they perceived to be
desirable. This study’s findings, then, may be skewed by the presence of actors whose
positions in the leadership structure are artificially higher than they would normally be (a
“man of the hour” effect), or artificially lower as a result of, for example, a local scandal.
Some participants seemed, as a rule, to be reluctant to give low scores, but broadly speaking,
this was not an issue in the vast majority of cases.
In addition, it must be noted that all data regarding the decision-makers described in
Chapter 4, as well as the resulting analyses in this chapter, are temporally-locked in the
summer and early fall of 2015, and may be less accurate as time passes, and circumstances
change (e.g. death or retirement of a highly-nominated actor). The information gained from
this study is, by its very nature, not as reliable as direct observation of the decision-making
process, taken over several years, but such a study would be infeasible, given the lack of time
or resources to perform it.
A final set of limitations come from the nature of this study’s use of Dallas as a
single-shot crucial case, rather than as part of a comparative study. To begin, Dallas was
assumed to be an extreme outlier, with respect to the presence of anchor institutions and
CDCs in governing coalitions; that no particular evidence was found to support their
involvement is unsurprising, and while (as noted in Chapter 3) it does not preclude the
possibility of anchor institutions and CDCs being deeply involved in the governing
coalitions of other cities, it does limit the contributions that this study can make to the
greater field. In addition, because of the lack of cross-case, comparative data, this study is
unable to eliminate alternative explanations for its findings. Dallas may simply be too
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extreme an outlier, when compared to other cities. It should also be noted that both of this
study’s focus neighborhoods – North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas – represent areas
undergoing various levels of gentrification. Dallas has as many as 355 neighborhoods619,
spread over an area (approximately) eight times the size of San Francisco620, and it is
unrealistic to assume that the results taken from these two are representative of those for
other neighborhoods within Dallas.
Recommendations for Future Research
Because this study was conducted with a limited pool of resources, over an equallylimited amount of time, a number of concerns could not be addressed, and a number of new
questions arose - questions that simply could not be answered in the interest of completing
the work. Additionally, some of this study’s limitations, especially those that resulted from a
reliance on secondary-source data, are infeasible to eliminate without unrealistic budgets, but
other limitations, such as those related to case studies more broadly, can be addressed by
future scholars, especially those working in teams. With this study’s unanswered questions
and “addressable” limitations in mind, this section now offers avenues for future research.
To begin, recall this study was a single-shot case analysis, and as such, lacks a strong
comparative element, both among Dallas’ neighborhoods, and among Dallas and other,
similar cities. Within the Dallas case, future scholarship should include additional
neighborhoods from across the city’s 14 districts, to determine whether Downtown Dallas
and North Oak Cliff happen to be outliers, or whether, for example there are regional effects
on leadership inside the city. Expanding to Dallas as one city among many, consider that it is
yet-unknown whether (or to what extent) the city’s contemporary decision-making structure

619
620

Wilonsky, 2012
United States Census Bureau, 2016a; 2016b

324

(i.e. the unstable nonregime) is unique to Dallas. If several cities can be found to have a nonregime
structure, even if this number is far-from a majority, then it may be time for scholarship to
reconsider what the de facto urban governance model should be, even if the analysis of
governing coalitions (or urban regimes) remains the preferred method for conceptualizing
these structures. Additionally, by understanding the connections (to the extent that they
exist) between neighborhood-level civic leadership and civic leadership citywide, new
avenues may open for would-be progressive leaders to either forge new paths to equitable
urban governance, or gain new insight into why efforts to-date have seen only limited
success.
Returning to Dallas specifically, recall that this study’s data collection and analysis
concludes as Dallas enters a critical and highly uncertain election season. Whether or not the
city’s progressive development agenda manages to carry the day, a follow-up study in the weeks
and months that follow could chronicle the transition of Dallas’ decision-making structure as
it marches toward one of three possibilities: first, a progressive-minded nonregime (unstable or
otherwise), second, as a reformulated entrepreneurial governing coalition that must nonetheless
reconcile its agenda with the visible success of progressive development initiatives, or as a
continuation of the existing unstable nonregime. In each of these cases, the lessons learned are
of immediate consequence to other cities facing what amount to “identity crises” with
respect to how they will be run. Remember that a significant critique of contemporary urban
theory is that it fails to identify the precursors of governing coalition transformation; in the
Dallas case, this study argues that the restructuring of its city council and rise of progressive
leaders from district-based elections, and the decline of its long-standing civic leaders with
no apparent successors are two likely precursors of governing coalition shift, but the extent
to which this is true will only be known once such a transition takes place, if it does at all.
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Further, in considering the New Orleans case, some results may take years to materialize.
Regardless of the outcome of this critical period, this study argues the lessons learned from a
follow-up study of Dallas will be helpful for would-be progressive leaders in other cities, as
well as for comparing the decision-making structures of “pre-crisis” and “post-crisis” Dallas.
Finally, in considering why Dallas’ decision-making structure lacked the hypothesized
involvement of CDCs and anchor institutions, this study considered that the city’s relatively
strong economy allowed decision-makers to pursue capital without the constraints of
mission requirements (or put another way, capital without the constraints of conscience).
This study now considers whether the willingness of governing coalitions to entertain
alternative sources of capital for development projects exists on a spectrum, with
“development-hungry” cities (e.g. Detroit, Cleveland) at one end, and “development-full”
cities like Dallas on another. As an alternative to seeking out cities similar to the Dallas case,
this path of future scholarship focuses on the relationship between the presence and
outcomes of third-sector involvement in governing coalitions and the amount of urban
development being undertaken through more traditional methods (inter alia public-private
partnerships). Such a line of research could discover, for example, whether there is some
kind of a “tipping point” or indicator that signals when (or whether) alternative development
projects become acceptable within the traditional division of labor, and whether these
projects indicate that third sector institutions have become equal (or at least “more equal”)
to public- and private sector institutions in governing coalitions.
Chapter Summary
As cities redefine themselves after decades of commercial abandonment, “urban
renaissance” movements, white flight, and the gentrification of central urban neighborhoods,
this study sought to determine whether cities still governed by the political-business
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coalitions conceptualized by urban regime theorists, or whether (or to what extent) new
players had emerged. It suggested that, in the forty years since the dawn of the political
economy paradigm, many cities looked nothing like they did when growth machine theory
and urban regime analysis were first conceptualized, and that contemporary observations of
central cities may, once again, yield new insight into their decision-making structures.
This study found that, at least in the Dallas case, the hypothesized “new players,”
that is, CDCs and anchor institutions, have failed to claim meaningful roles in the decisionmaking process, either at the citywide level, or within particular communities. However, and
of (arguably) greater note, this study found that a city whose decision-making structure once
epitomized the entrepreneurial governing coalition was now void of the unified agenda and
resource-sharing that defines governing coalitions, and further, that the wounds were selfinflicted. As Dallas inches closer to deciding whether it will double-down on the prodevelopment agenda of its past, or whether a more progressive future is in order, individual
progressive actors have found ways to operate successfully at the neighborhood level by
working (for the most part) independently of Dallas’ dysfunctional decision-makers, and as
new institutions develop significant resource pools, the connections made between missiondriven capital and mission-driven actors may prove to be the final nail in the coffin for the
“Dallas Way.” In many ways, Dallas represents what many cities, especially those in the Rust
Belt, might aspire to become; therefore, as the city’s decision-making structure grapples with
which future it wants to bring about, it remains poised to become either a shining example
or a cautionary tale.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1
Quantitative Data Source Tables, 1980
Source Table
(City of Dallas)

Variable Description

Source Table
(CBD & Oak Cliff Tracts)

Population (all)

Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons

Population (white)

Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons

Population (other / mixed)

Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons

Population (nonwhite)

Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons

Population (Hispanic)

Table P7: Race & Spanish Origin

Table P7: Race & Spanish Origin

Median Household Income

Table 3: Summary of Occupation, Income,
and Poverty Characteristics

Table P10: Labor Force and Disability
Characteristics of Persons

Poverty Rate

Table P11: Income & Poverty Status in 1979

Table P11: Income & Poverty Status in 1979

Unemployment Rate

Table P10: Labor Force and Disability
Characteristics of Persons

Table P10: Labor Force and Disability
Characteristics of Persons

Employment: Agriculture, forestry,
fishing and hunting, and mining

N.D.

N.D.

Employment: Construction

N.D.

N.D.

Employment: Manufacturing

Table 2: Summary of Labor Force and
Commuting Characteristics

Table 2: Summary of Labor Force and
Commuting Characteristics

Employment: Wholesale trade

N.D.

N.D.

Employment: Retail trade

N.D.

N.D.

Employment: Transportation and
warehousing, and utilities

N.D.

N.D.

Employment: Information

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

Population (black or African
American)
Population (American Indian or
Alaskan native)
Population (Asian American,
Pacific Islander, or native
Hawaiian)

Employment: Finance and
insurance, and real estate and
rental and leasing
Employment: Professional,
scientific, and management, and
administrative and waste
management services
Employment: Educational
services, and health care and social
assistance
Employment: Arts, entertainment,
and recreation, and
accommodation and food services
Employment: Other services,
except public administration
Employment: Public
administration
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Appendix 2
Quantitative Data Source Tables, 1990
Source Table
(City of Dallas)

Variable Description

Source Table
(CBD & Oak Cliff Tracts)

Population (all)

Table 1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table 8: Race & Hispanic Origin

Population (white)

Table 1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table 8: Race & Hispanic Origin

Table 1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table 8: Race & Hispanic Origin

Table 1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table 8: Race & Hispanic Origin

Table 1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table 8: Race & Hispanic Origin

Population (other / mixed)

Table 1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table 8: Race & Hispanic Origin

Population (nonwhite)

Table 1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table 8: Race & Hispanic Origin

Population (Hispanic)

Table 1: General Characteristics of Persons

Table 8: Race & Hispanic Origin

Median Household Income

Table 19: Income and Poverty Status in 1989

Table 19: Income and Poverty Status in 1989

Poverty Rate

Table 19: Income and Poverty Status in 1989

Table 19: Income and Poverty Status in 1989

Unemployment Rate

Table 18: Labor Force and Disability
Characteristics of Persons

Table 18: Labor Force and Disability
Characteristics of Persons

Employment: Agriculture, forestry,
fishing and hunting, and mining

N.D.

N.D.

Employment: Construction

N.D.

N.D.

Employment: Manufacturing

Table 18: Labor Force and Disability
Characteristics of Persons

Table 18: Labor Force and Disability
Characteristics of Persons

Employment: Wholesale trade

N.D.

N.D.

Employment: Retail trade

N.D.

N.D.

Employment: Transportation and
warehousing, and utilities

N.D.

N.D.

Employment: Information

N.D.

N.D.

Table 18: Labor Force and Disability
Characteristics of Persons

Table 18: Labor Force and Disability
Characteristics of Persons

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

Population (black or African
American)
Population (American Indian or
Alaskan native)
Population (Asian American,
Pacific Islander, or native
Hawaiian)

Employment: Finance and
insurance, and real estate and
rental and leasing
Employment: Professional,
scientific, and management, and
administrative and waste
management services
Employment: Educational
services, and health care and social
assistance
Employment: Arts, entertainment,
and recreation, and
accommodation and food services
Employment: Other services,
except public administration
Employment: Public
administration
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Appendix 3
Variable Description
Population (all)
Population (white)
Population (black or African
American)
Population (American Indian or
Alaskan native)
Population (Asian American,
Pacific Islander, or native
Hawaiian)
Population (other / mixed)
Population (nonwhite)
Population (Hispanic)
Median Household Income
Poverty Rate
Unemployment Rate
Employment: Agriculture, forestry,
fishing and hunting, and mining
Employment: Construction
Employment: Manufacturing
Employment: Wholesale trade
Employment: Retail trade
Employment: Transportation and
warehousing, and utilities
Employment: Information
Employment: Finance and
insurance, and real estate and
rental and leasing
Employment: Professional,
scientific, and management, and
administrative and waste
management services
Employment: Educational
services, and health care and social
assistance
Employment: Arts, entertainment,
and recreation, and
accommodation and food services
Employment: Other services,
except public administration
Employment: Public
administration

Quantitative Data Source Tables, 2000
Source Table
Source Table
(City of Dallas)
(CBD & Oak Cliff Tracts)
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics
Characteristics
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics
Characteristics
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics
Characteristics
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics
Characteristics
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics

Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics

Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics

Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics

Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics

Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics

Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics

Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics

Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics

Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics

Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics

Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics

Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics

Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics
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Appendix 4
Quantitative Data Source Tables, 2010
Variable Description
Population (all)
Population (white)
Population (black or African
American)
Population (American Indian or
Alaskan native)
Population (Asian American,
Pacific Islander, or native
Hawaiian)
Population (other / mixed)
Population (nonwhite)
Population (Hispanic)
Median Household Income
Poverty Rate
Unemployment Rate
Employment: Agriculture, forestry,
fishing and hunting, and mining
Employment: Construction
Employment: Manufacturing
Employment: Wholesale trade
Employment: Retail trade
Employment: Transportation and
warehousing, and utilities
Employment: Information
Employment: Finance and
insurance, and real estate and
rental and leasing
Employment: Professional,
scientific, and management, and
administrative and waste
management services
Employment: Educational
services, and health care and social
assistance
Employment: Arts, entertainment,
and recreation, and
accommodation and food services
Employment: Other services,
except public administration
Employment: Public
administration

Source Table
(City of Dallas)
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino
Origin: 2010
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino
Origin: 2010
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino
Origin: 2010
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino
Origin: 2010

Source Table
(CBD & Oak Cliff Tracts)
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino
Origin: 2010
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino
Origin: 2010
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino
Origin: 2010
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino
Origin: 2010

Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino
Origin: 2010

Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino
Origin: 2010

Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino
Origin: 2010
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino
Origin: 2010
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino
Origin: 2010
ACS Table B19013: Median Household
Income in the Past 12 Months (in 2010
Inflation-Adjusted Dollars)
ACS Table S1701: Poverty Status in the Past
12 Months
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics

Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino
Origin: 2010
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino
Origin: 2010
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino
Origin: 2010
ACS Table B19013: Median Household
Income in the Past 12 Months (in 2010
Inflation-Adjusted Dollars)
ACS Table S1701: Poverty Status in the Past
12 Months
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics

ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics

ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics

ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics

ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics

ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics

ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics

ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics

ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics

ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics

ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic
Characteristics
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Appendix 5
Dear [Participant Name]:
My name is Benjamin Leamon, and I am a doctoral candidate at the University of Louisville.
As part of my dissertation, I am conducting research on the general decision-making process in
Dallas. Because of your involvement in [Name of Organization], I would like to request your
participation in a brief survey and interview to help me better understand how projects that affect
large parts of the city are implemented. Your answers will be completely confidential. In addition,
the results of the survey will be reported in summary format, so your particular responses cannot be
linked back to you.
To participate in the study, please contact me by email at benjamin.leamon@louisville.edu,
or by phone at 502-554-6126.
Thank you for your time and consideration. If you have any questions about the survey,
please feel free to contact me, at the email address or phone number provided above.

Sincerely, Benjamin Leamon
Urban & Public Affairs, The University of Louisville
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Appendix 6
Census Tract Boundary Changes, 1980-2010
Tract ID
(1980)
Census Tract 32.01
Census Tract 42

Tract ID
(1990)
Census Tract 32.01
Census Tract 42

Tract ID
(2000)
Census Tract 32.01
Split into 42.01 & 42.02

Tract ID
(2010)
Merged into 204
Census Tract 204
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Appendix 7
All Census Tracts Used in this Study
Tracts Used to Approximate Downtown Dallas
Census Tract 17.01
Census Tract 21
Tracts Used to Approximate North Oak Cliff
Census Tract 20
Census Tract 44

Census Tract 31.01
Census Tract 32.01

Census Tract 204

Census Tract 42.01

Census Tract 42.02
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Informed Consent Agreement
PLEASE READ THIS DOCUMENT CAREFULLY. YOUR SIGNATURE IS
REQUIRED FOR PARTICPATION. YOU MUST BE AT LEAST 18 YEARS OF AGE
TO GIVE YOUR CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH. IF YOU DESIRE A
COPY OF THIS CONSENT FORM, YOU MAY REQUEST ONE AND WE WILL
PROVIDE IT.
Description of the Study:
This is a one-session study of the nature of Dallas’ decision-making process.
Nature of Participation:
If you consent to participate, you will be asked to participate in one session, during which you will be asked to
complete the attached survey.
Purpose of the Study:
The goal of the survey is to understand how community-wide decisions are made in Dallas, as well as
understanding the relationships among the people who are most active in this process. We are primarily
interested in your personal evaluation of how influential different people are in this city, based on your own
experience.
Possible Risks:
When filling out the survey, you may feel uncomfortable rating the influence of particular individuals. In
addition, you may feel that you do not have enough information to answer each question.
Possible Benefits:
When your participation is complete, you will be given an opportunity to learn about this research.
Confidentiality:
All of your answers will be anonymous, and no identifying markers will be used. In addition, completed surveys
will be stored within a controlled-access office, inside of a locked cabinet only accessible to the researcher. The
results of the survey will only be reported in aggregate, and no direct quotations will be used. Finally, please
remember that no particular person’s responses interest us; we are interested in the general decision-making
process in Dallas.
Opportunities to Question:
Please direct questions about this research to: Benjamin Leamon, at (502) 554-6126, or
benjamin.leamon@louisville.edu.
Statement of Voluntary Participation:
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to participate, there will not be any
negative consequences. In addition, if you decide to participate, you may stop participating at any time, also
with no negative consequences. By signing the supplied form, you are attesting that you understand this
information, and that you freely give your consent to participate in this survey.

Signature of Participant:

Date:

Signature of Person
Obtaining Consent:

Date:
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Survey Introduction
Thank you for participating in this survey of Dallas’ decision-making process. This
survey is part of a research project that will help fulfill the requirements for a doctoral
dissertation at the University of Louisville. The goal of the survey is to understand how
community-wide decisions are made in Dallas, as well as understanding the relationships
among the people who are most active in this process. For each question, please answer based
on your experience and opinions, even if doing so may mean that you cannot answer a
question in its entirety. While a more complete survey will be more helpful for the project than
a less-complete one, all answers and responses will benefit the research, and even a partiallycompleted survey is tremendously appreciated.
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Section 1: City-Wide Leadership
Many people would suggest that there is a group of leaders within the city, whose
members are highly active in making most of the important decisions, especially regarding
public policy or urban development.
On the following pages are a series of lists of influential people in Dallas. For each
person on the list, please complete the table that follows to the best of your knowledge and
ability, using the following information as a guide:
1. Rating of Influence– 1 (low) to 4 (high):
a. In this blank, please indicate how influential this person is with respect to
policy decisions or development in Dallas, ranging from 1 (not very influential)
to 4 (highly influential).
2. Reasoning for Rating:
a. In this blank, please discuss why you gave this person the rating you did. Again,
please be aware that these answers will be kept strictly confidential, and will
not be reproduced in any way.
3. Committee or Project in the Past 5 Years (circle yes or no):
a. In this blank, please indicate (yes/no) whether you have worked on a
committee with this person in the past five years.
4. Relationship (circle one):
a. In this blank, please circle the item which best describes your relationship to
the person
At the bottom of the list are several blank spaces. In those spaces, please list any names you
feel should be on the list, but who are not currently listed.

As a reminder: all of your responses are confidential, and no direct quotations will be
used without your permission
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Name

Rating of
Influence
1 (low) to
4 (high)
1

2

3

4

Reasoning for Rating

Yes
No

Know or

Thomas M.
"Tom" Dunning

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

Christopher J.
Durovich

3

4

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Matthew K.
Rose

3

4

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

John Field
Scovell

3

4

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Know or

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Know or

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Don’t

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Your Relationship to
This Person
Never heard of

Don’t

Elaine Agather

Committee
or Project in
Past 5 Years

relative
Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Know or

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or

Not Sure

relative
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Name

Richard K.
"Rich"
Templeton

Rating of
Influence
1 (low) to
4 (high)
1

2

3

4

Reasoning for Rating

Committee
or Project in
Past 5 Years

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Know or

Kneeland C.
Youngblood

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

Arcilia C.
Acosta

3

4

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Rafael M.
Anchia

3

4

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Barry G.
Andrews

3

4

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Ralph W. Babb
Jr.

3

4

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Know or

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Know or

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Know or

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Don’t

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Your Relationship to
This Person

relative
Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Know or

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or

Not Sure

relative
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Name

Rating of
Influence
1 (low) to
4 (high)
1

2

3

4

Reasoning for Rating

Yes
No

Know or

Barclay E.
Berdan

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

David W.
Biegler

3

4

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

Thomas W.
Codd Jr.

2

3

4

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Know well

relative

Don’t

Kim R. Cocklin

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Know well

relative

Don’t

Gene H. Bishop

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Know or

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Don’t

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Your Relationship to
This Person
Never heard of

Don’t

Brock K. Bailey

Committee
or Project in
Past 5 Years

relative
Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Know or

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or

Not Sure

relative
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Name

Rating of
Influence
1 (low) to
4 (high)
1

2

3

4

Reasoning for Rating

Yes
No

Know or

Joseph M.
DePinto

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

Ruben E.
Esquivel

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Wright L.
Lassiter Jr.

3

4

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Know or

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Know well

relative

Don’t

Kent Eastman

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Know well

relative

Don’t

Sean Donohue

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Don’t

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Your Relationship to
This Person
Never heard of

Don’t

David E. Daniel

Committee
or Project in
Past 5 Years

relative
Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Know or

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or

Not Sure

relative
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Name

Pauline
Medrano

Rating of
Influence
1 (low) to
4 (high)
1

2

3

4

Reasoning for Rating

Committee
or Project in
Past 5 Years

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Know or

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

Anne B.
Motsenbocker

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Daniel K.
Podolsky

3

4

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

Pete Schenkel

2

3

4

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Know well

relative

Don’t

Cindy Schamp

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Know or

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Know or

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Know well

relative

Don’t

David B. Miller

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Your Relationship to
This Person

relative
Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Know or

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or

Not Sure

relative
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Name

Jere W.
Thompson, Jr.

Rating of
Influence
1 (low) to
4 (high)
1

2

3

4

Reasoning for Rating

Committee
or Project in
Past 5 Years

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Know or

Jack C.
Vaughn, Jr.

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

J. Patrick
Faubion

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Robert Stephen
Folsom

3

4

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Henry Gilchrist

3

4

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Know or

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Know or

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Know well

relative

Don’t

John Warner

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Don’t

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Your Relationship to
This Person

relative
Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Know or

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or

Not Sure

relative
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Name

Rating of
Influence
1 (low) to
4 (high)
1

2

3

4

Reasoning for Rating

Yes
No

Know or

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

Thomas O.
"Tom" Hicks

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

Matthew "Matt"
Houston

2

3

4

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Know well

relative

Don’t

David B. Holl

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Know or

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Know well

relative

Don’t

Linda W. Hart

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Know well

relative

Don’t

Howard Hallam

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Your Relationship to
This Person
Never heard of

Don’t

Wanda Granier

Committee
or Project in
Past 5 Years

relative
Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Know or

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or

Not Sure

relative
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Name

James R.
Huffines

Rating of
Influence
1 (low) to
4 (high)
1

2

3

4

Reasoning for Rating

Committee
or Project in
Past 5 Years

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Know or

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

Kay Bailey
Hutchison

2

3

4

Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

3

4

Never heard of
Yes
No

Know or

Eric Johnson

2

3

4

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Know well

relative

Don’t

Lee F. Jackson

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

2

Know well

relative

Know or

1

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Know well

relative

Don’t

Ray L. Hunt

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Know well

relative

Don’t

Hunter L. Hunt

Know slightly

Personal friend or

Not Sure

1

Your Relationship to
This Person

relative
Never heard of
Yes

Don’t

No

Know or

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or

Not Sure

relative
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Name
(Write-In;
Optional)

Rating of
Influence
1 (low) to
4 (high)

Reasoning for Rating

Committee
or Project in
Past 5 Years

Your Relationship to
This Person
Never heard of

1
3

2
4

Yes
No

Don’t
Know or
Not Sure

1
3

2
4

Yes
No

2
4

Yes
No

2
4

Yes
No

2
4

Yes
No

Know well

Know slightly
Know well

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of

2
4

Yes
No

Don’t
Know or
Not Sure

1
3

Know slightly

Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of

Don’t
Know or
Not Sure

1
3

Know well

Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of

Don’t
Know or
Not Sure

1
3

Know slightly

Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of

Don’t
Know or
Not Sure

1
3

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of

Don’t
Know or
Not Sure

1
3

Know slightly

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of

2
4

Yes
No

Don’t
Know or
Not Sure

Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or
relative
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Section 2: City-Wide Project Committee
For this section, which begins on the next page, imagine that you are responsible for
a project that will have an impact felt throughout the city, and that this project will require a
decision made by a group of leaders – leaders whose opinions nearly everyone would accept.
Using the lists from the previous section, as well as your own knowledge of Dallas’ leaders,
which ten leaders would you choose, and why?
As a reminder: all of your responses are confidential, and no direct quotations will be
used without your permission.

Name
(Write-In)

Committee or Project in
Past 5 Years

Reasoning for Adding to Your Team

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Your Relationship to
This Person

No

Never heard of
Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or
relative

No

Never heard of
Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or
relative

No

Never heard of
Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or
relative

No

Never heard of
Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or
relative

Name
(Write-In)

Committee or Project in
Past 5 Years

Reasoning for Adding to Your Team

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

388

Your Relationship to
This Person

No

Never heard of
Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or
relative

No

Never heard of
Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or
relative

No

Never heard of
Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or
relative

No

Never heard of
Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or
relative

No

Never heard of
Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or
relative

No

Never heard of
Know slightly
Know well
Personal friend or
relative

Section 3: Development in Downtown Dallas
In recent years, there has been a tremendous revitalization effort within downtown
Dallas, with construction of new properties, as well as revitalization of existing ones. For this
section, which begins on the next page, imagine that you are responsible for a new project in
downtown Dallas, which (like in the previous section) will require a decision to be made by a
group of leaders, whose opinions nearly everyone would accept. Using the lists from the
previous section, as well as your own knowledge of neighborhood leaders, which ten leaders would you
choose to help with this project, and why?
As a reminder: all of your responses are confidential, and no direct quotations will be
used without your permission.
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Name
(Write-In)

Reasoning for Adding to Your Team

Committee or Project in

Your Relationship to

Past 5 Years

This Person
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
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Name
(Write-In)

Reasoning for Adding to Your Team

Committee or Project in

Your Relationship to

Past 5 Years

This Person

Never heard of
Know slightly
Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
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Section 4: Development in North Oak Cliff
In recent years, there has been significant interest in the redevelopment of North Oak
Cliff, with many organizations and leaders involved in a number of projects throughout the
neighborhood. For this section, which begins on the next page, imagine that you are
responsible for a project in North Oak Cliff. Similar to the previous sections, this project will
require a decision made by a group of leaders – leaders whose opinions nearly everyone would
accept. Using the lists from the first section, as well as your own knowledge of neighborhood leaders,
which ten leaders would you choose, and why?
As a reminder: all of your responses are confidential, and no direct quotations
will be used without your permission.
Name
(Write-In)

Reasoning for Adding to Your Team

Committee or Project in

Your Relationship to

Past 5 Years

This Person
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
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Name
(Write-In)

Reasoning for Adding to Your Team

Committee or Project in

Your Relationship to

Past 5 Years

This Person

Never heard of
Know slightly
Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
Never heard of
Know slightly

Yes

No

Know well
Personal friend or
relative
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Section 5: Free Response on Leadership in Dallas
In this final section, please record any concluding thoughts on the nature of decisionmaking in Dallas, such as your thoughts on how decisions are made, who makes them, or the
types of people who get most heavily involved in Dallas’ decision-making body, either for the
city as a whole, or for projects in particular neighborhoods. Please also list any other names of
people who might be willing to provide additional information that may be helpful for this
study.
As a reminder: all of your responses are confidential, and no direct quotations will be
used without your permission.

____________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
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Appendix 9
1. What can you tell me about projects and development in Dallas; specifically – who
gets involved?
2. Thinking about how development can differ based on the area, how does
development in South Dallas and Oak Cliff – like what’s going on with the Bishop
Arts District and Oak Cliff Gateway - differ from projects in Downtown, like
Downtown Dallas 360?
3. You mentioned that <Organization(s) or Person(s)> was involved in <Development
Plan> – could you tell me more about that?
4. Could you tell me a bit about how you are involved, or where you stand on some of
these developments?
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